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GENERAL HISTORY

FROM 5000 B.C. TO 1900 A.D.

MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
LONDON · BOMBAY · CALCUTTA
MELBOURNE
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
NEW YORK · BOSTON · CHICAGO
ATLANTA · SAN FRANCISCO
THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD.
TORONTO

GENERAL HISTORY

OF

WESTERN NATIONS

FROM 5000 B.C. TO 1900 A.D.

BY

EMIL REICH

DOCTOR JURIS

THOR OF 'GRAECO-ROMAN INSTITUTIONS'; 'ATLAS ANTIQUUS'; 'ATLAS OF ENGLISH HISTORY'; 'SUCCESS AMONG NATIONS'; 'SELECT DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATING MEDIAEVAL AND MODERN HISTORY'; 'IMPERIALISM'; ETC.

I. ANTIQUITY

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VOLUME I.

MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED

ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON

1908

HAZÁMNAK

PREFACE

THE present work is the result of twenty-seven years' study of the literary and monumental sources of history, and of the close observation and analysis, *in loco*, of twenty different types of contemporary civilisation. I attempt to do for the history of the Western nations what Bichat did for Anatomy, Bopp and Pott for Linguistics, or Savigny for Roman Law; I try to write the "General Part" of history. The institutions, events, and important persons in history are innumerable; yet history is not a congeries of countless little facts produced by chance causes. At the basis of all that happened in the history of Western nations there is a series of some twenty to thirty general facts, which singly, and still more by meeting, blending, or antagonising one another, created a multitude of particular facts. The present work treats mainly of these general facts, each of which has conditions, details, and effects of its own. In addition to a statement of these three features of a given general fact, I try to discover the real cause, that is, the human factor, or in other words, the psychological motive under-

lying each of the general facts as its prime cause. Accordingly, my book is not at all a philosophy of history. All historical thinking is teleological; it invariably presupposes, and works with the assumption of a motive, conscious or unconscious, that prompted men to have certain institutions or to do certain deeds. All true philosophical thinking rejects teleological thinking, or relegates it to a tightly circumscribed sphere. The motives of historic phenomena arise from various causes; one of the most important I have termed geo-politics. To discover these true motives of institutions is exceedingly difficult. Firstly, there is practically no "literature" on such things in existence. Thus, while most scholars will admit, that *the* general and important fact of all Grecian history is the πόλις as the only form of State of historically influential Hellenes before the middle of the fourth century B.C., yet no modern historian has ever seriously or *ex professo* tried to discover the true motives, that is, the psychological causes, prompting the Hellenes to adopt this exceptional form of polity. Secondly, the search for such psychological motives is discredited at the hands of the official teachers of history. Although every one of us is aware that his belief in his mother, father, friend, or wife, and most of his business or social relations, is based exclusively on such psychological considerations, yet in historical works it is not considered good form to try to know more than one's sources, which is precious little. In fact, most

writers on, or readers of, history view the institutions of the past in the same way that people view the mechanical institutions of a motor car. As long as they know how to use the machine, and thus how to enjoy a ride through lovely scenery, they do not in the least care to know the physical laws and their applications accounting for or explaining the movements of the motor. This indifference of the historians is not lessened by the current belief amongst most of them, that by mere constant reading of the sources an insight into the true causes of institutions and events is obtained by virtue of sheer habit. However, the disentangling of the true causes is, in the case of each general fact of history, a task of its own, and not a matter of historical *flair* or "historical imagination." It has to be undertaken as a particular problem, and with a staunch heart; for the attempts at arriving at the North Pole do not draw more heavily on a man's energies, patience, and intrepidity, than does the endeavour to lift the magic veil of the true causes in history. The very idea that each general fact in history has its specific cause, applicable in the same manner to no other general fact, will appear either contradictory in terms, or untrue in essence, to many scholars. Yet, nothing can be more evident. That specific cause of each of the general facts accounts for the conditions of time, place, and even persons connected with that general fact. It is quite possible and necessary to account for the date and place and persons of the general

fact in modern history which, after its most remarkable manifestation, is called The French Revolution. It can be shown why it broke out in 1789, and not in 1786; why in France, and not in Germany; and why its French leaders were all provincials, and not Parisians. Without penetrating to the real or psychological specific cause of the French Revolution, the historian remains only a *chauffeur* who knows nothing about his machine. He can indeed drive one through many an interesting country-side, but in case of mishap to a part of his machine he is helpless. The search for these specific psychological causes of the general facts, which constitutes the soul of the present work, clearly distinguishes it from any "Philosophy of History," the authors of which (with the exception of the great Joseph Ferrari) never seriously meant to account for time, place, and personality.

The method of the present work is based on the fact that the chief contents of history are either institutions, events, or persons. For reasons given in the *Introduction*, more especially on pp. 86-90, it is impossible to get at a complete knowledge of either the events or the persons of history. And since these two phenomena of history constitute what is commonly called the "facts," it may be stated that it is precisely of the facts, as far as they relate to events and persons, that we can, as a rule, not obtain an entirely satisfactory information. With regard to institutions, or the static and abiding element in

history, we are in a better situation. They, and they alone, are frequently recurring phenomena. The old question whether history repeats itself may be answered to the effect, that it does so in institutions, but not in events or persons. Accordingly we may, by the direct study of some modern institution, analogous to an institution of the Greeks or Romans, find a means of getting in closer touch with the real psychological essence of a given Greek or Roman institution. That modern institution may be in England, in America, in France, Spain, or Germany. Hence a lengthy sojourn in various modern countries is the indispensable condition for a true study of the past. The untravelled historian is like a chemist who has no laboratory. Travel and sojourn in countries of different types of civilisation can alone give those object-impressions of the forces of history, without which the related "facts" can be neither interpreted nor co-ordinated. From this it follows, that the comparative method, which in the study of Myths, Religions, Customs, Languages, or Laws has proved to be the greatest achievement of the last century, must needs be applied to history too. My book is, in this sense, a study of comparative history. The reader, and more particularly the English reader, will therefore, I trust, pardon a feature of my book which, as I know from experience, is not congenial to Englishmen. In a work on Greek and Roman history, as are these two volumes, the English reader expects to hear of nothing but of things

Greek or Roman. Any mention of institutions or persons French, American, or English seems to be an annoying habit of "not sticking to the point." From what has just been said, and from what is said in the *Introduction*, the reader will perhaps gather the conviction that such formal "sticking to the point" is in reality tantamount to an abandonment of the principal point. Since events or persons, or the dynamical elements of history, can never be understood without a comprehension of the institutions, or the statical elements; and since institutions of the past cannot be really, *i.e.* psychologically, reconstructed except with the aid of the study of analogous institutions of the present; or, in other words, since the present is the key to the past, while the past is the cause of the present; it follows, with irrefutable cogency, that he who in the study of Greek or Roman history persists in "sticking to the point" to the extent of neglecting all comparative study of modern institutions analogous to those of the Hellenes or Romans, must inevitably fail in the comprehension of either. Far from offering any further apology for the apparent digressions in these volumes dealing with Graeco-Roman history, on various institutions of the French, English, German, or American nation, I profoundly regret that my inability to stay in Arabia, India, China, and Japan respectively, has deprived me of object-impressions which would undoubtedly have materially assisted me in the comprehension of Greek or Roman institutions. The play of motives

in the institutions of nations is a *ricochet* play of a very intricate nature, and personal observation of the actual procedure of that historic game of forces, and not the mere reading of books on a variety of sciences, as Buckle thought, can really prepare the historian for his task. Most of these motives appear only on their lines of projection, by a process which psychologists in Germany now call *Einfühlung*. The passing from the projection to the real thing projected is a matter of great delicacy. It is easy to show up the illogicality or cruelty of certain beliefs or institutions. It is very much more difficult, and infinitely more to the point, to show up which real motives and forces were "projected" on to them.

I am fully aware that this method is not received amongst the "correct" modes of treating a subject of historical research. The *monde* of official scholardom has, like every *monde*, its unwritten laws and etiquette. Certain forms or certain subjects are, others are not, permissible. There is a *jargon* in everything, from the University to the pot-house. But having nowise precipitated my work—and making bold to say, as I do, that if most of my critics may surpass me in point of acumen, none will exceed either the industry, the patience, or the careful preparation by travel and study which I have devoted to problems that have hitherto never been treated with becoming seriousness—I am, I fully believe, entitled to hold strongly to my opinion that the institutions, or the major part of classical history,

have so far been inquired into by a method utterly inadequate and dilettantic. Any boy of twenty-five or thirty will nowadays undertake to write a *History of Antiquity*, or a *Life of Napoleon*, just as readily as he will write the history of the game of dominoes, or (what he is more qualified to do) the history of the valets of Napoleon. He has been taught that history is exclusively a matter of reading certain documents. Is he not right in thinking that by reading the documents of the time of Napoleon he can write up the incomparable Caesar of France, just as by reading the documents of the principality of Reuss-Greiz-Schleiz he could write up the history of Henry the LXXVth? That we must first of all acquire a real insight into the institutions, before we can treat of the events and persons of history; that a knowledge of institutions implies as its *conditio sine qua non* extensive travel and study of various types of modern civilisation; and that Napoleon the Great, as *the* European exponent of modern history, requires a first-hand knowledge of all European nations; all this is ignored or belittled. The result is accordingly.

How large a part is played in the *monde* of scholars by the *convenances* and etiquette of their order can be seen from a retrospect of the astounding antipathy with which they have, in turn, rejected and discredited all the innovations brought into the study of history during the last century, and which are now generally accepted as legitimate organs of historical

research. When at the beginning of the last century Indo-German linguistics were introduced as a master-key to the knowledge of Greek and Latin antiquities, the classical philologians stubbornly refused to declare it *hoffähig*, as they say in Germany, or presentable at Court. The same fate was reserved for Epigraphy and Archaeology in their bearings on history; and even quite recently, the late Professor Mommsen declared one of the most interesting and systematic of modern studies of history, Praehistory, to be "the science of analphabets" (*Beilage zur Allgemeinen Zeitung*, Heft 9, 1907, p. 378, a). On the other hand, any method that allows the arm-chair historian to increase his literary resources for the compilation of works full of heavy erudition and formal correctness, without introducing into his *convenances* and habits any annoying innovation; any such method is highly welcome and extolled in all the *Revues critiques* of the order. Such methods are: Astruc's theory of names; Nissen's *Einquellentheorie*; the theory of contamination in mythology; the *Rückspiegelungstheorie* in Graeco-Roman history; Lachmann's *Liedertheorie*; F. A. Wolf's theory of syndicating authors; Drumann's method of treating private letters written in haste as carefully pondered state-documents; etc., etc. All these methods were, as I show in the first volume, the usual methods of the inquisitorial tribunals in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries A.D. In addition to the reasons given in the *Introduction*, accounting for the

continuation of the inquisitorial methods in modern courts of historiography, I should like to place here the remark of Darwin about "experts" in cattle-breeding or gardening who, being immersed in the details of the single features of their individual animals or plants, are, like historians submerged in the particular "facts" of history, unable to generalise, that is, to see the influence of the institutions or general facts of the animal or vegetable kingdom. Darwin says:

> Ask, as I have asked, a celebrated raiser of Hereford cattle, whether his cattle might not have descended from Long-horns, or both from a common parent-stock, and he will laugh you to scorn. I have never met a pigeon, or poultry, or duck, or rabbit fancier, who was not fully convinced that each main breed was descended from a distinct species. Van Mons, in his treatise on pears and apples, shows how utterly he disbelieves that the several sorts—for instance a Ribston pippin or Codlin apple—could ever have proceeded from the seeds of the same tree. Innumerable other examples could be given. The explanation, I think, is simple: from long-continued study they are strongly impressed with the differences between the several races; and though they well know that each race varies slightly, for they win their prizes by selecting such slight differences, yet they ignore all general arguments, and refuse to sum up in their minds slight differences accumulated during many successive generations (*Origin of Species*, chapter i.).

The two volumes now published treat (1) of the method of history; (2) of the great inland empires

of Egypt, Assyria, Babylon, the Hittites, etc; (3) of the border nations called the Hebrews, the Phoenicians, and the archaic Hellenes; (4) the historic Greeks; (5) the Romans. Mommsen used to say that Greek history too must find her jurist. I prefer to think that Greek history will bestow more favours upon an historian imbued with the sense of Art; while a jurist, especially one versed in the intricacies of the inquisitorial procedure, is likely to benefit more the historians than the history of Greece. Had Lessing lived to write a history of Greece, we might have been spared many a subsequent heavy tome on *Griechische Geschichte.* It is in Roman history that a jurist is needed. Its most vital principle is of a juristic nature, and none but a close student of Roman Law can finally comprehend that the Roman distinction of *res juris* and *res facti* pervaded all life in ancient Rome. This principle ranges the *actiones in jus conceptae*, the old civil *negotia*, such as *mancipatio*, *stipulatio*, *acceptilatio*, etc., amongst the *res juris*; while it houses the *actiones in factum conceptae*, the *interdicta*, *pacta*, *ususfructus*, etc., under the roof of *res facti.* It applies to the political constitution of Rome too, in that a *consul*, *censor*, *praetor*, etc., were *res juris*, while a tribune was *res facti.* An historian unversed in the vast thought-fabric of this distinctly juristic or, as the Germans say, *civilistic* principle cannot hope to grasp the essence of Roman history. It is even so with many another period of history. Thus,

no one will write the history of the seventeenth century as well as could a trained diplomatist; while the eleventh and twelfth centuries require a man deeply versed in the spirit, law, and undercurrents of the Catholic Church. Such things cannot be learned in "historical seminaries." As I have tried to show in detail in the first volume, Greek States, unless viewed from the standpoint of Aristoxenus's classification of Art, will never yield up their Eleusinian mysteries. They were works of art, and Personality played in them a *rôle* which is identical with that played by the Popes, or by the founders of the great orders of the Roman Catholic Church. To deny the historicity of Theseus, Lycurgus, Romulus, or Moses (apart from their evidently mythical elements) is to deny Pope Gregory VII. in the eleventh century. The process by which these Titanic builders of great States have been sublimated into myths is, as I show in both my volumes, the very process by which a real woman used to be sublimated into an imaginary witch. All classical States were cephalic; just as the Roman Catholic Church still is. Yet all the modern official exponents of classical history deny the historicity of these very cephalic forces, without whom Sparta or ancient Rome is as unimaginable as would be the Roman Catholic Church without a Pope. Methods of historical study leading to such a wholesale perversion of all classical history cannot but be fundamentally erroneous. In England these methods

have been applied chiefly to Biblical history; on the Continent to both Biblical and classical history. And since the history of the Greeks, the Romans, and the rise of Christianity is the foundation and soul of all history, there is a serious danger lest all history be deprived, should such methods continue to be in use, of all value as a scientific research into the past.

The third volume will treat of the rise of Christianity, and further volumes will bring the story of the Western nations to the end of the nineteenth century. The material for the subsequent volumes is all ready. The *General History*, the first two volumes of which are here presented, is the central work of my *Bibliotheca Historica*, which comprises (1) two large volumes, containing the principal original documents of history, one of which was published in 1905, under the title of *Select Documents illustrating Mediaeval and Modern History*; the second volume, referring to Antiquity, is in course of preparation; (2) three elaborate historical atlases, with over a hundred maps on a new graphic system, text to each map, indices, etc., referring to (*a*) *English History* (published in 1903), (*b*) *Atlas Antiquus* (published in 1907), and (*c*) *Atlas of Modern History* (quite ready, and to be published shortly); (3) my *General History*. Together with the volumes of my *General History* I am going to publish a series of treatises expanding several chapters of my central work into independent and elaborate monographs.

My *Atlas Antiquus*, published simultaneously with these volumes, is meant to relieve my *General History* of the details of military events, especially for Greek history. That *Atlas* is therefore meant to be a constant complement to the text of the two volumes.

I am quite aware of the somewhat unwieldy character of Volume I., in which some points, especially the problem of Lycurgus, have been given an apparently disproportionate space. However, it was absolutely necessary to clear up the underlying principles of ancient history, even at the expense of much interesting narrative matter. Greek literature will be treated with all the attention becoming its unrivalled artistic beauty and great spiritual importance, in the third volume of my work, when the antecedents of Christianity will be discussed.

I want here to thank Mr. G. M. Gregory, late of the Indian Civil Service, for valuable secretarial work during the last two years.

EMIL REICH.

LONDON, 33 ST. LUKE'S ROAD, W.
May 31, 1907.

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INTRODUCTION

THE method and scope of history are still matters of discussion. In marked contrast to other branches of knowledge, history has as yet not freed itself from the annoyances and complications of boundary disputes. No one is at doubt about the true scope of linguistics, of theology, or of law; let alone that of physics or chemistry. With history it is quite different. According to the professional, social, or religious leanings of a writer, the scope of history will be determined in the most divergent manners. For one, history is a jumble of errors and crimes scarcely worth our attention; for the other, historical knowledge is a mere *fable convenue*; a third wants us to leave out of consideration all but the deeds of single great men who are held to be the sole makers of history; a fourth, heeding little the actions of "heroes," tells us to study nothing but the movements of the masses; a fifth, scouting the importance attached to wars, excludes from historic researches all events other than economic or social; a sixth sinks into insignificance all facts other than such as refer to religious institutions; and so on.

This being the case, it is impossible to invite the reader to the perusal of a comprehensive study on history without at the same time making a clear statement of the scope and method of history as

adopted in the present work. This Introduction is therefore meant to be an essay in the grammar of history.

I

Man, immeasurably superior to any other organism, is a microcosm of infinitudes; and nowhere has his development assumed aspects and tendencies more manifold and varied than in those aggregates and groupings without which human life seems to be impossible. Nature grows *seriatim*; man *gregatim*. He is nothing if not social; and so vigorous is the sympathetic impetus in man, that his strongest passions, selfish or otherwise, come from his altruistic and undying need of fellow-men. Hence the immense number of aggregates into which men have organised themselves. In Western countries these groups are so numerous as to preclude tabulation. But even in less civilised countries, man has crystallised into very numerous bodies of more or less peculiar formation. Each of these aggregates, and each of their many subdivisions, has its history. The family has institutions and events of its own, no less than the nation. There is a history of village institutions, as well as one of the institutions of the Church. There have been amusements, national, local, and domestic; and accordingly there is a history of the Olympic games in Hellas, and one of the waltz in Vienna. However, some of these aggregates, it will be remarked, are richer in institutions than in events. The family, for instance, is by nature far more institutional than eventful. Ordinarily, the events in families are, as it were, the due consequences

of the regular working of family institutions. When this sweet and respectable monotony is broken by some untoward domestic tragedy, both the members of that and other families appear to be shocked in the very deepest recesses of their souls. For so little are startling events either desired or expected in the family; or, in other words, so statical and institutional is the very essence of the family (certainly the European or monogamic family), that dynamic disturbances come as a most painful surprise. Other aggregates, again, the army, for instance, are nothing if not dynamic. There events are expected, nay, provoked. The State, too, is frequently more dynamic than static. Here we have, therefore, a means of classifying the multitude of aggregates of men in Europe according to a broad and definite principle. For the division of organic phenomena into static and dynamic is so general, and has proved so useful in all the departments of organic science, that we can certainly not commit a grave blunder by applying it, with due allowances, to human aggregates too.

Without pretending to exhaust the number of statical aggregates in Europe, it may be stated that the family; the various agricultural communities, such as the mark, the village community, the *mir*, the *mezzadria*, etc.; the guilds and other trade associations; the classes and castes of society; and the professions and crafts, are amongst the aggregates of men manifesting the character of static forces more than that of dynamic phenomena. It were a mistake to suppose that these aggregates have been pre-eminently statical at all times and in all countries. To history, far more than to any

other group of events, applies the word of Prince Metternich: "*Il ne faut jamais dire jamais.*" Yet, so much is certain that the aggregates mentioned have mostly possessed an institutional character. On their speed or trend, single events have had far less influence than on that of other aggregates. Hence their life has been steadier, and within more fixed limits. It will be remarked that in what has here been termed "statical aggregates" the influence of woman is very considerable. This too indicates their continuous and traditional character. Women are by nature statical and conservative. This peculiar character of the aggregates in question shows especially in the various amusements of nations. It is evident from the inherent monotony of statical aggregates, that the more such aggregates outweigh the dynamic aggregates of a nation, the more its people will be in need of amusements. It is for this reason that nations under an absolutist government, which is naturally averse to dynamic expansion of the people, are much gayer and more pleasure-loving than nations having largely dynamic institutions. In antiquity note the gay Egyptian beside the grave Roman; in modern times compare the pleasure-loving Russian with the sombre Swiss. For analogous reasons the modern stationary Spanish require amusements of the intensest and most exciting character, like bull-fights and similar aggregate intoxications; whereas nations full of dynamic vitality, as the English or the French, content themselves with far quieter, poorer amusements. By the intensity of amusements, we may gauge the prevalence of statical over dynamic aggregates of a given country.

From the few illustrations given (very many more will be found in the body of the work), it will be seen that static aggregates, or social groups, —for what name could be given them with more appropriateness?—show on the whole a regularity very much akin to that which we find in the groups of facts treated in natural sciences. Ever since 1750, when the sciences of organic nature began to receive that enthusiastic attention which previously had been devoted to mathematics and natural philosophy, an opinion has been expressed by many an anticipative thinker, that the "laws" regulating the growth of those social groups may be discovered by the application of the same scientific methods that are used in the discovery of the laws of Nature. Turgot, Condorcet, Henry Thomas Buckle, Herbert Spencer, Bagehot, but chiefly the great Auguste Comte, and his disciples and continuators, have, in writings full of daring thought and captivating illustrations of "laws," essayed to establish the theory that history may arrive at laws no less definite than those of the other natural sciences. And it is indeed hard to deny, that very many of the phenomena of static or social groups seem astoundingly fit for generalisation, and thus for *laws*. The reasons why some nations adopt the marriage-system known as exogamy; or that termed polyandry; or again polygamy, monogamy, or marriage for short terms;—the reasons for these institutions, we say, may no doubt be detected and finally summed up in a "law" of human marriage-systems, although we do not know that such a law has been detected. For such systems are based on social, economic, and ethical opinions and needs, almost entirely

independent of the capricious will of individuals. It is equally likely that the "law" regulating the choice of sites of towns may be ascertained by some future historian. In short, all such groups of static facts, on the production of which the indeterminable will and caprice of individuals have been of little or no influence, may in course of time be shown to have a regularity amenable to strict formulation.

In granting all that, however, we can by no means imply the concession that such "laws" will be or even may be also found for the groups of facts called dynamic. Some of these groups are, as has been indicated above, at times dynamic, at other times static. In their latter quality they may no doubt be reduced to laws. But certainly not in their former. Herein is the source of numerous mistakes and exaggerations. Properly speaking, we ought to speak of institutions being dynamic or static, and not of dynamic or static institutions. Thus religion with the ancient Greeks and Romans was incomparably more of a static institution than of a dynamic; whereas the Christian religion was essentially dynamic before the Council of Trent, but considerably less so ever since. Social customs and rules belong in modern times almost exclusively to static powers; in classical antiquity they belonged largely to dynamic causes. Both in ancient Attica in Greece, and in modern France, we see the beautiful custom of taking a glass of *un*-mixed wine at the beginning of the meal only. The Athenians had no hesitation in ascribing this custom to a law-giver and king, crediting him with motives both poetic and reasonable;[1] no French historian will

[1] Philochorus, *Fragm.* 18, in Müller, *Fragmenta Hist. Graec.* i. p. 387; taken from Athenaeus ii. 2, p. 38 c. The wise king's name was Amphictyon.

think of tracing such a "static" custom to the behest of a prince.

It will be seen how easy it is to overrate the possibility of arriving at "historic laws," by overlooking either the totally refractory nature of dynamic aggregates, or by neglecting the fact that some static institutions turn dynamic under certain circumstances. This serious neglect vitiated the noble attempt of Buckle, otherwise a scholar and thinker of singular worth. His contributions to a reform of history are very considerable, and on the Continent, at least, his name is as familiar to the educated classes as is that of any other famous British thinker. In his ardent desire to render history as scientific as is physiology or geology, he knew of no higher ideal than the discovery of laws regulating historic events. Like Bacon, he was stronger at determining than at exemplifying methods; but his book, a torso like his life, will continue to be instinct with powers of suggestion rarely to be met with in works of history. By his very excesses his *History of Civilisation in England* has proved the insurmountable difficulties of treating dynamic facts in the fashion of static.[1] Since the publication of Buckle's work, it has been noticed and distinctly expressed by numerous writers on history, that many important groups of historic facts are so indissolubly connected with the powers and deeds of one or a few persons, as to share the absolute impenetrability of that greatest of all enigmas—personality. No serious student of human nature can have failed to remark that formulation grows in usefulness in proportion to the impersonality

[1] Mr. John M. Robertson has published an elaborate and very able defence of Buckle (*Buckle and his Critics*, 1895), directed chiefly against the numerous assailants of Buckle who have read his work with carelessness.

of the object. We succeed best in formulating facts of stone-life; less in facts of the vegetable and still less in the animal kingdom; and when we reach the atom of humanity, man, no molecular analysis will avail us very much. Man can be described, portrayed; not formulated. It will never be possible to deduce the life of Caesar from a general law of historic personages; and naturalists succeed in establishing the general laws precisely because individuality is entirely neglected by them. The individual fox and his daily actions are matters of supreme indifference to the zoologist; all that he wants is to look at the individual fox as a type of his species. Man, on the other hand, is not a type but a personality; inexhaustible, unanalysable. Such groups of historic facts as are profoundly influenced by personalities cannot be handled by means of "laws" shaped after the form of the laws of naturalists. The origin and forms of the declension of the nouns of a language, for instance, may be subjected to a law; but not the style of a writer.

If, therefore, in the study of dynamic aggregates, we must give up all hopes of generalisations and "laws" at the very outset, with what expectations shall we undertake the laborious researches of the historian? Shall history renounce the dignity of a science, and content itself with the compliment of being an art?

Several great thinkers have denied that history is or ever can become a real science. Schopenhauer, in a famous passage, attributes to history no more than the power of a certain collocation of facts. History, he says, gives us some information, but considering the inability of the historian to group and subordinate

his facts in the manner of a system, history can never be a science proper; that is, history can never house its particular facts under comprehensive generalisations, as is done in physics, chemistry, or any other real science. The historian, Schopenhauer holds, must for ever be content to "creep along on the ground of empiricism."[1] A similar view has been expressed by Stanley Jevons. "A science of history," he says,[2] "in the true sense of the term is an absurd notion. A nation is not a mere sum of individuals whom we can treat by the method of averages; it is an organic whole held together by ties of infinite complexity. Each individual acts and reacts upon his smaller or greater circle of friends, and those who acquire a public position exert an influence on much larger sections of the nation. There will always be a few great leaders of exceptional genius or opportunities, the unaccountable phases of whose opinions and inclinations sway the whole body. From time to time arise critical situations, battles, delicate negotiations, internal disturbances, in which the slightest incident may change the course of history."

Of Schopenhauer's view it is now no longer necessary to give an elaborate refutation. With regard to Jevons, it is interesting to note that his forbidding attitude to Buckle's attempts to raise history to the dignity of a science bears a striking resemblance to

[1] Schopenhauer, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, ii. chap. 38. ("*Ueber Geschichte*") ". . . *ihr* (to History) *fehlt der Grundcharakter der Wissenschaft, die Subordination des Gewussten, statt deren sie blosse Koordination desselben aufzuweisen hat. Daher giebt es kein System der Geschichte wie doch jeder anderen Wissenschaft. Sie ist demnach zwar ein Wissen, jedoch keine Wissenschaft. Denn nirgends erkennt sie das Einzelne aus dem Allgemeinen, sondern muss das Einzelne unmittelbar fassen und so gleichsam auf dem Boden der Erfahrung fortkriechen.*"

[2] Stanley Jevons, *The Principles of Science* (Book VI., or chap. xxxi., p. 761, of the edition of 1900).

that of Descartes to the profound speculations of Galileo regarding the use of the concept of the infinite in mathematics. In words almost identical in drift, Descartes bluntly denies the possibility of ever availing ourselves mathematically of the idea of the infinite.[1] A few years after Descartes' death, Leibniz, then in France, and Newton, in England, introduced the infinitesimal calculus, by which the mathematical resources discovered by Descartes were increased a thousandfold.

Laws, in the sense in which that term is used by naturalists, it is impossible to arrive at in the study of dynamic aggregates. "The cervical region of the vertebral column in mammals presents the remarkable peculiarity that, whatever the length or flexibility of the neck, the number of vertebrae is the same, viz. seven, with only three known exceptions, the Manatee and Hoffmann's Two-toed Sloth, which both have but six, and the Three-toed Sloth, which has nine" (Prof. W. H. Flower, 1883). Here is a case of a law of Nature. If by hypothesis we assert that the number of royal dynasties in peninsulas never exceeds three, and in islands, four; such a constant and mathematical relation between insular or peninsular formation and royal dynasties would indeed form a law of history. But such laws are not discoverable. The facts of dynamic history are not of a nature to be caged in the angular and rigid frames of mathematical terms. And why should we despair, or even so much as wonder, at that? Each field of inquiry, natural or

[1] Descartes, *Principes de la Philosophie* (in *Œuvres*, ed. Hime-Martin, 1838, p. 293), chap. 26: "*Ainsi nous ne nous embarrasserons jamais dans les disputes de l'infini; d'autant qu'il serait ridicule que nous, qui sommes finis, entreprissions d'en déterminer quelque chose, et par ce moyen le supposer fini en tâchant de le comprendre.*"

human, has its proper methods. Observation, for instance, although an exquisite instrument for the discovery of facts in Nature, will be of no help in mathematics. No amount of observations would have sufficed to obtain the theorems of the first book of Euclid. Even so in the science of aesthetics. Thousands of learned men had read Homer before Lessing; but the latter alone noticed Homer's abstention from describing at length objects or persons. The fact is, that Lessing observed that feature in Homer, because his aesthetic speculations had led him up to it: without them he would have never observed it. It cannot thus be surprising that each field of inquiry, having its proper methods, has also results of its own. In *mathematics* we arrive at *theorems*; in astronomy, physics, or chemistry, at *laws* proper; in natural history, at *observations* of constant facts, or laws in the laxer sense, and chiefly at classifications. In history, and more especially in the study of dynamic aggregates, we can arrive neither at theorems or laws, nor at observations of constant facts, nor at minute classifications. Each important fact of the history of dynamic aggregates is endowed with an individuality baffling all generalisation into a theorem or law, as well as all attempts at stiffening it into a closed formula. We can show its relation and correlation with other facts; we can so clearly and fully set it off against events antecedent, contemporaneous, and posterior, as to shed on it all the light necessary for seeing and comprehending its place, drift, and importance in a given cluster of facts. But we can never make it a mere case of an historic formula. The facts of history are not what the facts of Nature appear to us to be. Historic facts do not melt in the

crucible. Of bodies of Nature we may, indeed, use the old adage: *Corpora non agunt nisi soluta.* Of bodies human and their actions we should have to negative that principle. They resist solution; and of the stubbornness of facts they have the largest share. However, as a compensation for that, they admit of an insight into their correlation and interdependence considerably richer than that which we can gain regarding Nature. The book of Nature can be only spelt here and there; the book of Man may be read for long passages.

History may rightly be called the science of correlations. In natural science, too, we hear of strange correlations, of unexpected coincidences. Thus Darwin tells us that white cats with blue eyes are nearly always deaf; and the races of pigeons that have the longest legs have, as a rule, also a short, compact head. But Darwin expressly adds that natural science is quite unable to account for these strange correlations. The historic life of nations is full of similar correlations. *Tout se tient.* Between the Greek city-state, the Greek athletic sports at Olympia or elsewhere, and the Greek oracles at Delphi or Dodona there is a direct and an indirect connection. No reader of Greek history but feels that although the interdependence of Greek states, Greek games, and Greek oracles has not yet been shown up clearly, yet it was a reality in Hellenic times. Or take the latent connection between the English system of public schools and the decided predilection of Englishmen for the inductive method of thinking. Such correlations in the life of nations can—in utter contrast to similar correlations in the life of vegetable or animal organisms—be fully

accounted for. Thus it is at once clear that the English public school system, developing as it does pre-eminently qualities of character and will-power, renders Englishmen naturally averse to brilliant ideas and to deductive thinking, and more inclined to value the patience and sturdy perseverance manifested in inductive pursuits. This gives us also a fair standard of estimating a history of Greece, of Rome, etc., at its true value. If the author succeeds in showing the real, that is, the psychological, connection of two or more historic facts or institutions, he has indeed advanced our historic insight. A few years' stay in a foreign country will convince the most refractory specialist that the life of a nation brings home no lesson more forcibly than that of the intimate coherence, mutual fitness and connectedness of things. He who has seen a great number of Sundays in England cannot but feel that the English Sunday is the necessary complement of the six week-days in England. It is the historian's duty to show this undeniable connection or correlation of the six week-days with the Sunday in England as arising from psychological causes determined by specific historic circumstances in time and space. Nor can the historian be said to have really advanced our insight into the origin and nature of duelling; of national or local superstitions; of prejudices or even absurdities, unless he clearly shows the *tertium quid* with which these apparent failings or vices are indissolubly connected. No nation has ever habitually practised what may easily appear to many of us a cruel or an absurd custom, unless the people were, by the latent play of other but interdependent institutions, forced to accept or tolerate those superstitions

or prejudices for the sake of securing an otherwise unobtainable and indispensable advantage. Thus it can be shown that the use of the torture, which was never tolerated in heathen Rome, except when applied to slaves, was freely used in Christian kingdoms under the pressure of circumstances that could be overlooked or disregarded only at an absolutely irreparable loss. He who pretends to write a true history of those prejudices and superstitions must be expected to discover the psychological connection of the pressure of circumstances with the cruelties or absurdities conditioned by them. To indulge in grim indignation at the horrors of the Inquisition; to pile up startling facts of cruelty and religious persecution collected from easily accessible works on the Holy Tribunal: in all this there is not a trace of that true task of the historian of which we are here speaking. The American writer whose name is now an "authority" on the history of the Inquisition has left his real duty completely undone. Apart from the fact that it ill behoves Americans whose very nearest ancestors committed, during seven years, the unspeakable horrors of the Seminole wars (1835-1842), to pillory the Catholic Church for abusing her *raison d'état*, Mr. Lea has not even seriously attempted to discover the psychological correlations underlying the Inquisition. His work constitutes mere *collectanea*, but cannot be taken as history. Given, that in point of ruthless use and abuse of its *raison d'état* one nation is as bad as another, we cannot expect, and need not unduly wonder at the ruthlessness of the Catholic *raison d'état*. But what we might expect from the historian is to learn the specific psychology of specific excesses in the history

of the *raison d'état* of this or that nation. In this, the cardinal point of interest, Mr. Lea does not advance us at all. Or take, as another instance, the rise of modern humour. The Greeks or Romans show little if any power in the play of wayward and profound humour. In modern times, on the other hand, the Spanish (in *Don Quixote*), the sixteenth-century French (in Rabelais' works), and the modern English have excelled in humour to a remarkable extent. It is incumbent on the historian to show in detail how that modern humour is connected with the wholesale mendacity of modern life; with the fact that our modern society abounds in false positions, in unavowed contrasts between what is and what is said to be; in short, in contrasts which on the whole were unknown to the more sincere ancients. It is therefore in the clearing up of correlations that the historian may, and ought, to distance the student of science proper. This is his true sphere. He can successfully do that both in correlations of statical institutions and in events of a more dynamic character.

In the dynamic phenomena of history, it is true, there is much chance, fortuitous happening, unforeseen yet incisive incidents. The brilliancy of many a writer has shone in deriving huge results from tiny incidents, such as court intrigues, backstairs manœuvres, interception of messages, etc. Many of these writers have no doubt exaggerated their case. Yet it would be, we take it, sham philosophy to deny or ignore the power of even small incidents in history. The strongest opponents of "incidental" historians are such among the philosophers as are bent on discovering "historic laws." To admit the power of

incidents were to deny the possibility of laws. Hence they discard and ridicule the assumption of history being influenced by incidents. In doing so they defend ramparts where attack need not be apprehended. For in directing our chief work to the discovery, not of "laws," but of correlations and connections, we are not, as a rule, seriously thwarted by the unaccountable actions of chance. Owing to a process of latent compensation, such unaccountable actions may be taken as, in the result, inefficient for the establishment of correlations. Chance, according to the luminous definition of Cournot, is a fact produced by the meeting of two or more mutually independent series of causations.[1] When, therefore, such a fact really bears on the correlation of two or more mutually independent causal series, it must needs relate to both of them. For if it related to one of them alone, and not to both, it would not affect their correlation, this being mutual. If, on the other hand, it thoroughly altered their original correlation, then its working would become so clear as to cease to be considered as chance. An example or two will illustrate this very important point. On the 1st of January 1762, or in the sixth year of the Seven

[1] A. A. Cournot, *Exposition de la théorie des chances et des probabilités* (Paris, 1843-73). "*Les événements amenés par la combinaison ou la rencontre de phénomènes qui appartiennent à des séries indépendantes, dans l'ordre de la causalité, sont ce qu'on nomme des événements fortuits ou des résultats du hasard.*" Compare also Cournot's *Traité de l'enchaînement des idées fondam. dans l. sciences et dans l'histoire* (Paris, 1861), vol. i. pp. 89, etc. In his *Considérations sur la marche des idées et des événements dans le temps moderne* (Paris, 1872) Cournot (whose works have justly been praised by Prof. Robert Flint, *Hist. of the Philos. of History* (Edinburgh, 1893, pp. 644-655), takes a view of history similar to that adopted in the present work. His distinction between *faits* and *lois*, and the *irrégularité du fait* as contrasted with the *régularité de la loi*, no doubt recommended itself to his strongly mathematical mind. Yet we cannot help repeating that the *faits* of history cannot be merged with those of Nature in one common mass of accidental happenings.

Years' War, Frederick the Great was in a most desperate condition. England had ceased to send him subsidies since December 12, 1761; other funds were not forthcoming; two important fortresses, one in the south, the other in the north of his realm (Schweidnitz and Colberg), had been captured by the Austrians and Russians; his army was exhausted, decimated, discouraged; his enemies more sanguine and enterprising than ever. All seemed lost, and his heroic struggle against tremendous odds appeared doomed to disastrous failure. Then, and just then, there happened one of those incidents that apparently change everything, although they themselves seem to be quite unaccountable. Elizabeth, Empress of Russia, and Frederick's inveterate personal enemy, died, January 5, 1762; and on her throne ascended the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, as Czar Peter III. By an oddity of predilection, Peter had long conceived a fantastic enthusiasm for Frederick; and he no sooner became Czar than he at once stopped all hostilities against the Prussian king. Thus relieved of the formidable armies of Russia, Frederick again resumed the struggle, from which in the end he emerged as victor. Elizabeth's opportune death and Peter's infatuation for Frederick are incidents, and no serious student of history can deny their importance. They relate to Frederick's position and chances; there can be no doubt about that. The question only is, How far does their bearing extend? Did they only colour or quicken the then political correlations, or did they quite alter them? Were all the chances of Frederick vested in the life of Elizabeth and in the accession of Peter? Or were the relations and correlations of his policy such as would ultimately bring about an

honourable peace for him, with or without these two incidents? Now, there can be no hesitation in saying that those incidents did no more than colour or quicken the working of correlations long established before. Russia had no interest to aggrandise Austria at the expense of Prussia. Already under Elizabeth, Austria vainly entreated her victorious ally to exterminate the Prussians whom they had both signally defeated at Kunersdorf (August 12, 1759). In July 1762 Catherine, it is true, on usurping the Russian throne, at once (July 9) announced in a public manifesto her hatred of Russia's "mortal enemy," Frederick. But already on the next day, July 10, she told Baron Goltz, Frederick's ambassador, that she would not alter her husband's, Peter III.'s, policy towards Frederick; nay, on the day of the appearance of her very manifesto she had made careful arrangements, by an express messenger, to enlighten Frederick himself about her real mind. And although no greater contrast can be imagined than that between Catherine and Peter, both as rulers and as personalities, yet both pursued the same policy towards Frederick and Austria, independent of all incidents.

As another example we may briefly adduce the well-known incident of Desaix's coming up in time to save Napoleon at Marengo (1800). It is now certain that the fate of the Austrians was strategically sealed long before the actual battle took place. Tactically, it is true, Napoleon lost the battle until Desaix saved him. The campaign itself he could certainly not have lost, considering the irretrievable strategic faults committed by his opponent, General Melas. Desaix's drawing up his

few battalions in time certainly coloured and quickened the final result; its absence could, however, scarcely have altered the inevitable issue of the campaign.

Many a leading historian of our time has, especially in the last six or seven years, condemned any attempt to reduce the incidents and chance occurrences of history to some intelligible order. Eduard Meyer in Germany, Langlois in France, and York Powell in England have expressed opinions such as the following broad and trenchant statement, formulated by MM. Seignobos and Langlois in their work, *Introduction aux Études historiques* (1898), p. 253: "*Toute l'histoire des événements est un enchaînement évident et incontesté d'accidents, dont chacun est cause déterminante d'un autre. Le coup de lance de Montgomery est cause de la mort de Henri II., et cette mort est cause de l'avènement des Guises au pouvoir, qui est cause du soulèvement du parti protestant.*" In other words, the rise of the Guises; the great religious wars of France (1559–1593); the coming of the Béarnais, and sundry other events of French history in the latter half of the sixteenth century, are due to the lance thrust of Montgomery. It cannot be denied that, looking at French history alone, one does not easily see how to question the power of that lance thrust. However, it might not be quite irrelevant to suggest that a glance at the other countries of Europe at the time of the Guises and the first Bourbons reveals the fact that aspirations and home troubles precisely identical with those raised by the Guises in France were going on in Hungary, in the Austrian dominions, in Sweden and a few other

countries, without any Austrian, Hungarian, or Swedish Montgomery killing his sovereign with a maladroit thrust of his lance at a tournament. If France had her Guise, so had almost at the same time Hungary her Zápolyais; Sweden her Wasas; Austria her Wallenstein. In point of ambition, means, objects, and events, the lives of those non-French Guises are practically identical with that of their French archetype, — except the lance thrust. The Zápolyais, as well as Wallenstein and the Wasas, were rich noblemen who aspired to the throne of the countries they lived in. The Zápolyais, Wallenstein, the Guises, failed in that attempt; the Wasas succeeded. Yet no interpretation of the events can possibly alter the fact that at a given and almost contemporaneous stage in the history of France, Austria, Hungary, and Sweden respectively, there was a fair chance for the coming of a new dynasty, and that powerful nobles, in each of those countries, availed themselves of the chance. This being the case, what importance can one possibly ascribe to Montgomery's lance? Is it not rather quite evident that the chances of the Guises in France, just as those of the Zápolyais in Hungary, of Wallenstein in Austria, and of the Wasas in Sweden, were due to a cause overriding any such unaccountable incident as the thrusting of a lance by Montgomery or some other knight?

Professor Eduard Meyer, of Berlin, has in his *Zur Theorie und Methodik der Geschichte* (Halle, 1902) delivered himself of the opinion, that Bismarck's entire political career was rendered possible only owing to his coming accidentally to be a deputy representative of a member of the United Landtag

who had fallen ill.[1] And since the unity of Germany is, according to Professor Meyer's latest declaration, the sole work of Bismarck, it is interesting to learn how much the German nation is obliged to the accidental illness of that member of the Diet whose place Bismarck was called upon to take.

In this case, as well as in that of the Guises, it would be idle to attempt from its own plane a refutation of a view which, in the nature of things, can neither be proved nor disproved. If Bismarck's career was started only by his taking the place of another member of the Diet who had accidentally fallen ill, he might have very well started his career, as thousands of less able statesmen have done before and after him, without any one's falling ill at all. But let us, for argument's sake, assume that Bismarck did, as a matter of fact, start his career "only" by taking the place of a disabled M.P.; and let us also admit that the secular aspirations of the Germans for political unity were realised by Bismarck alone and solely. Let us, however, at the same time not shut our eyes to the fact that contemporaneously with Bismarck, two other Bismarcks made good the secular aspirations for political unity and independence in two other European countries of great importance. In Italy, Cavour; in Hungary, Francis Deák, did, one for over twenty million Italians, the other for over twelve million Hungarians, the very self-same work of unification, and at the very same time that Bismarck realised the dream of all Germans. Yet in the history of neither

[1] "*Bismarck's gesammte politische Laufbahn ist nur durch den Zufall möglich geworden, dass er als Stellvertreter eines erkrankten Deputirten in den Vereinigten Landtag kam*" (*Zur Theorie und Methode*, etc., p. 50).

Cavour nor of Deák do we find any such incident as a member of the Diet being accidentally taken ill. May it not reasonably be supposed that the identical historic work of Bismarck, Cavour, and Deák was caused by circumstances and forces overriding such a small accident as the sudden illness of an obscure M.P.? Could any serious man, in the face of the unity of Italy and that of Hungary (let alone that of the United States, then rent by a civil war), consider the unity of Germany as a mere accident depending on the bad digestion of a member of a Diet? Is it not manifest that in the sixties of the last century some specific, broad, and irresistible circumstances had arisen, all making for a possibility of unity in Germany, Italy, and Hungary? It is the historian's duty to point out those specific circumstances in all their details without misleading himself or others by a cheap and useless reference to some chance incident or other. If Bismarck's career can seriously be said to have been started by the opportune illness of an M.P., we might urge with logically better reasons that he owed all his career to the opportune robust health of his Pomeranian nurse.

The career of John Law is strange enough. In his adventurous and startling life there seems to be very little that makes for a systematic connection or correlation with the history of France under the Regent, when Law occupied, for four years, the position of the most influential man in the country. Yet if in studying Law's history we take into consideration contemporary Spain, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, and Russia; and if then we find that the period of Law was also that of similarly brilliant and marvellously successful adventurers at Madrid

and the capitals of the other countries just mentioned; when we find that Alberoni, Ripperda, Goetz, Menschikoff, Struensee were practically the Spanish, Swedish, Russian, or Danish replicas of John Law in France; then we are in common sense driven to the assumption that in the first half of the eighteenth century there must have been in various European countries broad and abiding circumstances rendering the success of ambitious adventurers very much more likely, than had been the case either in the seventeenth century or in the nineteenth. It is the historian's duty to point out those specific circumstances, and to show their psychological correlations. He is not allowed to say, with the lawyer, "*quod non est in actis, non est in mundo.*" The historian must incessantly cross-examine and exceed his documents. He must Röntgenise the past. Indeed, as a rule, one might say with greater right: *quod est in mundo, non est in actis.*

It may be generally stated that incidents and chance events do not materially alter the proportions of a correlation; they may considerably alter details of the components of correlations. If this were otherwise, history could never rise above the telling of stories. Nor is there any need for lengthy proof of that. History treats chiefly of aggregates of men. The movements of aggregates are far less whimsical and irregular than those of individuals. An aggregate of men shows phenomena of its own, that can by no means be regarded merely as the sum total of the phenomena produced by all its component individuals. A family, a crowd, a town council, an army, a crew, a body of students, etc., have, when in serious motion, a life of their own. Many a person

will have experienced the strange change overcoming him when carried away by a crowd. Crowds will be remorselessly cruel, although most individuals in the crowd may be of very meek tempers. There is a psychology of crowds. The subject has been little studied, and leaders of men who might have written on it with the greatest authority have seldom done so. There is likewise a pathology of crowds. This sombre but very important branch of the study of aggregates is likewise neglected.[1] The more we shall learn about the physiology, both normal and pathologic, of aggregates of men, the less will our studies be hampered by historic incidents and haphazards. Of incidents in history there are as many as of comets and meteors in the skies; has the time not come to learn by the example of astronomers?

We must now guard ourselves from seeing the correlations of history in a false light. They are definite, precise, but not permanent. They refer to groups of facts of a certain period alone. Certainly, in a very general way, they may be considered to be permanent. Thus, for instance, the bearing of the *barbari* in classical antiquity on the Greeks, Latins, and Phoenicians alike, had many a feature in common. The "barbarians" of the Balkan peninsula, on the one hand, and the barbarians of Numidia in Africa, on the other, influenced the Hellenes and the Carthaginians respectively in a manner largely identical.

[1] Among the few works investigating social pathology we may here mention, C. G. Carus, *Über Geistesepidemien der Menschheit* (Leipsic, 1852); "On Moral and Criminal Epidemics," in *Journ. of Psychol. Medicine* (London, 1856, ix. 240-282); H. Hesser, *Histor.-patholog. Untersuchungen . . . der Volkskrankheiten* (Dresden, 1839-41, 2 vols.); J. F. C. Hecker's well-known work on the epidemics of the Middle Ages (Engl. transl., London, 1844, etc.). Much useful material will be found in the complete bibliography of "Medical Psychology" in the *Index* of the Surgeon-General at Washington, *s.v.*

Yet, in examining that influence, we have to study each case on its own merits. The correlation cannot be unduly expanded, so as to embrace the contact between the uncivilised and civilised nations generally. The contact, for instance, of the British in South Africa, or of the French in the very country of the ancient Carthaginians in North Africa, with negro and Barbary tribes respectively, has had consequences quite different from those of which we learn in antiquity.

Given the fact, that historic correlations—these the scientific outcome of historic studies—are limited, departmental, and lacking the force of wide generalisations; what becomes of that unity and system which appear to be the very soul of all scientific aspirations? Can history not attain to it? Shall history alone remain fragmentary, a collection of detached true statements rather than a focus of truth? By no means. The unity of history proper is vouchsafed by its very subject. During the last four or five thousand years there has been in reality only one history—that of the nations of western Asia, and of Europe, together with that of nations deriving from European stock. It is all one whole. This very unity of European history renders general history an indispensable introduction to the history of particular countries. Even as the history of Hellas must be studied comprehensively, it being impossible, for instance, to understand the history of Athens without understanding that of Sparta; even so is it with the history of Greater Hellas, or Europe. The history of one European country is linked to that of the other countries of Europe, as are the acts of one and the same drama, or at least the

scenes of the several acts. They are not only co-ordinated in space or time, but co-adapted into one powerful organism. In European nations there is a vast intellectual and political endosmose and exosmose. It is hopeless to attempt to comprehend the history of England without having a clear and substantial knowledge of the history of Europe. He who knows only English history does not know even the history of England. It is like trying to make out the sense of a sentence, the nouns, pronouns, or verbs of which are missing. At some period of European history, England represents the nouns, France the adjectives, and Italy the verbs of the sentence; at other periods those allegorical parts of speech are Germany, Spain, and England respectively. But at no time can we attain to a real understanding of historical events without reading them in the light of European, and not only of national history.

This is the simple yet deep meaning of the philosophy of Heraclitus as applied to history. In viewing nations, not as absolutely differentiated substances, but as processes, we learn to see that it was never the nation itself that was the real cause of its history; it has always been the process of the conflict of each nation with her neighbours which constitutes each nation's history. To use the terms of the sage of Ephesus: nations *are* not; they are constantly *becoming*. The conflict, for instance, between the English and the French is the most important part of either English or French history. Had the French been an inferior nation, the English too would have remained inferior. History is, like all processes, inevitably binary.

To understand history is to be able to distinguish the general from the particular facts of a nation's history. Not all facts are historical facts. The great popularity enjoyed by the word "fact" both in England and America has sorely confused the mind of many a student. They demand of the historian nothing but "facts"; and the greater the abundance of that article, the better they feel. Ideas, or explanations of facts, they ignore—nay, disdain. Ideas, they pretend, are matters of theory, and all theory is born wrong. Isaac Newton, they exclaim, used to say: "*hypotheses non fingo*,"—"I do not invent hypotheses." With the utmost deference to Newton, we venture to say that either in optics, in mechanics, or in astronomy few men ever invented more theories and hypotheses than the author of the *Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica*. The only difference between Newton and the imaginative Kepler was, that the latter was naïve enough to publish all the hypotheses he had tried in the course of his laborious meditations, both right and wrong ones; whereas Newton chose to give us only such of his theories as he had found to be true and working hypotheses. In fact, there is no such thing as a fact independent of theory. The most trivial fact, stating any one of the sensations of our senses, could not be expressed without the use of a theory. Nothing can have a stronger ring of matter-of-fact statements than the sentence, "Clovis conquered France and became king of the French." Yet in this innocent-looking and sober statement, which has been repeated by innumerable writers on French history, there is a world of mistakes and half-truths, caused by the false theory of kingship among the Teutons living in the

Roman Empire. Clovis was *not* king of the French; nor did he "conquer" France as William I. conquered England. The word "king" implies attributes that Clovis never dreamed of claiming. It has taken the Abbé Dubos, Garnier, and the late Fustel de Coulanges years of battling with all descriptions of theories before they alighted on the right one, by means of which we can now state what Clovis really was. To sever facts from ideas or hypotheses is to attempt to breathe by inhalation only, or to walk by stepping down alone. The union between facts and ideas is a catholic marriage, and intolerant of divorce. Far from grumbling at hypotheses, we should rather deplore the great difficulty of multiplying them. If facts were phenomena striking our senses only, they could be easily ascertained. Unfortunately, the major portion of a fact in history does not appeal to the physical senses of the observer alone. In the history of truly great nations psychological facts are the most important and the most interesting. It is in vain that we look for them in the works of the historian of "facts only." To perceive them, more than eyes and ears are requisite; and since most chroniclers have been unable to go beyond the data of their ocular and auditory senses, they have also failed to notice some of the most important facts of their times. Even the most gifted nation will not always perceive palpable facts of their own social or political condition. Thus, few things can be more evident than the inferiority of French lyrical poetry to either English or German lyrics; nor is anything more patent than the cause of that shortcoming. Young girls, the main source of lyrical inspiration, are kept in France in strict seclusion from young

men. Yet no French writer has ever been aware of the manifest correlations of these facts.

History cannot, therefore, limit itself to the reading of so-called "facts" only. More than that is required. Ideas must shed their lights and shades on the rough design of facts, and of the latter such alone are important as offer an image and not a mere sketch of historical events. Among facts, some partake of the nature of general conceptions, and some not. Some are like huge rivers, indicating the massing and lie of mountain ranges, dominating the flora of the land, controlling traffic and commerce, defending its dwellers, and regulating the sites of populous cities. Others, again, are like little brooks, useful to a few people, but unimportant to the nation; like picturesque lakelets high in the mountains, full of poetry and charm, but useless. It is even so with facts. In drawing that distinction, it is by no means intimated that historians should study important or general facts only. They must study all manners of facts, and all with equal fidelity and scrupulous care; but record they must only the important ones. And in general history general facts are the most important. Only when general history has been elaborated with some degree of perfection will it be possible to write satisfactory histories of particular countries of Europe. To these latter histories general history forms the indispensable introduction. The lack of such a general part is, in fact, an unfailing sign of the backwardness of a science. All advanced sciences have it. There is a general or introductory part for physics, for chemistry, for physiology, for anatomy, for astronomy, for the science of Roman law, for linguistics, and for all other sciences, whether natural,

legal, or philological. The history of philology, in particular, offers a most instructive illustration of the importance of the general part of a science. Previous to the beginning of the last century, the study of Greek and Latin was a mere matter of memory, and the great linguistic problems of Greek and Latin etymology or grammar were, on the whole, wrapt in utter darkness. The two classical languages were like a magnificent palace at night, in the beautiful chambers and halls of which the bewildered traveller groped his way by the feeble light of a flickering candle. No sooner, however, had the general fact of the Indo-German relationship of Aryan languages been established; no sooner had it been discovered that Greek and Latin are but branches of a noble tree of idioms all correlated to each other by descent from a common stock, than the rules and laws of Greek etymology and grammar assumed intelligible features, and the wanderer in the palace viewed the dimensions and architecture of the building by the skylight of generalisations. At present, we do understand many of the organic rules of Greek and Latin word- or phrase-building; we do distinguish many of their general features and facts from their particular facts. In other words, by means of the general science of Aryan linguistics, and by it alone, we are enabled to comprehend or to facilitate comprehension of the structure and life of Greek and Latin. Nor have the majority of Greek and Latin scholars, in the end, been backward in recognising the immense boon conferred upon their special studies by the results of general or Aryan linguistics; and at present a student of classical philology is not allowed to take an academic degree without having given

evidence of his proficiency in the study of Aryan philology.

However, just as Aryan grammar is not the mechanical aggregate of Sanskrit, Persian, Greek, Latin, Gothic, Celtic, and other grammars, so general history is not the mechanical aggregate of Indian, Persian, Greek and Roman, English, French, German, and other histories. A man may know all these languages, together with their grammars; yet he may have no idea of Aryan linguistics. Aryan or general European linguistics draw largely on the particular facts of Aryan languages; they contain, however, mainly general facts of their own. It is, if only by way of simile, like the science of international private law, which, although largely dependent on the several codes of European nations, is mainly a system of rules distinctively independent of them. General history, too, although dependent on the particular histories of nations for much of its material, is not a mere summary, abridgment, or digest of such histories. The facts constituting the essence of general history are distinctly facts *sui generis*. They differ from other facts, as physiological facts differ from chemical, or chemical facts from physiological. Surely no physiological fact can take place without concomitant chemical phenomena; yet nothing can be more certain than the difference in kind of the latter from the former. It is even so in history. General historical facts are expressive and indicative of hosts of particular facts, yet they are not of the same kind. Thus their very comprehensiveness renders a study of general history more feasible than is the study of many a special period. It has long been observed

that astronomy, dealing as it does with facts vastly more comprehensive than those of the other sciences, was also the first to realise systematic perfection. So great is the divergence between the two sets of facts, that he who has devoted himself exclusively to the study of one of them has lost, as a rule, both the taste and the gift for the other. The student of general history is in reality also a specialist; he specialises on the study of general facts. In medicine a man is not allowed to become a specialist unless he has passed through a thorough training in general medicine. In history, on the other hand, other opinions prevail. The specialist in history has, with few exceptions, nothing but scorn for the "universalist"; and the latter frequently looks down upon the mole-work of the specialist. Specialists invoke the famous principle of the "division of labour," and they might perhaps wish for the time when there will be a score, or so, specialists, for each one of our teeth; or one aurist for the right ear and another for the left. Yet it may not be quite unreasonable to urge, that in science not the "division," but the "differentiation," of labour is the more adequate principle. To mince up historical periods into lots by a mere arithmetical division of time, and to claim that the proper object of historical research is such a period, is not to divide labour, but to mangle it. More mistakes have been made by such students of mechanically divided periods of history than by students of comprehensive views. The proper differentiation of labour in history is the division of work into history general, institutional, military, commercial, literary, etc. The historian who studies

the growth of legal or religious institutions has aims and methods and stands in need of gifts of a kind other than he who studies the military history of a nation. But he who has devoted all his life to the study of, for instance, the period from 1100 to 1200 in English history, may do some valuable work, may even pass for an "authority"; yet unless he has a sound training in general history he will never materially advance the knowledge of that very period.

In the present work the attempt is made to do for History what Bichat has done for Anatomy; Bopp and Pott for Linguistics; or Savigny for Roman Law.

II

In surveying the actual results of history down to the present day, we cannot but notice that all the innumerable waves of the currents of past events evidently tend to form one paramount current—the Europeanisation of all humanity. In the present year, eleven hundred out of a total of over fifteen hundred million human beings are under the sway of Europeans or their direct descendants. The expansion of Europe and European modes of thought, sentiment, and government, beginning in the islands along the coasts of Asia Minor, Syria, and Phoenicia, some two thousand years B.C., and extending from there first to the coasts of the Mediterranean countries, until by the end of the fifteenth century A.D. it comprised the whole of Europe proper; that expansion has since the last decade of the fifteenth century been steadily proceeding, until it has Europeanised nearly the whole of the continents

of America and Australia, much of Africa, and considerable portions of Asia. History can therefore strictly be called the secular process of Europeanisation, which in all probability will finally comprise every country of the globe.

Europe being only one-thirteenth of the surface of the entire globe, another general characteristic of history suggests itself to the impartial student. History treats mainly of minorities; it goes by quality, and not by quantity; and if we now proceed to inquire into the factors that first launched the great process of Europeanisation, we shall be prepared to find small and few beginnings. That process has had indeed only three principal factors: (1) Hellenic civilisation and its immediate, chiefly Phoenician, antecedents; (2) The polity of the Romans; and (3) Christianity, together with its Hebrew antecedents. In fact, Europeanisation, this the chief result of general history, has been brought about by three successive and now long-coexistent processes—(*a*) the Hellenisation, (*b*) the Romanisation, and (*c*) the Christianisation, of an ever-increasing number of countries, first in Europe, then outside Europe.

Countries outside Europe and European influence have annals and biographies; Europe alone has a history. The one Asiatic country that has recently emerged into the sphere of real history, Japan, could do so only after a most thorough and energetic, self-imposed Europeanisation of nearly all the aspects of her national life. What classical Greece is to Europe, Europe is to the rest of the globe—*the* historical continent. Leibniz once called China the Europe of the East; and Giuseppe Ferrari made several laborious, if brilliant, attempts to establish a parallelism between

the history of China and that of Europe. A deeper study of Chinese literature and history has not confirmed the assumption of either the German philosopher or the Italian thinker. China, together with so many other countries in Asia and even in Europe itself, offers far more material to the folklorist, the ethnographist, and anthropologist, than to the historian proper. The really historic nations are rather poor in their folklore; and the wealth in folk-songs, folk-stories, and customs, intensely interesting as these undoubtedly are, is mostly an indication of a dearth in that historic life which is part of the great process of the Hellenisation of the world.

If we now inquire into the true causes that have made or produced the broad or general facts of history (not our *knowledge* of history), we may conveniently and perhaps exhaustively group them in the following manner. Probably greatest of all at the earlier stages, and very great at all stages of history, is the influence of *geo-political causes*, or, briefly, the influence of the geographical conditions, not of one country (polity) alone, but of the surrounding countries together with the country under consideration. Thus, the configuration of a country (that is, whether it is an island, peninsula, continent, a steppe, a plain, etc.) is by itself not decisive. More depends on the configuration of the neighbouring countries. One island has less influence on the other than has a continent on an island. Borneo, the second largest known island, has derived little benefit from its geographical configuration, because the surrounding countries are also islands. The same applies largely to Sardinia, being, as it is, surrounded by two other equally well-equipped large islands,

Corsica and Sicily, and several smaller ones. For identical reasons, the island of Crete, otherwise almost predestined to the first *rôle* amongst the Hellenes, very soon lost that ancient predominance so strikingly illustrated by the excavations at Cnossus and at other ancient sites in Crete. Had the Doggerbank formed an Ireland east of England, the strategic advantages accruing to England (Great Britain) from her insular formation might have been seriously reduced. The geographical influence must be studied not purely as a geographical, but as a geo-political factor, and in binary fashion. Moderate *climate* is one of the chief conditions of higher civilisation; even so tolerably fertile soil; and the accessibility, mineral wealth, and direction of large mountain ranges, as well as the course of rivers, have written many a chapter in history. Rivers invite the formation of nations; seas internationalise political and commercial relations, and give to the country controlling them one of the greatest leverages in the conflict of nations—sea-power. Steppes often breed hardy aggressive nations of shepherds, and the lack of such shepherds reduced pre-Columbian North America to sterility; while the steppes of Central Asia have always sent forth founders of empires, movers of men, builders of history.[1] The *natural boundary* of a country is of the highest historical importance. Where mountains, large rivers, seas, deserts, or swamps secure immunity from attack, there the people will, as a rule, remain stagnant. Where, on the other hand, two, three, or all the four sides of a country are exposed to sudden and dangerous

[1] Ratzel, Friedrich, *Politische Geographie* (1897), p. 218. There is now (1903) a second edition of this excellent work.

invasions, there the people will develop at a very rapid rate. The historic nations of the old world, such as the Hebrews, the Phoenicians, the Greeks, the Carthaginians, the Romans, the mediaeval Italian city-states, the French, the English, and the Germans, have all been heavily exposed at their frontiers. Rome, situated in the centre of a peninsula inhabited by very numerous and mutually hostile peoples, had to conquer, first Italy and then the other Mediterranean countries, in order to secure her exposed city boundary; and Germany is now beginning to play a great part, because to her three sides of hitherto possible exposure, in the west, east, and south, she is now adding the fourth side, the north (North Sea and Baltic), courting, as she does by her aggressive maritime policy, the danger of a conflict with England.

Second-rate countries are precisely such as have never been exposed to foreign aggressiveness on all sides; such as Hungary, Ireland, Poland, or Spain after the final expulsion of the Moors. Hungary's only exposure was in the south; Ireland's, in the east; Poland's, in the east and at times in the north; Spain's, for generations after 1598, only in her outlying non-Spanish possessions in Italy and France. Compare with that immunity from attack the position of England under the Tudors, or under William III.: attacks from the Scotch in the north; from the Spanish or French in the south; from the Irish in the west. France has ever since the last of the Merovingian kings been the most exposed large country of Europe. By sea and on land powerful enemies have constantly been threatening the French, thus producing that French alertness and quickness of intellect, that tendency to cen-

tralised, that is, ever-ready, government which is vainly ascribed to some "Gallic" or "Celto-Latin" race quality. Finally, we shall see in the course of this work that the geo-political condition of a territory by which it is made a *Hinterland*, has in all history had a very great influence on issues of the first magnitude.

Nations habitually exposed to foreign aggressiveness benefit, on the other hand, by an abundant influx of foreigners settling amongst them. The *foreigner*, whether he arrives in compact masses or individually, is one of the richest types of history. As a rule his very status as a foreigner quickens his energy, his wits, and endows him with a certain superiority over the native population, from whose national weaknesses he is often free. Some of the main streams of history have been largely formed by rich affluents of foreigners; and secondary nations have invariably been such as remained unmolested, but also unfertilised, by the immigration of numerous foreigners.

"No wiser word ever fell from the lips of John Selden than the remark that they who want to rule people make themselves as different from them as possible. The stranger, by the very isolation in which he stands to the people around him, acquires a superiority over them. Their foibles are not his; and therefore where they are weak he is strong. Their virtues are not his; and therefore where they recoil he will boldly push onward. Their perils are not his; and therefore where they succumb he will survive. But chief of all, where they are agitated by passion and blinded by violent desires, he is cool and collected. In all history, strangers have exercised an enormous influence. As so many other

chapters of general history, this too has not yet been written. There is no general history of strangers or foreigners. Yet if we pause to think, in English history, of the vast influence of foreigners, from William the Conqueror, Simon de Montfort, and William the Third, to Disraeli; or in French history, from Alcuin of York and Scotus Erigena, to Mazarin and Napoleon; in Austrian history, from Rudolf of Hapsburg (in Switzerland), Prince Eugene of Savoy, Van Swieten, Count Beust, a Saxon, to Count Andrássy, a Hungarian; in Russia, from the first Ruriks from Sweden to Catherine the Great, a German princess; we cannot but acknowledge that strangers have contributed to the formation of States and their history very much more than the patriotism or vanity of nations is ready to admit."[1] In a book of singular interest on the influence of strangers on the economic history of England, Professor W. Cunningham has arrived at the following conclusion: ". . . it is clear that for the whole of our textile manufactures, for our shipping, for numberless improvements in mining, in the hardware trades and in agriculture, and for everything connected with the organisation of business, we are deeply indebted to the alien immigrants. Their influence on other sides of life is less easy to assess and trace; but it is none the less real. It may suffice to say that all through the Middle Ages our isolated country was behind the rest of Europe in many ways, and that it has been through the agency of immigrants that we have been brought into contact with higher civilisations, and

[1] From an article of the author in the *Nineteenth Century* for September 1896.

thus been enabled to learn from them" (*Alien Immigrants to England*, 1897, p. 263).

The influence of the foreigner in France has been no less remarkable. Even to-day France has, of all European countries of considerable size, the largest share of immigrants. In the year 1851 there were 379,289 aliens in France. This number rose in 1891 to 1,130,211, the majority of whom were Belgians and Italians.[1] In Germany, on the other hand, the number of aliens in 1890 was only 433,254. In the Middle Ages the Franks, the Normans, the English, and a vast number of merchants immigrated uninterruptedly into the east, north-west, south-west of France, and into the districts of the famous Champagne fairs (at Provins, Troyes, Bar-sur-Aube, etc.), respectively. The Italians, or rather Lombards and Florentines, kept up a constant current of immigrants. It is no haphazard that the three greatest orders of the early Middle Ages were all founded in France, but by foreigners. St. Bruno of Cologne founded the Carthusians; St. Stephen (Harding) of Sherborne, in Dorsetshire, was the real founder of the Cistercians; and St. Norbert of Xanten in Westphalia founded the Premonstratensians. The United States, where most people are "foreigners" settled for one or two generations, is the classical type of what the energies of new-comers can do, in a country which from its immunity from invasion would otherwise be doomed to stagnation; and when the Scotch by the Union with England became "foreigners," settled in England, they quickly developed the marvellous resources of subtle and tenacious energy

[1] Turquan, Victor, *Le dénombrement des étrangers en France* (in *Journal de la Société de Statistique de Paris*, November 1894).

which have immeasurably extended their formerly poor spheres of activity. The Portuguese, who ought to be the Scotch of Spain, finally severed their connection with Spain in 1640, and thus also with ultimate success. The orthodox Jews are another historic example of the powers of "foreigners"; and in the Jesuits (artificial Jews, as it were) that power has reached its most consummate organisation. Nor must it be forgotten that the influx of the provincial into the towns, by giving the country-people, through their new status as "foreigners," new energies of the freshest vigour, has at all times infused new life into the history of a nation. All the leading men of the French Revolution were provincials; the two greatest minds of the English, Shakespeare and Newton, were provincials; with one or two exceptions, all the great writers of the Romans were provincials.[1]

[1] On the great effects of the migration of the country-people into the towns, the most suggestive book is Georg Hansen, *Die drei Bevölkerungsstufen* (Munich, 1889, pp. 407); see also the literature of the question in Georg von Mayer's *Statistik und Gesellschaftslehre* (1897), ii. pp. 124-125.

The literature of the "foreigner" is both numerous and difficult to reach. In addition to the state documents, statutes, and law cases of each country, to the "proceedings" of the various "Huguenot" societies, and the publications of Waldenses, Moravian Brethren, Knights-Templars, and similar sects and orders, there are many essays and monographs scattered over the whole of Europe, more especially about the Italians, who for several centuries (from the eleventh to the sixteenth) were the *foreigners* par excellence in all the western countries. Their merchants, doctors, teachers, *literati*, and ecclesiastical agents formed permanent currents of immigrants, very many of whom remained in foreign parts. The student will find ample bibliographies on the peaceful invasion of European countries by foreigners in Professor W. Cunningham's *Alien Immigrants to England* (1897); in L. Goldschmidt's *Universalgeschichte des Handelsrechts* (1891), pp. 180-237.; in von Fircks' *Bevölkerungslehre* (1898), pp. 470-474; in Georg von Mayer's *Statistik und Gesellschaftslehre* (1897), pp. 115-128; in Otto Bremer's *Ethnographie der germanischen Stämme* (1900), *passim*; and also in Ulysse Chevalier's *Répertoire des sources historiques du moyen âge*, second division (*Topo-Bibliographie*), under the names of the various countries, sections, *relations*, and *détails*. Nor should the *Anleitung zur deutschen Landes- und Volksforschung*, edited by Alfred Kirchhoff (1882), be neglected.

All these and other great influences are the effects of the geographical element. *Est locus in rebus*, may well be said with a slight alteration of the famous dictum of Horace; and site, locality, or, generally speaking, the area of events, has always formed the underlying and constant factor on which the shifting and accidental causes of luck and personality reared the temporary abode of events. History moves in space as well as in time; and space extending over an endless variety of objects and material powers, whereas time is linear and uniform, it is absurd to assume that the events of history are independent of geographical influences. Double or triple the width of the Channel, so that neither Dutch nor German merchantmen shall run—as they have been forced to—the gauntlet in the English Channel, and the whole of modern history is changed. We must, however, beware of thinking that history can all be explained by geography. While geography will account for much, it is very far from accounting for everything. Man is pre-eminently a spiritual being, and the material effects of geographical factors are frequently superseded by spiritual causes.

The second great cause influencing history is the *production and distribution of wealth*, by agriculture, industry, and trade. Economists and socialists, such as Karl Marx, Achille Loria, and largely also the historian Lamprecht, say that all history is a fight for economic goods, in that classes and castes are the product of the distribution of wealth, and their struggles with one another constitute, Loria says, the bulk of history. There can indeed be no doubt that wealth has at all times commanded power. The mistake of this, the so-called materialist school

of historians, lies in that they do not restrict the influence of economic causes in history to periods when indeed such causes were paramount. The history of the early Middle Ages in Western Europe is, from 600 A.D. to 1050, largely the history of the influence of *latifundia*, or vast estates in the hands of a few owners. At other periods, too, economic factors bear on history, but in a much smaller degree. In classical antiquity, for instance, where the economic production and distribution of wealth was largely sterilised by the prevalence of slavery, economic factors are traceable rather in the minor than in the leading features of history.

In the opening centuries of western history, wealth produced by trade and commerce is largely a product of geographical situation; and the existence or absence of rivers and inland seas—by far the cheapest means of conveyance—decides on the opulence of States. Did the Danube flow into the open Aegean Sea instead of into the closed Euxine, the Balkan peoples would have played an infinitely more glorious part. European history begins with the growth of the Mediterranean countries; and command of inland lakes large rivers, and good havens has dictated the rapid growth of some countries, as the lack of similar means of easy communication has permanently doomed others. The roads of international trade are also largely the routes of general history. The Eastern or Noric Alps possess no large rivers going from north to south into the Adriatic; the Western Alps, on the other hand, are all intersected by rivers connecting the mountains with the sea; hence the long backwardness of Noricum (Styria, Carinthia, etc.).

Economic causes show their greatest influence in

the various classes and castes, in the origination of which they frequently have a very large share. In the history of Europe the threefold stratification of people into noblemen, middle class, and peasantry is one of the most important of the static phenomena, and it can scarcely be denied that into the formation of these three layers of society economic causes, or the distribution of wealth, entered for a considerable part. Yet it cannot be ignored that the marked differences between these layers in one country from those in another clearly indicate causes other than purely economic. And if we restrict our attention to the differences in the middle classes of the various countries of Europe, we are struck—provided we have studied them *sur le vif* and not merely from books—with the astounding difference in the entire mental and social attitude of, say, the English middle class from the *bourgeoisie* in France; or the burgesses of North Germany from those of Austria. In fact, European nations differ mostly in their middle classes, and hence to expect a French *bourgeois* to act as one knows an English middle-class individual would act, is unfair to both nations. It is part of the task of the historian to point out the definite time- and space-bound causes, both economic and other, that have shaped and individualised the characteristic features of the middle class of his country. For Germany there is, in the exquisite works of W. Riehl, a very good beginning towards a real understanding of the German *Bürger*.[1] For France and England such works are still a desideratum. Once this great and thorough-going difference between the various

[1] W. H. Riehl, *Die Naturgeschichte des Volkes als Grundlage einer deutschen Social-Politik* (4 vols., 1894, etc. 9th ed.).

middle classes in Europe is fully grasped, a series of otherwise insoluble problems is cleared up, if not entirely solved. Thus the old question, why the English have never excelled in music, is certainly advanced towards a final explanation by noting the fact that music as an art is grafted everywhere on the middle classes only. According to differences in the internal or emotional attitude and atmosphere in those middle classes, music as an art will assume different forms and degrees of expression. The English middle class being distinctly less emotional than any *bourgeoisie* on the Continent, the Continental forms of music necessarily developed both earlier and more richly than any such forms did in England. For the same reason neither Hungary nor Spain, where a *bourgeoisie* proper is scarcely developed, has ever contributed high-class compositions, although both nations are well known to be intensely fond of and gifted for music.[1]

The third great factor of history is the *relation of man to woman.* Thus European history has one of its most vital roots in the monogamy of the Greeks and Romans. Woman is the great indirect cause. She makes and unmakes many of the webs of man. Her influence, being mostly indirect, has escaped the attention of numerous historians. Our entire knowledge, or rather ignorance,

[1] There is no careful, full, and methodic *general* work on the nature and individual true character of the various classes and castes in European nations, past or present. Frederick Bitzer's *Die socialen Ordnungen in weltgeschichtlicher Entwicklung* (Stuttgart, 1877, pp. 418) is a mere sketch. The student is thus forced to gather his material from law-books or political pamphlets. Both are rather misleading sources of information; and it is advisable to supplement the study of law-books by that of the poetry of the nation they refer to; say, the *Coutumes* of France by the *Fabliaux*; or the Greek or Roman legal texts by the comedies and satires of Greek and Roman literature.

of the Middle Ages, from 800 to 1300 A.D., is almost exclusively based on the writings of monks, that is, professed bachelors, who professionally ignore the indirect influence of women. And yet it is well known that French history, for instance, derives from her women as much as from her men. Woman, moreover, is the centre of the family, which by its static powers controls and balances the dynamic powers of the community. Family or private life likewise bears most decisively on the amusements of a people. So utterly neglected has the study of amusements been to the present day, that nobody has seriously attempted to study the psychology of human games, in which, as Leibniz profoundly remarked, man has shown more ingenuity than in his serious work.[1] Yet it may be said, with perfect accuracy, that given the games of a nation, the rest of the psychology of that nation becomes, or rather will become, a much easier task. In countries where woman is the chief source of social pleasure, man develops very late, and accordingly England has had in the last three centuries a number of mature and virile men from the age of twenty onwards quite out of proportion to her population, in that women in England have engaged a smaller part of man's sentiments and attention than have women, for instance, in France or Italy. The example of William Pitt is by no means exceptional. At the beginning of the eighteenth century England had, in spite of a population only one-third of that of France, as many reliable and virile men from twenty upwards as France had from the age of thirty-five to sixty.

[1] G. A. Colozza's *Il Giuoco* (Turin, 1895, pp. 286), and Karl Groos' *Die Spiele der Menschen* (Jena, 1899, pp. 538), are paedagogical and anthropological treatises respectively, but do not study their subject from the psychological point of view.

It is to circumstances like these that we must, as to their true causes, refer some of the startling successes of England in the eighteenth century.

The satisfaction derived from amusements grows in intensity with the class-difference of the persons engaged. In England, for instance, one of the chief elements of the games played is the fact, that in games alone all the socially differentiated classes meet in common. For the same reason the numerous balls and dances in Germany and Austria-Hungary play a great social part, and are naturally more pleasurable than similar amusements in levelled America. As Buecher has shown,[1] games and amusements originally preceded and guided serious work, by their rhythmic cadence, and man has naturally always looked for and invariably discovered amusements even where little pleasure might be expected. In studying the history of a nation we must therefore carefully investigate its amusements, both as part of its life and as a symptomatic fact of other features in national life; especially since nations differ in nothing more than in their pleasures.

The importance of the study of the amusements of nations implies the great significance of *ennui* in the development of human institutions. George Leroy, and more especially Auguste Comte,[2] have long called attention to this powerful motive in broad and lasting efforts of the human society to get rid of the monotony of life. Thus it has never been sufficiently taken into consideration to what extent the Crusades were due to the *ennui* of bored knights living in dark and

[1] Karl Buecher, *Ueber Arbeit und Rhythmus*; also in his *Die Entstehung d. Volkswirthschaft* (Tübg.[2] (1898), pp. 32-34).

[2] Auguste Comte, *Cours de Philos. Positive*, vol. iv. p. 449 (ed. Littré).

unsuggestive castles, and in times devoid of great interests in secular politics.

The fourth of the principal forces making history is the historic *Personality.* In nearly all the cases where professional historians or philosophers have discussed the famous question typified by the Greeks in the query, whether Athens made Themistocles, or Themistocles made Athens, the most important factor of the whole problem seems to have been lost sight of. We mean the factor of time and place. Personality, like any other cause in history, is bounded by specific conditions in time and space. Personality too has its history. There are times and places when and where a strong and gifted personality does really govern and direct an entire people; when the actions of that people are in reality only the execution of the will of the personality. Thus in Prussian history, given the politically inert or unripe character of the Prussian people until very recent times, we are bound to admit the paramount influence of the Great Elector (1640-1688), Frederick William I. (1713-1740), Frederick the Great (1740-1786), and Prince Bismarck. There are, moreover, polities whose sole existence, from its very inception, is bound up with a certain powerful personality. So were, in antiquity, the city-states; then the Roman Catholic Church; and the great orders of the Catholic Church. Other polities again, such as the Hansa towns, were indifferent to and independent of towering personalities. At times men endowed with the fascination and power of a superior personality founded States proper; at other times they were only able to found secondary States, such as the great orders; at other times again they were only king-makers (as from 1460 to 1634); or chief

ministers, as in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; or the exponents of national unity, as in the nineteenth. It is therefore clear that the historic term "personality" cannot denote one simple philosophical conception, but a great number of personal forces making for a variety of objects by a diversity of means. To speak of personality in general, without any regard to the character of the nation, the State, the political conjuncture, and the geo-political situation of each case, is to talk rhetoric and not history. In Athens of the fifth century B.C., subjective personality had a far higher importance, a far greater initiative and controlling power, than in Rome in the second century B.C. It was Themistocles who made Athens; but Athens was sure to produce Themistocles. Sparta was made by Lycurgus as surely as the Carthusians were made by St. Bruno; if for reasons widely different. To deny the existence of Lycurgus is as absurd as to deny the existence of St. Bruno. There is, as will be seen, more moral certainty as regards the existence of a lawgiver called Lycurgus, than as regards the existence of Frederick the Great. There is a geography and chronology of personality. As Professor Harnack has well remarked, the Greek monks (in the Middle Ages) were unable to produce a series of personalities remotely resembling the great Churchmen of the regulars of the Latin Church, such as St. Dunstan, St. Odilo of Clugny, St. Anselm, St. Bernard of Clairvaux, St. Thomas Aquinas, and others.[1] The problem of personality in history is therefore a highly technical one, and cannot be settled by general philosophic remarks. The most insignificant and limited person, endowed with

[1] A. Harnack, *Das Mönchthum* (Giessen, 1881, p. 27).

no great personality of his own, may eventually play a very incisive part in history, while some brilliant genius or character ends in miserable failure. The Guises and Orléans in France were always shorn of success; Mary Stuart, with all her brilliant beauty and political genius, only confirmed the fate of the Guises to whom she belonged; while her insipid son lived and died as King of England, Scotland, and Ireland.

This enigmatic rise or absence of historic personalities must, however, not be made a convenient loophole by which the incapacity of the individual historian is suffered to escape unnoticed. Many an erudite and methodic historian readily exaggerates, with raised brow, the importance of personality in history, so that he may appear justified in his failure to point out less obscure and less unanalysable causes of historic events. By admitting unconditionally that the Seven Years' War was caused by Frederick the Great, that is, by a factor the complete analysis of which can indeed not be made, one absolves by one stroke the incapable historian, and condemns the capable. Only from the barren and unhistoric standpoint of formal law can it be said that Frederick—by commanding his troops to enter Saxony, at the end of August 1756, an act that he alone had the legal power to do—caused the Seven Years' War. The sober fact is that most arm-chair historians, lacking as they do the richest source of ideas, *i.e.* object-impressions (*Anschauungen*), are also very deficient in throwing out any of those historic constructions that alone make history a scientific study. As in all science and in every art, all comes back to one question, to a new and

true *aperçu*. To avoid the tiresome reproach of a lack of ideas, too many historians, more especially of the Berlin school, insist that personality is the main cause of historical events, well knowing, as they do, that in the necessary obscurity surrounding the final problems of personality the wisest of their opponents can see very little more clearly than they can. They then solemnly proceed to an ethical catechisation and moralising appreciation of such personalities, and gravely leave their task with the conscience of duty done. The result of such catechisation depends on the social *milieu* of the learned historian. Accordingly, to give just one example, he will eventually fall foul of all brilliant personalities in history, and Isocrates will be made to appear superior to Demosthenes; Augustus he will declare to have been considerably greater and more important than Caesar; and of modern personalities, stupid, priggish Frederick William I. of Prussia was "probably the most important historic personage of modern times."[1] The cold truth is that such historians have at no time of their lives made a serious study of the principles and method of history. He who has honestly, and not unfrequently with a despairing heart, wrestled with those problems, both by intense study of their vast literature, by deep and persistent meditation, and by attempting to apply them to a concrete case,—he cannot for a moment be deceived by the "methodologies" of history that men like Droysen, Langlois, Eduard Meyer, etc., have, *à propos* of some passing literary event, dropped from their tables. The public, however, looking at the bulky volumes written by these

[1] Eduard Meyer.

men on some historic subject or other, is easily made to assume that such historians are best qualified to pronounce upon the principles of a science which they have practised so extensively. Extensively; but poorly. The true spirit of history has never come over them; for that spirit breathes life and reality, and they, like their predecessors in the mediaeval abbeys, know of no reality. So little are they acquainted with the forces that guide and control reality that they, who so gravely insist on the paramount influence of personality, have repeatedly denied the existence of the most real, most necessary, most indispensable of historic personalities. The very historian to whom Frederick William I. of Prussia is "one of the most important personalities of modern history" has, together with the vast majority of German historians, denied the existence of Lycurgus. One might just as well ascribe the downfall of Napoleon to Lord Liverpool, and then proceed to a denial of Napoleon's existence. The arguments of these historians are purely philological,—arguments taken from the only reality they know, the reality of words. But while words have their say in history, their etymology does not make the historian. Philological historians are erudite; their works, however, do not constitute history. Their means suffice indeed to write the history of Hesse-Cassel or of Mecklenburg, or of some other absolutist State in 12mo, that properly speaking has no history. They cannot attempt to write the history of great, intensely active, deeply agitated nations, such as the Greeks, the Romans, the French, or the English.

In those nations we do indeed see the influence of mighty personalities. The sphere of these otherwise

unanalysable agents of history is, however, strictly circumscribed and determined by causes frequently quite clear to us. It is impossible to "construct" Themistocles or Epaminondas; it is not impossible to show the clear and analysable causes that made the work of Themistocles' genius not only one preceding that of the great Theban by four generations, but also one of a far more enduring character. His very genius falls partly within the grasp of what is historically explicable. He was, on his mother's side, not an Athenian, and he thus participated in that peculiarly strenuous and ingenious resourcefulness which foreigners, as we have seen above, have so frequently displayed in the most critical moments of their adoptive country.

In this and in many other ways shown to us by the serious historian, even the dark power of personality can be made much more accessible to our understanding. And if, in addition to the searchlight of influences geo-political, economic, and social, we add the insight frequently won by genealogical investigations into the history of personalities, we shall considerably reduce the area of facts wholly dominated by unanalysable personality. This applies more particularly to the work of great personalities in war and in diplomacy.

It is, of course, impossible to deny the paramount influence of successful or unsuccessful wars and diplomatic movements on the fate of nations. Much as military success may be dependent on the geography of the country, the genius and luck of the leading general are for very much in the ultimate result. However, as in the case of personalities in general, so in the case of great or small

generals, we are very frequently, and probably always, in a position to reduce the facts bearing on the ultimate achievement of the general to terms less inaccessible than is his luck or genius. It can be shown why Austria from 1796 to 1813 almost invariably failed to hold her own against France; that is, why her generals, Beaulieu, Wurmser, Alvinczy, Melas, Mack, and even Archduke Charles, failed to repel or defeat the armies of Napoleon.

Austria always had good generals in plenty; she also had bad ones. It was, however, her invariable rule to put the bad ones at the head, and the good ones in secondary positions. So she did in the war of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), when the ingenious Traun was persistently subordinated to the incapable Charles of Lorraine. So in the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), when excellent Laudon was persistently subordinated to pedantic and dilatory Daun; so, finally, in the great wars of the French Revolution, and of 1866, when Archduke Charles (with very few exceptions) and his son Albert respectively were given posts of inferior import, while incapacities were placed at the head of the vital campaigns. In other words, in Austria there has, for now close on two hundred years, been a faulty system in the appointment of the generals-in-chief. In that way we can very well reduce the difficulties besetting the explanation of lucky and unlucky Austrian battles, as far as the battle depends on the personality of the general. It is part of the task of the true historian to reduce, by new sidelights or new correlations, the unanalysable factor of personality in war.

The same remarks apply to the great diplomatists, more especially of modern history. The superior

sneer with which some historians view, or rather deprecate, the great historic work done by mere diplomatists, is sheer pedantry. Diplomatists have, at times, made history; and in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries they have made a very considerable portion thereof. It would have mattered very much indeed whether Henry IV. of France had sent, instead of President Jeannin as his diplomatic agent to Holland, some other man of less signal capacity; and as to the great French diplomatists, from Père Joseph, d'Avault, Servien, Lionne, Harcourt, and Pomponne to Vergennes, it cannot seriously be denied that they have, from the time of Richelieu to 1789, much influenced the destinies of nations. On the other hand, it is absurd to exaggerate the importance of ambassadors and diplomatic agents in times when they had none. Thus to consider even the reports of the subtle, and by secular tradition highly trained, Venetian ambassadors of the sixteenth century as containing the final word about the events they refer to, would be manifestly irrelevant. The problems then agitating the world could not be, and were not, solved by ever so clever diplomatists. Nor can diplomatists of our own days claim a very prominent position, in that their efficiency is, by the modern means of instantaneous conveyance of news and altered orders from headquarters, toned down to that of mere agents of the central power. As in the case of the general, so in that of the diplomatist, the historian is bound to light up the otherwise hopeless obscurity of his hero's personality by shedding fresh lights of novel correlations upon the facts.

One can, finally, hardly deny that among the powers making history there are also, at times and

with certain nations, a number of ideals, sincerely believed in, and fervently hoped for. The sanest and soberest statesman of our time, Bismarck, has frankly admitted these *imponderabilia*, as he called them. However, as in the case of personality, so in the case of ideals, we must always consider the elementary historic conditions of time and space. It was, as we now know, quite wrong to assume, as Amadée Thierry and his contemporaries did in the first half of the nineteenth century, that the Treaty of Verdun (843 A.D.) saw already two nations, each conscious of the national German and French ideal respectively. Such ideals were quite strange to the people of that time. It would be equally absurd to deny the power and influence of the national ideal in the war of the Germans in 1870.

These are the principal five correlative forces which make history. It might now be urged that the purely intellectual forces, such as ideas, knowledge, or science, have here met with undeserved neglect. Knowledge, it would seem, has shaped many a human glory, and the apparently undeniable fact of progress is, it might be suggested, due to knowledge. It is here not meant to deny that there has been remarkable progress in knowledge. All that we advance is, that history does not consist of the progress of knowledge. In fact, history is the product of the emotions and the will, and not of reason, common or systematised. There is little logic in history; and the human heart, its chief instrument, has in historical times changed in no perceptible degree. The human heart is the most conservative of powers, and provided we apply sound psychology both of the individual and the masses to the events of history, we may very

well leave the consideration of the scientific and philosophic efforts of mankind outside the study of history proper. Literature and art, but especially religion, flowing as they do much more from the heart than from reason, have indeed a serious claim to the attention of the historian. In history, Pascal's *Lettres Provinciales* carry more weight than his barometrical experiments on the Puy de Dôme. Knowledge is not a primary but a secondary phenomenon in history, in that it is far more conditioned by the trend of historical events than they are conditioned by it. The Reformation was started by Luther, not by the learned and subtle Erasmus.

On further reflection over the nature of the five principal forces making history, as stated on the preceding pages, we cannot but note that four of them, to wit, geo-political forces, economic, social, and finally ideal causes, exhibit a decidedly more regular, static, or at any rate more steadily variable character than does the fifth or irregularly variable force which we call personality. Availing ourselves, as students of other sciences have long done, of the singularly fertile conception of Descartes, who introduced the indirect method of solving geometrical problems by introducing his regularly and irregularly varying variables into problems where the ancients had tried to obtain their end by direct or, as it were, frontal attacks; we are legitimately entitled to hope that by a careful handling of our historic *abscissae* and *ordinatae*, *i.e.* of our five principal forces making history, we shall likewise secure the immeasurably more advantageous means of approaching solutions, if need be, by indirect methods too, and not, as has hitherto been the case, by merely advancing on lines of direct or frontal

attack. What Kepler and Descartes really did for mathematical and physical science was this: they gave us new methods by which much that could formerly be done only by wearisome direct observation was henceforth made accessible to an indirect and incomparably quicker calculation. This progress from direct to indirect methods of study is the very life-process of every true science. In history too we must at last arrive at the point to which Kepler raised astronomy. We must be able to see and learn much more than our mostly unsatisfactory "sources" can yield to passive or direct reading. We must apply indirect processes. These indirect processes in historic research are, as we shall see, psychological conclusions from a given fact to a directly unverified one. Such conclusions will, however, be legitimate only by virtue of a due and careful consideration of all the historic *abscissae* and *ordinatae* above discussed. If, for instance, we leave out the geo-political element (unless its inefficiency in the concrete case can be proved); or, again, if we disregard the power of personality in any one of its numerous manifestations (unless its relevancy can be disproved); then we must not wonder that the curve of events will never tally with that of our own historic curve raised on deficient *abscissae* and *ordinatae*. How the historic elements of the curve of events are to be adjusted; in what manner their correlations are to be formulated; that can be generally laid down no more than can the general method of finding the analytical equation of any given curve. It is a matter of direct experiences gathered in several countries with divergent civilisations; it is the product of long practice, tact, and talent. On the other hand, it cannot seriously be

disputed that a neglect of some of the great correlative forces of history will leave the student without any means of understanding history.

In the preceding discussion of the forces that make history, the reader will probably, to his astonishment, miss a mention of forces that in the ordinary everyday view of history are almost invariably taken as the chief factors of great events. Of these forces, Race is *facile princeps*. It is a matter of universal knowledge that the average man in this country, in the United States, or in France, let alone in Germany or Russia, is profoundly convinced that the greatness of his country is, in the first place, due to an innate greatness of his "race." The superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race is an axiom in England and in the United States; even so the superiority of the Latin race, in France; and that of the Teutono-Germanic race, in the German Empire. Or again, to most people it is a matter of absolute certainty that the Celtic race is as distinct from the Anglo-Saxon as is the white from the black, or *vice versa*. To doubt "Celtic" race influences seems almost ridiculous; and both in polities, literature, and common life such influences are taken for granted. While therefore each nation of Europe vaunts its undoubted "superiority" of race respectively, not one of them will admit that there are no distinct races at all. Yet such is the case among white men. The arguments in favour of a belief in races in Europe (most effectively advanced in the works of Count Gobineau) have long been refuted by Buckle and numerous other historians and ethnologists. It is not denied that a group of, say, 10,000 people, living in one and the same locality and under practically unchanging circumstances for three

or six generations, will rapidly develop certain physical and mental features characteristic of them. It is denied that these features are (1) permanent, *i.e.* unchanging under altered circumstances; (2) due to some mysterious "race" quality. They are due to the above five great forces of history, and to nothing else. The idle, over-excitable, unbalanced Irish poor become, in the States, the sturdy, wealthy, well-balanced leaders in politics and business. The slow, uneloquent, unexcitable average Briton turns, in the States, to the over-rapid, eloquent, nervous Yankee. Again, the Czech who, since his absurd defeat in a battle, or rather during a short panic in 1620, has never been able either to revolt, sword in hand, against Austria, or to acknowledge frankly and acquiesce in his defeat; the Czech has, for such as know both nations intimately, a very striking similarity with the Irish. It is history, even more than contemporary nature, that shapes man. Over the physiognomy of every one Englishman are written the historical events called Hastings, Magna Charta, Crécy, the Armada, the Bank of England, and Trafalgar. These events had greater influence on him than has race, weather, or climate. Reduced to its essence, the character of the English is consummated in this, that, as their country is physically, so is every one of them morally, an island for himself. This ethical insulation is the product of vast and long-working historical forces that have made islands of those innumerable foreigners too who have, in these two thousand years, landed in England with the attempt of continuing here their continental or ethically peninsular character.

One of the commonest, and also one of the worst arguments for "race," is that taken from the alleged

permanency of the Jewish race. Nothing is less true in fact. Among modern European Jews there are at least five almost totally different types; such as the Polish Jew, the Austrian Jew, the Spanish Jew, the Russian Jew, the Levantine Jew. Neither the nose nor the chin shows any permanent shape whatever. In fact, we know pertinently that the Jews have in mediaeval times absorbed a large element of non-Jewish origin.[1] But even the frequency of the sameness in some types of Jews does not prove anything in favour of a "race." The Jesuits are a group of men of all "races," now moulded after ideas and educational systems absolutely identical with those that over 300 years ago were introduced by St. Ignatius and by Aquaviva. Yet the Jesuits have during all these years unfailingly preserved the same highly differentiated mental habitus; and their example alone, as has long been remarked by Hume, ought to dispose for ever of the void idea of permanent race-qualities. The study of genealogy will convince any unprejudiced person that every family, more especially in Western Europe, is of so mixed an origin, and has in the course of centuries been infused with blood from quarters so

[1] See the *Regesten zur Geschichte der Juden im fränkischen und deutschen Reiche b. z. Jahre* 1273, edited by A. Dresdner, L. Lewinski, and J. Aronius (Berlin, 1902), and especially the following sections (number of documents), 8, 19, 28, 60, 64, 103, 108, 117, 147, 195, 460, 725, 740, and 757. An entire and very populous pagan nation, the Chazars, whose military power was dreaded even by the Byzantine Emperors, and who inhabited most of South-East Russia, embraced Judaism in the eighth century A.D., and continued to be Jewish in religion and custom all during the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries. See Graetz, *Geschichte der Juden*, vol. v. (1871), pp. 186-191; and *The Jewish Encyclopædia* (New York, 1903), vol. iv. *s.v.* "Chazars." Even Professor Ripley (W. Z.) of New York, who has written most elaborately on "Race" (in which, if with very great restrictions, he still staunchly believes), denies that the Jews are a "race." According to him they are "*only a people.*" *The Races of Europe* (London, 1900), p. 400.

remote from one another, that the old saying of genealogists, that each of us has amongst his ancestors kings as well as beggars, will hold good in most cases. On the other hand, reigning sovereign families, such as the German Imperial family, besides having the blood of all nations in their veins, have among their ancestors persons in the humblest stations of life.

To the serious student of history the perusal of modern works on the "races" of Europe, America, etc., is a melancholy performance. Knowing, as he does, that social or historical phenomena are the results of the most varied and frequently unexpected correlations of forces physical and moral, latent and explicit, he stands amazed and helpless at the sight of so-called anthropologists, ethnologists, or demologists, who, on the strength of observations of head-forms, cranial angles, hair-colour, etc., divide, say, the 400,000,000 Europeans into three, six, nine, or twelve aboriginal, yet permanent, "races." Before advancing his heavy artillery of counter-arguments, may the student of history not point out the utter insufficiency of such anthropological mangling of Hellenic Europe, even on the anthropologists' own lines? The race for "Race" is, as any reader of the works of Quatrefages, Deniker, Topinard, J. Ranke, Virchow, Beddoe, Rhys, Haddon, Sergi, or W. Z. Ripley may see, an attempt to reduce the various bodily features of people to a system of *somatology*, or a science of the outward form of human bodies. The observations made on the stature, hair, eyes, colour, head-form, and similar somatic features of people are, in quantity, immense. Yet one cannot but wonder that the numerous workers in this field have never paid the slightest attention to a physio-

logical feature that characterises people probably very much more than does either their stature, colour of hair, or cranial angle. We mean the *timbre*, pitch, and cadence of the human voice. No one endowed with an ear for sounds can have travelled extensively without noticing the distinct and frequently very considerable difference between the force and stress (the *staccato*) of accents, the variety of pitch, the divergence in cadence in French, as spoken by French people in France, and English, as spoken by Englishmen in England, on the one hand, or Canadian-Frenchmen, and Americans, in America, on the other. Thus the well-known "twang" of Americans outside New England is practically identical with the "twang" of the Spanish-Americans in Central and South America when speaking Spanish. The speaking voice reveals, one may assume, very much more of the real nature of people than can any other somatic feature, except the expression of the eyes. The latter, however, cannot easily be tabulated or registered, whereas all the shades of accent, pitch, and cadence of the voice might now very well be made visible by photographing the indentations on the various gramophones recently invented. We might thus obtain curves for *timbre* and pitch, very much more important for a real insight into the soul of a nation than is any other somatological curve.

The anthropologists have so far built on most insufficient material. Ripley himself restricts the proper sphere of "race" with such anxious care as to leave it almost no sphere at all. The more history will accomplish her real task, the more the phantom of permanent race-qualities will disappear and the more one will learn that there are types indeed, but

not races. Types are very marked; yet, under changed circumstances, they invariably disappear. The children of German parents, if born in the States, or if only brought up there from their early youth, have scarcely a trace of German characteristics, somatic or mental. Has any German of America excelled as a musician? Has any German of America shown any of the philosophical genius of the Fatherland?

One of the chief obstacles to a right understanding of race is the widespread belief that there is practically no other alternative than either Race or Environment. Nothing is further from truth. The alternative is either the arbitrary assumption of permanent race-qualities, or the laborious inquiry into the Correlations of the Five Causes of historical phenomena discussed above. "Environment" says far too little. Physical and moral or intellectual features of people are the resultants of forces utterly beyond any influence of mere climate, mountains, food, or drink. We have to study all the Five Causes, their mutual correlations, their latent or explicit play of leverage. The French are, no doubt, much influenced by their country and food, but still more by the Roman institutions they have accepted; by placing all their private life on the unit called Family instead of, as do the English, on the unit called Individual; by the immense influence of women in France, who cause their sons to have a more animated play of facial muscles, and thus a totally altered physiognomy; by their extreme thrift, which is part of the causes of their general cheerfulness. Thrifty people are psychologically singularly prone to gaiety, and thus likely to smile and laugh more frequently, thereby changing the

physiognomy of the lower part of the face, and the mobility and size of the eyes. It is by studying these, and a few more of the correlations that have been at work in France, that we can arrive at a tolerably clear comprehension of the French type, without in the least needing a recourse to any permanent "race"-qualities. The assumption of "race" must, as may now be seen, foreclose the very researches by which alone we may hope to win a true insight into nations. Where the historical student of peoples begins his researches, there the "race"-theorist has already terminated them. Instead of tracing carefully, at the hand of simple and sound psychology, the correlations of the real forces of history, the "race"-theorist is contented, *a limine*, with a mere name. In fact, the whole "race"-theory is mainly of philological make. Words, indeed, have primeval roots; and therefore historians, who have mostly been of a philological bent, assumed that nations, too, have such primeval roots in some aboriginal "race"-quality. Moreover, the "race"-theory is one of the best-cherished prejudices of people whose chief pleasure in life is in congratulating themselves on their own native superiority, and in pooh-poohing the inevitable inferiority of their less elect fellow-beings. The number of those people is not on the decrease. It is needless to add that "nationality" has nothing whatever to do with "race," as has been admitted by the "race"-theorists themselves.

Altogether the idea of race lacks any serious foundation in fact, and has, on the whole, been abandoned by most responsible students of history.

Amongst the causes generally, or at any rate

frequently, held to be the true originators of historic events, religion is, next to race, the most universally accepted. However, religion is not a primary cause of historic events with peoples whose political life has passed the stage of infancy. Religion is the cloak, the complement, or the resultant of forces political and social.

It is likewise inadmissible to assume that the form of the political organisation, such as monarchy, republic, oligarchy, etc., may or must be considered as the prime cause of the historic process. To begin with, these forms are very frequently deceptive. Theocracy is in reality an excessive form of democracy; and oligarchy is often a veiled Caesarism. Form, as in art, so in politics, is meant to disguise as much as it reveals; and he would commit a childish error who, in the study, say, of the Roman or English Constitution, would not pay as much attention to the implied, unexpressed, and veiled undercurrents, as to the institutions explicitly and solemnly named, draped and pageanted. As in private law, so in public, the *contractus innominati* are numberless; and we find such a great difficulty in understanding the Roman Constitution, because so much of its real life has found no direct expression in the laws and writings of the Romans. Moreover, forms of state are, as a rule, the final and not the inceptive expression of the whole political and social life of a people. The republicanism of the Americans is based and founded, not on a document dated on the 4th of July 1776, but on the social homogeneity of the American people. In Europe, except in France to a considerable extent, and in England, in the political sense of the term, there is as yet no such homogeneity.

Accordingly, European countries still need that ideal rallying-point of highly differentiated classes and peoples which we call dynasties. Level down the inhabitants of Europe to practically one mode of thinking and acting, and the reigning dynasties will disappear automatically. It is doubtful whether this process of Americanising Europe is anything to be seriously hoped for. It is certain that unless Europe's peoples are first levelled out to one homogeneous mass of wage-earners and capitalists, Europe will not only not attempt to come nearer to the American ideal, but will, as the great Giuseppe Ferrari has intimated with regard to history in general, insist with energy on a constantly increasing differentiation of her component elements. M. Tarde has tried to derive most phenomena of history from the power of imitation. It appears more to the point to derive many an institution or event from the power of that conscious contrast which has invariably driven neighbouring nations to adopt diametrically opposed laws, customs, or measures. Now that Europe is, so to speak, the immediate neighbour of America, that power of contrast will, one may safely assume, drive Europe into the very opposite of American institutions.

From whichever standpoint, therefore, we may consider the influence of the form of State, we cannot but arrive at the conclusion that it is a derived and secondary result, not a primary cause of history.

III

In the preceding chapter we have considered the powers and forces that make history. We shall now

try to investigate the question as to the sources from which we derive some knowledge of those powers and forces.

Those sources are the historical records in the most general sense of the term. They comprise chronicles, annals, biographies, letters, memoirs, charters, documents, laws, inscriptions, coins, seals, and monuments of all kinds. The common feature of these records is that they contain direct information. It is superfluous to state that the historian must, first of all, study the direct sources. It is more necessary to insist on the fact that a mere study, ever so elaborate, of these direct sources does not constitute the true work of the historian. If, indeed, the direct sources contained a full and complete photograph of the external and internal aspects of the events and persons they refer to, then, and then alone, it would be sufficient to study them, and history might be written by giving a fair abstract of them. However, the sources are, from every standpoint, most deficient. They are exasperatingly incomplete, both for Antiquity and the Middle Ages; and even where their text is not lost or not hopelessly corrupt, they but too frequently furnish information only on the very points in which we take little or no interest. Last, not least, the amount of matters *sous-entendus* in the sources is by far greater than the matters clearly expressed. Balzac once said that "*les sous-entendus font la moitié de la langue française.*" One is more justified in saying that the sources of history contain principally information they were not meant to convey. Under these circumstances it is evident that the historian cannot be satisfied with a passive attitude towards his sources. In a

few cases indeed the sources are so full, so satisfactory, that the closer we keep to them the better history we are likely to write. Such is the case in Church history, more especially in the history of the Catholic Church. That Church, as a body politic, consists of regulars or monks, and seculars or priests, who, the regulars at all times, the seculars since the end of the eleventh century, have reduced the rich capital of human forces and emotions to a few features. A monk and a priest are in reality emasculated, not to say eviscerated, humans. Such reduced specimens of humanity may indeed be fully described in charters and annals. One may in all probability be able to represent completely the daily life and the inner world of a Cistercian of the twelfth century, whose movements, external as well as internal, were proceeding strictly on the lines prescribed by the *regula* of his order. In the same way, a council, local, provincial, or national, held by priests and monks of the Middle Ages, may be described with approximate completeness in the minutes drawn up by its secretary. When, however, we turn to men not reduced in their human capital, to men and women instinct with all the impetus and wealth of human desires and aspirations, dry documents will, as a rule, prove far from satisfactory. Documents that may give us a fair notion of a Carthusian or a Cistercian, give us a most incomplete idea of the lay men or women of the same time. Such men and women do not live according to a *regula*; their lives cannot be tabulated nor paragraphed. The principles of historic criticism applying to Church history cannot therefore be applied to the history of lay states. For analogous reasons we must not apply the same methods of

doubt and text-criticism to the history of Sparta as we do to the history of Athens. The Spartans too were in many respects eviscerated Hellenes, and their state-charters contained more of their real history than did the Athenian charters of the history of Athens.

The truth of the preceding remarks will be readily seen and admitted by whosoever reads the historical works of Professors Janssen, Pastor, and other modern disciples of the Jesuits, which are at once scrupulously true to the "sources," and grossly untrue in spirit. Janssen has advanced no indictment against the Reformation without adducing unimpeachable quotations from some source or other. Only the Reformation being largely a movement of unbroken and uneviscerated men, all the written "sources" referring to the Reformation are insufficient to reflect faithfully the full spirit of that great movement; and the sublime hymns of Luther undo legions of insipid quotations from pamphlets and charters testifying to the less elevated features of the Reformer's private character.

It is thus quite clear that the interpretation of the sources is by far the most important, as it is the most difficult, task of the historian. Nor is this task lightened by the ingrained mendacity of most of our sources. Lies, conscious and unconscious, pervade the whole body of historical sources. Patriotism, religious prejudice, ignorance, vanity, rancour, and all the innumerable motives of the forger, the fanatic, or the believer in a *pia fraus*, have thrown over the fields and meadows of the past huge erratic blocks or deceptive haze, impeding progress and outlook. To disentangle truth from the half-truths and lies direct,

or still worse, from the deliberate omissions and distortions of the sources, is frequently quite impossible, and always very difficult. In history, more perhaps than in any other study of facts, doubt must be the constant companion of the student. On the other hand, mere brilliant doubting does not constitute a real historian. Historical doubts, such as have been applied to Greek and Roman history, that is, doubts affecting rather texts than things, are as a rule mere philological *jeux d'esprit*. Such are, for instance, the doubts thrown on the reality of the seven Roman kings; or on the trustworthiness of most of Roman history before the Punic wars; or on the reality of the exodus of the Hebrews from Egypt. Doubts must be psychological, and not philological. Even if the chronology of the first Roman kings could be shown to be quite artificial; and even if the various stories about the birth, education, and deeds of Romulus are proved to be repetitions of similar stories in the folklore of other nations; all that does not psychologically disprove the historical existence of Romulus. It only proves that many a legend has gathered round Romulus, as it has round Caesar or Napoleon.[1] The artificiality of early Roman chronology only proves that our sources cannot be relied upon with regard to the dates they give. It does not prove at all that the institutions and principal events related in those sources are untrue. Dionysius of Halicarnassus or Livy may contradict themselves

[1] Napoleon has long had his place in the folklore of various nations. See the interesting work of Mr. Amfiteatroff, a Russian scholar, who collected from the mouths of Russian peasants the fables circulating among them about "Napoleonder." Mr. Kerman translated Mr. Amfiteatroff's book under the title of *Folk-tales of Napoleon* (New York, 1902). Compare S. Reinach in *L'Anthropologie* for 1903, p. 118.

and each other ever so frequently, yet there is no psychological reason to think that they merely invented, or copied the invention of others, when they tell us of seven Roman kings and their reigns. It is only owing to the purely philological views of the study of history that an indictment of the author of a source at once discredits the facts contained in the source. In private life, indeed, we dismiss with contempt the stories of liars. In history, itself full of lies, we are not generally justified to act upon the same principle. We must investigate each case on its own merits. One of the greatest philologians, F. A. Wolf, wasted all his vast knowledge of Greek literature on the attempt to prove, from reasons purely philological, that the Greeks of the time of Homer were ignorant of the art of writing. Philologically, and from the standpoint of the then extant Greek sources, Wolf's arguments are probably unimpeachable. Historically, he has, especially with regard to Mr. A. Evans' splendid discoveries in Crete, long been proved to have gravely erred. Had he studied his problem psychologically and historically, he could not possibly have doubted that the Greeks even of prae-Homeric times were acquainted with an art which their nearest neighbours in Egypt, Phoenicia and Asia Minor, had been practising for thousands of years before Homer.

The problem of the interpretation of the sources raises the question whether the theory of evolution, now so generally accepted as a working theory for the explanation of biological and morphological facts, is not also applicable to the explanation of the facts of history. The remarkable success obtained by the methods and concepts of Darwinism in the last forty

years has, in fact, so encouraged its adherents, that they have boldly applied it to problems which the great Darwin himself distinctly declined to embrace within his researches. Both popular and professional books and essays have been published in large numbers, in which the doctrine of evolution is declared to solve the great problems of present sociology or past history. Draper, Letourneau, von Hellwald, and a host of minor writers, but more particularly Mr. Herbert Spencer in nearly all his works, have so impressed the general public with the all-sufficiency of evolution as a method of reconstructing the growth of human history, that it is at present almost a heresy, if not an absurdity, to doubt that evolution can account for history as well as for Nature. This all but general acceptance of evolution in matters of history has been singularly facilitated by the widespread conviction of men of "general culture" that they are sufficiently acquainted with history. Few gentlemen will be ashamed to admit their complete ignorance of physics or chemistry. It is different with history. Most men will speak with emphasis and authority of what "history has proved," or of "incontestable historical facts." It seldom occurs to them that a real knowledge of history is still a very rare achievement, and that very few persons have acquired a tolerably trustworthy knowledge of even the main events of the near past. In fact, the prejudices and patriotic wishes of people are so strong with most men that it may be said, that while with regard to the history of their own country they do not in the least desire to know the real truth; they do not, with regard to countries other than their own, wish to know either the truth

or the untruth at all. Under these circumstances, a convenient catchword, such as "evolution," is to them a highly welcome general solution of problems of the complicated nature of which they have scarcely an idea. Everything is made by "evolution"; and the growth of institutions, in particular, is, to them, clearly explained by "evolution."

However, a serious study of history does not at all encourage us to believe in evolution as a true solution of the problems of human history. Darwinism freely draws on the inexhaustible supply of time, in that the theory of evolution assumes that at some unknown period there appeared that incipient "variation" which by means of the "struggle for life," of heredity, and of other forces assumed by the Darwinians, succeeded in establishing itself firmly as a new and definite form of organic life. The evolutionist has no interest in accounting for the precise period of time at which his "incipient variation" made its first appearance. Whether that period was 400,000 or 450,000 years B.C., that is practically indifferent to him. He likewise disclaims the necessity of accounting for the individual character of that "incipient variation." For him, it is sufficient to show that such an incipient variation has somewhere and at some unknown time taken place.

In both these capital respects the interest and the task of the historian are radically different. He cannot afford to neglect the question of time. On the contrary, he is bound to investigate why the variation arose at a given time. He is likewise bound to explain why the variation has assumed its individual form and no other. Thus, to the evolutionist, the crusades may appear sufficiently

accounted for by placing them on a line with the migration of lemmings, storks, or other migratory animals; and the French Revolution, he has held, is the "natural evolution" of a discontented people. The historian of the crusades must regretfully decline the lemmings, for those strange animals have practised their suicidal migrations from times immemorial; whereas the crusades commenced only in 1096, and were never attempted before. They likewise ended in 1270, and were never fully realised after that date. The difficulty of the crusades is therefore not that they showed the phenomenon of suicidal migration so familiar to lemmings, but that they never arose before 1096, although both popes and knights and pious monks had repeatedly essayed to put them in motion. Unless the historian can show why the crusades were first undertaken in the last decade of the eleventh century, he has left the problem where the evolutionist would have left it—unsolved.

It is even so with the French Revolution. The problem implied in that momentous event is not that the French, being discontent with their government, rose against it; but in the question, why the French made a vast revolution, not from 1763 to 1774 when they had the most legitimate and urgent reasons to rise against a profoundly immoral, inefficient, and wicked king; but after 1783, when the new French king, an honest, moral, if narrow-minded ruler, had just obtained the greatest possible triumph over Great Britain that any French king had ever succeeded in achieving, and when the general prosperity of the country was greater than during the two preceding generations.

It will thus be found that the ways of the

evolutionist and the historian diverge from one another from the very commencement. Incipient variations the evolutionist takes for granted, and does not trouble at all about their origin or their chronology. To the historian both points are of vital importance, and both are, in history, capable of solutions. Here, however, the great difference between the two students of life, organic and historic, does not stop. The concepts of the Darwinian do not help the historian in the study of the later "stages" of the "variation" either. Even if one should admit that the play of the various forces assumed by the evolutionist renders superfluous the hypothesis of one or several original acts of creation of species, we are by no means compelled to admit that the play of similar forces will render unnecessary the hypothesis of creative forces in history too. For, in history (and this we take to be its deepest principle) we are confronted with phenomena manifesting effects of continuous creation. In human history the elements or factors of an historic event contain less than their product. The latter cannot be deduced from, nor can it be resolved into, the former. Our religious books speak of one great series of creative acts at the beginning of the world. This may be incorrect in form; although symbolically, as introducing the great concept of creative forces in a strong, if formally incorrect manner, it is endowed with abundant power of truth and suggestiveness. The more deeply we analyse the phenomena of historic life the more we shall be inclined to adopt the view that the world represents one unending drama of continuous creativeness. Creative forces pervade every particle of infinite space and time, and things, as the

great Heraclitus has long formulated it, are processes, and not movements come to their last concrete and abiding form. This paramount element, of continuous creativeness in the events of human history, must necessarily prove quite refractory to the instruments and methods of the Darwinian. He invariably assumes, as assume he must, that his organic products are indeed deducible from their elements, and that the latter do not contain less than the former. Whether he is really right in assuming that with regard to lower or non-human organisms is yet far from proved. Here, however, we are concerned only with human aggregate organisms, and of them, indeed, we are forced to admit that the impossibility of deducing the whole of the product from its component elements is too evident to be either ignored or denied. In studying the history of literature or of religions, that element of creativeness becomes manifest in the most unmistakable manner. No amount of analysis of what can possibly be considered as the elements or factors of the English language as spoken and written in the period from 1520 to 1560 can enable us to foresee, to fore-construct, or even to account *a posteriori* for the incomparable idiom in the works of Shakespeare. In the case of Lessing's German prose the problem becomes still more difficult. German prose as written immediately before Lessing's *Litteraturbriefe* (1759) is *toto coelo* different from the German of the incomparable author of *Laokoon*. And as to religion, it has never been *historically* explained why the Christian religion, for instance, should have arisen in Judaea, and in the first century of our era, rather than at Athens in the second century B.C. What are commonly taught to have been the factors of that

great event do not help us in the least to arrive, historically, at a tolerably acceptable insight into the rise of Christianity. We have here, as almost invariably in history, to deal with a *novum*, with a phenomenon in which the incessant creativeness of things has shaped a new force. Nobody can read the *regula* or constitution of two or three of the great Catholic orders without being struck with the astounding difference in the spirit and character of orders whose constitutional differences, according to their minute *regulae*, are merely external and superficial. The *regulae* appear to be, and are generally held to be, the factors or elements of the orders. These *regulae* differ mainly in regard to matters of costume, diet, freedom of speech, manual labour, and such-like. Yet what difference between a Cistercian and a Cluniac! between a Dominican and a Jesuit! The difference indeed is as great as that between entire nations. Whence that difference? To this there can be only one answer: from the element of creativeness embodied in the new and powerful personality of St. Odo, St. Bernard, St. Dominic, and St. Ignatius. As Lessing created a new type of German prose, so St. Bernard created a new type of regulars. This element of creativeness, materialised in history through the medium of historic personalities, must necessarily quite escape the evolutionist. In nature, outside man, there is no personality proper. For the naturalist one fox is as good as another. There are no Caesars amongst lions.

Finally, it has been already remarked that the strange and exceedingly important phenomena of correlative variations, which the evolutionist must,

by Darwin's own admission, leave severely alone, are the very daily bread and staff of life of the historian. It is precisely in pointing out the inner or psychological connection of correlative variations that the historian can and ought to excel.

The technical theory of evolution is thus quite helpless in matters of history. As to the vague idea of evolution denoting progress and improvement generally, it is as yet impossible to say whether we may or may not accept it. It is more (or perhaps less) than doubtful whether we are really superior to the Greeks, or even to the Romans; and whether the festival day of mankind was in Athens under Pericles, or in New York under Mr. Cleveland. We have no slaves such as the Greeks had; we have other descriptions. Some of us may find ourselves inclined to prefer Epaminondas to the Duke of Marlborough, and Themistocles to Count Cavour. However that may be, it is far too early in the day to pronounce an ethical judgment on the short span of 7000 years of history.

This latter remark with regard to ethical judgments applies in general to every single period of history. Historians are, as a rule, too fond of seeing their proper duty in a kind of culinary ethics, which consist chiefly in pouring some moral sauce or other over the poor flesh of their facts. Readers too are very fond of such historical moralising, and more particularly English readers, with their insatiable appetite for moral stimulants, can rarely get enough of it. It remains true, nevertheless, that ethical valuations of historic events are not among the chief duties of the historian. What we expect of him are not ethical, but specific or technical explanations.

He who wants to account for the Revolution in England under Charles I. must not only show the discontent of the people in the first fifteen years of Charles's reign; discontent being a feature common to all popular risings. He must enable us to see the specific difference in the historic circumstances, both impersonal and personal, that mark off clearly the Revolution in England (1642-1660) from the Revolution in the Netherlands (1565-1609) and from the French Revolution (1789-1815). Likewise he who tells us that all Hellenic civilisation was grafted on city-states, fails entirely in his duty as an historian by accounting for the rise of these all-important city-states by a vague reference to a "rise in general culture." A "rise in general culture" accounts for too much; it explains a greater hygienic use of oil or soap, as well as the rise of more complicated actions-at-law. What is wanted in general history are specific explanations of fundamental facts—explanations such as account with definiteness for the individual character, and the particular time and locality of that fundamental fact, in contradistinction to other fundamental facts. The Greek city-states did not arise before 1000 B.C., although the Greeks had been living in Greece and in the Greek islands for scores of generations before 1000 B.C. The Greek city-states arose first on the coast of Asia Minor, and were always incomparably less numerous on the western side of Greece. In that way we get the problem of the Greek city-states in a form of great precision. To this definiteness and specific character of the problem there must be a corresponding definiteness and specific or individual character in the explanation. Nothing short of such explanations can be accepted as true historic teaching.

IV

Sources of General History.—Of special histories the sources are innumerable, some written on papyrus, parchment, or paper; others engraved as "inscriptions" on stones, metal tablets, walls, tombs, pyramids, rings, seals, coins, etc.; or *cut* into baked earth, as are the Babylonian tablets. For general history proper the direct sources are very few. For classical antiquity we have only three ancient authors who attempted to write the general history of antiquity: (1) Diodorus of Sicily; (2) Nicolaus of Damascus; and (3) Pompeius Trogus. We possess only portions of their works. Neither of them seized the meaning of a general fact proper, and their works serve mostly as very valuable collections of materials for a general history. Our sources for the general history of the Middle Ages are exceedingly few, two alone of the general historians of that period standing out from the mass of dry annalists and "world-chroniclers"—Otto, Bishop of Freisingen, and Matthew Paris.

For modern times our general sources are of a very much higher calibre and more numerous; one of the earliest works, the *Historia suorum temporum*, by De Thou (covering the period from 1543 to 1607), opening the long series of valuable sources of the general history of Europe in the last three centuries in a manner worthy of the best traditions.

The lack of real general histories entails the necessity of piecing together, from scattered and unwieldy masses of details, the broad lines of events and their correlations. With very few exceptions,

the ancients as well as the moderns prefer coasting along the pleasant and homely bays of some one small parish history, to putting boldly into the sea of general history. Immense ant-labour has been and is being spent on the repairing and whittling of this little boat or the other; the fitting out of a gallant vessel, mighty to ride the waves of the broad ocean, has seldom been attempted. The most recent attempt to embark on the broad sea of antiquity is the work of Professor Eduard Meyer. The learned author successfully proves that talent and labour will permit a man to combine the qualities and power of several philological specialists in one person. However, fifty specialists of words together may not strike out one generalisation of substance; or, as has well been said, Nature has revealed several of her general laws to Newton, but none to the Royal Society.

Criticism of Sources.—The direct sources of general history being very few, the indirect or local and departmental sources must be resorted to; and with regard to them the first and imperative question is, Are they authentic? do they deserve credence? The criticism of sources has long been made a matter of great technicality; and both for ancient and mediaeval history philological methods of analysis and text-criticism have come to be regarded as the *sine qua non* of historical research. True, the results of the innumerable monographs containing text-criticisms and investigations into the sources of each source have turned out in too many cases to be pleasantly contradictory. As Dr. Kenyon, of the British Museum, has amply proved, the more conservative the reading, the more likely it is to be

correct. Of the hundreds of Bentley's ingenious and much-admired emendations of Horace, half a dozen alone have stood the test of time. Philologians are, as a rule, the worst experts in estimating the historical value of a "source." Livy, the historian of Rome, is cold-shouldered by one scholar, extolled by another. Herodotus, to one historian, appears scarcely above a teller of stories, fair and fairy; to the other, the sage of Halicarnassus exhibits, if in a naïve form, the true mastery of the art and science of history. Yet with all these shortcomings, text-criticism has done much for a more positive knowledge of the past, and while it would be unwise to accept, it is no doubt highly improvident to ignore, all the labours of the modern Bentleys and Du Canges.[1]

They frequently correct or purify the texts of sources; but history is not all comprised in the lines of the texts. Much, frequently the essence, is contained between and behind the lines. This no mere philological criticism can unravel. The historian who

[1] On historical criticism there are four modern works likely to help the student; two of them, one by Professor Blass, the other by M. Giry, being of exceptional merit. Frederick Blass in Iwan von Müller's *Handbuch der klass. Alterthumswiss.* (1892), I. 2, pp. 149-295. A. Giry, *Manuel de diplomatique* (Paris, 1894). Ernst Bernheim, *Lehrbuch d. histor. Methode* (1894), pp. 236-438. Ch. V. Langlois and Ch. Seignobos, *Introduction aux études historiques* (1898), pp. 51-179; there is an English translation. A masterly introduction to text-criticism will be found in W. M. Lindsay, *An Introduction to Latin Textual Emendation based on the Text of Plautus* (1896), p. 131.

Historical sources are full of falsifications and forgeries. Hardouin, a famous and learned French Jesuit (1649-1729), seriously held that nearly all Greek and Latin classics were forgeries of mediaeval monks, likewise all coins, reports of councils, etc., and P. J. F. Müller (in *Meine Ansichten der Geschichte*, Düsseldorf, 1814) held that all classical and mediaeval history is a mere invention of a band of forgers. It has been proved that of the charters of the Merovingian period (418-752 A.D.) nearly fifty per cent are forgeries; and of the Carlovingian charters from 752 A.D. about fifteen per cent are certainly spurious. See Buchheim, *loc. cit.* pp. 244-258.

scorns anything outside "documents" has a fatal resemblance to Philip II. of Spain. King Philip attempted to govern reality from his writing-desk and with no regard for things and persons. His rule, based on *paperasse*, ended in failure. The student of history needs, much more even than the textual skill, the rare possession of actual and personal experience of the institutions of various nations. A long sojourn in and close study of countries strongly differing from one another, such as England and France, or the United States and Germany, is imperatively needed to acquire that chief organ of the historian, the faculty, to wit, to take in, and appreciate rightly, customs, social forces, and features utterly different from those of one's own country. Three-fourths of the errors of judgment committed by historians arise from that lack of historic altruism which no mere study of charters and documents can give. The Germans especially have written up the history of every one country of the world,—but badly; for in most cases they were not even aware of their total lack of that altruism which living experience in various countries alone can give. They wrote not history, but one historical book out of a number of other books. As in the case of the geographer, botanist, zoologist, so in the case of the historian, a preliminary study of at least two foreign countries ought to be required as the indispensable qualification for the study of any part of history. Arm-chair history will do no more than does arm-chair geography. History has been made by the passions of men; and the cool atmosphere of the study of the historian tends more and more to dissociate and wean him from the tempers and minds of the makers of history.

The historian is neither a lawyer nor a judge. He must be able to sympathise well with the sombre and deeply troubled currents of emotions which underlie most historical events. Mere coldness of judgment will not secure true historical insight. Historical events have, as a rule, been due to warm-hearted, impulsive, passionately proud, or violent people. The greatest nations have invariably been at the same time the greatest criminals. Their life being full of intense agitation, they excel both in goodness and wickedness.[1] Nearly twelve hundred persons, amongst them many a physician, offered their services, some time ago, as public executioner in Paris; at a similar emergency in little backward Greece not a single modern Greek would volunteer. More savagery is chronicled in the London newspapers regarding the horrors of East-end life, than can be read in books of travel about barbarous Africa or South America. Such being the case, the historian must be richly endowed with sympathy for all the powers of agitated souls, and if err he must, it is preferable he should do so on the side of warm-heartedness.

Much has been said, since Montesquieu, about the necessity of viewing past ages from their own standpoint, and not from the plane of impressions received from more recent occurrences. Nor can it be denied that there is much truth in this remark.

[1] A learned Hungarian, the late Professor Julius Schvarcz of the University of Budapest, has drawn in a stately volume a grave indictment of the vices and follies of the Athenian Democracy under Pericles. But Athenian wickedness, which nobody seriously thinks of denying, was only the other—of course disreputable—aspect of that immense mental and moral agitation which Phidias immortalised in the Parthenon, Socrates in his teachings, Thucydides in his history. Other nations were less wicked, even less stupid, but also less important.

On the other hand, Mark Pattison was certainly not wrong when he said that we can apprehend of past ages no more than we can comprehend of our own. He who is too indifferent to his own age, or incapable of seizing its real drift, will, it is seriously to be feared, never comprehend the totally different features of the past. No doubt, in applying notions gained from the consideration of modern circumstances to institutions or events of the past, we render ourselves liable to a great many mistakes. Yet it is equally certain that we have no means of bringing home to us the past, otherwise than by comparing or contrasting it with what is going on around us. He who has gone through or rather undergone a series of law cases in modern law-courts will, in all probability, be better prepared to understand Gaius, Papinianus, or some other Roman jurist, than he who has contented himself with the mere reading of the works or fragments of the legal sages of Rome.

The point here raised is of such vital importance that we must crave the reader's permission to discuss it, as it were, *ab ovo*, from its root-principle.

Whatever view one may take of the manner in which knowledge, or the process of cognition, arises in our mind, it can hardly be denied that all our ideas need, as causative, suggestive, or howsoever named antecedent or coefficient, the fact of sense-impressions. We have no ideas without some previous or concomitant sense-impression. From this fundamental fact it follows that direct and full knowledge of historical institutions or events is, strictly speaking, a matter of impossibility. We can no longer obtain direct sense-impressions of the

murder of Caesar; nor can such sense-impressions be realised with regard to a discussion in the Assembly of Periclean Athens. To avoid the theoretically inevitable insufficiency of History, there is, we submit, no other means left than to grasp the sense and purport of an institution of the past by a direct study of some one essentially analogous institution of the present. When, in that way, we really understand the ancient institution, *i.e.* the constant factor of events, the events themselves become more easily accessible and comprehensible. The choice of the right modern institution in the right modern country is no doubt difficult, and for the untravelled student, impossible. Nor ought the untravelled to write history. The travelled student alone can have those *Anschauungen* that may eventually suggest to him the right analogies. Had this circumstance not been neglected, the English would have long ago written the leading history of Rome, instead of attempting, as they have hitherto done, to write bulky books on the history of Greece, for which, as a rule, they are less richly endowed with opportunities for acquiring adequate *Anschauungen*.

It cannot, however, be disguised that while object-impressions or *Anschauungen* of things political, legal, social, and religious, constitute the most important preparation for an efficient study of history, the historical writer who has impregnated himself with clear and substantial notions derived from reality runs, for this very reason, the grave risk of being persistently misunderstood, and, in the end, condemned by most of his readers. For it is evident that an historian who bases his interpretation of the sources on reasoned object-

impressions obtained during a long sojourn and struggle for life in various, highly differentiated modern countries, is *eo ipso* unable to convey to his readers the strongest of his arguments. In physics or chemistry, a novel idea can very well be forced even upon an unwilling audience of physicists or chemists by inviting them to repeat the experiments on which the novel theory is founded. This invitation to verification can apply in the case of a novel view in history only in quite exceptional cases. To ask one's readers to spend five years in France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, the United States, and England severally, before they may pass judgment on one's ideas based on object-impressions gained in those countries, that is more than modesty will allow, or the patience of the reader admit. Yet one of the most frequent sources of misunderstandings must be traced to this lack of varied object-impressions on the part of the reader. The psychological explanation of historical facts has, moreover, the further disadvantage of being, when correct, simple and not erudite. It rarely lends itself to a long string of quotations. This renders it easily a matter of contempt on the part of pedants who weigh a book by the number of its "references." Thus when we say that the whole history of Republican Rome is contained in the one sentence, that it is one of objective Personality, we have no doubt that such a statement will be condemned as shallow and vague by the Salmasii and Gruteri of our age, who have, as is their wont, carefully avoided learning the true sense of either *Personality* or *Republic*. The consequence is, that psychological explanations of historical phenomena can easily be made to appear as mere platitudes.

For, however laborious and profound the researches and meditations of the psychological historian may have been, he must, in the end, formulate his results in the homeliest fashion. He cannot possibly use other terms than such as we apply in everyday life to occurrences of family life or social gatherings. It is with historical psychology as with astronomy. Psychology is to history what dynamics are to astronomy. The most scientific and elaborate book on the movements of the stars is bound to come back to considerations of everyday mechanics. Newton's triumph and glory, his formula of cosmic attraction, can easily be watered down to a platitude so banal as to provoke a contemptuous smile on the lips of the sciolist. Could this formula not be diluted to the commonplace statement, that when a person A is stronger than a person B, the latter will easily be pulled over ("attracted") by A? To decry correct psychological constructions in History as shallow and banal because they are clothed in terms of everyday life, is like sneering at Newton for having given a high-sounding mathematical appearance to a fact known to every schoolboy the world over. The philological historian, it is true, proves himself the greater master in at least one section of human psychology: in the art of effect. The majority of people will always be inclined to think that there is much more behind obscure terms, such as *Aryan*, *logopoeic*, *Hittites*, *Pelasgic*, and other learned words leading at once to bewildering arrays of long-lost languages and customs, than behind such simple things as "fear," "interest," "stress," etc. However, one may rest assured that the most ancient Hittites were more influenced by fear,

interest, or stress, than by their being Aryan or non-Aryan.

It is, finally, quite evident that no historian can do justice to his subject unless he respects and loves it. There are, for instance, grave psychological arguments against a belief in a great history of Europe written by an American. No American really places Europe as high, in his inward esteem and love, as he ought to. This alone prevents him from writing a great history of Europe. For similar reasons there exists as yet no truly great English history of France or of Germany; while Englishmen have written very important works on the history of Venice, Florence, or the Byzantine Empire. In history too, *les grandes pensées viennent du cœur.*

GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF HISTORY

(*A*) *Printed Works*

Together with the stupendous growth of historical literature, there may be noticed a parallel movement aiming at a complete registering of all the works of historical writers in the past and in the present. Not only lists of books, or bibliographies of a given subject, have been published extensively, but also bibliographies of bibliographies are drawn up, both general and special. The most comprehensive list of bibliographies on any subject is the *Manuel de bibliographie générale* by M. Henri Stein (Paris, Picard, 1897, pp. 895, 8vo). For historical bibliography the latest, and so far the fullest book, is the *Manuel de bibliographie historique* by

M. Ch. V. Langlois (Paris, Hachette, second edition, 1901-1904, pp. 623). In these two works the reader will find means of hunting up any treatise, essay, article, or book ever printed on the history of the Western nations. In the present work sufficient bibliographical indications will be given in their due places for the purpose of finding any work, large or small, written on the chief periods and events of general history. The most comprehensive and best arranged *annual* publication on all *current* historical literature of any country is the *Jahresberichte der Geschichtswissenschaft* (Berlin, since 1878, now edited by J. Jastrow). For less ambitious purposes of historical reading, the student will find lists of good works on the history of most countries in Mr. Swan Sonnenschein's *Best Books* (London, 1894-1895, 2 vols. 4to; the section "History" has also been published separately).

(*B*) *Manuscripts*

In addition to printed books there are huge masses of records and charters, and manuscripts of all kinds (such as memoirs, letters, diaries, etc.) preserved in the various archives, libraries, and private collections. The following bibliographical indications will enable the student to lay his hand on most of the historical manuscripts scattered over Europe.

(I.) *In Archives:*

In the article "Archives" in the *Répertoire général alphab. du droit français*, edited by Fuzier-Herman (vol. v., 1889), by E. Lelong, there is a very full and comprehensive bibliography of works on the archives

of all civilised countries. See also an article by Langlois in the *Revue internationale des Archives, des Bibliothèques et des Musées* (vol. i., 1895, *Archives*, pp. 12 *seq.*); and Giry, *Manuel de Diplomatique* (Paris, 1894), pp. 37 *seq.* In *Les Archives de l'histoire de France*, by V. Langlois and H. Stein (Paris, 1891), there is an abundance of bibliographical indications on most of the archives in Europe.

England

S. R. Scargill Bird, *A Guide to the Principal Classes of Documents preserved in the Record Office* (London, 1891). Charles Gross, *The Sources and Literature of English History* (London, 1900), pp. 55-62.

Index to the Printed Reports of Sir F. Palgrave, Deputy Keeper of the Public Records, 1840-61 (London, 1865, fol.).

Index to the Printed Reports, etc. of the Public Records, 1862-1878 (London, 1880, fol.). Compare the very instructive and complete article on the history, constitution, etc., of the State Paper Office by W. N. Sainsbury in the 30*th Report of the Deputy Keeper*, 1869, pp. 212-293. For archives other than such as have been concentrated in the Record Office, see:—*Return to an Address of the House of Lords, dated 13th May* 1890, *for Complete List . . . of the Reports of the Historical Manuscripts Commission* (London, 1890, Eyre and Spottiswoode; 24 pp. fol. The first *Report* was published in March 1870).[1]

Belgium and France

Inventaires des archives de la Belgique, edited by L. P. Gachard (Brussels, 1837, etc., fol.), chap. v.

Langlois and H. Stein, *Les Archives de l'histoire de France* (Paris, 1891, pp. 1000).

Henri Bordier, *Les Archives de la France* (Paris, 1855). A complete list of all the *Inventaires* of archives in France published by the French Government up to 1892 will be found in the

[1] For the United States, see the *Reports of the Hist. Manuscript Commission of the American Histor. Association* for 1896, 1898, etc.

annual *Annuaire des bibliothèques et des archives.* For lists of *Inventaires* published by private authors, see L. Pannier, "*L'État des inventaires sommaires . . . aux diverses archives de la France au 1er janvier 1875*" (in *Biblioth. de l'École des Chartes*, vol. xxxvi., 1875), and the work of Langlois and Stein, quoted on p. 92.

Netherlands—Germany—Austria-Hungary—German Switzerland—Luxemburg

Overzicht van de inventarissen der oude Rijks Archieven in Nederland (The Hague, 1884).

C. A. H. Burkhardt, *Hand- und Adressbuch der deutschen Archive im Gebiete des deutschen Reiches, Luxemburgs, Oesterreich-Ungarns, der russischen Ostseeprovinzen und der deutschen Schweiz* (2nd ed., Leipsic, 1887, 2 vols.).

Archivalische Zeitschrift (ed. by Fr. v. Löher, since 1875).

The archives in Germany, except Bavaria, are not as well organised as those of France.

Spain

Isidoro Carini, *Gli archivi e le biblioteche di Spagna* (Palermo, 1884-1888). Very full. Compare also *Revista de archivos, bibliotecas y museos* (Madrid, a monthly); and the article "*Archivos*" in Alcubilla's *Diccionario de la administr. española.* See also Rudolf Beer's "*Handschriftenschätze Spaniens*" in the *Sitzungsberichte* of the Vienna *Akademie*, philos.-histor. class, 1891-1893; and R. Altamira, *De historia y arte* (Madrid, 1898, pp. 64 *seq.*).

Italy

(a) *State Archives*:—Bartolomeo Cecchette, in *Atti del Reale Istituto Veneto di scienze, lettere ed arti*, vol. ii. serie 4, parte 2 (Venice, 1872-73), pp. 1052-1082: *Bibliografia degli archivi nazionali e stranieri.* A supplement to Cecchette by G. Porro is in *Archivio Storico Lombardo* (Milan, 1874), pp. 465-482. N. Vazio, *Relazione sugli archivi di Stati Italiani*, 1874-1882 (Rome, 1883, 4to, 410 pp.). G. Mazzatinti, *Gli archivi*, etc. (since 1897).

(b) *Vatican*:—G. B. de Rossi, *De origine, historia, indicibus scrinii et bibliothecae sedis apostolicae commentatio* (Rome, 1886).

Denmark—Norway—Sweden

Ad. D. Jorgensen, *Udsigt over de danske Rigsarkivers Historie* (Copenhagen, 1884); *Meddelanden fran svenska Riksarchivet* (Stockholm, 1887, etc.); Secher, *Das Archivalwesen im skandinav. Norden* (in *Archiv. Zt.* vols. iv. to vi., 1879-1881).

United States

E. C. Burnett, *A List of Printed Guides to and Descriptions of Archives and other Repositories of Historical Manuscripts* (Washington, 1897).

Russia

V. S. de Ikonnikov, *Russian Historiography* (in Russian), Kiev, 1891-1892.

(II.) *In Libraries, Private or Public:*

E. G. Vogel, *Litteratur früherer u. noch bestehender europ. öffentl. Bibliotheken* (Leipsic, 1840), Standard work. E. Huebner, *Grundriss zu Vorlesungen über die Geschichte u. Encyclopädie der klass. Philologie* (2nd ed. Berlin, 1889, pp. 57-64), arranged according to countries.

England

Except E. Bernard's (now antiquated) *Catalogi librorum manuscript. Angliae et Hiberniae in unum collecti* (Oxford, 1697, fol.), there is no general list of the catalogues of MSS. preserved in English libraries. The student must have recourse to the catalogue of each library severally. Much useful material will be found in the *List of the Books of Reference in the Reading Room of the British Museum* (3rd ed., London, 1889, under "British Museum," "Oxford," "Cambridge," etc.); and in *Archives des missions* (Paris), 3e série, vol. iii., 1866, p. 247; vol. iv., 1867, p. 115; vol. v., 1868, p. 139. There is also a good article in the *Grande Encyclopédie* (Paris), by Ch. V. Langlois, under "British Museum."

France

There are very numerous and admirable catalogues of the MSS. preserved in French libraries. A complete list of these catalogues will be found in the *Annuaire des bibliothèques et des archives*, up to the date of publication respectively.

Germany

Gabriel Meier, "*Verzeichniss der Handschriften-Kataloge der deutschen Bibliotheken*," in *Centralblatt für Bibliothekswesen*, vol. iv., 1887, pp. 1, etc. (Berlin, 1893, etc.).

The Prussian Government is now publishing an inventory of all the MSS. in the Prussian State under the title *Verzeichniss der Handschriften im Preussichen Staate.*

Austria-Hungary

A. Goldmann, "*Verzeichniss der österreich-ungarischen Handschriften-Kataloge*," in *Centralbl. für Bibliothekswesen*, vol. v., 1888, pp. 1, etc., and p. 55.

Belgium and Holland

Ulysse Robert, "*État des catalogues des manuscrits des bibliothèques de Belgique et de Hollande*," in *Cabinet historique*, 24th year, 1878, 2nd part, pp. 196, etc.

Italy

The Italian *Ministero dell' Istruzione Pubblica* is publishing (since 1885) *Indici e Cataloghi* of the MSS. in Italy. These official catalogues are supplemented by the work of G. Mazzatinti, *Inventari dei manoscritti delle biblioteche d' Italia* (Torino, 1887, etc.). For more works on MSS. in Italy see G. Ottino's and G. Fumagalli's *Biblioteca bibliogr. Italica* (Rome, 1889), Nos. 2523-2574.

Denmark—Iceland—Norway—Sweden

Ulysse Robert, *État des catalogues des manuscrits de Danemark*, etc. (*ib.*, 1880, 2nd part, pp. 118, etc.).

Spain—Portugal

Isodore Carini, *Gli archivi et le biblioteche di Spagna* (Palermo, 1884, 2 vols.). Ulysse Robert, *ib.*, 1880, 2nd part, pp. 294, etc.; R. Beer, "*Handschriftenschätze Spaniens*," in *Sitz. der k. Akad. d. Wiss. zu Wien, phil.-hist. Klasse*, 1891, etc., vol. 124, etc.

Switzerland

Gabriel Meier, "*Verzeichniss der Handschriften-Kataloge der schweiz. Bibliotheken*," in *Centralblatt f. Bibliothekswesen*, vol. iv., 1887, pp. 1, etc.

Auxiliary Studies.—Like all other branches of the study of man, history too draws on various departments of knowledge. For geo-political researches a careful study of geography is indispensable; for the second of the great forces of Correlation (trade, industry, etc.) a firm grasp of the principles of *political economy* is required; for the fourth, or personality, a study of *genealogy* is of the greatest use;[1] for the third, or social status of man and woman in a given period, as also for the second Correlation, a knowledge of *law* is imperative; and for all the aspects of history *chronology* brings order into the temporal succession or coexistence of events. Moreover, the study of coins, seals, and blazonry, or *numismatics*, *sigillography* and *heraldry*; the reading of ancient texts and inscriptions, or *palaeography* and *epigraphy*, together with the vast study of *archaeology*, or the examination of ancient monuments; let alone the various branches of philology; all are needed for historical research in degrees varying with the different periods of history.[2]

[1] See the remarkable work of Professor Ottokar Lorenz, *Lehrbuch der gesammten wissenschaftlichen Genealogie* (Berlin, 1898, pp. 489, 8vo).

[2] For bibliographies of the auxiliary branches of history, see Langlois, *Bibliogr. hist.* (1901), pp. 160-169, and 193-201.

It cannot, however, be sufficiently repeated, that a mere reading of books on political economy, law, geography, or archaeology will not enable the student of history to grasp the true causes of the economic, legal, or artistic growth of a country. He who has assisted at fifty "leading" law cases actually carried on in a law-court; or, perhaps more important still, he who has attended the "readings" of bills on civil or criminal law in parliaments, will therefrom derive more benefit for his historical studies than from any course of mere book-work. It is impossible to be an expert in a score of sciences; it is quite possible, and for the historian, necessary, to have a living knowledge (*Anschauungen*) of some of the leading principles of several legal, economic, and natural sciences. Great journalists and statesmen who abound in such living knowledge of legal and economic matters, are very well qualified for writing history. Bismarck rightly preferred their historic works to those of the book historian; and the cold-shouldering of the works of Thiers, Guizot, Lord Mahon, and other statesmen-authors, who both made and wrote history, is nothing short of absurd. With all the occasional inaccuracies of detail in Thiers or Louis Blanc, there is more real substance to be obtained from their works than from those of Sybel, Alfred Stern, and other archivists.

BOOK I

THE GREAT INLAND EMPIRES, OR THE PRAE-CLASSICAL NATIONS

CHALDEA—EGYPT—ASSYRIA—THE HITTITES—THE PHRYGIANS—THE LYDIANS

Our oldest historical records come from Chaldea and Egypt. Already five thousand years before our era there were large towns, inhabited by relatively civilised people, on the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates, and also on the lower Nile. Authentic documents of that time prove the existence of regular government, of extensive trade and agriculture, of arts. These documents, written either in wedge-shaped or cuneiform script, or in so-called hieroglyphs, have, previous to the last century, baffled all attempts at reading them. In the last century, however, Grotefend, a German philologist (in 1800), supplemented by Burnouf and Lassen (in 1836), unriddled the old Persian cuneiforms; Rawlinson (in 1851), Hincks, and Oppert solved the mystery of the Babylonian and Assyrian cuneiforms; while François Champollion, almost single-handed, solved the problem of the hieroglyphic signs and their language. Owing to the difficulty of the idioms in which Chaldean, Assyrian, and Egyptian records are written, the study of western Asiatic history at once split up into a

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number of specialities, and the real connection between the history of the Empires founded between the Tigris, the Nile, and the Aegean Sea with the immeasurably more important city-states founded by the Phoenicians, Hebrews, and Hellenes has therefore frequently been misread or ignored. The difference between these imperial nations has been mostly considered to lie in the difference of race, it being assumed that the Babylonians and Assyrians were "Semites," whereas the Egyptians were of a different race. Likewise the Armenians, Medes, and Persians are thought to have been different in race from the Assyrians or from the Hittites; the Medes and Persians being Aryans proper, the Armenians again an Indo-German race. Accordingly, vast ingenuity has been spent on proving or disproving a particular race-quality of the immense number of nations who roamed through or settled in Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, and Syria from 3000 or 4000 B.C. to the times of the classical Hellenes, say 800 B.C., such as the Phrygians, Lydians, Carians, Lycians, etc. This race-assumption is exclusively based on philological evidence. If the vocabulary or grammar of some of the few Phrygian literary remains is proved to be Indo-German in character, then the Phrygians are credited with Indo-German race and its concomitant qualities. The Lydians are thus made out to have been full of "intense passion" and "depth of thought" in that they were Semites; or sadly lacking in both, in that, properly speaking, they were Indo-Germans.

However, as shown in the *Introduction*, Race is not one of the great forces of history. The Phrygians may, in spite of their presumably Indo-German language,

have been of a quite different stock, just as the Magyars adopted some time before the ninth century A.D. a language different from their former idiom. The distinctive features of the imperial nations of Western Asia are not at all to be sought for in their different "races." Their historical importance and significance are not in what each of them respectively achieved, which was little, but in what the nations on their borders, by means of a titanic reaction against their aggressiveness, contrived to accomplish. The *rôle* of the Empires was preparatory. They were the great leaven of the real bread of history, of the Hellenes and cognate nations.

The imperial nations of Western Asia founded none but inland empires. Such empires can be held together only by vast and well-led armies, whereas maritime empires need few soldiers. The British Empire, the greatest *thalassocracy* or maritime empire known to history, is held together by 120,000 sailors, whereas France alone needs a land army of 4,000,000 men. Moreover, ascendency on the sea is, as Bacon rightly remarked, gained or lost by one or two great battles, such as the battle of Actium (31 B.C.), or that of Trafalgar (1805). Finally, large inland empires require a most elaborate system of government. All large inland empires enjoyed but a short spell of power, whether founded by Thutmosis III. in the sixteenth century B.C., by Ashurnasirpal in the ninth century B.C., by Cyrus in the sixth, by Alexander the Great in the fourth century B.C., by the Arabs in the seventh century A.D., by Charlemagne in the eighth, by Jenghiskhan in the thirteenth, or by Napoleon in the nineteenth century. The vast plains, deserts, and mountain-

ranges of Western Asia, together with Egypt, have known many a large inland empire, each of which, after a relatively short duration, gave way to new empires of the same character. Hence those semi-historic regions were for thousands of years the tumultuous stage of aimless wars, furthering neither real power nor intellectual movement. Between the Euphrates and the Tigris, the Summerians and Accadians were succeeded by the Babylonian Semites, who established first a number of small kingdoms, such as that of Lagas, Ur, Nippur, Agade, all on the lower Euphrates and Tigris, and then a large inland empire by about 2500 B.C. About 2300 B.C. the Babylonian rulers were hard pressed by a people coming from Elam, east of Babylon, who finally (about 1960 B.C.) became the rulers of Babylon. By the beginning of the seventeenth century B.C. Babylon was conquered by the Cossaeans, an ethnographically undetermined tribe, also from the east. After that time the Babylonians, since about 1100 B.C. under Chaldean rulers, waged innumerable wars with the Assyrians, who conquered, under their king Tiglathpileser I. (1023-1002 B.C.), "forty-two countries and their rulers" (Tiglathpileser's own words), including Babylon, even Egypt acknowledging his ascendency. On the other side of the vast scene, the Hittites established, by about 1500 B.C., a large inland empire stretching from the Halys river to the Orontes river. Many were the nations they conquered, and even the Egyptians, who had under Tahutmes or Thutmosis III. and Amenhotep II. conquered the whole of Palestine and Syria, in the sixteenth and fifteenth centuries B.C., were severely checked by them in the thirteenth century B.C. under Pharaoh Ramses (or

Ramessu) II., who, however, once at least inflicted upon the Hittites or Chati a severe defeat at Kadesh on the Orontes river. Traces of Hittite monuments, the inscriptions on which have not yet yielded to the efforts of philologists, may be found all over Asia Minor.

From 3000 B.C. to 1000 B.C., then, Western Asia was, as a rule, under the sway of one, two, or of all the four empires of Babylon, Assyria, the Hittites, and Egypt. The frequency and importance of the international relations between these empires are clearly shown in the Tell el Amarna letters, or some three hundred brick-tablets (160 now at Berlin, 82 in the British Museum, the rest dispersed in Egypt and elsewhere) found near the place of that name, about 160 miles south of Cairo, containing chiefly official despatches from Syrian and Mesopotamian princes to Pharaohs Amenhotep III. and IV., written in the Babylonian language and script, then the diplomatic medium of Western Asia. We still have several of the international treaties concluded between the empires, such as the treaty of alliance between Babylon and, probably, Thutmosis IV. of Egypt, in about 1450 B.C. (in the Tell el Amarna tablets); a similar treaty of Egypt with the king of the Mitani (on the upper Euphrates); a treaty of 1430 B.C. between Babylon and Assyria; a treaty between the Hittites and Ramses II. of Egypt (held to be the Pharaoh of the oppression), 1300 B.C., etc. Boundaries are carefully determined, as in the above treaty between Babylon and Assyria,[1] or in those of 1360, 1320, and 900 B.C. between the same empires.[2] Stipulations of extradition of rebels and alliance against outward

[1] Eberhard Schrader's *Keilinschr. Biblioth.* i. 195. [2] *Ib.* i. 197, 201.

foes are made in elaborate detail. Several international roads connected Egypt, Syria, and the Euphrates countries. Commerce and trade were flourishing, and accordingly in Babylon the law of contract and commerce reached a very high degree of development. The excavations made at Susa under the direction of the French scholar J. de Morgan during 1897-1899 have brought to light the oldest known code of laws, that of the Babylonian king Hammurabi, the Amraphel of the Bible (Genesis xiv.), about 2250 B.C. It betokens an advanced and complicated social structure.[1] Innumerable are the baked clay-tablets still extant on which the ever-present Babylonian scribe incised the various stipulations; the contracting parties, or, later on, one of them only, impressing their finger-nail as their signature. We read of firms; regular banks held by the priests; of contracts on behalf of unknown third persons; of obligations with collective responsibility; of mortgages; free representation and cession; and even, it would appear, of bills of exchange and cheques. However, they had no coined money. The culture of the continent of Western Asia during that period was pre-eminently Babylonian. The script and the religious ideas of the Babylonians spread over Assyria and Syria. The Babylonians believed in innumerable monster-shaped demons, whose ill-will had to be appeased by incantations, prayers, and

[1] The literature on Hammurabi's Code is already very extensive. Perhaps the most important contribution, in addition to the works of C. H. W. Johns (*The Oldest Code of Laws in the World*, London, 1903), and Stanley A. Cook (*The Laws of Moses and the Code of Hammurabi*, London, 1903), is the study of D. H. Müller (*Die Gesetze Hammurabis*, Vienna, 1903), in which the Code is shown to confirm the Hebrew tradition of the legislation of Moses. Compare Fritz Hommel, *Grundriss der Geogr. u. Geschichte des alt. Orients*,[2] 1904, p. 236.

sacrifice. Alongside with them are the "great gods"—for instance, Anu, father and king of the gods; Ea, ruler of the "watery depth" and possessor of inscrutable wisdom; Nergal, the destroyer; Sin, god of the moon; Bel, likewise the father of gods; and amongst goddesses, particularly Ishtar, goddess of love and life and nature generally. The "great gods" protect men against the demons; their wrath, on the other hand, brought about the great Deluge over the world, of which event the cuneiform texts give a report identical, in the main, with that of Genesis. It forms the eleventh "book" of the Chaldean epic of Gilgamesh or Nimrod, written about 2200 B.C.[1] The peculiarity of the Chaldean religion consists in its placing the heavenly powers in the stars, to each god being attributed a star of his own. This, by a natural identification of the character of the god with the star, gave rise to an elaborate system of astrology, magic, and augury among the Chaldeans. The constant observation of the stars then led to some positive knowledge of astronomy. It seems at present fairly certain that "the zodiacal system as a whole is the product of the Babylonian schools of astrology." The Babylonians recognised more than twelve constellations; they probably knew most of the forty-eight constellations enumerated by Ptolemy.[2] Of Chaldean views regarding after-life or

[1] Translation of the *Deluge Tablet* in C. J. Ball, *Light from the East* (1899), pp. 35-42.

[2] Jastrow, Morris, *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, 1898, p. 456. Mr. Robert Brown, jun., in several works, and more particularly in his *Researches into the origin of the primitive constellations of the Greeks, Phoenicians, and Babylonians* (1900, 2 vols.), has contributed what would appear to be a series of decisive arguments in favour of the Babylonian origin of the constellations. Dupuis' (Charles François) *Origine de tous les cultes* (4 vols. 4to, 1795) is not antiquated in its historico-astronomical sections.

the immortality of the soul, few traces have as yet been found. Unlike the Egyptians, the Chaldeans practised no worship of the dead, and in the epic of Gilgamesh the dead are said to "live" wretchedly, except such as had fallen in battle. We can form no adequate idea of Babylonian architecture, their temples and palaces, built of bricks, together with their terrace-shaped towns, having completely disappeared. In science they never reached any higher stage, the utter clumsiness of their script depriving them—as for the same reason it did the Egyptians, and has the Chinese—from any analytical leverage in mental processes. Their literature is intolerably tedious and inept.[1] In fact, their whole history appears to be the make of geo-political factors only; hence it shows abiding but no progressive forces. Their growth and relative preponderance were caused by the rivers Euphrates and Tigris, which then flowed separately and entered the sea higher up than is their present embouchure, and which alone in that dry zone offer means of livelihood, commerce, and, by dint of a system of well-regulated canalisation, also of extensive agriculture. Moreover, some of the tribes that conquered Babylon seem to have come from the steppes between the Caspian Sea and Lake Aral, and thus brought with them the horse—a power of locomotion, conveyance, and tactical energy unknown to the rest of the peoples of the Empires. The Babylonians had the genius of mediocrity, and for the prosaic and utilitarian needs of life they provided efficiently enough to serve as models for many another nation. Their system of measures and weights was wide-

[1] Maspero, *Histoire ancienne*, 1895, i. 772.

spread; their woven tissues and earthenware were much sought after. They did not, however, create any of the guiding ideals of mankind.

Egypt

I. Perhaps nothing in the history of the Egyptians is as remarkable and instructive as the history of that history. From the times of Hecataeus and Herodotus to the immortal discovery of Champollion, Egypt and the Egyptians were viewed in the light of extraordinary phenomena. The men of the Nile were held to be absolutely unlike the rest of the world. Their history appeared full of enigmas; their culture full of charm; their lore unfathomable; their religion at once bizarre and profound. Just as Egypt is fairly at the crossing-point and centre of the two international routes combining Europe, Asia, and Africa, so the Egyptians appeared to be the focus from which emanated all that goes to make European civilisation. The cleverest people of antiquity, the Hellenes, never tired of admiring and studying Egypt; and the cleverest people of modern times, the French, not only resumed that admiration and study, but also, by extraordinary efforts of genius, brought it to a surprising conclusion. The interest cherished for the antiquities of Egypt was, and to a considerable extent still is, excessive. The number of books written on the manners and customs, religion and lore of the ancient Egyptians is astounding. From the Egyptian bibliographies, complete though they are as regards serious works on Egyptology, no adequate idea can be formed of the huge mass of books and essays written on the mysterious country of the

Pharaohs. Dilettanti and sciolists of all countries, but more especially of England and the United States, have flooded the market with works on Egypt. One finds the whole of Christianity in the religion of the most ancient Egyptians; the other discovers the most refined system of measurement and astronomy in the proportions of the Great Pyramid; a third unravels, out of Egyptian hieroglyphs and by means of ignoring entirely the art of reading them, a marvellous system of metaphysics, eschatology, or theosophy; and so forth *ad infinitum*.

Yet a reaction has set in at last. So long as the script of the ancient Egyptians was wrapped up in impenetrable darkness; so long as no authentic copies of Egyptian monuments or books were extant, the mystery of Egypt could well exercise its fascination. But when Champollion finally lifted the veil of Isis; when numerous Egyptian texts became as easily readable as is any other ancient text, or very nearly so; when students, unbiassed by *antiquariasis* and Egyptomania, came into possession of fair and intelligible translations of those enigmatical texts: what remained of that fascination? what is the upshot and clear balance of that secular admiration for things Egyptian? Very little.

We do not pretend to any authoritative knowledge of Egyptology. All that we may offer our readers is the result, not of the study of the original texts, which our ignorance of ancient Egyptian debars us from reading, but of the study of the works of the foremost Egyptologists of our age. Yet even from that inferior vantage-ground of ours we cannot help stating, that the culture and religion of ancient Egypt have, on close investigation, been found to be

disappointing, or, at best, an historic oddity. If it be possible at all to put down the value of nations in their work for civilisation with any degree of precision, such estimations must certainly depend on the amount of abidingly valuable work performed by those nations. Or, to put it more briefly, no nation can claim first-class importance in history, unless it has succeeded in establishing or elaborating one or more of the ideals regulating and animating all real culture. A nation that has spent its days mainly in providing for its wants of physical and moral comfort, cannot be considered a nation of great historic importance. The declamations of materialists notwithstanding, all history is an attempt to realise ideals political, religious, artistic, social, or intellectual. Where such attempts have not been made, there is no history. There may be work, comfort, ease, pleasure, but there is no high-strung effort towards regions loftier than satisfaction stomachical or muscular. For this reason the life of the numerically insignificant Hebrews is of infinitely greater importance than that of the numerically imposing Assyrians or Chinese; and the handful of Greeks have influenced the world more lastingly and incisively than have the countless hordes of Teutonic or Scythian tribes of their times. What, then, were the ideals suggested or realised by the ancient Egyptians? Have they created ideals in politics or in religion, in art or in literature, in commerce or in inventions? Have they given the world any *Leitmotiv* or principle by which people may be governed without being enslaved, enlightened without being drained of emotions, or stimulated without being diseased?

No, they have not. At least, the works written

by the most famous Egyptologists of the day do not, to an impartial student, furnish any evidence for the contrary assumption. From all the extant translations of Egyptian texts, and from all the engravings representing Egyptian monuments, one and one result alone can be deduced as to the innermost and true character of the ancient Egyptians; to wit, that they were a singularly unimaginative people, averse to all abstract and ideal modes of thought, living and dying in the concrete, cleaving to utilitarian things, and totally incapable of rising to the plane of ideals political or other. Such a nation, while it may do much for its bodily welfare, and offer many a curious or even useful contrivance for material comfort, will never become an historic nation proper. The human mind, unless quickened by imagination and abstract ideation, will for ever remain clotted with the dust of triviality. There is nothing as useless as utilitarianism. The things of this universe were not made, certainly not in the first place, to be useful to man. Hence he who searches for naught but the utilitarian side of things, must needs go astray and fail to comprehend or rule things. That nation alone will achieve greatness that has carefully nurtured its powers of rising above the immediate needs of commonplace life. In war, as in science or art, more than frigid caution or prudence is required. Enthusiasm, the fire of sacred phantasy, is needed, and without it a nation ends, like the Egyptians, by being enslaved, in war, by any invading foreigner, and in creed, by the worship of cats and crocodiles.

The Egyptians were the Chinese of classical antiquity. Their country consisted of a narrow strip of land on both sides of the Nile, offering in each

year, according to Amru, the Arabian conqueror of Egypt, the three successive aspects of a desert of dust, a sea of sweet water, and a garden of paradise. The ancients rightly called Egypt the gift of the Nile; for, as is well known, but for the fertilising power of that majestic river, Egypt proper would be like the deserts enveloping it to the west and the east. By the middle of June, the Nile, owing to heavy rainfalls and the melting of huge masses of snow in the mountains of its origin, begins to rise. The river rarely rises to a height sufficient to cause its flowing over the banks, although this is what most people understand by the "inundations of the Nile." Had the Egyptians, both ancient and modern, not seen to the watering of their fields by means of canals skilfully laid out over the whole extent of their country, the Nile alone would never have fertilised their fields, or certainly only a very few of them. Thus the Nile became the Father of Egypt only through the labour of its children. The Egyptians, quite different from other nations, owed to Nature the fertility, not the existence, of their soil. The water of the Nile rendered the soil fertile; but an elaborate system of canals had to be created to provide for a soil to be fertilised. From this two fundamental facts followed—

(A) That the Egyptians, being neither deserted nor too well helped by Nature, were bound to have recourse to their own ability and perseverance. This made them a sober, prudent, and self-sufficient nation; but it also minimised the resources of their imagination. Where Nature is poor, there man lacks one of the most frequent of imaginative incentives. This poverty of Nature deprived the Egyptians of another

great incentive too—of neighbours. To the north the sea, to the west and east inhospitable deserts, isolated Egypt for long, if intermittent, periods almost completely from conflict with superior nations. Such conflicts, however, are amongst the most beneficial of influences. Woe to the neighbourless nation. The only neighbours of the Egyptians for many centuries were negro tribes in the south. From them they could not expect either models or worthy enemies. Thus the exiguity of Nature made the Egyptians both clever and insignificant. They were, like their very country, a narrow strip of interesting humanity enveloped in deserts of hopeless superstition and inanity.

(B) The second fundamental fact was the fatal necessity in Egypt to attach far greater importance to a centralised administration than to a well-balanced or popular government proper. Already Napoleon I. in his masterly remarks on Egypt, dictated in St. Helena, has shown the natural ascendency of *administration* over political rule in Egypt. A country depending mainly on an equable management of its canals must needs centralise and bureaucratise its administration. Without a central and despotic bureaucracy regulating the size, opening, barrage, or closing of the canals and water-basins, a small minority of the Egyptians alone could have found a means of living in a naturally barren country. From the times of Herodotus (ii. 109) the inundations of the Nile have been said to have given rise to the science of geometry. This, as will be shown later on, is quite erroneous; those inundations gave rise to no science of geometry at all. But they did give rise to the most potent machinery of absolutist governments. No serious student of history can have failed to remark the policy of

absolutism consisting in the minimising of popular government proper by an elaborate *administration.* The latter caters to the physical and egoistical instincts of man, and thus satisfies many people so well that they finally quite unlearn to demand a share in the nobler tasks of govérnment. This has been, and largely still is, the case with all modern absolutisms. But what in modern times is the result of dynastic astuteness and popular indolence, that came to be the natural and necessary contrivance with the ancient Egyptians. The Nile at once fertilised their fields and sterilised their political instincts. In modern times, too, the means of conveying persons, goods, or news will inevitably fall to be centralised in the hands of government; one of these means, the post-office, having already been bureaucratised completely, the others to a great extent. Yet, railways and telegraphs, although very necessary to modern business and comfort, cannot, in point of importance, be compared with the canals of Egypt. Utilitarian, over-administered, and neighbourless, the Egyptian people could not but become purely empirical in knowledge, king-ridden in politics, and ideal-bare in religion or art.

Their "history," it is true, is far from being known; yet our gratification at this state of blessed ignorance must not prevent us from seeing that the Egyptians had no history. We may unearth still longer lists of Egyptian kings, still drearier biographies and epitaphs of Egyptian treasurers and high-priests: we shall never unearth Egyptian history. History is not the lumber-house of events trivial or pointless; and bare facts are the most odious of things unless they join and form an intelligible chorus of harmonies. The facts of

"Egyptian history" do not in the least indicate any such harmony. They have no bearings, no goal, no nucleus of crystallisation. It is impossible to point out a direction, an idea, or system in them. They are mere occurrences. A king builds a temple; an official is punished; a prince is born; etc. etc. Thousands of such doings will not make one historic act. For no nation has a history unless it has a State of higher organisation. The Egyptians had no such state. A glance at the most elaborate works on ancient Egypt will suffice to prove that the bulk of books on that country treat of the religious and social institutions of the Egyptians, and not of their history. Manners and customs the dwellers of the Nile had in plenty, but no history proper. The more they had of the former, the less they produced of the latter. They furnish immense material to folklore. That is the very symptom of unhistoric nations. The Slavs, negroes, and many an obscure German tribe offer treasures of folklore to the patient student. The more historic a nation, the less will it yield to the folklorist. Compare Bavaria with England, or Styria with Hungary. In Bavaria or Styria the harvest of the folklorist will be incomparably richer than either in England or in Magyar Hungary. In keeping with the object of the present work we might therefore despatch Egypt with a few lines. We are not writing folklore. Yet it will be prudent, if not systematic, to treat of some of the religious and social institutions of Egypt before proceeding to the study of nations really historic and important.

II. Of all the manners and customs of the ancient Egyptians, nothing has struck the fancy of nations more than the *Religion* of that people—if religion it

may be called, for Wiedemann curtly declares that, "as regards ancient Egypt, we can speak of religious ideas only, not of Religion."[1] Already in the inscriptions of the sixth dynasty (say 3400 years B.C.) we find that the Egyptians had embraced Monotheism, Pantheism, Ancestor-worship, Polytheism, and other forms of religious worship, *all at the same time.* To their unprogressive and ultra-conservative intellect the acquiescence in so many and totally divergent creeds and beliefs seemed just the fit thing. They took, as it were, the average of various creeds. Monotheism appeared quite acceptable, but Polytheism also offered advantages; nor could fetish- and ancestor-worship be dismissed off-hand. In Egypt things did not transform, but were superposed. Here, if anywhere, we must again remind the reader that our knowledge of Egyptian mythology is still very poor. Very few of their numerous divinities have been made a special study of; and since every one of the provinces or *nomoi* of Egypt, nay, almost every single town, had gods and divinities of its own, no final word can be said about the *general* character of their religious systems. De Rougé and Brugsch credit the Egyptian priests, if not the Egyptian people, with a monotheism as pure and definite as that of the Israelites after the second return from Babylon. Maspero, however, contradicts them, the Egyptians in his view having had "*des dieux uniques*" but no "*dieu unique.*" In other words they were *henotheists*, each *nomos* or province believing in one chief and unique god, without troubling themselves about the unique god

[1] A. Wiedemann, *D. Religion der alten Aegypter* (Münster, 1890), p. 3: "*Man kann in Aegypten wohl von religiösen Vorstellungen reden aber nicht von einer ägyptischen Religion.*"

of the other provinces. Thus was saved amongst the gods of Egypt both their uniqueness severally and a fine *camaraderie* collectively. Each *nomos* had a temple of its own, with a high-priest, high-priestess, and a few assistants. It is particularly noteworthy that there was no hierarchy amongst these priests, the servants of one temple being quite independent of the servants of another.[1] One of the chief gods was *Râ*, representing the sun, who was worshipped chiefly at On or Heliopolis. Râ was the centre of numerous mythological stories and legends. Besides Râ, *Osiris* and his sister-wife *Isis* were most generally worshipped. The goddesses, with the exception of Isis, are of no importance in Egyptian mythology, and are left in vague outlines, although Egyptian women had a social position of such freedom and emancipation as to be accorded far more independence and influence than was possessed by women of most other Mediterranean countries in antiquity. The Egyptians had very clear ideas about everything happening to Man after death, and they have embodied this valuable knowledge in a huge collection of theological writings commonly called *The Book of the Dead.* Up to this writing the explanation of this work has not yielded more than litanies devoid of any religious or metaphysical value. We must therefore wait until something will be discovered justifying the assumption of esoteric lore possessed by the priests of Thebes or Memphis.

We do not think it necessary to fill our pages with tedious details about Egyptian mythology, books giving accounts of the myths about *Râ*, *Horus*, *Tum*, *Su*, *Aten*, *Anubis*, *Nut*, *Osiris*, *Isis*, and other

[1] Wiedemann, *l.c.* p. 7.

Egyptian gods being of easy access. We prefer to dwell on the most singular feature of Egyptian religion, that is, on their *Worship of Animals.* It is a fact, proved by a great quantity of Egyptian and Greek texts, that many animals, such as the cat, the crocodile, the bull, the goat, the ape, etc., were worshipped as sacred, god-like beings, that is, as incarnations of god. The pious went to the temple with a distinct intention of worshipping the individual living animal kept there by the priests as a divinity and an object of adoration. This mode of worship has at all times been a matter of bewilderment or scorn to the visitors or students of Egypt. Many theories have been advanced to account for this strange aberration of the religious mind. Modern Egyptologists, it must be remarked, fight rather shy of this annoying problem. This may explain why the following explanation, which we venture to broach, has not yet been taken into consideration.

The Egyptians, like all other nations, must have commenced their religious life with the worship of Nature and her various manifestations. It is superfluous to adduce here evidence for what has been universally acknowledged by all students of the science of comparative religion. Nature offers the first and most imposing of the phenomena impressing the human mind with the forebodings of Life immense, overawing, and worship-claiming. But it so happens that Nature in Egypt is radically different from Nature in most other countries. The cloudless sky of that country offers none of those gigantic and myth-provoking spectacles which in other climes have filled and stimulated human imagination. There were no tempests; no mysterious cloud-formations;

no torrents of rain; no snow; no hail; no heavy fogs; no rainbows; no lightnings;—in short, there were none or very few of those phenomena of mid-air that with other nations have given rise to countless myths and religious legends. And as the sky, so the soil. There were no springs; no rivers beside the Nile; no mines; no high mountains; no forests; no awe-inspiring caves; no richly varied flora. The only domain where Nature manifested herself with some impressiveness was in the animals of the country. Neither mid-air nor the ground could be peopled by the religious instincts of the Egyptians with gods, nymphs, satyrs, and their legends. Both were too monotonous, too uninviting, for such flights of fancy. But animals there were. And if to the insignificance of Nature—except the range of the stars—we add the insignificance and banality of Man in Egypt, it becomes far less astounding, nay, almost intelligible, how religious worship in Egypt came to select animals as its objects. When Man once wakes up to the miracles and wonders of his own mind and heart, the miracles of Nature cease to occupy him exclusively. But when, as in ancient Egypt, he never soars above the level of the commonplace; when the objects of religious worship cannot be provided from the depths of his own inner life; when he continues to stand in need of outward Nature for religious incitements;—then we cannot wonder that he will *religionise* such objects of Nature as his country will offer him. To the present day, we are assured, the Christian Copts in Egypt revere the cat. If that be possible with Christians, why should the ancient Egyptians not have intensified reverence into worship? For reasons similar in drift, nations im-

measurably superior to the Egyptians have made use of animals as objects of reverence and family pride. According to the luminous explanation of Lessing, animals have, by representing the constancy of human emotions and passions, come to be necessarily used as vehicles of moral teaching in fables.[1] From moral to religious impressions there is no great distance. Animals have likewise been used, not only as *totems* by savage nations, but also as chief and distinctive signs of one of the strongest and most unyielding forms of pride. In the coats-of-arms of the nobility of Europe, pictures of animals are used almost exclusively in addition to geometrical figures and decorations for the distinctive representation of noble descent. In British armorials, for instance, the frequency of the use of animals to that of the human figure (both terrestrial and celestial) stands at least as 190 to 3.[2] The British nobility have put on their shields as signs of privileged respectability the figures of apes, asses, bats, cats, bears, boars, dogs, elephants, fish, goats, lions, moles, and mules;[3] and any act casting ridicule on the ape or cat represented on a nobleman's escutcheon is considered an injury to be punished at the judge's discretion. This certainly is one of the forms of animal-worship—a worship deeply rooted in the mysterious reverence and fear felt by Man for the dumb creation. The Egyptians, instead of relegating

[1] Lessing, *Abhandlungen (Werke*, ed. Lachmann-Maltzahn, vol. v. pp. 433-434).

[2] This proportion is arrived at by comparing the number of pages in John W. Papworth and Alfred W. Morant's *Ordinary of British Armorials* (Lond. 1874), referring to the headings, "Beast," "Bird," "Fish," "Insect," "Monster," and "Reptile," with the number allotted to the heading "Human Figure." By adding to these articles on animals the one under "Heads," the disproportion becomes still greater.

[3] See the *Ordinary of British Armorials* under the headings quoted in note above.

such a worship, as we have done, into the obscurity of private pageants, have raised it into the lofty sphere of religious adoration. But all the three cases here considered have a common basis of reverence for animals. The Egyptians, whose range of subjects to be religiously embraced was narrowed down by the nature of their country, and whose religious or aesthetic emotionality was ill-balanced,—the Egyptians, we say, only overdid an otherwise not illegitimate respect for Mother Nature's children. Being caricatures themselves, they made of caricatures their gods. Finally, it may be said that the element of mystery (or absurdity, as rationalists would say), indispensable to all religions, took in Egypt the shape of animal-worship.

III. It will not be necessary to dwell at length on the deserts of the ancient Egyptians in *Science*. Here, as well as in the case of their religion, we notice the fact that they who know least, both of science and of the original sources containing Egyptian works on science, are loudest in the praise of the latter. Thus the Egyptians have been credited with an insight into astronomy, geometry, and mathematics generally, which is borne out by no known manuscript of theirs, and refuted by every papyrus hitherto published. In arithmetic and geometry we have the *Papyrus Rhind* of the British Museum, published by Professor A. Eisenlohr (2nd edition, Leipsic, 1891). In medicine we have the *Papyrus Ebers* and the *Papyrus Berolinensis medicus major*.[1] In astronomy

[1] Compare Lüring (H. L. E.), *Die über die medicinisch. Kenntnisse der alten Aegypter berichtenden Papyri* (Leipsic, Inaugur. Diss. of Strassburg Univ., 1888), where the contents of these papyri are given at length. See also the bibliography of Egyptian medicine in the *Index Catalogue of the Library of the Surgeon-General's Office, U.S.*, under "Medicine"; and James Finlayson, *Ancient Egypt. Medicine* (a bibliography), Glasgow, 1893, 8vo, 55 pp.

(from the time of the New Empire), we have the inscriptions in the temple of Ramses II. on the western side of Thebes (in the so-called *Ramesseum*), in the Theban tombs of kings (Sety I., Ramses IV., and Ramses VII.), and on sarcophagi (Ramses IX.), all of which may be found in Lepsius' *Einleitung*, pp. 62 *seq.*; and in the astronomical section of Brugsch's *Thesaurus*; besides inscriptions scattered in various collections. Our knowledge of the state of these sciences in ancient Egypt is certainly far from complete. But, on the other hand, the papyri just mentioned do not suggest or prove any high opinion of the knowledge of Egyptian philosophers. The Papyrus Rhind is, in all probability, a practical guide for arithmetical and geometrical calculations occurring in common life. We cannot therefore expect it to contain much refined theory. Yet it certainly indicates a very low level of scientific knowledge in that, with one single exception (No. 61 in Eisenlohr's 2nd edition, or Table XVI. in the English edition), it never shows the faintest trace of such general rules as will be found in the most primitive treatise of the Middle Ages. Mensuration is taught in the clumsiest and entirely concrete manner, and has therefore to be adapted to every new object afresh. Even the surface of an isosceles triangle is given incorrectly.[1] Of fractions it uses,

[1] The Papyrus Rhind teaches that the surface of an isosceles triangle is obtained by multiplying the base with half the length of one of the sides, that is, in modern notation, $\frac{a \cdot b}{2}$; whereas the correct formula is, of course, $\frac{a \cdot b}{2}\sqrt{1-\left(\frac{a}{2b}\right)^2}$. In the Papyrus we learn also of equations with one unknown quantity, but they are all numerical equations, of the form $\frac{x}{7}+x=15$, or $\frac{1}{3}\cdot\frac{1}{2}x=5$.

except $\frac{2}{3}$, only the subdivisions of 1, etc. We cannot, therefore, ascribe to the ancient Egyptians an important place amongst the peoples preparing the rise of a science of mathematics. And how could that have been otherwise? Mathematics can be a science only by being based on abstract and general notions of quantity, space, position, and motion. A nation habitually averse to all abstract thinking; a nation so sense-ridden as to require in its writings the full image of an object together with the letters and syllabic signs representing the name of that object,—such a nation will never rise to the plane of generalisations. The Egyptians knew that three logs of 3, 4, and 5 feet severally will, on being connected together by their ends, form a rectangular triangle. They may have known three other measures of length having that quality; nay, ten such measures of three logs forming rectangular triangles. With all this merely empirical knowledge they could never attain to the beautiful generalisation arrived at by Pythagoras —a mathematical rule of such importance as to have been rightly called *Magister Matheseos*. Nor can we now wonder to hear that when Archimedes came to Egypt, in the second half of the third century B.C., he is said to have taught the Egyptians how to raise their dykes. We cannot but accept the severe judgment passed on the mathematical knowledge of the ancient Egyptians by a scholar of singular catholicity of taste and breadth of view.[1]

[1] Paul Tannery, than whom nobody has devoted a more zealous and less prejudiced study to the history of Greek mathematics, expresses himself as follows: "*L'explication du papyrus mathématique égyptien par Eisenlohr* [the above Papyrus Rhind], *le déchiffrement de quelques tablettes chargées d'écritures cunéiformes, nous ont révélé des faits curieux et permis de préciser un peu mieux le point de départ des découvertes hellènes; mais, en thèse générale, ces documents ont singulièrement rabaissé l'opinion que l'on se faisait des*

It is practically the same with Egyptian astronomy, medicine, or any other natural science. Their medicine is entirely popular and, in the lowest sense of the word, empirical; nor is their pharmacopoeia in any way remarkable for quantity or preparation of remedies. Their astronomy — a still very doubtful subject—has so far not been proved to rise over the most commonplace observations. Their law alone seems to have been somewhat remarkable. For the earliest times, our knowledge of their law is still very poor.[1] For the times of the Ptolemies we possess a vast number of papyri in demotic script bearing on questions of private law. M. E. Revillout, of Paris, and a few other scholars have extracted from them a rather remarkable body of law-regulations.[2]

IV. Egypt is still covered with innumerable remnants

connaissances mathématiques chez les Égyptiens et chez les Babyloniens, quoique d'ailleurs la plupart des orientalistes soient toujours disposés à s'exagérer ces connaissances."—La Géometrie grecque (Paris, 1887), pp. 5, 6. See the summary of what the present condition of our knowledge of ancient Egypt permits us to call "Egyptian Geometry" in Moritz Cantor, *Vorlesungen über Geschichte d. Mathem.* (Leipsic, 1880), i. pp. 61-63. Since the appearance of Tannery's and Cantor's works, there has been published no considerable addition to our knowledge of Egyptian geometry. Prof. E. Weyr's *Ueber die Geometrie d. alt. Aegypter* (Vienna, 1884) is an inaugural discourse.

[1] See a very elaborate dissertation on some points of the administration of law during the Dynasties XVIII.-XXI. (about 1500 to 1000 B.C.) by W. Spiegelberg, *Studien u. Materialien z. Rechtswesen des Pharaonenreiches . . .* (Hanover, 1892, 4to, 132 pp.).

[2] Revillout, E., *Droit Égyptien*, 1903, 2 vols. M. Revillout and his brother, not satisfied with having laid the foundations of later Egyptian Law, have been somewhat too desirous of laying new foundations for Roman Law too, by trying to prove that all that renders Roman Law valuable has been taken from Egyptian Law. It is comforting to learn from Prof. Hugo Winckler of Berlin that the excellence of Roman Law is really of Babylonian origin. Between these and other opinions, such as the pretended Greek origin of Roman Law, it is, we take it, possible to arrive at a view ascribing some little share in the multitudinous paternity of Roman Law even to the Romans themselves. See the end of the chapters on Roman history.

of the *Art* of the ancient Egyptians.[1] Pyramids, *mastabas*, temples, obelisks, and sphynxes form the chief, if not the exclusive types of old Egyptian Art. They were all in direct connection with religious, and more especially with funerary, institutions. The *mastabas* were pyramid-shaped tombs of the wealthy; the pyramids were the gigantic *mastabas* of kings. Of temples we know mostly such as were built in the "New Empire"; and almost all pyramids are close to or not far south of Cairo (more precisely, Gizeh). The pyramids, and especially the "Great Pyramid," or the tomb of King Cheops, the masonry of which still amounts to 3,246,600 cubic yards, have at all times been objects of wonderment to all visitors of Egypt, and the most fanciful theories have been broached as to the hidden meaning of these architectural colossi. It is to be feared, however, that the only thing hidden away in these ungainly tombs are the mummies of their builders. Considering the void and shallowness of Egyptian life, it need astound no one that they busied themselves so eagerly with the possibilities of life hereafter. So have done all peoples whose life lacked higher stimuli of action and mental effort. In the early middle ages, when idleness was the stamp of life, the ingenuity and wealth of several generations were spent on the building of huge churches; and the peoples of Peru and Mexico erected their immense pyramidal *Teocallis* for pre-

[1] In the following two works the reader will find a complete and handy bibliography of the history and the monuments of ancient Egyptian Art: (1) C. B. Stark, *Systematik und Geschichte der Archaeologie d. Kunst* (Leipsic, 1880), pp. 59 (under "*Kunsttopographie*"), 252, 357-361; (2) E. Knoll, in *Jahresber. üb. d. Fortschr. d. class. Alt.-wiss.* (Berlin, 1895), vol. lxxxi. pp. 1-53, comprising 1880-1894.

cisely the same reason as did the Egyptians their pyramids. The *Teocallis* were temples, not tombs; but that does not affect our point.

All the reasons advanced above for the impossibility of the rise of science in ancient Egypt, apply with redoubled force to the innate inferiority of Egyptian Art. Art is the language of Ideals. Unless a nation cultivate a certain range of Ideals, it will never make works of Art. The Egyptians cultivated no ideals. Their art was invariably subservient to purposes outside real art. It served as the handmaid of religion, of monarchical pride, of commerce. Nay, the Egyptians evidently lacked the very desire for art. Or how shall we otherwise understand the bizarre fact that they, the most garrulous of nations, they who have covered the stones of their entire country with paintings and inscriptions relating the most minute events of their life,—that they have not thought it worth while to record the names of the artists who designed or executed their pyramids, temples, or obelisks? For we know scarcely a single name of the artists of extant ancient Egyptian temples, pyramids, etc. Now, a true interest in art cannot possibly be severed from a lively interest in the artist. The personality of the artist is the very mould where the individual work of art is shaped, and where it receives that indefinable charm which no mechanical contrivance can give it. The Egyptians thought very poorly of their artists. The Papyrus Hood [1] ranks the artists far below the bakers of cakes, and immediately after the milk-carrier. Yet even this cannot be strongly instanced against

[1] Published by Maspero in *Un manuel de l'hiérarchie égyptienne* (Paris, 1888).

the Egyptians as art-connoisseurs. Mozart, too, was obliged to take his meals in the servants' kitchen of his employer, the reigning Archbishop of Salzburg. But it certainly exceeds the worst effects of social misplacement when the very names of artists are left to fall into utter oblivion. No doubt the Egyptian architects and sculptors worked collectively, and mostly or exclusively for fixed wages. That alone would stifle the first breath of Art. And as if to dry up the tenderest seedlings of Art, conventionalism—this, the mildew of Art—required the Egyptian artist to represent persons of the higher classes in the stiffest and most absurdly unnatural shape, whereas labourers, servants, and other people of the lower classes alone were suffered to be painted or sculptured more truly. Perspective was unknown; and the only domain of low art congenial to the Egyptians and successfully cultivated by them was caricaturing.

Under such circumstances it is a matter of wonder indeed that we find in the decorations of Egyptian temple-halls, in a few sculpturings and wall-paintings, in very beautiful works of goldsmiths, and in many miniatures of the papyri, remarkable symptoms of true Art. The consideration of these details is outside the scope of this work. In Messrs. Perrot and Chipier's well-known work on the history of Egyptian Art, the reader will find all the minutiae he may desire. But we cannot leave the subject without adverting to the important question as to whether Egyptian Art was original or no. Mr. Perrot, on the whole, strongly advocates its originality. Professor Flinders Petrie, however, has declared that the history of Egyptian Art must be divided into four

periods, the second of which is that of Semitic influences.[1] Professor Flinders Petrie's view has so far not enjoyed general acceptance, but it is in singular harmony with the view of a German orientalist, who has in an elaborate monograph essayed to show "the Babylonian origin of Egyptian civilisation."[2] The question is still an open one, and can be decided only by long researches into various branches of oriental archaeology. Yet so much has been conceded, even by M. Perrot, that the originality of Egyptian art must not be insisted upon too strongly.[3]

V. It will not, we hope, be considered superfluous or inconsistent to here add a few of the data known of the political *History* of Egypt.

King Menes of This (near Abydos) in Upper Egypt is said to have been the founder of the first dynasty of kings; and 4800 B.C. seems to be a fair date of his reign. From 4000 B.C. to 3300 B.C. the fourth, fifth, and sixth dynasties are said to have reigned. The kings of these dynasties had vast pyramids built, especially King Cheops and King Mencheres (Mykerinus). Under King Phios of the sixth dynasty, Lower and Upper Egypt were united into one realm. The seventh, eighth, and ninth dynasties (about 3300 to 3000 B.C.) appear to have achieved nothing remarkable, either in war or in monumental buildings. With them ends the *Old Empire.*

[1] See *Saturday Review*, 1883, p. 677: "*What we generally look upon as typical Egyptian art is* [according to Mr. Flinders Petrie] *not Egyptian but Semitic.*"

[2] A. Hommel, *Der babylonische Ursprung der aegyptischen Kultur* (Munich, 1892). Brugsch has proved from the table of Karnak that the metrical system of the Egyptians in the fifteenth century B.C. was identical with that of the Babylonians of that time. See his *Egyptologie* (1891), p. 481.

[3] M. Perrot admits (in the volume on Assyrian art) that Mesopotamian influence on Egyptian art becomes evident from the time of Dynasty XIX.

The *Middle Empire*, beginning about 2800 B.C., was, under the twelfth dynasty, a period of expansion to the country of Kush in Nubia (famous for its gold), and of much monumental activity in Egypt. The marvellous lake Moeris was constructed at that time; and the style of the inscriptions became a classical model. Under the thirteenth and fourteenth dynasties (about end of third and beginning of the second millennium B.C.) Egypt appears to have been distracted and weakened by dynastic and party dissensions; so that eastern Bedouins conquered Egypt, or rather Lower Egypt, forcing the kings of the rest of the country to pay them an annual tribute. These invaders are commonly called *Hyksos*; they reigned in the first half of the second millennium B.C. They quite conformed to Egyptian manners and culture, but were finally supplanted by the Egyptian dynasties forming the *New Empire*. The most celebrated of these was the eighteenth or Theban dynasty, down to about 1300 B.C. The *Hyksos* or "Shepherds" were driven out of Egypt; the negroes of Kush, who appear to have severed themselves from Egypt during the reign of the *Hyksos*, were again subjected; and the first ten kings of this dynasty succeeded in extending their influence to the peoples of the deserts of Arabia Petraea, of Palestine, of Syria, of Phoenicia and Cyprus, and even to those of the "streamland" of the *Mitâni*. In the tablets of *Tell el Amarna* we can still trace the official correspondence, written in cuneiform characters and in Babylonian, between the Egyptian officials and the above vassal countries. In the statistical table of *Karnak* we read all the exploits of the great Egyptian king Thutmosis III. (sixteenth century B.C.)

and the long list of Asiatic peoples subject to him. Ramses II. of the nineteenth dynasty (1275 to 1208 B.C., Petrie) added very much to the splendour of Egypt both by not unsuccessful wars against the *Chati* or Hittites between Mesopotamia and the western coasts of Asia Minor, and by the erection of countless temples, obelisks, sphynxes, etc. Menephtes (Egyptian: Mi-n-pteh), son of Ramses II., is held to be the Pharaoh under whom the Israelites left Egypt. Ramses III. of the twentieth dynasty took Ramses II. as his model, and rivalled him in prodigal gifts to the temples, of which we still have a most minute list in the Papyrus Harris No. 1, in the British Museum. His wars were directed mostly against several sea-faring tribes coming from the north and against the invasions of the Lybians. The supremacy of Egypt in Asia seems to have been on the wane; and at about 1100 B.C. we find apparently two dynasties (XXI.*a*, XXI.*b*) of kings in Egypt, one at Thebes, the other at Tanis. A Lybian finally united Egypt again under the twenty-second dynasty, about 950-800 B.C.[1] Of the twenty-third dynasty we know little. The next dynasty came from Sais, and the twenty-fifth from Aethiopia. In 666 B.C. the Assyrians again conquered Egypt. They ruled it by satraps, both of Assyrian and Egyptian nationality. One of them, subsequently Psammetichus I., contrived, by the aid of Gyges, King of Lydia, to free Egypt from the Assyrian yoke, and also to defeat local "kings" in that country; so that under him and his successors Egypt was again united, until it fell into the hands of the Persians under Cambyses, 525 B.C. The influx of Greeks under Psammetichus and his successors went

[1] One of the kings of this dynasty was Shishak, the friend of Jeroboam.

on increasing; the Egyptians, however, far from assimilating Hellenic culture, became more forbidding and exclusive than ever. Their civilisation adapted itself neither to lasting conquest nor to assimilation of foreign peoples. From the time of the Persian conquest of Egypt the history of this country becomes almost entirely provincial.

We have hitherto not yet spoken of the *State* and its organisation in ancient Egypt. Our knowledge of this vital institution of a people is not very extensive. Yet so much may be said with certainty, that the State in Egypt formed, with the exception perhaps of a period of oligarchic supremacy of a few Egyptian "nobles" during the twelfth and thirteenth dynasties, an absolutism as complete and as bureaucratic as there ever has been. The king was the "god," his servants the only rulers, and all officials his servants. The country was covered with a host of scribes, who, together with the priests and soldiers, formed the real citizens. All other Egyptians were *misera plebs contribuens*. A middle class there was not, as there seldom is in purely agricultural countries; and although it is incorrect to speak of castes *de lege* in ancient Egypt, yet it is safe to speak of castes *de facto*. For reasons mentioned above, administration bulked so heavily in the theory and practice of Egyptian government as to almost exclude all other functions of political rule. We have also remarked that both the nature of the country and its isolation from other nations prevented the Egyptians from working out a State of a higher type. In fact, their polity had chiefly social organs; and it is in respect of her social institutions that Egypt may claim a certain share of importance

in the history of the world. Folklore, sociology, "history of civilisation," and similar branches of history, will always find abundant material in the remains of Egyptian literature, monumental or other; and did we know more about their domestic and public finances, they might give us many a valuable hint in historic political economy. But in all walks of higher life, whether political, religious, scientific, or literary, the Egyptians can teach us nothing, as they have never taught any other nation. The mysterious magic that surrounded Egypt as allegedly the oldest civilised country, has long been dispelled. Babylonian civilisation is much older than Egyptian. There now remains no charm other than that of immense materials for philologic researches. The lessons to be learnt from ancient Egypt are all negative. We see that the social polity alone, howsoever cultivated, is quite insufficient to stimulate into existence either literature proper or science, either great inventions or great commerce. The Egyptians had no literature proper, as they had no more than mere beginnings of art. Women, it is true, occupied a high position, vapid novels flooded the country, and manners were no doubt polite and suave. Amusements, too, were varied, and perhaps even refined. By the seventh century B.C. Egypt was in the position of the Roman Empire in 300 A.D. An invasion and irruption of northern nations found both Egypt and Rome equally unfit to maintain themselves. But while Rome fell because her grand State had reached its natural end before the invasion of the "barbarians," Egypt fell because it had never been able to organise a State proper.

THE ASSYRIANS AND BABYLONIANS AFTER 1000 B.C.

The vast territories conquered by *Tiglathpileser I.* (see p. 104) were lost by his immediate successors but recovered by *Ashurnasirpal*[1] (885-860 B.C.), who, in the inscriptions of his time, is said to be lord of all the countries from the Tigris to the Lebanon and to the Great Sea (Mediterranean). Every year of his reign was taken up with wars against kings, rebels, and nations, the names of whom, together with their towns, appear in bewildering numbers on the inscriptions of this great Assyrian king, the only one of whom we possess an original portrait in a statue. His successor was *Salmanassar II.* (860-825 B.C.), whose residence too was at Kalach (now Nimrod), whereas formerly, and subsequently again under Sanherib, Nineveh (near Mossul) was the site of the magnificent palaces of the Assyrian kings. In his thirty-one large campaigns against countless peoples (Uruartu (Armenia), Nairi, Patin, Damascus, etc.) he fought with great success, especially against the Hittites. His sixth and his eighteenth campaigns were directed against the kingdom of Israel. His second successor, *Rammannirari III.*[2] (812-783 B.C.), extended his conquests to the Caspian Sea, and the western countries (the Hittites, Syria, parts of Phoenicia) too were under his sway. Under the first three of his successors—*Salmanassar III.* (783-773 B.C.), *Ashurdan II.* (772-755 B.C.), and *Ashurnirari II.* (754-745 B.C.)—the Assyrian Empire was considerably reduced in power, especially by the realm of

[1] See his inscriptions and annals in E. A. Wallis Budge and L. W. King, *Annals of the Kings of Assyria* (1902), vol. i. pp. 155-387.

[2] Messrs. Budge and King, *l.c.*, write Adad-nirari, p. xvii.

Uruartu (King Argistis and others), and by pestilence and rebellions. With *Tiglathpileser III.* (745-727 B.C.) opens a new and brilliant epoch in Assyrian history. He not only recovered the Assyrian provinces lost by his immediate predecessors, but also defeated the Alarodians or people of Uruartu, and brought under his sway all the tribes and realms of Syria, Palestine, and the north of Arabia, including the kingdom of Israel and Judah. In 729 B.C. he was crowned as king of Babylon. His successor, *Sàlmanassar IV.* (727-722 B.C.), is known from his wars with Hosea, king of Israel. *Sargon* (722-705 B.C.) was both a powerful conqueror and a remarkable organiser. He too sat on the throne of Babylon; so did his successor, the cruel and powerful *Sanherib* (705-681 B.C.), of whose first eight campaigns against all the realms of Western Asia we have the Assyrian annals on the "Taylor Cylinder" (really a hexagonal clay prism) in the British Museum. According to 2 Kings xviii. 13-xix., and Isaiah xxxvi.-xxxvii., Sanherib's army, while besieging Jerusalem—whose people had in conjunction with most Syrian, Phoenician, and Egyptian powers started a vast rebellion against Assyria,—was devastated by pestilence. Jerusalem thus escaped being conquered. Sanherib was assassinated by some of his sons, but another of his sons and his successor, *Assarhaddon* (681-668 B.C.), had the parricides put to death. He defeated the Cimmerians who, probably hard pressed by the Scythians in South Russia, had invaded first Armenia and then Assyria, coming in vast numbers through the Caucasus. He also commenced the final conquest of Egypt, consummated by his son *Ashurbanipal* (668-626 B.C.), the *Sardanapal*

of the Greeks, in 666 B.C. He was a great conqueror and also a patron of science. His vast library (clay-tablets) discovered by Layard testified to his love of literature. From the cuneiform inscriptions we know that Sardanapal was not, as the Greeks would have it, the last of the Assyrian kings, who, on seeing Nineveh hopelessly surrounded by the Medes, burnt himself together with all his innumerable wives. Several more Assyrian kings follow, and Nineveh was probably destroyed and the Assyrian empire terminated in 606 or 605 B.C. by Cyaxares, king of the Medes. Herodotus and Ctesias speak of a *Median Empire* founded towards the end of the eighth century B.C., and they give a list of the rulers. However, such an empire did not exist before the times of Sardanapal, and Cyaxares is so far the only Median king regarding whom we have authentic records.

The *civilisation* of the Assyrians seems to have been quite dependent on that of Babylon. Although stones were easily obtainable, the Assyrians followed the Babylonian manner of employing bricks rather than stones. Vaults they used rarely, and columns not at all. Assyrian sculptures are more animated but less finished than Egyptian; however, animals, especially lions, appear well drawn. Statues proper are very deficient, but works *in relievo* have some artistic merit. The Assyrians seem to have been a stalwart and manly race of strong and cruel men and handsome women. Since the times of Sargon (722-705 B.C.) the Assyrian armies consisted of mercenaries only, and this explains to a large extent the frequent loss of power and the rapid downfall of Assyria. The favourite sport of the Assyrians was lion-

hunting. Their women they treated well. The marriage ceremony was performed by the father, and not by the priest. Their national god was Assur, and other gods of the Babylonians.[1]

Meanwhile (in the last decade of the seventh century B.C.) the Chaldean Nabopolasser had cut loose from Assyria and founded the short-lived *New Babylonian Empire*; his son, subsequently King Nabukodorozor II. (Nebuchadnezzar, 604-562 B.C.), defeated the Egyptian king Neko II., who had invaded Palestine, at Karkemish (605 B.C.), and in 586 (others 587) B.C. took Jerusalem, which he had razed to the ground, sending most of the Jews into the "Babylonian captivity." The kingdom of Judah ceased to exist. Nabukodorozor could not reduce Tyre; he was more successful with the Egyptian pharaohs and the Arabian kings. The known inscriptions of his time speak almost exclusively of the buildings and mighty canals that he caused to be made. Babylon remained from the time of Nebuchadnezzar to the invasion of the Mongols in the thirteenth century A.D., the largest emporium of eastern commerce. Under Nabonit (556-539 B.C.) Babylon, the huge capital, was taken by Kurash, king of Anshan, as he styles himself, or Cyrus, king of Persia, as he is generally called, in 539 B.C., and so the Babylonian Empire too came to its term.

The Phrygian and Lydian Empires

In Asia Minor empire-building was proceeding on

[1] Of the famous Assyrian queen, Semiramis, no record has been found on the monuments.

lines identical with those of the history of the rest of Western Asia. In the sixteenth or fifteenth century B.C. the Hittites had established an empire stretching westward from the Halys river to the Aegean Sea, eastward and southward to the Orontes river. In the twelfth century B.C. we read in Assyrian records of the powerful Mushki in Asia Minor; and there can be little doubt that in the eleventh or tenth century B.C. the Phrygians, presumably a people immigrated from the Balkan and speaking an Indo-Germanic language, established in western Asia Minor a great empire, whose last ruler, the famous Midas, came in conflict with Sargon, king of Assyria, and was by about 700 B.C. deprived of his realm by the Cimmerians.[1] Just as the Assyrians were naturally pushing on to their outlet to the sea, that is, to Syria, so the Phrygians necessarily gravitated towards the Aegean Sea, and their thalassocracy, mentioned in the lists of thalassocracies given by Eusebius and St. Jerome, can admit of no doubt.[2] Their empire was succeeded by the *Lydian Empire*, whose founder Gyges (687-652 B.C.) is well attested in the Assyrian records and in Greek histories. His policy was international indeed. He combated Assyria, made an alliance with Egypt, commenced subjecting to his sway the Greek dwellers on the coast of his realm, and contrived to beat back the Cimmerians. His son Ardys (652-615 B.C.), hard pressed by the Cimmerians, was compelled to implore, temporarily at least, the protection of Sardanapal;

[1] On the Phrygian Empire see Paul Kretschmer, *Einleitung in die Gesch. d. griech. Sprache* (1896), pp. 204 *seq.*; and especially Hugo Winckler, *Altorient. Forschgen.* 2nd series, pp. 103-137 (1898); and pp. 277 *seq.* (1899); see also Maspero, *Hist. anc.* (1899), vol. iii. pp. 330-331.

[2] Eusebius, *Chron.* ed. Schoene, p. 225.

yet he too encroached upon Greek territory on the coast, which under King Alyattes (610-561 B.C.) was largely brought under Lydian sway. The last of the Lydian kings, Croesus (561-546 B.C.), was in reality absolute lord of Asia Minor from the sea to the Halys river; but his empire, like all the others, was brought to a sudden fall by Cyrus, king of Persia. Many had been the feuds and wars between Lydia and Assyria, and the Medes and Persians, and the wealth of Lydia (gold was found in the Pactolus river, and the Lydian stone was long used as a touchstone for the purity of gold) must have been considerable. The riches of Croesus became proverbial. The situation of the Lydian empire and the conquests of its kings made the Lydians the great commercial link between Asia and Europe. The archaic route leading from Cyme on the coast, through Sardes to Pteria (now Boghaz-Koei), called the royal road, and reaching, through Mesopotamia, Susa in Persia—was in its western portion quite in the possession of the Lydians, as before then it had been in that of the Hittites and the Phrygians; and the great commerce of the time of the Mermnades (687-546 B.C.) led to the invention by the Lydians of coined money. The Lydians were also known for their love and invention of games, and their gift for music.

About the middle of the sixth century B.C., then, all the great empires of Western Asia, originally founded on the Euphrates, on the Nile, in Asia Minor, and on the southern slopes of the Caucasus, had ceased to exist. A new empire, the Persian, took their place; but for analogous reasons its duration was not, as we shall see, very prolonged

either. Not one of these empires sensibly advanced the intellectual forces of mankind; not one of them created abiding ideals of Religion, Art, Literature, Science, or Industry. In material achievements they displayed much ingenuity; but in the higher tasks of mental, political, and commercial organisation they proved sadly deficient.

THE BORDER STATES, OR THE CLASSICAL NATIONS

THE PHOENICIANS—THE HEBREWS—THE HELLENES

HISTORY proper begins with the Phoenicians, the Hebrews, and more especially with the Hellenes; that is, not with three distinct races or tribes, "Semitic" or "Indo-German," who had some mysterious "historic vocation," or some unanalysable racial gift for performing great or historic deeds; but with three groups of people, recruited in all probability from an indefinite number of other nations of all kinds who, under stress of circumstances, as hereafter explained, contrived to carry on the real business of mankind in a manner at once more original and more efficient than had been done by the peoples of the preceding empires. The Phoenicians or the Hellenes were, like the English, the French, or, to quote an African example, the Boers, of a most varied origin. No doubt all the Phoenicians of, say, the sixteenth century B.C. talked one and the same language, just as did all the English in the fifteenth century A.D. Yet, as to their physiological complexion, as to their blood, they were, like all great nations, of very mixed origin. Hence the race-question is of no account in any attempt at clearing up the ever-remarkable origins of

the history of these nations. Instead of separating the history of the "Semitic" Phoenicians and Hebrews from that of the "Indo-German" Hellenes, as if history moved on racial lines, we must in the first place investigate what we have found to be the most constant, and in early periods the most powerful factor of history, namely, the influence of the geographical situation together with the political bearings of the surrounding polities; in a word, the geo-political influences.

In investigating this, the paramount factor in those remote ages, we are struck, first of all, with the fact that the geo-political situation of the Phoenicians in the eighteenth or fifteenth century B.C. was quite identical with that of the Hebrews and Hellenes in the twelfth century B.C. All the three groups of people were border nations; that is, they lived on the frontiers of vast and powerful empires, and naturally apprehended to be swallowed up by them. In this they resembled, of course, any one of the countless nations and "lands" enumerated in Egyptian, Babylonian, and Assyrian lists of conquered inland peoples, such as the lands of the Suchi, of Kummuch (Kommagene), of Tabal (in Cappadocia), of Chilakku (Cilicia), of Gurgum, Samal, Patin, Nairi, Nirbi, Gibzan, etc. The border nations, dwelling along the coasts of Palestine, Phoenicia, and western Asia Minor, enjoyed, however, as against all the other border nations scattered between the empires, the inestimable advantage of being able to betake themselves, in case of extreme danger, to the sea, of which none of the great inland empires had for any length of time undisputed dominion. In any struggle with the aggressive empires, these border nations had

therefore a vastly greater chance of success. The sea offered them substantial hopes of emancipation. The Hellenes were in this respect even more favourably situated than the Phoenicians, the coast of western Asia Minor being studded with smaller or larger islands, or natural fortresses unapproachable by empires without sea-power, whereas such islands are exceedingly scarce on the coast of Palestine and Phoenicia. The struggle between coast or border nations and the inland empires was going on—according to records already at our disposal—from the twentieth century downwards; but there is scarcely a doubt that further excavations will bring to light evidence of much earlier struggles of that kind. We venture to predict[1] that as soon as the Cretan inscriptions discovered by Mr. A. Evans, and the Hittite inscriptions of Asia Minor, are deciphered, the historic reality of those secular struggles between the inland empires and the Hellenic or Hellenised border nations will be seen to rest on documentary and contemporary evidence. The temporary absence of direct evidence of the majority of the secular and immense conflicts between the border nations and the Empires is not surprising. Thus of the domination of the *Hyksos* and their descendants in Egypt, which lasted, according to Prof. Petrie, for 511 years,[2] we have practically no Egyptian evidence whatever; just as for the immortal struggle of Hannibal with Rome we have not discovered a single line of Punic evidence. As is the case in all unequally matched contentions, the weaker side

[1] This was written in August 1898.

[2] Flinders Petrie, *History of Egypt* (1895), ii. p. 236. Compare W. M. Müller, *Asien u. Europa* (1893), p. 177; Maspero, *Hist. ancienne* (1897), ii. p. 53; J. Krall, *Grundriss d. altor. Gesch.* (1899), pp. 29, 30.

necessarily had recourse to that means of defence in which even an individual man may be superior to thousands of people—to intellectual resources. Unable to match the material power of the vast inland empires, the border nations naturally tried to repel them by means of better organisation, both political and intellectual. To avoid being absorbed by the empires was their daily and most pressing need; and accordingly anything promoting greater intellectual, moral, and political organisation stood at a high premium. Such high-strung development of all the human faculties can, however, not be expected to be realisable in great masses of people; hence the border nations were, by the strongest of human instincts—by the desire for self-preservation—prompted to shun the formation of one great border State. Moreover, such a State would have soon provoked the coalition of all the inland empires. There remained, therefore, only the formation of small, territorially very limited States, the relatively few inhabitants of which might reasonably be supposed to arrive at that intenser culture of mind and will-power, without which even the sea was insufficient to guarantee their threatened existence. This natural tendency to the formation of small border States was moreover in agreement with the policy of the inland empires, who preferred apparently feeble and mutually hostile States on their borders, just as modern Russia and Austria-Hungary endure five small States on their borders, but would not tolerate one large border State; or, as between Prussia in the north, and Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden in the south, there are only the small and curiously straggling central States of the German Empire; and

as between Germany and France, there are only the small States of Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Switzerland. This is the true origin of the classical city-state. We read of city kingdoms in ancient Babylonia and Egypt too; but the people of these kingdoms were neither locally nor politically absorbed by, nor centred in, one city. There was a considerable rural population living in villages. The classical city-state is grafted on the people of one town. Territorial aggrandisement mostly takes the shape of the foundation of new city-states, of colonies. The development is intensive, not extensive. It grows as did, in the twelfth century A.D., the new Catholic orders of monks, not by expanding the original demesne of the mother-monastery, but by establishing new monasteries of the order in new places. The imperative necessity of obtaining higher organisation of all the forces of the citizens, led, after innumerable attempts, to the invention of the city-state, one of the most powerful engines of intellectual efficiency ever devised.

The records regarding the struggles of the Phoenicians and the Hebrews with the empires being much older, we shall first speak of the city-states of Aradus, Byblos, Sidon, Tyre, etc., on the coast of Phoenicia, then of the Hebrews, and finally of the Greeks.

THE OLDEST STATES OF THE BORDER NATIONS

PHOENICIA—DAMASCUS—EDOM—MOAB—ETC.

Modern antisemitism in no small measure explains the misconstruction of the history of the "Semitic" Phoenicians, especially at the hands of German

writers. That the Phoenicians were clever traders, successful merchants, and not unskilled seamen—this much is readily admitted by the German student of Phoenician antiquities. That they were the inventors of some useful technical processes, or of the incomparably useful alphabet—that is strenuously denied or doubted by the learned historians of the Fatherland. That the Phoenicians wielded real power at any given time of their history—that is absolutely denied by the authorities of Berlin or Strassburg.

As a matter of fact, few things in ancient history can be proved to be more evident than the political and commercial superiority of the city-states of Phoenicia in the latter half of the second millennium B.C. We must, however, distinguish between evidence as required in a court of law, and evidence as accepted in the court of history. When an Assyrian king does not mention a certain Phoenician town in the list of towns he conquered in Phoenicia, no sane historian will doubt that the town in question had not been conquered by the king. In law, on the other hand, such an *argumentum ab silentio* would not necessarily be valid.[1] From the king's omission of the town it could, in law, not be inferred that he had not conquered that town. As in this case, so in most other cases, we are nowise entitled to apply the kind of evidence that obtains in law to the facts of history. As there are no crown witnesses in history, so there are no rules excluding circumstantial or psychological evidence. On the contrary, the most potent means of the right interpretation of historical facts is to be found in psychological analysis.

[1] Savigny, *System* (1840), vol. iii. § 132. The objections of Brinz, *Pandekten*[2] (1892), vol. iv. pp. 273 *seq.*, are purely academic.

We do not know very much about the history of the nations living on the common borders of the Assyrian, Babylonian, Hittite, and Egyptian empires from about 1500 B.C. to 1050 B.C. But we know enough about the then history of these nations in Syria, Palestine, and Phoenicia, to be able to arrive at a clear and broad conclusion regarding their political attitude towards these empires.

We know that the Babylonian kings extended their influence to the Mediterranean by the end of the third millennium B.C.; that, more particularly, Hammurabi, King of Babylon, exercised political influence in Syria and Palestine[1] about the twenty-third century B.C.; and when most of those border nations were temporarily conquered by the pharaohs of the eighteenth dynasty of Egypt in the fifteenth century B.C., Babylonian influence had already spread deep into the customs and social habits of the Syrian and Canaanitic nations. It is thus quite certain that those border nations were subject to the influence of and to conflicts with the Babylonian and, later, the Egyptian empire. From the fifteenth century B.C. onward we have positive and abundant information about the attempts of the Egyptian as well as the Hittite empire during several centuries to keep the border nations in subjection.[2] Since Tiglathpileser

[1] Maspero, *Hist. anc.* ii. (1897), pp. 48-50; Hugo Winckler, *Altor. Forsch.* i. pp. 140 *seq.*, 224 *seq.*

[2] The first Egyptian campaign in Syria was under Tahutmes (Thutmosis) III.; see his own report in Flinders Petrie, *Hist. of Egypt*, ii. (1899), pp. 103 *seq.* Other campaigns were by Amenhotep (Amenophis) II. (Petrie, *Hist. of Egypt*, ii. p. 155); by Harmais (Harmhib) about the middle of the fourteenth century B.C. (*Recueil de travaux rel. à . . . l'arch. égypt. et assyr.* xvii. pp. 42 *seq.*); by Sety I.; by Ramses II.; by Menephtah; by Ramses III. (about twelfth century B.C.). The Egyptian records of these wars also contain reports about the Hittites.

I. (about 1100 B.C.)[1] the Assyrian empire likewise attempted, and for several centuries, to include within its sway the countries from both sides of the Lebanon to the Mediterranean. In the eleventh century King Ashur-irbi invaded Syria and Phoenicia.[2] In 876 B.C. Ashurnasirpal invaded Phoenicia; in 856 B.C. Salmanassar II. repeated the attempt, which was also made by the Assyrian king Rammannirari in 803 B.C.; by Tiglathpileser III. in 742 and 738 B.C.; by Sanherib in 704 B.C.; by Assarhaddon in 668 B.C.; and by the latter's son Ashurbanipal.[3]

It is thus certain that from the fifteenth century B.C. to quite historic times, that is, to the seventh century B.C., we have ample and direct evidence of the very numerous attempts of the inland empires to possess themselves definitively of the territories held by the border nations close to and on the Syrian and Phoenician coast of the Mediterranean. Independently of any such evidence, the mere geographical configuration of those empires suggests the assumption that, since Syria, Phoenicia, and Palestine offer both the only convenient roads of communication between the empires of Asia and Africa, and the nearest outlet to an open sea proper, the rulers of those empires must have necessarily gravitated towards them. As Germany or Russia in modern times, so the inland empires of the third and second millennium B.C. were compelled to find an outlet in an open sea.

What, then, was the attitude of these border nations to the mighty empires leading almost incessantly onslaught after onslaught against them?

[1] Maspero, *Hist. anc.* ii. (1897), p. 656.

[2] H. Winckler, *Keilschrift. u. d. alte Test.* (1902), p. 38, quoting the reports of Salmanassar II.

[3] Maspero, *Hist. anc.* iii. (1899), pp. 41, 279, 280, 281, 288, 352.

Did they meekly submit? Did they unite into one powerful buffer-state?

In Syria, Palestine, and Phoenicia there were in the third, certainly in the second millennium B.C., very numerous tribes and settlements, the members of which manifested but a poor desire to unite in one strong body politic. From all the records of the empires and the border nations we can only gather one general fact, to the effect, that the rulers and peoples of the very numerous cities and regions, the names of which are bewildering both in number and in difficulty of philological collocation, were practically at constant warfare with one another. The *Habiri* (Hebrews) of whom we read in the Tell el Amarna tablets of the fifteenth century B.C.; the Phoenician towns of the same time (Aradus, Byblos, Sidon, Tyre, Berut); later on, the kings of Damascus, Moab, Israel, Judah, etc., were constantly plotting and intriguing and warring against one another, both at home and at the courts of the empires. It is no exaggeration to say that the territory close to the Syrian coast was in the latter half of the second millennium and in most of the first half of the first millennium B.C., the slaughter-house of western Asia. Attacked by their immediate neighbours, themselves border nations; attacked by the mighty empires around them; those small nations soon learned to use efficiently all the resources of subtle diplomacy, and the leverage of well-chosen strategy in war.[1]

[1] The above statement, written in 1900, has now (1904) been borne out by the discovery of such diplomatic correspondence between the border nations in Canaan. It was found by Sellin, at Ta'anukh, in the southern portion of the plain of Jezreel. The documents are written in cuneiform script (see the *Denkschriften der kaiserlichen Akademie d. Wiss. zu Wien*, Band L., No. IV.; *Tell Ta'annek* (1904), pp. 113 *seq.*).

Far from being helpless, petty, resourceless, and merely imitative of the culture of the great empires, those small nations clearly and firmly grasped the necessity of choosing between two possible destinies only: one consisting in unconditional submission to the empires and in absorption by them; the other consisting in a constant diplomatic and military struggle with those empires in order to maintain their individuality and independence. It is historically certain that each of these border nations maintained its individuality and independence for many a century. Aradus fought and resisted the might of Thutmosis III. (fifteenth century B.C.) in, probably four, certainly in two campaigns.[1] This powerful city-state, built on an island and surrounded by a Cyclopean wall, fought likewise the pharaohs Amenhotep III. and IV. (fifteenth century B.C.); the pharaoh Ramses II.; the Assyrian king Tiglathpileser I. (eleventh century B.C.) could not conquer it;[2] nor could the mighty Ashurnasirpal;[3] and while Ashurbanipal (seventh century B.C.) controlled it for a time, yet Aradus again fought Egypt in 588 (pharaoh Apries), and down to Seleucid,[4] Roman, and modern times was practically

[1] Maspero, *Hist. anc.* ii. (1897), p. 190, n. 1, quoting Thutmosis' own annals, the Tell el Amarna tablets in the British Museum, ed. Bezold-Budge, and the Egyptian poem of *Pentaourit*, ed. De Rougé.

[2] Winckler (Hugo) indeed says that Tiglathpileser I. "*besetzte*" Arvad (Arad), *Keilinschrift. u. d. alte Test.* (1902), p. 37, quoting Schrader's *Keilinschr. Bibl.* i. 125, 127; but that inscription is only assumed to refer to Tiglathpileser I., and moreover only says that the Assyrian king (whether Tiglathpileser I. or another) employed ships from Arvad. Such ships may have been lent to him by the city. Maspero expresses himself with great caution, and explicitly says, "*nous ignorons . . . comment les villes phéniciennes l'accueillirent* [Tiglathpileser I.]," ii. p. 657.

[3] *Keilschr. Biblioth.* i. pp. 107-111; Ashurnasirpal's own report of his invasion.

[4] In 218 B.C. even King Antiochus III. made an alliance with Aradus (Polybius, v. 68. 7).

independent, offering staunch resistance even to Marc Antony's generals.[1]

The history of Tyre is even more famous, and of that city-state, likewise built on an island near the coast, it may be said in strict accordance with the facts, that although Assyrian, Babylonian, and Egyptian kings repeatedly tried to reduce it, the rich and powerful island-town itself could be conquered neither by Ashurnasirpal, Salmanassar II., Sanherib, Assarhaddon, and Ashurbanipal, that is, from 876 B.C. to 668 B.C., nor by the Babylonian king Nabukodorozor II. (605-562 B.C.), who besieged it for thirteen years. The Egyptian pharaohs of the eighteenth to the twentieth dynasties were likewise unsuccessful; and the glory of having conquered the impregnable Phoenician city-state was reserved for Alexander the Great, who after a siege of seven months at last possessed himself of Tyre. When we remember the relative ease with which the Assyrians under Assarhaddon and his son Ashurbanipal overpowered Egypt, we shall adequately measure the true greatness of the power of Tyre, which neither of these two great Assyrian conquerors was able to reduce.

Sidon, likewise built on an island near the coast, was, as we see from the Tell el Amarna letters, a centre of resistance to Egypt, as later on to the might of Assyria. It was indeed destroyed by Assarhaddon in 677 B.C., but at that time it had already a great history of over 800 years behind it.

[1] Dio Cassius, 48, 24; 49, 22. See especially the most instructive chapter on the isle of Ruad, as Aradus is now called, in Carl Ritter's *Erdkunde* (Berlin, 1854), vol. xvii. Part I. pp. 868-879; more particularly pp. 871-872, where Ritter well shows the practical impossibility of conquering Aradus in ancient times. See also Renan, *Revue archéologique*, 1862, pp. 273-280; *id. Mission de Phénicie*, pp. 19-42; Maspero, *Histoire ancienne*, vol. ii. (1897), pp. 169 *seq.*

Even Byblos declared, as early as (about) 1075 B.C., to an Egyptian envoy asking for permission to cut timber in the Lebanon, that neither Zeker-baal, its then king, nor his ancestors had ever been under Egyptian rule.[1]

The power of Damascus was for a time very considerable, and the Assyrian king Salmanassar II., who easily conquered Babylon, tried in vain to defeat the army of Bir-idri (or Ben-hadad) in the formidable battle of Karkar, on the Orontes river, 854 B.C. Four other attempts of the same Assyrian king to reduce Damascus in 849 and 846, 842 and 839 respectively, likewise failed.[2] Nor was Salmanassar III. much more successful.[3] Damascus was not taken by the Assyrians before 733 B.C.

Such as cannot prevail upon themselves to see in the border nations anything more than mere appendices and petty offshoots of the great empires, are inclined to think that the power of Tyre and other Phoenician and Syrian towns was extant only in those periods when, for reasons of internal dissensions or other events, the great empires did not interfere with the border nations, and so left them breathing-space for growth and wealth. Thus it has been stated that the apogee of Tyre was in the tenth and ninth centuries B.C., because neither Babylonia nor Assyria interfered with it. Nothing could be more remote from the truth.

We have seen that all the Phoenician towns were from the fifteenth to the tenth century in constant

[1] Golenischeff, in *Recueil de travaux* (1899), giving the journal of the Egyptian envoy's journey.

[2] Maspero, *Hist. anc.* iii. (1899), pp. 70 *seq.* Maspero writes Adadidri, instead of Bir-idri. Winckler, *Keilschrift.* (1902), pp. 44, 45.

[3] Winckler, *l.c.* p. 47.

conflict with the Hittites, the Egyptians, Assyrians, and minor tribes and towns in the borderland, who again called in the assistance of other, frequently very powerful realms.[1] For these immense conflicts, in which all the powers of man must have been laid under contribution, we have contemporary evidence. Is it possible to assume that these secular and successful conflicts contributed little or nothing to the more intense development of the political and social institutions, or of the intellect and power of the Phoenicians and Syrian tribes? Is it likely that the undoubted and admitted greatness of Tyre, for instance, under King Hirom I. (in the tenth century B.C.), was owing, not to the secular strain on all the mental and physical resources of the Tyrians from 1500 to 1000 B.C., but to the temporary lull in those struggles for two or three generations at the beginning of the first millennium B.C.? To assume that peace as such is necessarily conducive to a more intense growth of wealth and culture is, as everybody knows, in the highest degree gratuitous. But that a peace lasting not quite a full century, that is, from the times of Hirom I. to the invasions of Ashurnasirpal, should have produced the marvellous wealth and power of Tyre, is absolutely inadmissible. If the non-interference of the empires was the cause of Tyrian and Sidonian greatness, why did it contribute so little to real intellectual and economic greatness in Damascus, in Moab, in Edom, or in any other of the border nations? Why did it give rise to such greatness only in Phoenicia and in the kingdom of the Hebrews? For it is well known that it was only in Phoenicia and in the realms of

[1] The Phoenicians had during those centuries no small number of conflicts with the Hellenic peoples from the west too.

David and Solomon that the true business of humanity was substantially advanced during the eleventh and tenth centuries B.C. David's and Solomon's writings have, to the present day, an unalterable value of their own; and the Phoenicians had long before the period of the non-interference of the empires, *i.e.* long before the Tyrian king Hirom I., introduced their greatest contribution to the history of mankind—alphabetical writing.[1] The Phoenicians, owing to their sea-power, were in an exceptional position. While Damascus, Moab, or Edom might resist the onslaughts of the empires intermittently or temporarily, the Phoenicians, owing the protection of the sea, resisted, on the whole, all the empires with almost uninterrupted success. Professor Hugo Winckler has indeed spoken with sarcasm of the power of the Phoenician towns in the fifteenth century B.C. The Phoenician towns of that time, he says, give him a most desolate impression of wretchedness, of excessive smallness and insignificance.[2] The ruler of Gebal (Byblos), Winckler says, appears in the Amarna letters as one "whining" and moaning for help from Egypt. This cannot be denied. Rib-Addi of Byblos does indeed clamour for help from Egypt. But apart from the fact that other Phoenician towns (Sidon and Arvad) of the same period (fifteenth century B.C.), far from "whining" for help, boldly attack Egyptian subjects and Egyptian supremacy,[3] the "whining"

[1] A cup of Hirom I. (tenth century B.C.) contains an inscription in alphabetical writing (Maspero, *Hist. anc.* ii. (1897), pp. 573, 574).

[2] Hugo Winckler, *Altorient. Forschungen*, i. pp. 426, 429.

[3] *Tell el Amarna Letters*, ed. H. Winckler (1896), pp. 175 (letter 81), 199 (letter 92), 235 (letter 124), 275 (letter 150), 283 (letter 155). Winckler indeed says (*Keilinschriften u. d. alte Test.* (1902), p. 199) that Aziru, "*amel*" (ruler) of the inland Amurri, "possessed" (*besitzt*) Arvad, and quotes the 150th letter of the Amarna collection, section 59. The passage in question

letters of Byblos, Tyre, and Jerusalem do not in the least prove the helplessness or puny pettiness of those border towns. It was part of their deep game to appear helpless while intriguing against the very power whose help they implored. While Zimrida of Sidon complains to the pharaoh about raids on the part of the Habiri (Hebrews); Abimilki of Tyre complains about raids on the part of that very Zimrida of Sidon.[1] The border towns acted as small powers exposed to the inroads of mighty, or apparently mighty, empires have always acted. The Italian cities in the Middle Ages, including papal Rome, have invariably "whined" for help from the German or Greek emperor, although they just as invariably turned against those emperors a few months or years after they had implored their assistance, if circumstances had changed. Pope John XII. asked Otto the Great in 960 A.D. "for the love of God" to come into Italy and to save the church of St. Peter.[2] Shortly after that Pope John became the most violent adversary of Otto. The Italian town of Benevent asked Emperor Lothar III. "with tears" to help them against Roger, Count of Sicily, in 1133.[3] Four years later the good citizens of Benevent turned a deaf ear to all the offers or proposals of the same Lothar.[4] Even when

in Winckler's own edition of the Amarna letters (p. 275), however, runs, "*Zimrida of Sidon and Aziru rebel against the king, and the people of Arvad have conferred with one another.*" This nowise proves that Aziru possessed Arvad.

[1] See *Tell el Amarna Letters* (ed. Winckler, 1896), letters 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 155.

[2] "misit nobis in Saxoniam nuntios, rogans ut ob amorem dei in Italiam veniremus et ecclesiam Sancti Petri ac se ipsum ex eorum faucibus liberaremus" (Liudprandus, *Hist. Otton.* c. 15).

[3] ". . . lacrymis orantes, ut civitatem Beneventanam a comite Rogerio Siculorum jugiter oppressam liberarent," Falco, *Chronicon*, p. 113 (in Muratori, *Script. Rer. Ital.* vol. v.).

[4] Falco, *l.c.* p. 121.

the Lombard cities sided with an emperor, they did so with great show of humility outwardly, but with grim distrust inwardly.[1] This was no doubt also the policy of the border nations near the Syrian coast. They played a *politique de bascule*. When Egypt attacked them, they became the allies of the Hittites or of the Babylonians; and *vice versa*. When they were beaten on land, the Phoenicians withdrew to their impregnable island-towns.[2] The alliances and counter-alliances between the border nations themselves were countless. All the resources of the subtlest diplomacy must have come into play; just as of all European states in modern times, small Savoy always practised the most refined and far-seeing diplomacy.

Considering, therefore, the sea-born success of the Phoenicians, one cannot wonder that the inland border nations or states, having less geo-political leverage, did not reach the height of commercial, political, and intellectual advance of the Phoenicians. The one exception to this were the Israelites. We shall see in the next chapter why they of all inland border tribes alone achieved a great historic feat. One thing, however, remains certain. Those nations near the Syrian coast were all highly agitated people, constantly on the *qui vive*, constantly forced to be on the alert, and to look for some mental advantage in a struggle in which they could not hope to have decisive advantages by masses or numbers. No doubt they adopted and borrowed many a contrivance or implement from the neighbouring empires. It is, however,

[1] See the most instructive fictitious correspondence of Lombard towns *temp.* Lothar III., first utilised by Wattenbach (*Iter Austriacum*, in *Archiv f. Oest. Gesch. Quell.* xiv. 1-94); especially pp. 76 *seq.*

[2] See the remarks of Maspero, *Hist. anc.* ii. pp. 190, 191.

totally unhistorical, as it is against all psychology, to behold in them nothing but poor imitators aping or copying the *obiter dicta* of their "highly civilised" imperial neighbours. These neighbours, as we have seen, were by no means highly civilised. In their culture there were all sorts of germs harbouring various possibilities of mental progress. They did not, however, develop those germs. If it be true that the Babylonians or the Egyptians had monotheistic views too, they discovered them in the way in which the Vikings discovered North America—in a haphazard, casual way, that led to no lasting benefit. If the Hebrews took their religious ideas from Babylonia, they changed them, *en route*, so profoundly, so energetically, so intensely, that no Babylonian proper could have recognised them. It is the change of the story of Hamlet in the chronicle of Saxo Grammaticus to the drama of Shakespeare.

We must regard these small "Semitic" border nations as the real leaven in prae-Greek history; as peoples out of whom the advantages of their strategical position together with the necessities of their configuration in political space evoked a greater energy both of thought, feeling, and action. As the Hebrews crystallised and for ever fixed the leading principles of the religion of the most powerful nations in the world, so the Phoenicians invented, or at any rate crystallised and spread, the most important invention that has ever been made.

The invention of the Alphabet is still a most controversial question; and so it will remain for ever, if we apply none but philological points of view. To the philologian it may no doubt appear impossible to decide which of the border "Semites" invented the

alphabet.[1] In addition to the philological there are, however, other and more decisive points of view. Had no nation other than the border nations employed symbols for single consonants (the Babylonians had a few symbols, letters, for vowels), we should indeed be hard put to in inquiring which of those nations employed those letters first. However, as a matter of fact, the Egyptians had used, long before any Phoenician or Moabite, letters proper, *i.e.* symbols designating consonants. The alphabet was actually in the hieroglyphic script. In hieroglyphic words there were also letters proper, and a considerable number of them. The real question of the problem is therefore this: Which nation was likely to avail itself of the advantage offered by the Egyptian letters? In Egypt or Babylon the advantage was ignored, because the very influential class of the scribes had a caste-interest in keeping down all simplification and popularising of the script. Different countries are ridden by different classes. As England is barrister- and solicitor-ridden, and Germany is bureaucrat-ridden, so the Babylonian and Egyptian empires were practically scribe-ridden. As in England the alphabet of law, or its codification, is impossible, it being against the class-interests of the lawyers, so in Egypt the alphabet of the script was purposely ignored, although existent. The nation, therefore, that was likely to avail itself of the possibilities of the alphabet embedded in the hieroglyphs could necessarily be only one where scribes had no preponderance. This brings us at once to the border nations. Amongst these nations again, the Phoenicians alone, by their very considerable trade

[1] See Lidzbarski, *Handbuch d. nordsemit. Epigraphik* (1898), pp. 173 *seq.*

and wealth were in daily need of a script, that by its simplicity facilitated the only massive correspondence then existent, that is, commercial correspondence, and by its novelty well appealed to all border nations as a kind of diplomatic cipher in their continuous plottings and intrigues against Egypt, the Hittites, Assyria, and Babylonia. When, then, we learn that the all but unanimous opinion of classical antiquity ascribed the invention of the alphabet to the Phoenicians, we cannot for a moment hesitate to acknowledge that such a statement carries full *prima facie* evidence with it. We now know that it was introduced between the fifteenth and the eleventh century B.C. This tallies completely with the other features of the real history of those nations. It was especially during those centuries that the border nations carried on their secular struggles against the empires and other enemies. It was then that they were forced to draw ever more intensely on all their mental resources in an unequal fight.

It is here not intended to prove that the alphabet must have been *invented* by a Phoenician; although the probability of Phoenicians having proposed it first is very great. In fact it is as great as was the probability that America would be discovered, not by an Irishman, but by an Italian of the fifteenth century; although Italy is much more remote from America than is Ireland. It is here only meant to accentuate the overwhelming probability that the Phoenicians were the first to introduce, to employ in daily life, the alphabet virtually long extant in the hieroglyphs of Egyptian scribes. To ascribe the invention of the alphabet to the Babylonians, although every one must admit that they never used it at any time of

their history, is mere arbitrariness. Pan-Babylonianism was never a real power; least of all in the domain of intellectual pursuits of a superior kind. The alphabet was for the civilisation of the ancient nations an invention of even far greater importance than was either typography in the fifteenth, or the telegraph in the nineteenth century. Neither of the latter inventions was made in stagnating and unprogressive countries. Inventions too have their *locus*.[1]

In the Phoenicians, then, and in the Hebrews, as will be seen in the next chapter, we see the first great example of border nations proper; that is, of nations living on the borders of several powerful and hostile empires, against which, however, those small border nations find an efficient means of resistance behind a bulwark or place of vantage given to them by Nature. It is clearly not sufficient to live on the borders of a great empire, to constitute a border nation proper. For this status it is likewise insufficient to carry on merely desultory raids and wars with some more powerful enemy. It is necessary that the opponents shall be empires proper; that is, polities with a distinct system of government and an elaborate civilisation. In the interior of Africa or in Central Asia there has at all times been fighting and intriguing of an aimless and low kind. Such warring does not draw heavily upon, nor does it necessarily develop, the intellect of men. Border nations proper, on the other hand, cannot hope to become both prosperous and independent unless they place a very high premium on intellectual force too. By border

[1] De Rougé's opinion that the Phoenician alphabetic symbols were derived directly from Egyptian characters, has received additional strength from a paper by Mr. Kyle in the *Recueil de travaux* for 1901, pp. 151 *seq.*

nations, then, we mean nations living on the borders of very powerful and considerably civilised empires, against which those nations are carrying on secular fights, aided, in the first place, by some natural feature of their strategic position, and then by the more intense development of their political organisation and mental culture.

With the Phoenicians begins our first knowledge of the use of sea-power, that is, of one of the greatest formative forces in history. There is, however, little doubt that other nations in the eastern or western Mediterranean, such as, *e.g.*, the Cretans, had also learned to value the immense leverage implied in sea-power. The Phoenicians colonised Cyprus with its valuable copper mines, Rhodes, Itanos in Crete, Thera, Melos, Cythera, and probably some more islands in the Aegean Sea; they were carrying on a brisk trade with the kings of the Mycenaean period (1500 B.C.), and were supplanted from Greek waters only in the course of the twelfth or eleventh century B.C. In the south of Spain, or the land of Tarshish, and on the West African (Morocco) coast, the Phoenicians had hundreds of colonies, such as Gades (now Cadiz), Carteia, Sexi, Lixos, etc. Spain was very rich in silver, and to Spain was brought tin from England. In modern Algeria and Tunis the Phoenicians founded Utica, Hadrumetum, and especially the famous Carthage, founded by Queen Dido, as tradition has it. On the other islands in the western Mediterranean we also find traces of Phoenician colonisation.[1] Of the religion and mythology of the

[1] The most elaborate research into the travels and colonisations of the Phoenicians in the Mediterranean will be found in the beautiful and important work of M. Victor Bérard, *Les Phéniciens et l'Odyssée* (Paris, 1902-1904, two large vols., fully illustrated). M. Bérard has repeatedly visited the numerous

ancient Phoenicians we know practically nothing. We have, except inscriptions, no remains of their literature and few remnants of their art. Yet we can unhesitatingly ascribe to the Phoenicians the great merit of having given to the human mind one of its most powerful engines, and to human activity one of its most beneficial spheres.

The Hebrews

In any attempt to write the history of the ancient Hebrews we must never lose sight of the central and, to the present day, abiding fact of all Hebrew history, to the effect that that nation, in utter contrast to all the other nations of antiquity, not only succeeded in holding temporarily their own as a State against the power of the Eastern empires, but also that they, in addition to their immense spiritual influence over white humanity, have maintained their peculiar nationality against all the empires of the West, lay or church, Latin, German or Slav, to this day. Between such an extraordinary fact and its causes there must be a reasonable connection and proportion. The unique energy and exclusiveness of a few Hebrews for the last three thousand years cannot possibly be derived from a merely clever device of this priest or that king in the fifth or sixth century B.C. Such colossal energy must have arisen from a long series of events

Mediterranean places of which he treats, and has thus acquired more adequate means of settling questions of Phoenician topographical nomenclature.

From the latest researches into the site of the land of Ophir, and more particularly from the works of Messrs. Th. Bent and Swan on Mashonaland, and of A. H. Keane, it appears to be very probable that the Phoenicians extended their commercial and colonising enterprises even to the region of central Eastern Africa, where they seem to have found rich gold-mines.

and institutions making for intense national energy. Sustained collective energy is, in all history, the exception, not the rule. We have no right to assume such energy in any nation whatever; we are, on the contrary, in each case burdened with the proof of its existence and with the task of explaining its growth. The Old Testament has, as is well known, been taken under the critical knife of modern philological analysis for the last two hundred years, from the Oratorian Father Simon, and the physician Astruc, both Frenchmen, to De Wette, Eduard Reuss, Bleek, Graf, Kuenen, Bishop Colenso, Canon Cheyne, Professor Driver and Wellhausen. The Pentateuch, it has been tried to show, consists of various layers of old, young, or fabricated documents, written by various post-Mosaic Hebrews, such as the "Elohist" (designated E.), the "Jahwist" (J.), the second "Elohist" (E^2), the "Deuteronomist" (D.) respectively; and was finally deliberately "harmonised" by the priests about 444 B.C., Ezra and Nehemiah having the greatest share in the "codification." The number of these alleged authors of the Pentateuch, as well as the mutual relations of their respective writings, have by the said critics and their followers been varied and multiplied *ad infinitum*. According to their view, the Hebrews previous to the eighth century B.C. were little, if at all, above the ordinary paganism of their neighbours, the Moabites, Philistines, Amalekites, etc. Their sojourn in Egypt, the existence of Moses, the exodus,[1] the conquest of

[1] One of the latest and most sober statements about the measure of information so far discovered in ancient Egyptian texts about Israel, Moses, the exodus, etc., will be found in *Recueil de travaux*, etc., for 1902, pp. 121 *seq.* No known Egyptian text speaks of Israelites *in Egypt*; *ib.* p. 124. An ancient Egyptian text, discovered by Professor Flinders Petrie, speaks of

Canaan,—all this, most critics say, is highly problematic. When, however, the Assyrians invaded Israel (see p. 134), Amos and Hosea addressed the Hebrews with signal success; so much so that the Hebrews readily changed their heathenish, henotheistic belief in Jahwe to a true belief in one ethical God. Amos and Hosea, it will be noticed, are thus credited with instilling in a crude nation a belief which none of the Greek sages ever hoped to succeed in imparting to the civilised Hellenes. After this successful invention of Monotheism, the codifiers of the next century "edited" Deuteronomy in 621 B.C.; and at last Judaism, as it has existed to the present day, was manufactured by a bland courtier, Nehemiah, who prevailed on the good-natured king of Persia to graciously allow him, Nehemiah, the floating of Judaism. Thus Judaism was established after the manner of a lying-in hospital, or an orphanage.

The "higher critics" of the Pentateuch completely disregard the most trustworthy of psychological experiences. They willingly credit two prophets—that is, private patriots, with a power of changing the entire religious mind of a nation by a few sermons; but they refuse to believe that Moses, who is said to have led the Hebrews from Egypt, and was for a generation their general, ruler, and spiritual guide, could have endowed his people with the immense intellectual and political ascendency of Monotheism. In rejecting Moses and the exodus, the "higher critics" abandon all hopes of ever seriously explaining the broadest fact of Hebrew history, and rest content with court gossip and

Israel in Palestine (*Contemporary Review*, May 1896; *Revue Archéologique*, 1896, ii. p. 120).

backstairs comment. However, the contemporaries of Amos and Hosea would not have listened to the prophets' sermons, had they not long been under monotheistic influences at home and in public. In times of great danger people are infinitely more inclined to listen to gross, superstitious, and terrorising beliefs, than to abstract sublime teachings. The very existence of men like Amos and Hosea proves that the Hebrews had long been acquainted with, even if they did not always practise, pure Monotheism, and that the unparalleled force implied in that belief had long been familiar to them. The Hebrews, being a border nation such as were the Phoenicians, the Greeks, and very probably many another forgotten nation on the coasts of Syria and Asia Minor, the Hebrews had only one means of securing the existence of their commonwealth against the Empires—by placing it on a spiritual, hence indestructible basis. The Phoenicians did the same, in that they, by intellectual superiority, possessed the thalassocracy of the eastern or western Mediterranean for several hundred years; and, if the long tenure of power of Phoenician Carthage is added, for over a thousand years. The Greeks likewise owed their most vital power of resistance to sheer intellectual superiority. In all the three cases that superiority was slowly obtained by dint of immense struggles against apparently fearful odds. In the case of the Phoenicians we already have the direct evidence for these struggles; in the case of the Greeks they are forthcoming every year. If, therefore, the Hebrews of the eighth century B.C. display that spiritual superiority which border nations proper must have or else perish, it is a most legitimate

supposition to assume that the Hebrews too must have passed through struggles and hardships infinitely severer than ordinary border warfare. Nations acquire the sense and power of great leading ideas, not by reading books or by listening to lectures, but by being made to feel the impact and trend of those ideas through tragic or elevating events of national life. To assume that Monotheism was *given* or *taught* the Hebrews by the Babylonians is to believe that the cautious, inductive thinking of the average Englishman was produced by the teachings of Bacon. In reality, this preference for inductive thinking of the average Englishman is the natural result of the preponderance of his volitional over his intellectual powers; and that preponderance again is the product of his Spartan education in youth, *i.e.* the solitude, the severe moral and physical hardships endured by English boys. The assumption of inordinately great national catastrophes undergone by the old Hebrews at some previous time is fully met by Hebrew tradition, according to which the Hebrews—men, women, and children—in order to rescue their independence from Egyptian sway, decided to undertake the most dangerous "trek" or exodus ever undertaken in antiquity, in deserts full of perils of the most exasperating description. During that "trek," lasting, tradition says, for forty years, the Hebrews, thrown back upon their own resources, resorted to spiritual encouragements offered by a belief that has these three thousand years proved to be the most potent religious force known to mankind. No doubt Monotheism was not the invention of any single man, but it has always taken individual men to inculcate it on masses; it

spreads by missionary work, not by contagion, as does Polytheism. Tradition, therefore, rightly says that the leader of the Hebrew exodus and the master who infused a monotheistic belief in the trekking Hebrews was one of those towering personalities without whom no religious belief, based on Monotheism, has ever been spread amongst multitudes of people. That personality was, tradition says, Moses. Tradition, then, is not only not out of keeping with all that authentic records teach us about border nations in a position identical with that of the Hebrews, but it fully corroborates it. As we shall see more clearly in the case of the Greeks, city-states, once started, need, and imperatively too, a central personality as a nucleus of crystallisation.

Whence, then, shall we take any right to reject the Hebrew tradition? It is in absolute concordance with everything we may expect to learn in the history of a successful border nation. The details of the tradition may be inaccurate; the broad fact underlying it is corroborated by the history of all the border nations in antiquity, and, as we shall see in the history of the Italian city-states, in the Middle Ages too. What the sea was to the Phoenicians and Greeks, the desert was to the Hebrews; it protected the infant period of their growth as a nation and State. In proportion as their position was very much more exposed than that of the Phoenicians and Greeks, in that the desert was neither very large nor impenetrable to the imperial nations, the Hebrews were forced to intensify their spiritual bulwark to a degree unknown to less imperilled border nations; just as for identical reasons the Scotch and the Dutch, likewise border nations, were naturally driven

to adopt the most rigorous forms of Protestantism, that is, Calvinism. The Hebrews, then, neglecting all the other spheres of organised intellectuality, concentrated the intellectual strategy so indispensable to border nations on one point—on Monotheism, and thus they matured that lofty and profoundly ethical idea of God and wrote several of the truly religious works contained in the Old Testament, which to the present day are the basis of all civilisation. They identified God with their State and nationality. When, therefore, the Assyrians and Babylonians victoriously entered the kingdoms of Israel and Judah, they could destroy the walls and houses of Hebrew towns indeed, but they were unable to demolish the real bulwarks and abodes of the Hebrew State. The Hebrew polity was transformed into Judaism; just as the Greek city-states were ultimately transformed into Hellenism, both living powers at the present day.

It is well known that the very numerous works dealing with so-called "Higher Criticism" of the Bible have, in the last twenty-five years, made such a deep impression on the general and clerical public, that nowadays even canons and bishops do not hesitate to declare in public that they no longer believe in the historical existence of Moses; or in Moses' authorship of the Pentateuch; in the authenticity of the Exodus, or the legislation on Mount Sinai, etc. This result has been obtained quite in the same manner in which Homer has, in the modern Βατραχομυομαχία of over a thousand *Homer-critics*, been refined into a cento of *x*, *y*, *z* layers; just as Livy or Diodorus Siculus has been "analysed" into twenty or thirty "sources"; Lessing convicted of having purloined "every line" of his poems and

dramas from innumerable authors, German, French, English, Italian, Spanish, etc.;[1] Tacitus proved to have been written by Poggio Bracciolini in the fifteenth century A.D.;[2] Shakespeare shown to have been written by Bacon, etc.[3] He who has read the original minutes and *rotuli* of witch-trials from the sixteenth or seventeenth century A.D. is aware that the method of insinuation, circumstantial evidence, proleptic proof, oblique cross-examination, and verbal fence used by the "higher critics" with regard to the Bible, is not only analogous to, but also very frequently literally identical with the form and verbiage of the procedure, on the strength of which hundreds of thousands of innocent "witches" were first tortured and then sent to a terrible death. The "inquisitorial principle," as Continental criminalists term the underlying idea of criminal procedure in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, has long been given up even on the Continent in the treatment of criminal cases. In the treatment of Moses, the Hebrew judges, kings, and prophets, Jesus, and the Apostles, most modern theologians are still in the ban of Julius Clarus, Prosper Farinacius, Jodocus Damhouder, and the rest

[1] Albrecht, Paul, *Leszing's Plagiate* (Hamburg, 1888-1891, roy. 8°, pp. 2494). Compare the author's *The Failure of Higher Criticism* (London, 1905), pp. 63 *seq.*

[2] Hochart, *De l'authenticité des Annales et des Histoires de Tacite* (Paris, 1890); and *Nouvelles considérations au sujet d. Annales et d. Hist. de Tacite* (Paris, 1894). See *contra*: Tannery, *Annales de la Faculté de Bordeaux* (1890, 1891).

[3] Pais, Ettore, denied the authenticity of the remains of the Twelve Tables; Mommsen denied the historical existence of the Roman annalist Cincius Alimentus, which L. Cohn fully re-established (*Neue Jahrbb. f. kl. Altkde*, III. v. 1); Consoli ascribes Tacitus' *Germania* to Pliny the Elder (*L' autore del libro De orig. et situ Germ.*, Rome, 1902); etc. For many more examples see the excellent bibliography of *Littérature Latine; les textes et les sources*, by R. Pichon, in the *Revue de Synthèse Historique*, Paris, 1904, December, pp. 352 *sq.*

of the terrible criminalists who raised the technique of insinuation and verbal quibble to a height that Robespierre at his best could not hope to attain.[1]

The causes of the failure of the "higher critics"

[1] It is well known that the mother of the great astronomer Kepler was accused of witchcraft, and had to undergo the ordeal of a criminal accusation launched against her, *ex officio*, by the tribunal of Leonberg, in Würtemberg, in 1620. In the edition of Kepler's works by Ch. Frisch, viii., pars 1, pp. 361-562, there is a reprint of all the *rotuli*, decrees, and acts passed in that trial. As Frisch (although too sweepingly) says, *nulla* [*causa capitalis contra sagas*] *comparari possit cum hac, . . . quia res tota contra usum receptum per lileras agebatur . . .*, so that we have the complete material of the depositions of witnesses, pleadings, decrees, arguments, and counter-arguments of this typical case. He who is well acquainted with the tone and trend of the arguments current in the works of the "higher critics" of the Bible, cannot read this reprint of a witch-trial without being more than once struck with the appalling similarity, in point of mental procedure, of the trial of the Bible with the trial of the mother of the great astronomer. The public prosecutor, who is bent on bringing the old woman to the *peinliche Frage*, or torture, uses the very kind of arguments that have served the "higher critics" to lacerate the author of the Pentateuch. Thus, in order to show "conclusively and irrefutably" that the old woman must be subjected to the "question," *i.e.* the torture, the public prosecutor points out her "*variatio et inconstantia*," saying that *The Kepplerin* was inconstant, contradictory, and varying in the use of her words (*das die Kepplerin in ihren Reden ohnbeständig, wanckelmüttig und in denselben variere*); just as the "higher critics" start with the "inconstant, contradictory, and varying" use of the Hebrew terms for the Godhead in Genesis. And as the Würtemberg public prosecutor in 1620 comes to the conclusion, fortified by ample quotations from the criminalistic works of Clarus, Zanger, Carerius, and Bodinus, that *ex variatione autem et inconstantia sermonis judicium oriri ad torturam* (in Kepler's *Opera*, ed. Frisch, viii. 1, p. 512), even so the "higher critics," quoting profusely from one another and their predecessors in the eighteenth century, arrive at the conclusion that Moses was not the author of the essential portions of the Pentateuch, and accordingly, he must be put to the "question" in order to make him reveal the real authors. When, however, the "Kepplerin" points out to the prosecutor that the witnesses bearing out his contention are also contradicting themselves, and that therefore their testimony ought not to pass for complete and convincing, then the public prosecutor retorts that such "slight" contradictions in the depositions of the same witness or of the incriminating witnesses must not be taken any notice of; for, he adds, *est enim prudentis providique judicis, testium dicta conciliare, ut valeant potius quam pereant!* Can anything be more similar to the way in which higher critics invariably insist upon certain and neglect certain other contradictions in the Bible, according to the measure in which these contradictions favour or do not favour the preconceived theories of those critics?

to recognise the true bearings and the right historic perspective of the Old Testament, are twofold. In the first place, they have completely neglected to pay close attention to the specific and highly individual character of the Hebrew nation, to the equally specific and strongly differentiated nature of the Hebrew State, and to the peculiar difference between historic persons and historic personalities. In the second place, they have applied purely philological, *i.e.* inadequate methods to the analysis of the Hebrew text of the Old Testament.

As to the Hebrew nation, it is quite evident from the preceding sections of this chapter that the Hebrews were not only, in common with all the border nations in the area of the inter-imperial conflicts in Syria and Palestine, an exceptional nation, but that they were also, owing to their national crisis, a nation notably differentiated from even the exceptional border nations. This unquestionable quality has been expressed by the orthodox view in the well-known phrase that the Hebrews were God's elect people. Whatever objections may be raised to the phraseology of this expression, it cannot be said to be essentially contradictory to a broad historic fact. For, however remarkable a place and *rôle* we may ascribe to the border nations called the Edomites, the Phoenicians, the people of Damascus, the Amalekites, the Midianites, etc., we cannot possibly attach either to their history or their writings the vast importance that all humanity has long agreed to attribute to the history, personalities, and writings of the Hebrews.

From the standpoint of the historian, then, the principal question will always be this, By what

historic circumstance or factor were the Hebrews enabled to distinguish themselves so pregnantly from amongst the other border nations in Syria and Palestine? Any reference to mere "superiority by race" being excluded by the principles laid down in the *Introduction* to the present work, we must needs attempt to find other and more definitely controllable methods or means to answer this, the most interesting and most important problem of Hebrew history. When now we turn for help to the "higher critics," their present leader, Professor Wellhausen, vouchsafes us the following reply: "Why Israelitish history, although starting from a practically equal commencement, has yet arrived at a totally different final result than, for instance, the history of the Moabites, that can, after all, not be explained."[1] In other words, the higher critics, after having, these one hundred and fifty years, "analysed" and "reconstructed" the text of the Old Testament in thousands of works of the heaviest erudition and most penetrating research into each syllable of each word of the text, and into each institution, person, or circumstance referring to the text; the "higher critics" give us, as a reply to the cardinal question of all Hebrew history, the cold comfort of a *non liquet*. This alone, we take it, is proof unanswerable that the methods of the "higher critics" *qua* historical reconstruction, are decidedly inadequate. Over one hundred and fifty years of unremitting research, if really conducted on the right method, ought to have yielded a result more satisfactory.

[1] Wellhausen, J., *Israelitische und Jüdische Geschichte* (third ed. Berlin, 1897, p. 35): *Warum die israelitische Geschichte von einem annähernd gleichen Anfange aus zu einem ganz andern Ergebnis geführt hat als etwa die moabitische, lässt sich schliesslich nicht erklären.*

The "higher critics," trained in nothing but philology, have indeed neglected to study the National Crisis of the Hebrews, considering, as they did, only the texts of Hebrew writings. However, the National Crisis made the Hebrews, and the Hebrews gave rise to the Hebrew books. It was, as we have seen, owing to that National Crisis of unparalleled severity that the Hebrews contrived to distinguish themselves even among the other exceptionally remarkable border nations; and being thus endowed with higher-strung powers of mind and heart, the Hebrews naturally produced also writings of a value superior to that of all the rest of the border nations. The Hebrews, then, were not, as Wellhausen thinks, "a nation as are other nations."[1] They not only underwent struggles and conflicts, as did all the other border nations; they suffered a national crisis such as very few nations have suffered. In modern times we have lived to see an identical case of a nation energised into an exceptional vigour and power of resistance by means of a *trek* or Exodus remarkably similar to the great national *trek* of the ancient Hebrews. The Boers acquired their exceptional national power through their twenty years' *trek* in the wilderness of what is now Orange River Colony and the Transvaal. But for this *trek* and its energising effects they would have resisted British armies as little as have the Birmanese or the Ashanti. While the resistance of the two latter nations was broken by relatively small British corps, the campaign against the Boers required the largest army that Great Britain ever raised in the course of her history.

[1] Wellhausen, J., *Israelit. u. Jüd. Gesch.* (1897), p. 21: *Die Israeliten waren eine Nation wie andere Nationen.*

"Higher critics" have thus completely misjudged the specific nature of the Hebrew nation.

When we now consider the nature of the Hebrew State, it is clear that that State, ever after the national crisis, always was, if not always in the same degree, what cannot but be called cephalic. In fact, in sharp contrast to modern "territorial" or "national" States, the Hebrew State, together with most classical States in Greece and Italy, may be likened to a pyramid growing from the top downwards, from the personal head to the broad popular base; whereas modern "territorial" or "national" States are like pyramids growing from the broad base to the capping head. The Hebrew State, and the other classical city-states are indeed the outcome of perils so menacing and jeopardising the very existence of a high-strung border nation, that all its members clearly feel that, for the sake of greater readiness, unity, and efficiency, as well as for the sake of the practically best, *i.e.* most intelligent organisation of their forces, they must accept the whole scheme and plan of their national life at the hands of one superior personality. Accordingly, the Hebrews always lived, as it were, through and by some one great personality, whether a *nomothetes* proper, or a judge; a king, or a prophet. If we lose sight of this, the most characteristic feature of the Hebrew State, we cannot expect to see any of the real bearings of Hebrew history. The "higher critics," who have never paid the slightest attention to this specific character of the Hebrew State; they, for whom, it would appear, a State is a State, whether cephalic or non-cephalic,—the "higher critics" have consequently not only completely misunderstood the

Hebrew State, but also Hebrew personalities. For "higher critics" the existence of Abraham must be and can only be proved by means of the same evidence as can that of Moses. However, Moses is an historic personality; while Abraham is a mere person, though an eminent one. A personality proper is so intimately bound up, and so completely identified with his great historic work, that one may safely conclude from the work to the author. A person, on the other hand, is not an integral part of his work. All, therefore, that could be advanced is that the leader of the Hebrews in their great national crisis and also their *nomothetes* was a personality whose name may not have been Moses, but perhaps Sesom or Uriah. But the existence of such a leader and *nomothetes* cannot possibly be doubted; it rests on a psychological inference as strong as that from the artistic work to the artist. It is only when we confound one specific genus of States with another genus, and one genus of persons with another genus, that we do not even notice the rocks on which all merely philological "higher criticisms" must inevitably founder.

In approaching, finally, the "higher criticism" hitherto practised on the text of the Bible, we must, in the first place, never forget that our knowledge of Hebrew is exceedingly unsatisfactory. Spinoza, himself of Jewish origin and educated at a Hebrew "Academy" where lectures for the advanced students were given and discussed in Hebrew,—Spinoza, a classical witness in all matters of that kind, expressly says, that our interpretation even of the simplest terms in Hebrew is quite inadequate, and that but too many Hebrew terms for such ordinary objects as

fruit of all kinds, birds, fish, etc., are "nearly all" lost.[1] Under these conditions it is evident that the stylistic, syntactic or verbal criticism of the Old Testament must be pursued with the utmost caution, and under no circumstances can it be said to rest on a firm basis.

Apart from this, the linguistic side of the question, it is now, after the luminous and erudite researches of August Klostermann, quite plain that the whole system applied by modern "higher critics" to the text of the Old Testament is thoroughly vitiated by a false conception of the literary character of the Old Testament. In fact, as the "higher critics" have neglected or misconstrued the political and national character of the Hebrews, so they have also neglected or misconstrued the specific literary character of the Bible, more particularly of the Pentateuch; they have, since Astruc (1753), taken it for granted that a *philological* partition or grouping of the text according to the use or disuse of certain Hebrew terms for the Godhead is also tantamount to a partition and grouping of that text according to the *original* authors of those parts and groups. In other words, the "higher critics" have unhesitatingly applied to the text-criticism of the Old Testament

[1] Spinoza, *Tractatus theologico-politicus* (in *Opera*, ed. Van Vloten and Land, 1895, cap. vii. p. 45). "*Magna imprimis in hac methodo* (the study of Holy Writ from the text of the Bible alone) *oritur difficultas ex eo, quod linguae Hebraicae integram cognitionem exigit. At haec unde jam petenda? . . . nec* [*Hebraea natio*] *nisi pauca quaedam fragmenta linguae et paucorum librorum retinuit; omnia enim fere nomina fructuum, avium, piscium, et permulta alia, temporum iniuria periere. Significatio deinde multorum nominum et verborum, quae in Bibliis occurrunt, vel prorsus ignoratur, vel de eadem disputatur . . . et multae occurrent orationes, quamvis notissimis vocibus expressae, quarum tamen sensus obscurissimus erit et plane imperceptibilis. Ad haec, quod scilicet linguae Hebraeae perfectam historiam non possumus habere, accedit ipsa huius linguae constitutio et natura; ex qua tot oriuntur ambiguitates ut impossibile sit, talem invenire methodum, quae verum sensum omnium orationum scripturae certo doceat investigare.*"

such rules of procedure as have very legitimately been applied to the text-criticism of mediaeval chronicles. It is, indeed, true that most of these chronicles are simple mechanical conglomerations, so to speak, of bits taken bodily from former chronicles or late Roman writers of world-histories, such as Eutropius, Orosius, or others. This being the case, the original authors from whose works a given mediaeval chronicle has been pieced together can very well be "traced back." Giesebrecht has, in that manner, "reconstituted," in 1841, the then lost *Annales Altahenses majores* by tracing out their straggling members from among the texts of a number of Bavarian chronicles in which these *Annales* had been used. The subsequent discovery, in 1867, of a good copy of these *Annales* fully confirmed the feat of Giesebrecht.

If, then, the Pentateuch had been compiled in the manner of most mediaeval chronicles, it would indeed be quite legitimate to consider an "analysis" of the Pentateuch as tantamount to the discovery of the contributions of the "original authors." However, as Klostermann has pointed out with unanswerable arguments, the Pentateuch was *not* compiled in the fashion of a mediaeval chronicle. It was a singularly individual book of the ancient Hebrews, a blend of a Common Prayer Book and a national history; a *Gemeinde-Lesebuch* as Klostermann felicitously calls it.[1] The Hebrews have at all times, owing to their very highly differentiated individuality, crystallised their literary activity in forms utterly different from those of the Greeks and Romans. As in the first three centuries of our era the Jews, instead of dis-

[1] Klostermann, Aug., *Der Pentateuch* (1893) pp. 59-61.

tributing their religious, philosophical, legal, medical, poetical, and astronomical lore and traditions into so many different treatises or monographs, chose to collect, pell-mell, all that was taught in the various schools of Jamnia, Nehardea, Pumbaditha, etc. into one, continuous, huge work called the Talmud, of which we have two recensions; as their prophets embodied their singularly soul-stirring sermons, teachings, prophecies, and political advice into a literary form unknown to the Hellenes; even so the ancient Hebrews shaped their national book, their Pentateuch, in a manner essentially different from any similar popular work of the Hellenes, let alone the mediaeval nations. The Hellenes found their Pentateuch in the great poems of Homer. The Hebrews had, instead of an artistic epic, a collection of books united by the internal unity of the great crisis which called it into existence. Those books were popular books, inspired originally by Moses and the grand events of his times, but copied out by anonymous and, in course of time, countless scribes. Accordingly, variations or new versions, slight or more elaborate interpolations, could not but make their appearance in a popular book circulating in all Hebrew households for many a generation. The recently found papyri, containing, among other fragments of Greek authors, parts of the dialogues of Plato, copied in the third century B.C., *i.e.* long before the date of our hitherto earliest manuscripts of Plato, amply confirm such variations of text in the case of a well-preserved Greek author.[1] The

[1] See the important paper of Dr. F. G. Kenyon, read January 27, 1904, before the British Academy, in the *Proceedings* of which it was published in 1905, pp. 17, 18, 19.

inevitable conclusion from all this, in the case of the Pentateuch, composed before the year 1000 B.C., is this, that the text we *now* possess cannot possibly be a compilation directly made from the writings of Moses, or of his contemporaries, *i.e.* the real original authors. Our present text of the Pentateuch is, on the contrary, a version derived from compilations of "redactors," who themselves only compiled from other and previous "redactors." It is therefore quite impossible to reach, by an analysis of the *present* text of the Hebrew Pentateuch, the precise *verbatim* text of the original authors thereof, should there ever have been more than one original author of the Pentateuch.

The "higher critics" are thus placed before a dilemma from which, it must be stated, no human ingenuity or erudition can escape.

1. If there was originally, say in the fifteenth or twelfth century B.C., more than one "original" author of the Pentateuch, then we cannot possibly reconstruct nor trace them through an ever so penetrating "analysis" of the present Hebrew text of the Pentateuch.

2. If there was only one "original" author, that is, Moses, then the whole contention of the "higher critics" falls to the ground as absolutely unfounded.

The net result, then, of Biblical "higher criticism," as far as the constructive history of the ancient Hebrews is considered, is nil. It is, of course, not expected that "higher critics" will heed the preceding arguments at all. The definitive *reductio ad absurdum* of all "higher criticism" will be compassed by an early work of one of the spades now so busy in Palestine. That spade will unearth a copy

of Genesis or any other part of the Pentateuch written in cuneiform script, about 1300 or 1250 B.C. It is indeed more than likely that the Israelites of that time recorded their Exodus in the script of the time, *i.e.* in cuneiforms (see above, p. 149, n. 1, and the Tell el Amarna Letters); and that therefore many a difficulty in the names and composition of Genesis can be removed by tracing it to the loss of sounds and forms inevitable in any process of transliteration from cuneiforms into the alphabetical script of the eleventh or tenth century B.C.

By considerations such as the preceding, it becomes fairly comprehensible why the Hebrews (by which we do not mean at all a special race or tribe, but a probably highly mixed congeries of Bedouin peoples with certain common aims and ideals) have been able to occupy such a strikingly exceptional position in the history of civilisation. Stimulated by their position as border nations, they solved the great problem of civilisation in one of its vast aspects, just as the Greeks solved it in four or five other aspects.[1] Accordingly,

[1] In the last two years the belief in the Babylonian origin of all Hebrew theology, religion, institutions, and achievements has been widely spread by the works of Frederick Delitzsch, Hugo Winckler, and others. There is now, one may state, a complete Pan-Babylonianism at hand, which, in reality, is only the old Anti-semitism *à reculons*. Since it is impossible to deny the importance of the Hebrews, the anti-semitic scholars, *i.e.* nearly all German professors, hasten to show that all that is important in the Hebrews comes from Babylon, or is a mere repetition and imitation of Babylonian ideas and institutions.

The reader who has, by a consideration of the facts adduced in the preceding pages, firmly convinced himself that the ever-important achievements of the Hebrews were the result not only of their character as a border nation, but also of their having been specially privileged among all the other border nations by an unparalleled national crisis,—the reader, we say, who has once satisfied himself that it is the geo-political situation of the Hebrews in historic space that has enabled them to produce a religion, a system of polity and a literature of imperishable value, cannot for a moment admit that the Babylonians, who were no border nation, and who were actuated by none of

the Hebrews can lose their importance for history no more than can the Greeks. Their polity was, in reality, a city-state, in that the whole life of each citizen was absorbed by state or public functions and

the powerful historic stimuli of the Hebrews, should have been the inventors either of the Alphabet or of ethical Monotheism. Ethical Monotheism like Imperialism, or like the polity of a City-state, cannot be 'taken over' from somebody else. To the recluse scholar and bookworm, Monotheism, like Imperialism, is indeed a mere abstract idea which, like weights and measures, or costumes, can very well be handed over to or loaned from any other nation; just as each idiom has always "borrowed" single words and phrases from various other languages. Accordingly, the arm-chair historian does not hesitate to state that Monotheism was "taught" the Hebrews by the Babylonians. One might as well say that the English were "taught" their Imperialism at Oxford and Cambridge by reading, when undergraduates, their Livy and Caesar. A whole scheme and organic system of life, public, religious, and private, such as is ethical Monotheism, cannot be "taught." It must necessarily grow out of certain historic situations; it arises by fulguration rather than "evolution," under the psychological pressure of peculiar historic and geo-political events. Where these historic events have not taken place, there Monotheism, as a *national* religion, could not have arisen.

These general reflections will, however, carry little weight with people to whom learned quotations from obscure languages seem to have more cogency of evidence than do considerations of human psychology. They treat the living men of history like vocables, and when they have found some syntactic rules enabling them to group words, they believe they have discovered the forces ruling human beings. But historic events are quite independent of grammar. Even should the Pan-Babylonians be able to trace a very considerable number of Hebrew terms of religious import to Babylonian words used in Babylonian clay-tablets of the second or third millennium B.C., they would have thereby made out no case whatever for their principal contention. In the English language there certainly are over 45 per cent Latin words. Yet the English language is thoroughly un-Latin. Languages have or do not have words; they borrow or do not borrow words, for reasons that are hopelessly contradictory and unknown. The strong-willed English have no verb corresponding to the German *Ich will*. From the presence or absence of words, from the indigenous or foreign character of a word, it is impossible to make safe conclusions in history. Even Paul Kretschmer (*Einleitung in d. Geschichte d. griech. Sprache*, 1896, p. 50) says: "*Eine Kulturgeschichte auf sprachwissenschaftlicher Grundlage ist ein Unding.*" It so happens that the philological *tours de force* by which the Pan-Babylonians have tried to derive all Hebrew religion from Babylon can now be reduced *ad absurdum*, by the discovery of the religion of a negro tribe in German East Africa. This tribe, the *Masai*, has now been shown to have religious views, stories, and institutions so strikingly similar to those of the ancient Hebrews, that there would be less improbability in tracing Hebrew traditions to Masai origins than in deriving them from Babylonian sources. At any rate, it is absolutely certain

subjected to a very severe strain. Nobody has seized that more profoundly and put it in clearer language than Spinoza in the fifth chapter, secs. 25 *seq.*, of his *Tractatus theologico-politicus*. The Hebrew State

that there is no connection whatever between the Babylonians and the Masai. If, therefore, a negro tribe in Africa, thousands of miles away from Babylon, could and did arrive independently at religious views practically identical with those of the Hebrews, what force can there remain in evidence merely philological and against all historic psychology to prove the dependence of Hebrew religion on that of Babylon?

The following statement of the Masai religion is taken from an article by the author in the *Contemporary Review* for February 1905 (see also the author's *Failure of Higher Criticism*, pp. 16 *seq.*):—

Our information about the Masai we owe to a German officer stationed in German East Africa, whose carefully collected evidence it is impossible to doubt. Captain Merker has spent some eight years in the neighbourhood of Mt. Kilimanjaro, and his leisure time has been devoted to the gathering together of most interesting ethnological data, which he has published (1904) in an elaborate monograph printed with the support of the German *Kolonialgesellschaft*.

It is good to hear of the scrupulous care with which Captain Merker has endeavoured to avoid any kind of bias in getting together his records. He was early conscious of the remarkable coincidences between many of the native traditions and those which we find in Genesis. Such a discovery might have thrown a less conscientious and circumspect investigator off his guard. He might very well have used precipitate haste in following up his evidence. To begin with, it was no easy task to win sufficiently the confidence of the natives, who seemed to be exceedingly reticent about their traditions. It was only with infinite trouble that they could be brought to talk at all upon the subject. But even when Captain Merker had sufficiently ingratiated himself with them to obtain their confidence, he studiously avoided putting any questions. He was anxious in no way to suggest or bias the answers, and he therefore waited patiently until the natives came of their own free will to him. In taking down their records, he observed the same scrupulous precautions. He purposely abstained, during these investigations, from referring to the Old Testament or from making any comparisons which might cause him to falsify, even innocently and unconsciously, his observations. We cannot therefore fail to accord the most complete credence to evidence accumulated with such scientific thoroughness and in so hyper-conscientious a manner.

The legendary traditions of the Masai are not the common property of the whole tribe. It is only a few privileged families which possess their secret, and among these families the stories are handed down from father to son. Like all traditions thus preserved, there is imminent danger of their dying out.

Captain Merker in his interesting description of Masai religion informs us that the people possess no distinct priestcraft. They generally pray alone, but upon certain rare occasions the entire population of a kraal will meet together for devotional purposes. Even in such cases there is an almost entire absence of any description of ceremonial, but it is then that the aged depositaries of Masai legends will come forward and recite the ancient myths which they have learned from their forefathers.

The Masai are, however, exceedingly loth that their legends should be overheard by any one who is not a member of the community. Captain Merker tells us that though for more than four years he had been thoroughly cognisant of the main features of the Masai religion, it was not until the fifth year of his sojourn in the Kilimanjaro region that he became aware of the existence of this store of

had very little, if anything, of the differentiation of government into powers legislative, administrative, and executive. The legislature or assembly, this the chief organ in a Greek city-state, was superfluous, in

legendary beliefs. To get a comprehensive idea of these took him another eighteen months, and he encountered constant difficulties in the reticence of the natives.

I give a very brief summary of the Masai myths, which will, however, suffice to convince the reader of the astonishing similarity existing between them and our own Biblical tradition.

In the beginning the earth was a waste and barren wilderness in which there dwelt a dragon alone. Then God came down from heaven, fought with the dragon and vanquished it. From the dragon's blood, which was water, the barren rocky wilderness was made fertile, and the spot where the struggle between God and the dragon took place became Paradise. Thereafter God created all things—sun, moon, stars, plants and beasts, and finally two human beings. The man was sent down from heaven and was called *Maitumbe*, and the woman *Naitergorob* sprang from the bosom of the earth. God led them into Paradise, where they lived an untroubled existence. Of all the fruits therein they might eat by God's permission; of one tree alone they might not taste: this was the *ol oilai*. Often God came down to see them, when he climbed down a ladder from heaven. But one day he was unable for a long time to find them, but finally he discovered them crouching among the bushes. On being asked the meaning of his conduct Maitumbe replied that they were ashamed because they had eaten of the forbidden fruit. "Naitergorob gave me of the fruit," he said, "and persuaded me to eat of it, after she had eaten of it herself." Naitergorob sought to excuse herself by saying: "The three-headed serpent came to me and said that by tasting the fruit we should become like unto thee and almighty." Then was 'Ngai (God) wroth and banished the two first human beings from Paradise. He sent *Rilegen*, the Morning Star, to drive Man out of Paradise, and to keep watch thereover.

This sample should give a fair idea of the astounding similarity to which we have referred. We can only briefly mention one or two of the more striking parallelisms. The Masai have a story of the first murder which reminds us forcibly of the Bible account of Cain and Abel. But even more remarkable is the Masai legend of the flood, sent as a chastisement for human iniquity. The Masai have their Noah, the holy man who is excepted from the general disaster, and so succeeds in carrying on the human race. His name is *Tumbainot*, and he, too, builds him an ark, wherein his six sons and two wives are saved together with certain chosen animals. When the Masai Noah desires to find out whether the waters are subsiding, he, too, conceives the happy notion of sending forth a dove. Four rainbows are the sign which tells the Masai Noah that the wrath of God has passed away.

The whole story of the decalogue finds its place in Masai tradition. It might have been translated almost literally from the Bible. The circumstances of the Divine law-giving are closely akin to the Hebrew version. Upon the summit of *ol donjo geri* the thunder peals and the storm rages as the voice of God proclaims his law from a cloud. Nothing could be more like Moses upon Sinai. But hearken to the words of the Masai commandments. The first is as follows: "There is one God alone, who hath sent me unto you. Heretofore ye have called him the Forgiver (*E'majan*), or the Almighty (*E'magelani*), but henceforth ye shall call him *'Ngai*. Of him ye shall make no image. If ye follow his commands, it will be well with you; but if ye obey him not, famine and pestilence shall chastise you." Captain Merker gives just as striking resemblances between the Masai decalogue and the third, fifth, seventh, ninth and tenth commandments.

It would of course be very natural to suppose that these Masai legends were due to the half-forgotten teachings of some Christian missionary. But

that all the laws were believed to have been given by the Godhead who cannot change. The administrative powers of coercion were replaced by an excessive rigour of ritualism, comprising the smallest as well as

Captain Merker completely disposes of any possibility of Christian influence. There is, to begin with, no trace of New Testament doctrine or history. The Masai tradition stops short with the Divine law-giving. It is, moreover, quite certain that no foreign missionaries have at any time carried their propaganda into the Masai country.

That the Masai should at any time have come into contact with Babylonian culture is also quite out of the question. The assumption that the Masai at any period migrated into Africa from Egypt seems quite hypothetical. We may, at all events, thinks Captain Merker, be quite certain that the immigration did not take place subsequently to the fourth millennium B.C. Had the Masai passed through Egypt later than that date we might look to find some written record in Egypt itself. Of the traditions which the Masai possess we find no trace among Egyptian beliefs, so that there is no likelihood whatever of their having been brought thence. Even if we admit that the Masai came south, but before the fourth millennium B.C., we must recollect that at this early period the Babylonians were still plunged in Shamanistic superstitions.

A full consideration of the authentic story of Masai legends and myths, doctrine and dogma, forces us to lay down the following alternatives:—

1. Either the Masai have received their legends at the hands of the Hebrews; or
2. The Masai have received them from the Babylonians; or
3. They have invented them—that is, they have been revealed to them independently; or
4. Both the Babylonians, Hebrews, and the Masai, coming, as they all did, from Arabia, had those legends in common before the Chaldeans went from Arabia, north-eastward to Babylonia; the Hebrews, northward to Palestine; and the Masai, southward to what is now German East Africa.

There is no fifth alternative. For the first alternative, the Hebrew origin of the Masai legends, there is not a shadow of evidence; nor is there any for the Babylonian origin of those legends—that is, the second alternative. The third alternative, a separate revelation to the Masai nation, is completely irrelevant, either for the orthodox, who believe in revelation only as regards the Hebrews; or for the "higher critics," who do not believe in revelation at all, whether to the Hebrews or to any other nation.

Remains the fourth alternative, or the common origin of the Hebrew, Babylonian and Masai legends in the legends of Arabia.

There is little doubt that this, the fourth alternative, is, *from the philological, and not from the historical standpoint*, the right one. Arabia, at all times the "store-chamber of nations," was never able to feed her untold thousands of hardy, beautiful, gifted people. Accordingly, they emigrated in all directions, as they did in the times of Mahomet and at other times. Thousands of years before Christ a stock of religious and other legends had grown up amongst them about the great riddles of the world. This they carried into their new countries; and thus the Babylonians, the Hebrews, the Masai, and very probably many another now unknown tribe from Arabia, whether in Persia, Afghanistan, Beluchistan, or India, preserved, and still preserves, the legends about Creation, the Deluge, etc., in their aboriginal form. It is just as possible, with purely philological arguments, to deduce the Masai legends from Hebrew stories as it is to deduce Hebrew legends from Babylonian myths. Or, to put it in a different fashion, the same philological arguments that have served to declare the Hebrew legends mere copies of Babylonian myths, may

the greatest acts of a man's life, making everybody at fault a sinner, and thus handing the transgressor over to the most relentless of judges, to one's own religious conscience. For executive powers there was only left the sphere of the judiciary. It must, of course, not

now be employed in proving that all the Hebrew legends are of Masai origin, or *vice versa*. This absolute inability of the philological method of "Higher Criticism" to decide definitively which is the parent and which the child, at once condemns it. Already in the question as to where was the original seat of the "Aryans," philologians have, in the last eighty years, given solutions locating that seat from the Pamir, through South Russia, to Sweden. Such Cook-tours are not permissible in Science. If philological arguments are sufficient to persuade one set of scholars that the original home of the Aryans was in Central Asia, while another set of philologians is firmly convinced that it was in Scandinavia; common sense will tell any one who cares to listen to it that philology is unable to settle that question at all. It is even so with the original home of the legends common to the Hebrews, Babylonians, and Masai negroes. If it should be found out that the Cossæans, Elamites, Scythians, or any other Central Asiatic tribe had legends similar to those of the Hebrews, then philologians will drop the "Babylonian" theory with contempt, and deduce all the Old Testament from Cossæan, Elamite, or Scythian origins.

This may be very erudite, it is at the same time most preposterous. The possession of certain legends does not prove much. A multitude of nations may have had legends similar to those of the Hebrews, or to those of the New Testament. What no nation other than the Hebrews ever had were Moses, David, the Prophets, Jesus. These personalities, in whom the greatest forces of history became focussed and intensified; these personalities, that really made Hebrew history, if on the basis of national tendencies and national opportunities; these personalities are *the* distinctive feature of Hebrew history. They stand to the persons of Babylonian history, or Masai history, as does Shakespeare's *Hamlet* to the Hamlet in the dry chronicle of the Dane Saxo Grammaticus. If Lord Bacon had written a thousand lines in Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, he would not have written Hamlet. What makes Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, is the immortal and inexhaustible typical personality of Hamlet himself, which must necessarily be the product of one vast poetic imagination, and is by no means the arithmetical sum of this sentence or that in the piece called *Hamlet*. Even so the personality of Moses, David, the Prophets, or Jesus, is not an arithmetical sum of a number of sayings; but the integration of forces, national and hyper-national. One may prove that this saying of Jesus is Buddhistic, and the other is taken from the Zendavesta. What can never be deduced is the transcendental personality of Jesus. The marble slabs of the Parthenon came from the Pentelicus or other mounts; the Parthenon came from the Athenians of the fifth century B.C. Says Poet to Dives: "The land is yours; the landscape is mine."

It is evident that philological reasoning which brings us to results which are so little permanent, results which are absolutely overturned by the first chance discovery, must have something fundamentally wrong in it. This fundamental and initial vice, *quod tractu temporis convalescere nequit*, which can be cured neither by the moderation and soberness of Hommel, who together with a few other historians has not yet given in to the claims of the "higher critics," nor by a still greater refinement of philological methods; this initial fault has vitiated and will vitiate all modern hyper-criticism of ancient records. Nor is there any particular difficulty in finding out the true nature of this fault. It is this: The history of the ancient nations must be constructed not on the basis of the philological study of their records, but mainly on the basis of considerations of geography, or, as the present writer has ventured to call it, of geo-politics.

be thought that the Hebrew State as here outlined existed in that clear-cut fashion from the arrival of the Hebrews in Canaan, say 1300 B.C. It may have so existed for some time, then again relaxed for a certain period, again to resume its original tendencies, as we know to have been the case in other city-states, such as, for instance, Sparta. The obscure chronology of the Hebrew constitution apart, it is sufficient to state that the above were its chief characteristics, showing that the Hebrew State from the eleventh to the sixth century B.C. did have a constitution proper, that is, a social, religious, and political organisation of a definite kind.

Beyond the general fact of Hebrew history discussed in the preceding paragraphs, there is little in that history that is not either well-known or unimportant for purposes of general history. Unable to gain the sea from which the Philistines and the Sidonians debarred them, the Hebrews lived first under "Judges," until in the eleventh century B.C. Saul was made king of the Hebrews. His successor was David (1055-1015 B.C.), a powerful ruler, who was followed by Solomon (1015-975 B.C.). After that time the Hebrews were divided into two "kingdoms," that of Israel and that of Judah;[1] the kings of the former lost their independence in 722 B.C. to the Assyrians (see p. 135); the kings of the latter had the same fate at the hands of the Babylonians (see p. 137) in 586 B.C.

[1] In 1868 a "stele" or inscribed slab was found in the ancient country of Moab, written in Phoenician script and in an idiom akin to Hebrew, in which King Mesha of Moab records his successful war against King Omri of Israel (929-918 B.C.).

BOOK II

THE HELLENES OR GREEKS

As in the case of the Hebrews, so with regard to the Greeks, the most important of all nations, we must never lose sight of *the* fact of their history — that is, that they, comparatively few, and in the course of a very short period, contrived to endow humanity with most of the intellectual powers and ideals that go to make civilisation and render life worth living. Unless we can account for that general fact, we shall work in vain. The "gift" and "race" theory we refuse to accept as an explanation of the unique achievements of the Greeks; because, if a special gift of theirs could account for their success, it becomes impossible to understand why that Greek special gift proved so fertile only from about 900 B.C. to 300 B.C.; and why in the thousands of years preceding that period it was absolutely sterile and poor, and in the twenty centuries after that period it became, a few generations excepted, quite abortive. Nay, that special "gift" has its definite place as well as its definite time. It first showed on the coasts of Asia Minor, the Aegean islands, and on the eastern side of Greece proper; then in Sicily and South Italy, while numerous Greek countries, such as Acarnania, Aetolia, and even famous Sparta, never produced works of

specifically Hellenic genius. The chief geographical feature of Greece is not in its otherwise undoubted high geographical individualisation and very rich indentation (Greece has the longest coast-line of European countries), but in its forming practically two connected peninsulas in the midst of an archipelago. The connecting neck of the peninsulas (Megara) was thus given an extraordinary importance, and Corinth, Mycenae, and Tiryns inside a closed sea and still close to the open Mediterranean and Aegean possessed a geo-political preponderance of a decisive character. Both Hellas proper and the Peloponnesus again naturally subdivided into peninsulas (Attica, Argolis, etc.), adding to the geo-political complication.

We have seen that two of the border nations, the Phoenicians and the Hebrews, had preceded the Greeks in the creation of several fundamental institutions and intellectual factors of our civilisation. The Greeks, or rather such of them as were border nations, continued, enlarged, and deepened the great work of emancipation, political and intellectual, commenced on the coast of Phoenicia and Syria. We must accustom ourselves to view the history of those three great border nations as being essentially of one and the same character and drift. As charcoal, graphite, and diamond are, although widely different in appearance and even quality, chemically one and the same substance, to wit, carbon; so the Phoenicians, Hebrews, and the Hellenes in the Aegean islands and on the coasts of Asia Minor (2000 B.C. to 700 B.C.) are, in spite of great differences in appearances and even qualities, historically of the self-same substance and function.

Archaic Greece

The modern conception of the archaic history of the Greeks has, in the last five-and-twenty years, undergone a very marked change. Previous to the famous excavations of Schliemann, the prehistoric period, as well as any other subsequent period of Greek history, was exclusively within the demesne of the philologians. Attaching, as philological historians invariably do, great value only to evidences of etymology, grammar or written documents generally, they were naturally led to conceive a very poor opinion of the civilisation of prae-Homeric Greece and adjacent islands, which, they held, had no literature whatever. As late as 1898, Professor Pais gravely scolded "a man of the intelligence and critical acumen of Aristotle" for having believed that the names of Lycurgus and Iphitos were actually written on a disc of the ninth century B.C.[1] At present we know that over a thousand years before Lycurgus the Greeks, all over the eastern part of the Mediterranean, had long used systems of writing, and had long recorded events very much less memorable than the foundation of the Olympian games by Iphitos. In fact the most important result of the excavations of Schliemann, Arthur Evans, Dörpfeld, Lucio Mariani, Halbherr, Hiller von Gaertringen, Pernier, Demargne, Savignoni, De Sanctis, Taramelli, and so many other scholars who have endowed us with the new Philology of the Spade, is the conviction now shared by all competent men, that the Hellenic peoples enjoyed, thousands of

[1] Pais, Ettore, *Storia di Roma*, i. (1898), p. 97.

years before Homer, a civilisation the remains of which must still engage our respect and admiration. Far from being barbarous, or semi-barbarous and roving tribes, previous to what has been called the Mycenaean period (from about 1500 to 1000 B.C.), the Hellenes or whosoever built the magnificent prehistoric fortresses, palaces, towns, streets, or villas which are now being excavated from Crete to Dodona, and from Laconia to Lesbos, and to far-off Cyprus, were a people of singular activity, skill, and inventiveness. What the late Mr. Schliemann had dug out at Hissarlik, at the site of ancient Troy; at Tiryns; at Mycenae, and at other places, was marvellous enough. Both in the masonry of the walls, tombs, houses, and in the ceramic and jewelry work found in abundance, one could see that the so-called Mycenaean civilisation was one of striking splendour. All this, however, was distanced and eclipsed by the finds of Mr. Arthur Evans, when, under his direction, the archaic palace of Cnossus, in Crete (near modern Heracleion or Candia), which Kalokacrinos had discovered in 1878, and which was originally (about 1500 B.C.) the palace of King Minos, was brought to light in all its grandeur.[1] The immensity of the buildings; the noble streets; the storied houses; the complete systems of drainage, including latrines, with flush-pipes; the magnificent hall of the Throne, with gorgeous frescoes; the hall of double axes, so called after the symbol of a double hatchet drawn on each

[1] See Evans, *Cretan pictographs and prae-Phoenician script* (London, 1895), and his articles in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies* (1901 *seq.*), and in the *Annual of the British School at Athens* (1900-1903). See also an instructive *résumé* by S. Reinach in *L'Anthropologie* (a periodical) for 1902, pp. 1-39 ("*La Crète avant l'Histoire*"); and, under the same title, *ib.* 1904, pp. 257-296.

stone of the masonry; the chapel found in May 1902; the snake-goddesses, and numerous other idols made in fayence, and manifesting, more especially in the female figures, a strange resemblance to modern fashions of headgear and toilette; the innumerable vases of all kinds, and frequently of exquisite beauty,—all this has swept away the last trace of the old conception of the barbarism of prae-Homeric times. And when Mr. Evans found some 2000 tablets inscribed in an unknown script, and evidently meant to serve as regular records of household, religious, or public affairs, one could not but arrive at the conclusion that Crete, even more than Mycenae, was a centre of elaborate and far-reaching civilisation by the middle of the second millennium B.C., if not much before that time. For Mr. Evans has long found unmistakable traces of buildings erected very many centuries before this great Minoan civilisation, and reaching back to the neolithic age. In addition to the momentous discoveries of Mr. Evans, Professor R. Herzog has found inscriptions in a prae-Hellenic script in the island of Cos;[1] in the island of Melos a prehistoric palace, not unsimilar to that of Tiryns, has been unearthed;[2] in the west of Crete, more particularly at Temenia, M. Thénon has found the ruins of a vast Cyclopean wall surrounding a town, every house of which was a small fortress. Architecture and masonry betoken an advanced civilisation, and a state of constant warfare.[3] Similar remains indicating a strenuous life of political and military

[1] *Archaeologischer Anzeiger*, 1901, pp. 131-140.

[2] J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias*, vol. v. (1898), p. 553, quoting the *Journ. of Hellenic Studies* (1896), p. 356.

[3] *Revue Archéologique* (new series), vol. xvi. pp. 109, 110; *apud* P. Cesare de Cara, *Gli Hethei-Pelasgi* (Rome, 1902), vol. ii. p. 186.

activity may be seen in Lucio Mariani's *Antichità Cretesi* with regard to Gulas and Phaestus in Crete.[1] In fact, there is little doubt that Crete still contains scores, if not hundreds of prae-Homeric fortified places, palaces, towns. Near Dodona, in Epirus, remains of prehistoric, so-called Cyclopean walls have been found by Pouqueville and Carapanos. In addition to this important archaeological evidence,[2] we have in the Egyptian inscriptions direct evidence of the "peoples who live in the midst of the Very Green," *i.e.* of Aegean folk who already, in the sixteenth century B.C., assailed and pillaged all the eastern shores of the Mediterranean,—Hittite, Phoenician, "Syrian," and Egyptian polities alike. Their generic name is, in Egyptian, *Keftiu* ("at the back of" or "behind").[3] Their conflicts with the Egyptians were, as much as we may gather even from our present information, both numerous and momentous. Thutmosis III., in the sixteenth century B.C., pretended to rule over them; in the fifteenth century B.C. they traded with Egypt under Pharaoh Amenhotep III.; we find Aegean "foreigners" in Egypt in the time of the XIXth Dynasty (1350-1200 B.C.); and under Ramses II. many an Aegean people joined the Hittites against the Egyptians; in the fifth year of

[1] In the work of Father de Cara, quoted in the preceding note, there is much interesting material on prehistoric Crete, vol. ii. (1902), pp. 132-210. De Cara adds a valuable map of ancient Crete. To this add now the excavations at Artsa and Muliana (*L'Anthropologie* (1904), pp. 645-656).

[2] Since the cessation of the valuable *Chroniques d'Orient* by M. Salomon Reinach (2 vols. of which appeared up to 1896), the most complete records of archaeological discoveries will be found in the *American Journal of Archaeology* (Norwood, Mass.; New York, Macmillan and Co.).

[3] W. M. Müller, *Asien u. Europa nach altaegypt. Dkmälern* (Leipsic, 1893), pp. 337 *seq.*, tries to show that *Keftô*, as he writes, meant only Cilicia; however, Mr. H. R. Hall, in *The Oldest Civilisation of Greece* (1901), pp. 164-165, has interpreted the Egyptian term more correctly, it would appear.

Pharaoh Menephtah (Merenptah) Aegean tribes joined the Lybians against Egypt, and suffered a great defeat; under Ramses III. (about 1200-1150 B.C.) they attacked the Egyptian provinces in Palestine and Syria, and were defeated by Ramses, both on land and on sea.[1] They appear on Egyptian monuments under the names of Luku, Shardanas, Danauna, Uashasha, Pulasati, Akauasha, Zakkala. Several scholars have, it is true, maintained that the Shardanas were Sardinians; the Lukku (Luku), Lygians, etc.; in other words, that the above names did not indicate peoples of the Aegean islands or of Asia Minor. However, in addition to the arguments of Maspero, W. M. Müller, Torp, Hommel, and other philologians,[2] the most elementary geographical considerations force us to attribute those names to peoples living in the nearest islands of the sea of Egypt, *i.e.* in the Aegean and in Asia Minor. When we read in letter 28 of the Tell el Amarna collection (in the fifteenth century B.C.) of the Lukki devastating the shores of Egypt, and almost annually those of Alasia (Cyprus), we cannot for a moment hesitate to locate the Lukki somewhere on the southern shores of Asia Minor. In the same letter, the ruler of Cyprus reminds the King of Egypt of the old relations that had existed between their fathers "in former times"; and from this and many another passage in the inscriptions found in and out of Egypt, we may safely confirm the geo-political inference that the Aegean people,

[1] Maspero, *Histoire ancienne*, ii. (1897), pp. 359 *seq.*, 432, 462 *seq.*; H. R. Hall, *Oldest Civilisation of Greece* (1901), pp. 165, 169, 170, etc.; Hommel, F., *Grundriss d. Geographie und Geschichte d. alt. Orients*[2] (1904), pp. 28 *seq.*, 58.

[2] More especially W. Streitberg, who fairly proved Ἀχαιοί = Egyptian *Akajwasa* (*Indog. Forschungen*, vi. (1896), pp. 134-135); and Raymond Weill (*Revue archéol.* (1904), i. pp. 52-73).

whether in Crete, Cyprus, Rhodes, or on the shores of Asia Minor, were in practically incessant contact or conflict with Egypt. The same remark holds good of the other great Empires in Western Asia; in the first place, that of the Hittites.

When the strange inscriptions of the Hittites were first discovered; when we learned from Egyptian texts of the power of the Cheta or Hittites, a number of philological enthusiasts at once rushed to the most excessive views about the importance of that enigmatic people. Most ancient history seemed to flow from Hittite origins; and the wildest philological dice-throwing with roots and syllables has been practised to trace most things to the Cheta.[1] A more sober attitude is now prevailing. We have learnt to doubt whether the empire of the Hittites ever extended over the whole of the peninsula of Asia Minor.[2] While a great many Hittite seals, cylinders, monuments, and inscriptions have been found in many parts of Asia Minor, and even collected into a *Corpus*;[3] yet south of Hamat, on the Orontes river, in Caria and Lycia, Pamphylia, and Cilicia Tracheia no Hittite monuments have as yet (1904) been found.[4] But whether the Hittites did or did not

[1] The most comprehensive work of this kind is that of Father de Cara, quoted above, in three stout volumes. It is, of course, based on the belief in races—a belief that has vitiated most ancient history as written in the last hundred years. Even if the Hittites could be proved to be the fathers of all history, they could not be considered the same "race" in Asia, Crete, Greece, and Italy. The Canadian French are *toto coelo* different from the French in France.

[2] Müller, W. M., *Asien u. Europa* (1893), pp. 333 *seq.*; Hommel, *Grundriss*[2] (1904), p. 54.

[3] Messerschmidt, Leop., *Corpus Inscriptionum Hettiticarum* (Berlin, 1900, and *Nachtrag*, 1902). They contain about 200 signs, the interpretation of which has been attempted by Professor Sayce (in the *Proceedings of the Soc. of Biblic. Archaeol.* for 1903 and 1904), Jensen and Messerschmidt.

[4] Some of the more remarkable Hittite monuments have been found in

control the whole of Asia Minor, and whether they, too, were or were not of European origin, all this cannot be considered as a fact of decisive importance. To the philologian, indeed, everything seems to be gained as soon as he is, or thinks he is, in a position to give a certain nation a definite ethnic name. If he can, by etymological arguments, make it probable that the Hittites were really Pelasgians; or that the Pelasgians were Leleges, and these again Carians or Pisidians; or if, on the other hand, another etymological or mythological expert can make it superficially "evident" that the Pelasgians never existed, and that the Hittites were in reality Etruscans; then he has, he thinks, substantially advanced our insight into the nebulous past of Greek prehistoric ages. As a matter of fact, however, these hypothetical proofs of any one of the preceding "ethnological" statements would, were they never so cogent, advance our real knowledge of that momentous time but very little. The nationality of the Aegean peoples was not the driving force either in their struggles in war or in their accomplishments in peace. To base any attempt at the comprehension of arts and crafts of pre-

Lydia, and close to the coast, at the Pass of Carabel, near Smyrna; at the Sipylos, west of Sardes (the so-called Niobe-sculpture); at Fassili, in Isauria (discovered in 1902); at Sinjirli (in Commagene), a number of *stele*-s, without inscriptions; at Euyuk; at Boghaz-köi (ancient Pteria), with the famous rock-sculptures representing a procession of gods; at Palangah, near Darendeh, where the longest of all known Hittite inscriptions has been found (*Comptes Rendus* of the Paris *Acad. d. Inscript.* 1902, pp. 452 *seq.*); near Hilar, between Harput and Diarbekir (*Records of the Past*, ii. 1903, pp. 131-40); on the Upper Halys river, near Mocissus (*Journ. of Hellenic Studies*, 1901, p. 323); and at other places. In addition to Messerschmidt's *Corpus*, see also Hommel, *Grundriss* [2] (1904), pp. 47, 48. See also Ramsay and Hogarth, *Pre-Hellenic Monuments of Cappadocia*, in *Recueil de Travaux*, etc., tome xiv. (1892), p. 74; and tome xv. (1893), p. 89. Compare the full and instructive *thèse* by C. Fossey, *Quid de Hethaeis cuneatae literae nobis tradiderint* (Paris, 1902), pp. 2 *seq.*

historic peoples on the notion of nationality is quite impossible. In those ages there were peoples indeed, but no nations; just as there were persons, but no personalities. The greatest similarity between prehistoric decorations, sepulchral ornaments, vases, utensils, and monuments generally, does not entitle us to assume direct loans or derivations from one prehistoric "nation" to another. The same forms and decorative motives, and even so the same customs and myths, recur in prehistoric objects and peoples found or recorded in countries thousands of miles apart from one another.

On the other hand, it is of vital importance to observe the novel psychological position of the peoples who, probably from the central and northern, or even western, parts of Europe, had, somewhere towards the end of the third millennium B.C., arrived in the Aegean waters. The knowledge, the arts and crafts which they had brought with them, and which, according to recent researches, were far from primitive, they not only retained, but slowly increased or intensified. For in their new domiciles, in the Aegean islands, they could not live for many generations without coming into some conflict or contact with the rich and better developed empires of Western Asia and Egypt, the only ones then existent in the Western world. In that first stage of their Aegean history they, no doubt, became more civilised by passively accepting many a small contrivance or method at the hands of the superior people of the empires. However, it is evident that such passive "taking over" of Egyptian or Babylonian accomplishments could not have really intensified their mental resources. Their astounding progress in various arts and material achievements

that we now see in their marvellous prehistoric palaces and fortresses, dating from the second millennium B.C., indicates infinitely more than mere passive acceptance. It unmistakably points to forces making for original thought, for organised thinking, for Art proper. Such forces are, however, neither a mere "racial" gift nor a mere matter of imitation. Such forces are the final outcome of intense struggles in which an inordinately high premium is laid on intellect and intellectual organisation. Those wonderful and original palaces, those Titanic, and not only Megalithic, towns and castles, roads and necropoles, in the Aegean islands, clearly indicate that the peoples who built them must have been engaged in fearful struggles against vastly superior Powers. Nowhere else in Europe could a struggle of that kind have arisen. There were in the second millennium B.C. no civilised and organised Empires proper outside those of Western Asia and Egypt; those Empires, again, did not extend their power to the Mediterranean during the third millennium. Accordingly, the peculiar struggle between a small number of islanders, on the one hand, and rich and civilised empires on the other, could take place only in the Aegean Sea in the second millennium B.C.

It was in consequence of these struggles with the Empires of the Egyptians, Babylonians, Hittites, or Phrygians, and with the Phoenicians who had the thalassocracy of the eastern Mediterranean in the latter half of the second millennium B.C., that the Aegean peoples were forced to lay a very unusual and high premium on the development of their intellect and their political and social organisation. Unable to meet the power of the empires by equal hosts of men and amount of wealth, they could, as we have seen

in the case of the Phoenicians and Hebrews, meet their mighty aggressors with some hope of success only by means of better organised, *i.e.* intellectualised forces and organisation.

It so happens that in our own times the very process of intellectualisation of ambitious Border Nations here presumed and borne out by considerable, if not quite sufficient, *direct* evidence with regard to the Aegean or prehistoric Hellenic peoples on the western shores of Asia, has actually taken place, under our own eyes, with regard to another Border Nation, on the eastern shores of Asia. The Japanese have, through the advance of Russia and also through the encroachments of other European and American Powers in the eastern seas and territories of Asia, become, during the last twenty to twenty-five years, a Border Nation proper. Threatened on all sides by apparently irresistible Powers, the Japanese, for the very same reasons that actuated the Aegean Hellenes in the second millennium B.C., were forced to Europeanise, *i.e.* to energise themselves into a nation of superior intellectual and political organisation. Through superior intellectualisation alone could they hope to avert the danger of absorption by the apparently irresistible power of Russia. Accordingly, the Japanese readily resolved to break completely with their past, and to imbue themselves with the forces of European intellect, that is, with the spirit and system of Hellenism. Their sudden and seemingly inexplicable or "unprecedented" breach with their former organisation is thus neither inexplicable nor unprecedented. Having for centuries been in a state very similar to that of border nations proper, in that they continued for centuries wars of defence and

aggression with Korea and China, they were well prepared to appreciate rightly the true sense of Russian, American, English, French, and German "advance" in the seas and territories of eastern Asia. The break with their past, their superior energisation became a matter of iron necessity. Premiums for a better systematised and intellectualised polity became premiums on their very national life. The present war (1904-5) has fully proved their superior intellectualisation and its inevitable results.

What is here contended, then, is simply the fact, that what at present is called the Europeanisation of Japan was, in the second millennium B.C., the Hellenisation of the Aegean peoples. In both historic phenomena the same geo-political circumstances had the same result.[1]

The superior intellect of the Hellenes was, therefore, a product not of their *contact*, but of their secular *conflict* with the Oriental empires.

Of these conflicts with the Egyptians we have, as was pointed out above, direct and contemporary evidence. Conflicts with the Phoenicians and, since the ninth century B.C., with the Assyrians are likewise recorded in documents from the second millennium and the second century of the first millennium B.C.[2] It is, moreover, quite evident that the Phoenicians

[1] It may not be superfluous to note that the preceding remarks on the true, *i.e.* geo-political causes that forced the Hellenes, as it did the Phoenicians and Hebrews, into an intellectuality superior to that of the peoples of the inland empires,—in one word, that the whole theory of the border nations here published was first laid by the author before a large Cambridge audience in a course of lectures delivered at Emmanuel College, Cambridge, in February 1900, four years before the Russo-Japanese War.

[2] See the Assyrian text (Sargon's *Annals*, 91, 92, and in the *Inscription des Barils*, 21), and the elaborate commentary in Hugo Winckler's *Altorient. Forsch.* i. 4 (1896), pp. 363 *seq.*; and Maspero, *Hist. anc.* (1899), iii. pp. 259-260.

lost their supremacy in the Aegean waters to the Hellenes only after long and determined struggles. Between Phoenicia and the Aegean islands there is a current in the sea running from Phoenicia, along the southern coast of Asia Minor, towards the islands. This current was naturally utilised by the Phoenicians at an early time, and they, who were not cowed by the Assyrians nor by the Hittites, certainly did not abandon such a superior "road" without most energetic struggles. As to the secular struggles of the islanders with the empires of Asia Minor we have a precious, if not explicit, indication in the famous stories about the Amazons and their fights with the Greeks, more especially with Hercules and Theseus. It is well known that a large number of towns in western Asia Minor traced their foundation to the Amazons.[1] It is now generally admitted that the Amazons, who in all the Greek myths about them are invariably treated as humans, as natural, if bellicose women, must be considered as historical and not merely as mythical beings. It is, of course, not impossible that the Greeks, who must have fought the Hittites for many a generation, mythified that people in the form of Amazons, considering that Hittite men wore long hair, female dress, and no beard, and perhaps first introduced the horse into Asia Minor.[2] But even, if that should have been the case, that myth was not, as W. M. Müller suggests, an artificial myth, arising from a contemplation of the images of Hittites on the rock sculptures in Asia Minor. Such a myth must have been the result of

[1] See, amongst numerous monographs, the interesting paper of A. Klügmann in *Philologus*, vol. xxx. (1870).

[2] Müller, W. Max, *Asien u. Europa* (1893), p. 328, n. 2.

intense conflicts with the mighty Hittites themselves, in that such conflicts alone will stimulate the popular imagination to the creation of new myths. The myth of the *Wandering Jew* or of the *Flying Dutchman* did not arise from contemplation of pictures. On the other hand, if the Greek stories about the Amazons are not relating to Hittite men, but to women indeed, then there is nothing to prevent us from crediting the Hittites with a female bodyguard, such as to the present day may be found in more than one African kingdom or sultanate. In either case the mythical figure of the Amazons arose from long and violent struggles between powerful inland empires in Asia Minor and Hellenic people on the coasts of that peninsula. Two thousand years after the Hittite and Phrygian empires, the Turkish empire in Asia Minor was victoriously resisted for centuries by the Islanders in the various isles of the Aegean, long after the inland towns of the Byzantines had been forced into submission.

The towns in Western Asia reported to have been founded by Amazons, and always mentioned as the *loci* of the Amazon myths, or said to have had Amazon eponyms, are the following, in geographical order from the southern portion of the western coast of Asia Minor to the southern shores of the Euxine: Priene, Anaia, Samos, Ephesus, Pygela, Latoreia, Smyrna, Gryneia, Cyme, Myrina, Pitane, Mytilene, Myrlea, Pythopolis, Nicaea, Kinna, Amastris, Thibais, Sinope, Themiscyra. There are, it is true, other towns that, in the Augustan and post-Augustan period, employed emblems referring to Amazons on their coins. It is, however, impossible to regard the posthumous use of such emblems as evidence of

Amazonic origin, quite apart from the fact that those towns were, nearly all, founded after Alexander the Great.[1] If, therefore, we restrict ourselves to the list just given, which comprises the classical *loci* of the myths of Amazons in Asia Minor, we arrive at a singularly telling geographical illustration of the above statement about the struggles of the Greeks with great inland empires in Asia Minor during the second millennium B.C. The towns enumerated cover nearly two-thirds of the coast-line of Asia Minor. They are all on the coast, or quite near to it; and only Hellenic towns, the Amazonian origin of which is quite uncertain (see note [1]), are located more inland. This geographical fact alone shows that only the Amazonian towns proper were founded by peoples fighting, from Priene to Themiscyra, that is, on an enormous length of coast-line. This may safely be taken as indicating the boundary of a large empire, the unity of the Amazon myths referring naturally to a unity of adversaries. In that way we are enabled to account, for the first time, both for the locality of the Amazon towns and for the meaning of the Amazon legends. For it is scarcely necessary to show that the border Hellenes used emblems of Amazons as the proudest of "blazonry," in that their towns had been founded by them during, and in consequence of, their struggles with "Amazonian" peoples.

Historians have long essayed to use the ancient myths of the Hellenes for the elucidation of ancient Greek history. Unfortunately the nature of the

[1] Radet, *Lydie*, pp. 29-30 (1893), gives a list of such towns. It is impossible to accept numismatic evidence as proving facts dating from 1500 to 2000 years previous to the date of the coins.

Hellenic myths has been misunderstood by philological historians, and thus the method of clearing up prehistorical ages by means of myths has been shorn of most of its utility. Hellenic myths of the second millennium B.C. or of the first two centuries of the first millennium B.C. are, generally speaking, not mere idle fancies arising from any ordinary or simple occurrence in the life of men or in that of Nature, or the soil of Hellenic settlements. Nearly all nations have certain legends and myths about gods, man, stars, stones, rivers, plants, and animals. The distinctive feature of the great Greek myths is that they exemplify in poetical form some great psychological or physiographic truth. They are, *per eminentiam*, human and natural. Although the stories about the Amazons may, and very probably do, refer to positive historic facts, yet they have, quite independently, a psychological value of their own. The type of the Amazon is one of the human types to the present day; and a great sculptor could, for instance, express the innermost nature of modern American women by nothing as impressively as by a statue of an Amazon. Myths embodying such profound and ever-valuable psychological truths are not and cannot be the result of mere day-dreaming. They do not arise in their original form by "concoction," "contamination," "imitation," or "genealogical tree-making." They are, if in a poetic form, the final upshot of great and serious struggles, in the course of which the most fundamental cravings, hopes, and forces of the human soul become revealed to the combatants. The type of Robinson Crusoe is not a mere fanciful invention of Daniel Defoe. It is the creation of an age when the sturdy individuality and

self-reliance of the English first asserted itself in vast Imperial fights all over the globe. Without the great War of the Spanish Succession, without Marlborough's victories and England's nascent second period of Imperialism, no Defoe could have succeeded in creating the great human type of Robinson Crusoe. Little England herself was, in those times, the Robinson Crusoe fighting all Nature and man. In the same way Cervantes could not have created his ever-true Don Quixote in a country other than Spain. That strange, yet thoroughly human hero is indeed Spain herself,—Spain, with her radical incongruity of boundless strength in appearance, and weakness, insolvency, and decadence in reality. Had Cervantes not been profoundly impressed by the vast spectacle of Spanish Imperialism at once so imposing, ideal, and hollow, he could not have risen to the heights of his immortal humour.

It is even so with the Greek myths. When we hear of the famous myth of Danaus and his fifty daughters; when we consider that that myth clearly expresses a grand phenomenon of Nature's life in rivers and springs, we cannot for a moment assume, as has been generally done, that a myth like that arose from the observation of a tiny river, really a torrent, such as the Inachus (now Panitsa) in Argolis. If this small river had given rise to a myth so comprehensive and full of details, then it is difficult to see how the remarkable phenomenon of the Dine (now Anavolo), in the midst of the sea near Argos, has given rise to no particular myth whatever.[1] The

[1] Frazer, J. G., *Pausanias's Description of Greece*, vol. iii. (1898), p. 306. See also Reclus, Elisée, *Nouvelle Géogr. Univ., L'Europe Méridionale* (1887), p. 98; Guides Joanne, *Grèce*, ii. (1903), p. 243.

torrent called Inachus is now, and was in antiquity, mostly dry, and instead of forcing its way into the near sea, it disappears, not far from the sea, into *katavothras* or chasms. Yet, not far from the shore-line of modern Kiveri, and in the midst of the sea, there is a body of fresh water fully fifty feet in diameter. "In calm weather it may be seen rising with such force as to form a convex surface, disturbing the sea for several hundred feet around. It is clearly the exit of a subterraneous river of some magnitude, and thus corresponds with the Dine of Pausanias (viii. 7. 2)."[1] The plain of Argolis is indeed one in which drought and fertility alternate in startling contrast. But the Peloponnesus is full of such plains,[2] and the smallness of the Argive plain is curiously adverse to the origination or suggestion of a myth symbolising vast natural phenomena. If, on the other hand, we take the hints broadly given in the myths of Danaus and his manifold connections with Egypt, we may very well discover the true origin of the Danaid myths, which one of the old Hellenic epical poets wrote up in an epic of 6500 lines. In Egypt, indeed, the well-known alternation of drought and exuberance of fertility has always been visible on an immense and most impressive scale. The dependence of man upon Nature and her boundless power over him has been brought home to the human mind in Western Asia and Africa nowhere more dramatically than in Egypt, the "gift of the Nile." The myth, then, of the Danaids is safe evidence bearing out in cogent, if poetical form, the frequent conflicts of the Aegean Hellenes with the country of the Pharaohs. We say "conflicts"; and it is meant

[1] Frazer, *Pausanias, l.c.*

[2] Reclus, E., *l.c.* p. 97.

to point out as clearly as possible, that such myths are the original elaboration of a high-strung nation, and not the passive repetition of legends heard in far-off countries. Egypt was, indeed, the country suggesting to the Hellenes the myth of the Danaids; but had the Hellenes not fought the Egyptians in great and dangerous conflicts, the imagination of the Hellenes would not have been roused to the creation of a great myth. This psychological moment is rarely, if ever, taken into consideration. Great, that is, such myths as are full of artistic, philosophic, and religious possibilities, cannot be simply "taken" or "borrowed" from other nations or originated by leisurely, peaceful "tradition." They must spring forth from underneath the Titanic blows of a nation's hammer on that nation's own heated anvil. All Greek myths have, no doubt, their parallels and similarities in the myths of other nations.[1] Yet the mythical figures of no nation have so far impressed the cultivated mind of Europe with the intensity, significativeness, and charm of the immortal mythical figures and stories of the Greeks. This is owing not only to the fine artistic expression these myths have received at the hands of Greek artists and poets, but also, and even pre-eminently, on account of their great philosophic and religious suggestiveness. This thought-stirring wealth of Greek myths is probably the main reason why exceedingly few Greek philosophers officially combated Greek mythology. Plato uses myths as one of his most effective means of clothing philosophical ideas in intelligible forms.

[1] See, *e.g.*, Hartland, E. S., *Legend of Perseus* (3 vols. 1894-96); Mannhardt's works on *Greek Cults*; Girard de Rialle, *Mythologie comparée* (1878); Elard H. Meyer's, *Indogerm. Mythen* (1883-87); v. D. Gheyn, *Essais de mythol. comparée* (1885); J. G. Frazer's *Golden Bough* and *Pausanias*; etc.

Aristotle nowhere combats Hellenic myths as modern rationalists have been combating Christian dogmas.

From this deep sense of the great Hellenic myths, then, we are entitled to infer that, by careful distinction of the external garb from the internal kernel, several important historic hints may be obtained. In the first place, that the Hellenes were, in their myth-making period (second millennium B.C.), a people intensely energised by constant conflicts with the adjacent great inland empires in Western Asia and Africa. Nations less high-strung never invent myths of abiding significance and charm. Strenuous national life alone can so stimulate the imagination of the people as to produce, in some still finer organised individuals, the power of exceptional poetic creativeness. As in all history, so at the beginning of the classical period, the general dominates the particular. Had the Hellenic islanders, as a whole, not been subjected to intense dangers, nor been irresistibly attracted by dangerous prizes of adventure; no mere "racial" quality could have elicited out of the inert mass of lingering mental faculties the spark of divine poetry. The Hellenes of the second millennium B.C. were, however, as a whole, in a most trying geo-political situation of danger and temptation, and this "national" force became, in a few better-equipped individuals, a great driving current of poetry, organisation, and success.

In the second place, we obtain from an adequate consideration of the old Greek myths a means of interpreting the historical substratum of those myths with much greater sureness of method. We see that as the conflicts in Asia Minor gave rise to the myths about the Amazons; so the conflicts with Egypt

suggested the myths of the daughters of Danaus, together with other myths. It is here impossible to point out in detail how this method of deriving many of the Greek myths, not from phenomena of Greek or Aegean locality, but from the countries where the Greeks had their great conflicts with inland empires, is destined to put a stop to the arbitrary handling of Hellenic mythology at the hands of philologians and folklorists. Both philological and folklorist students of mythology fail to consider the fact, that great myths are nowise mere story-telling, practised leisurely by idle bards. They are, for very ancient times, what literature proper is for more advanced times. As literature is incisively determined by great national events, so is mythology. As long as the Greeks in the Aegean islands were mere peoples and no nation (to about 1600 or 1500 B.C.), they probably had myths of a value not superior to those of other "peoples." When, however, under the stress of mighty conflicts with inland empires, they began to crystallise into a nation proper, they also commenced to organise their vague notions about the gods, Nature, and Man, into ever-memorable myths and legends.

It would be incomplete to speak only of the large empires and city-states of Asia Minor and of Egypt as the great adversaries of the Hellenic islanders. It is certain that the inhabitants of the larger islands, more particularly of Crete, acquired, some time in the first half of the second millennium B.C., the thalassocracy over the Aegean waters. This they exercised, no doubt, with great efficiency, and tried to control the more remote islanders and dwellers in coast-towns as well as the

islands around them. The towns on the coast of Asia Minor were thus placed between the powerful empires inland, and the great thalassocracies in the Aegean, on the sea-side. If to this we add the very frequent invasions and raids waged by those islanders and coast-town people, after the fashion of the Normans in the eighth and ninth centuries A.D., against Phoenicia, Palestine, and Egypt; we must admit that theirs was a most strenuous life of defence and aggression, of scheming and energy, of resourcefulness and vigilance. They could not hope to hold their own by sheer brute force, and they were irresistibly driven to seek for safety in organisation, *i.e.* in the systematisation of their mental, social, and political life.

It is in this way that the border nations on the western coast of Asia Minor, in the Aegean islands, and on the eastern shores of Greece were led to develop an intellect and organisation superior to that of the peoples of the Hittites, Assyrians, Babylonians, or Egyptians. Higher intellect was the principal premium of their existence. Without it they could not have resisted the power of the empires. Their geographical situation rendered resistance possible, and so naturally gave rise to a growing national ambition. Intellect and system, then, completed what the geo-political situation had set in motion. The Normans, who in the early Middle Ages invaded and combated the Carlovingian Empire, likewise developed powers that finally raised them to the headship of very important monarchies. It is, moreover, certain, as will be seen in subsequent sections of the present work, that islands cannot hope to hold their own for any considerable period, unless they at once increase their naturally feeble resources by

building up an empire. Not one of the larger islands of Europe, let alone the smaller ones, has escaped absorption by some continental Power, unless, as was the case with Venice, and is now the case with Great Britain, it has indefinitely enlarged its striking and defensive efficiency by an empire. Neither Corsica nor Sardinia, neither Sicily nor Ireland, neither Cyprus nor Rhodes, has in historical times ever been able to remain independent for any lengthy period. This clear teaching of the past gives us a clue to the history of Crete in the latter half of the second millennium B.C. Crete is indeed the Ireland of the prehistoric Aegean civilisation. Like Ireland, in the early Middle Ages, it developed rapidly a remarkable civilisation; and, undoubtedly, also held for a considerable time the thalassocracy of the Aegean. Yet, like the Irish, the Cretans failed to grasp the necessity of complementing their polity of an island by that of an empire, and so, as in the case of Ireland, the inner cohesion of Cretan politics was soon disturbed and finally degenerated into petty local wars and anarchy.[1]

We are now in a position to approach the problem of the origin of Greek civilisation in a spirit presumably more adequate to the real issues of the case. The interest we still have and always shall have in this civilisation is, *in ultima analysi*, the interest in Art, in the widest sense of the term. Had the Greeks not created ideals in the arts of sculpture and architecture, as well as in literature, philosophy, and science, we should not care more for the Greeks than for any other nation of antiquity. The question of the origin of Greek civilisation is thus in reality

[1] Pausanias, *Descriptio*, iii. 2.

one of the origin of Greek art. But for their deep artistic sense the Greeks could never have produced eternal models, not only of art in the narrower meaning of the word, but also of style in literature, system in philosophy, and method in science. Whence, then, did the Greeks derive that sense?

At the present time, as several generations ago, there are still two opposing schools of thought regarding this question. One maintains that the Greeks owe practically nothing to the Orient; and their art is eminently *autochthon*. The other allots to the Orient such a large share in the forces producing Greek art, as to make the latter a mere disciple, or, at best, a continuation of Oriental art. The Oriental hypothesis is closely connected with what M. Salomon Reinach has termed *Le Mirage Oriental*, and which has consciously, and even more often unconsciously, led scholars to derive all "Indo-German" civilisation, *i.e.* all European culture from the Orient. M. Reinach, in a paper under the above title,[1] has collected the most instructive of the facts disproving the value of the famous theories, so much admired in the last century, about Sanskrit being the oldest of the Aryan languages;[2] about Vedic, or old Persian literature being much older than Greek literature;[3] about all the Greek gods being old Vedic gods;[4] about the Aryans originally coming from somewhere in Central Asia;[5] about all our plants, animals, instruments, and such-like coming from the East;[6] and in short, about all the theories that have,

[1] Reinach, Salomon, *Le Mirage Oriental*, first in *L'Anthropologie* (1893), pp. 539 *seq.*, 699 *seq.*; then, somewhat enlarged, in his *Chroniques d'Orient*, second vol. (1896), pp. 509 *seq.*

[2] *Ibid.* p. 511 [3] *Ibid.* p. 512. [4] *Ibid.* p. 514.

[5] *Ibid.* p. 515 [6] *Ibid.* pp. 517-525.

more especially before 1875, been proposed and elaborately "proved" by the abuse of purely philological means of research. He who, in defiance to authors of works of stupendous erudition, should have, by about the middle of the last century, ventured to maintain the European origin of the Aryans, of Greek religion, of neolithic utensils and ceramic work, would have been treated as the merest sciolist. We have already seen that philological historians have, by necessity, an irresistible bent to deny the existence of the most real facts or persons of history, and to teach, with the greatest seriousness, the real existence of mere phantoms of their own imagination. This curious bent is due to the nature of their chief instrument of research, of language. The grammar of action, that is, of the principal contents of history, is radically different from the grammar of language. Action is Heraclitic; language is Eleatic. Language must assume the substantiality of things in order to house and fix them in permanent words. Action comes from and proceeds to an unending flux of things. Of all modes and methods of historical research, then, language is the poorest. It can never reach the psychological engine behind the actions. It is, indeed, after a perusal of M. Reinach's remarkable paper impossible to deny the gigantic failure of philological methods of history in the last hundred and fifty years. Archaeologists may have, and have, no doubt, committed many a blunder, but it is scarcely possible to make of their errors a list so formidable in extent and purport as is that of the philological historians. Thus in the present question, archaeologists have certainly done more towards an elucidation of primitive Greek history than have philologians.

Archaeologists, it is true, do not trouble themselves either about the real or psychological factors, and only consider mere external resemblances. The similarity of the Hittite constructions at Boghaz-Köi in Asia Minor with those of Mycenae or Tiryns; of Greek early vases with those of Asiatic origin; the total absence of the *fibula* in Asiatic finds; and similar facts are taken by archaeologists as a basis for stating an Asiatic or a non-Asiatic origin of archaeological objects.[1] However, it is certain that Greek art, *qua* art, could not possibly be of any origin other than Greek. One can very well imitate a railway, a tram-car, a watch, or a hat-form; one cannot imitate a non-indigenous art. The present proposal (April 1905) to rebuild the Parthenon is meeting with the absolute disapproval it merits. *We* cannot rebuild the Parthenon, much as we are advanced in the theory and practice of art. The Parthenon, like the smallest or biggest object of art, requires specific atmosphere, mental and social. Such atmosphere can be neither imported nor made to order. Whatever detail the early Greeks took from the Orientals, they never took their art from them, simply because they could not do so. If this, the psychological factor, had not been lost sight of, the problem of the origin of Hellenic art would long have been formulated more adequately. For, this problem is not identical with the alternative of Oriental or non-Oriental origin. Greek art, being art proper and specific, cannot for a moment be supposed to have been "taken" from

[1] Compare the following passages:—Perrot and Chipiez, *Histoire de l'art dans l'antiquité*, iv. 662; Chantre, Ernest, *Rapport s. une mission scient. en Asie Mineur, et spécialement en Cappadocie* (1893-1894), p. 27; Pottier, *Catalogue des vases antiques*, pp. 208-209; Cavvadias, *Catalogue des Musées d'Athènes* (1894), p. 8; Salomon Reinach, *Chroniques d'Orient*, ii. p. 556.

anywhere else than from the Greek mind. The real question, then, is: What circumstances stimulated the Greek mind into the great energy and intensity, the outcome of which is art?

This question resolves itself into the broader question of the origin of that immense national energy of the Greeks in the latter half of the second millennium B.C., of which their artistic power was only one, if probably the greatest manifestation. There can, indeed, be little doubt that art is the product of a higher energy and intensity of all the mental, emotional, and moral forces of a nation. Where some of these forces are left unelectrified, there art is limited, and eventually poor. Now we have seen that the Greeks of the latter half of the second millennium B.C., were, by their geo-political situation in historic space, driven into an energisation of nearly all their faculties, as a sheer necessity of their daily life. The final upshot of this high-strung and all-round energisation was their art. The Oriental Empires had thus indeed a very great and direct influence on Greek art, but not as makers of artistic models, but as part-makers of the geo-political situation of the Greeks. These empires did not make Greek art; but they, together with the configuration of the eastern Mediterranean, were chiefly instrumental in the making of the Greek artists, of the Greeks. We see in this, as in every historical problem properly put, the working of the historic *abscissae* and *ordinatae*, of which we spoke in the *Introduction* to the present work (pp. 57-58). The *abscissae*, or the constant (static) element, are, in this case, represented by the peculiar trend of coast-lines, of islands, currents in the sea, and sea-routes in the

Aegean Sea and in the eastern Mediterranean; the *ordinatae*, or the movable (dynamic) element, are represented by the Imperial nations, on the one hand, and the Greeks, on the other. In that way we may indeed obtain a curve of events closely similar to that of history itself. In that way we are certainly enabled to see more clearly why the Greeks, and not the Celts or Lithuanians produced art proper; why the Greeks did so in the latter half of the second millennium B.C., and not in the preceding millennium; why they did so on the eastern, and not on the western shores of Greece proper; why on the islands and on the western coast of Asia minor, and not in Macedonia or Thessaly. Wherever the Greeks originally (in the third or fourth millennium B.C.) came from; whether their better classes were blond or dark; whether their "race" was "Mediterranean" or Celtic,—all this loses its point as soon as we see the true psychological levers of their rise.

HELLENIC EXPANSION

HOMER

We have positive proof for the colonisation of the plain of the Troad in north-western Asia Minor by Greeks from the island of Lesbos, who founded the coast-cities of Antandros, Assos, Lamponeia, and others; and it is equally certain that the Greeks, coming from the Balkan peninsula and from Greece proper, perhaps already in the thirteenth century B.C., settled first in the Aegean islands and then on the coasts of Asia Minor. The cities they founded are usually classified as (1) Aeolian, such as the cities just mentioned, together with the Twelve Cities of which Cyme and Smyrna were the most famous; (2) Ionian, such as—proceeding from north to south—Phocaea, Clazomenae, Teos, Colophon, Ephesus, Magnesia, Priene, Miletus, and the islands of Chios and Samos; and (3) Doric, such as Halicarnassus, Cnidus, and the islands of Cos and of Rhodes. Miletus alone founded about eighty colonies (in reality new city-states), which, with the exception of Naucratis in Egypt, were all situated on the Propontis and the Euxine, such as Sinope and Odessus (not modern Odessa). Cyrene on the Lybian coast in Africa was founded by Greeks from Thera, about 600 B.C.

It was also in the islands near to, and on the coasts of, Asia Minor that the Greeks first gave an earnest of their immense achievements in the cause of higher civilisation. All art, as is well known, is of Greek origin; but it must not be forgotten that the inventors were Greeks of Asia Minor. In the Empires we look in vain for any manifestation of art proper. Moderation, harmony, unity, and, chiefly, human personality, these the very soul of art, are missing in everything the peoples of the Empires practised or produced. Their polities were vaguely and loosely organised; their science was devoid of generalisations; their religions half poetry, half mythology; their architecture grotesque. The Greeks, on the other hand, were by the ninth century B.C. in possession of real poetry, or of art sculptured in words. Their national epics, commonly called the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, are incomparably superior to the *Kalewala* of the Finns, the *Nibelungen* of the Germans, or the *Sagas* of the Norse peoples. The Greek epics appeal to our hearts as strongly and intimately as they did two thousand years ago to the Hellenes. They show first of all moderation, in that the ghastly creations of a disordered fancy, such as monstrous demons or gods, are exceedingly rare in them. Their metre is better adapted for epic dignity, power, and dramatic agitation than the metres of other epics; and when in the eighteenth century A.D. music reached its epical stage, the oratorios of Handel and the grandest fugues of Bach were composed in the metre of the *Iliad*. No other popular epic poetry shows that fine sense of beauty and grace that made the *Iliad* as well as the *Odyssey* a training-school for sculptors and painters. The remarks in these epics

on the artistic treatment of the hair; on the shoulders as the seat of grace; on the proportion of the legs to the upper part of the body a-sitting or a-standing; on ankles as the seat of charm; and in a word, the deep Hellenic sense of the exceeding power of beauty in man and woman, raises the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, quite apart from the rest of their features of imperishable fascination, far above anything that other nations have ever produced.[1] In the epics of other nations, too, there is occasionally power and natural beauty; in the Greek epics alone there is Art. That of itself is sufficient to prove that the stock of these epics was composed by one great poet, by Homer. The Germans have for the last hundred years tried hard to reduce Homer to a syndicate; but all that the learned promoters have achieved is to prove certain inconsistencies and anachronisms indicating subsequent alterations in Homer's original poem. The *Sagas* may have been concocted, each by a band of bards; but real art is pre-eminently personal, and grows from one centre.

Homer's poems arose on the coast of Western Asia, although in them are sung the exploits of continental Greek heroes such as King Agamemnon of Argos; King Menelaus of Sparta, husband of beauteous Helen; King Ulysses or Odysseus, husband of Penelope from Ithaca, an island. In Achilles and Telemachus, the great poet sings ideals of youth; in Odysseus, ideals of ripe manhood; in Nestor, of wise old age. In Nausicaa he has left us the touching figure of innocent maidenhood; in Penelope, the ideal matron. In the centre of the epics is the great war waged by

[1] The classical work on the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* for initiation into their art and beauty is, of course, Lessing's *Laokoon*.

the continental Greeks with Priam, king of Troy, in Western Asia Minor, for the rape of Helen by Paris, Priam's son. The war was ended in the tenth year by a ruse of Odysseus. Homer's epics do not show a complete agreement, in objects described by the poet, with the actual remains of the Mycenaean period. Nor did the Greeks commemorate their great and all-important struggles with the Hittites, the Phrygians, and the prae-Mermnade Lydians in epics or other records; just as the Athenians did not commemorate their ever-memorable struggles with the Persians on the pediments, metopes, or friezes of the Parthenon.

The existence of the Homeric poems in the ninth or eighth century B.C. is both a symptom and a consequence of the high-strung life of the Greeks, dependent on their position as border nations. It is the first finished work of Art proper produced by mankind. Art is the highest and, at the same time, the pre-eminently human product of man. We are naturally much more gifted for art than for any other line of work, and art is our real home, our true excellency, our terrestrial consolation. The Greeks, subject as they were to an extraordinary strain of all powers vested in man, naturally drifted into art, which is the expression of man's capacities in their most exalted phase. Mental energy pushed to its final artistic expression leads to systems of thought, to philosophy, even as the supreme intensity of emotional life necessarily crystallises for its own relief in artistic literature. Art thus became the very atmosphere of Greek life. Their State is one of their first works of art; and their persons, as well as their writings and technical performances, all breathed the spirit and force of art, that is, of a phase of higher

life unknown to the people of the Empires. However, the Greeks could not indulge in an intense culture of the mind only. Each Greek city-state consisting of relatively few citizens, they were forced to cultivate the development of their physical energies as much as their mental, and so the Greeks became the first people preaching the glory of the human body along with that of the human mind. As their States were the consummate expression of the harmony of means and resources both physical and mental, so their citizens, individually, very frequently combined in beautiful unison the strength and suppleness of muscle with the vigour and elasticity of thought. The Hebrews, for identical reasons, had raised for their defence the purely intellectual bulwark of Monotheism, which proving all-sufficient, considerably abated any desire for higher physical culture. The Greeks alone arrived at the true ideal of humanity, as they alone of ancient nations were, by their situation, forced to invent the best means of combating great powers from abroad, and of averting, by the intense organisation of their small States, rapid disorganisation from within. True, they were unable to continue in their greatness for a long period. The Asiatic Greeks flourished for about four centuries; the Greeks in Greece proper for about as many. Life as high-strung as theirs, high-strung in deeds good and bad, cannot last for ever. Their States were meant for the few, and for a short time. But during that short spell they did enough to lay all subsequent humanity under heavy obligations to them. All of us still live very largely by what they did and thought, and although a few centuries only were allotted to them, no lapse of time can obliterate the effects of their lives.

HELLENISATION OF THE MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES OUTSIDE GREECE PROPER

The new life developing in the Aegean and on the coasts of Asia Minor spread rapidly to Greece proper, and from there to Italy, where Greeks from Chalcis (in the island of Euboea) founded Cumae, near Naples; others again founded Crotona; rich and voluptuous Sybaris; Locri and Tarentum in South Italy; Zancle or Messana, Naxos, Syracuse, Hybla or Megara, Acragas, in Sicily; Marseilles (then Massalia) in France, founded at the end of the seventh century B.C. by Phocaeans; then in the north-east of the Aegean, Sestos, Abydos, Lampsacus, Byzantium (founded 658 B.C.); in the west, or the Ionian Sea, Corcyra or Corfu, settled by Corinthians (758 B.C.), the island of Leucas (about 660 B.C.), Epidamnus (625 B.C.), etc. In all, the Greeks founded, from the eighth to the end of the sixth century B.C., over 340 colonies, in reality independent city-states, on the coasts of the Mediterranean, the Aegean, and the Euxine. The connection between the mother State and the "colony" was exceedingly loose and academic. Each of the new settlements was practically a border polity, and thus obliged to draw very heavily on the mental and physical resources of its citizens in circumstances when help from the mother State would in most cases have been too tardy. The Tarentines, a Spartan "colony," were very seriously harassed by the numerous inland tribes of the Iapygi; the Abderites by the Triballi; the Byzantines and other Greek city-states on the south coast of modern Turkey by the ferocious and gifted people

called the Thracians; and the Sicilian Greeks were heavily exposed to the Etruscans and the Carthaginians. The Greeks in Greece were relatively less exposed to incessant attacks, and their development, therefore, proceeded at a considerably slower rate. From the ninth to the sixth century B.C. the intellectual growth of Hellenism manifested itself mostly in what is inadequately called "colonial" Greece. The arts flourished in Samos and Sicily; the great poets Alcaeus, Sappho ("the tenth muse," as Plato called her), Archilochus and Stesichorus, were "colonials"; the first great schools of philosophy originated at Miletus, at Elea, at Crotona, at Abdera, and at Ephesus, and the fundamental problems there discussed by Thales, Zeno, Pythagoras, Democritus, and Heraclitus respectively have to this day retained the impress of the minds of these great thinkers. The harmony of body and mind so characteristic of the Greeks is well illustrated by the example of the Crotonians in S. Italy, who, from 588 to 484 B.C., carried off the much-coveted victory in the running races at Olympia no less than twelve times, boasting at the same time the greatest pugilist of antiquity — Milon; while the sage Pythagoras, a Samian, who united in his soul the immense religious power over men and women of a Savonarola or John Wesley, with the wealth and profundity of scientific initiative of a Galileo, made Crotona during the latter half of the sixth century B.C. the intellectual centre of the occidental Greeks. The "colonial" Greeks, being, it would appear, more heavily exposed than were, from 900 B.C. to 500 B.C., the Hellenes of Greece, advanced under greater pressure at a more rapid pace, and it is only owing

to the lack of great historians of those times and on account of the greater splendour of Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries, that the immense merits of the Greeks of Magna Graecia and Sicily have, as a rule, been neglected or overlooked.

GREECE PROPER FROM ABOUT 900 B.C. TO 500 B.C.

The Mycenaean period (1500 B.C. to 1000 B.C.), mentioned above, the powerful kings of which resided at Mycenae, Orchomenos, Tiryns, Argos, and other places, where recent excavations have unearthed "Mycenaean" palaces, treasure-houses, tombs, and fortifications of astounding size or workmanship, came to an end by the influx of numerous Greek tribes from the north at various times. These inroads are promiscuously called the Dorian Invasion, or the advent of the Heraclidae. Considering the fact that already in Homer's epics we never read of dwelling localities other than towns, and that the city-state proper makes its appearance in Greece as early as the eighth century B.C. or a little before, we are bound to credit the general fact of that tradition regarding the Dorian invasion. City-states being the outcome of the most pressing necessity of defence on the part of a limited number of people, the political circumstances of the Mycenaean age, when no city-states existed, must have undergone a radical change either by the invasion of large "empires," of which we learn nothing, or by the invasion of a limited number of victorious people who, in their isolation amongst the conquered multitudes, naturally,

resorted to the foundation of that kind of State which had proved so successful in the case of their kinsfolk in Asia Minor under similar circumstances. The lesson offered by the Greek city-states on the coast of Asia Minor was readily taken by the Hellenes in Greece, just as the same lesson given by the Phoenicians of Aradus, Sidon, or Tyrus was readily accepted by the Phoenicians who founded Utica or Carthage in modern Algeria. The immeasurably heightened power and dignity of each citizen of a city-state was not the least tempting motive for the Dorians and other invading Greeks who possibly, already in the beginning of the ninth century, introduced into Greece proper the process of city-state building. The organisation of Greek society and Greek polities previous to the period of city-states was aristocratic or monarchic. The city-state, from its very necessity of relying on each of its few citizens, at once showed a strong tendency to democracy.

Thus the great process of political and social individualisation that had, probably long before 2000 B.C., commenced on the coast of Phoenicia and Syria and spread to Palestine on the one hand, and to the western coast of Asia Minor, on the other, had, in the ninth or eighth century B.C., finally reached Greece proper and other Mediterranean countries. That process, the most important ever recorded, produced, wherever it was at work, the very elements of real civilisation, and eventually very much more than that. In Greece, and in Greek city-states outside Greece, it now started on a still loftier career. From the intensely typical character of Greek history, it follows that nearly the whole of

Greek history might be indicated, as it is reflected, by the history of any one Greek city-state; on the other hand, the variety of constitutions, cults, amusements, or mental phenomena in the Greek States is bewildering. Cities a few miles apart from one another differed as widely in apparently all that makes public or private life, as do nowadays the United States from Russia, or England from France. In Athens, mental pursuits as well as physical exercises were eagerly cultivated; in Sparta, practically only physical and *music* exercises. At Corinth and Athens men considered it beneath their dignity to dance with women; at Thebes they did so with pride. The people of Tanagra were proverbially upright and law-abiding; the Thebans, a few miles west of Tanagra, were noted for their lawlessness. In Athens honest women were kept in lifelong bondage; in Sparta they enjoyed excessive liberty. In many Greek city-states real property could be freely negotiated; in Leucas it was entailed. In a word, Greece in the seventh century B.C., and probably long before that time, was, on a small scale, what Europe is to-day; or, rather, Europe is greater Hellas, in that the Hellenic ideal of high-strung individualisation of polities has been definitely victorious in Europe over all the numerous attempts of making Europe, too, the demesne of one or two huge empires, instead of, as it is now, a galaxy of six-and-forty political, and more than a hundred national, individualities.

THE GREEK CITY-STATE

The Greek State is the classical State, in the sense that Greek sculpture is classical sculpture, which no new departure in sculpture can ever render negligible or uninstructive. New forms of State have arisen since the times of the Greeks, but they were either mere transformations of the Hellenic or Roman city-state on a bigger scale, or they have proved inefficient; and at the present day all States are rapidly adopting many of the most specific features of the Greek city-state, such as military service of all the citizens, a greater share of each citizen in the direct government of the polity, and, chief of all, a passionate insistence on one's own individuality and an uncompromising attitude to other States; in other words, extreme nationalism. As is the case in modern Europe, war or the eve of war was the normal condition between Greek States. The Greeks are frequently scolded and blamed for their incessant warfares. In times, however, when the most amazing facilities for frequent contact between the peoples of Europe have only resulted in an incredible increase of the most forbidding nationalism, we might be perhaps somewhat less censorious with regard to the Greeks. Nor, on the other hand, must their "local" wars be belittled as pettifoggery (*Krähwinkelei*, according to Wilamowitz). That is unkind, especially when we consider that the quarrels and wars of these Greek "pettifoggers" have had, directly and indirectly, more importance for mankind than had the history of the "Holy Roman Empire of the Germanic Nation" from

Otto I. (962 A.D.) to the date of its dissolution in 1806. The battle of Potidaea was certainly small as compared with the battle of Kolin or Jena, but amongst the combatants were Socrates and Alcibiades.

In the following paragraphs it is intended to give a general picture of the nature and functions of the Greek city-state. The immense variety of constitutions in these States renders every general description more symptomatic than strictly accurate. Yet such a general statement seems indispensable for the present work.

The territory of one city was the home and fatherland of each of its citizens. Outside the city he had no hope of comfort, no chance of protection, no expectation of glory. As a rule he was not allowed to marry a woman from a city other than his own, and naturalisation or change of citizenship was practically impossible, or at any rate exceedingly difficult. The Athenians would rather have destroyed Megara than have conferred the Athenian citizenship upon it; and exclusion from the city of Athens was deemed so awful a punishment by the Athenians, that they willingly afforded convicts a chance of escaping the penalty of death by means of what they considered worse than death—voluntary exile. This excessive value set on their citizenship was peculiarly Greek. In modern times the Germans, for instance, in 1871, fairly forced the Alsatians to accept German citizenship; and they, or any other European nation, would gladly confer their citizenship on any negro tribe in Africa. In Greek city-states citizenship consisted not barely of the political franchise or the right of suffrage. At the end of the sixth century, the rule of

autocrat kings, princes, and usurpers ("tyrants") had ceased. Only one dynasty of tyrants, those of Sicyon, called the Orthagoridae, maintained itself in power during three generations; whereas the rule of the other tyrants did not last more than one or two generations (the Cypselidae in Corinth seventy-three years, the Pisistratidae in Athens thirty-five years, Gelon and Hieron in Syracuse less than eighteen years). Even the oligarchical commonwealths accorded their citizens a larger share in the public life of the city. than would nowadays be granted by the most democratic State of America. In Greece the democratic States and all those numerous oligarchico-aristocratic commonwealths in the fifth and fourth centuries, whose constitution was tinctured with democracy, totally engrossed the individual citizen's time, fortune, and abilities; and of them (and therefore of the great majority of Greek city-states during those centuries) it may be said that citizenship meant the sum total of a man's existence.

In modern times every single individual moves in at least three distinctly different spheres of action and personal relations—in (*a*) Society; (*b*) the State, or public life, which is political or professional, or both; and (*c*) the Church, or religious community. These three spheres are kept strictly apart from one another, and are, in many respects, wholly incompatible and incommensurate. Surely nothing is realised more clearly than that the laws of the State, or those of "business," are not those of Society; and that as members of a religious congregation we stand in relations essentially different from the position we are in as members of a club or a social meeting. The rules of the State are set by laws of Parliament; the

laws of society are set by tacit rules of custom. The Church in Catholic countries is administered by a close and absolutely exclusive hierarchy of officials alone, and no lay member can so much as think of performing any rite or liturgy; and while this rigour has been somewhat relaxed in Protestant countries, even here we find a hierarchy of specially ordained priests or officials for the celebration of religious services. Lastly, the life of the State has neither any of the frivolous or gaudy elements of society, nor has it much of the awe-striking ceremonies of religion —in fact State, Society, and Church move on lines widely deviating from one another.

In ancient Greek city-states, on the other hand, all this was quite different. In those commonwealths, State, Society, and Church or Religion were welded into one homogeneous organism, so as to be practically one and the same institution. Consequently to be the citizen of a Greek commonwealth was equivalent to being committed to a particular set of laws and political institutions, to particular manners and customs of social life, and to a particular mode of religious worship, both public and private, every Greek householder being at the same time the priest of the family. The broadest experience has long since taught us that few passions are as strong as is attachment to a political creed; that still fewer will exceed in tenacity the observation of social habits; and that none will outvie the force of religious belief. In Greek city-states these three powerful emotions were intimately united into one potent agency; and hence every Greek citizen, in addition to family ties, was devoted to his State with the ardour of the professional politician, the fastidious-

ness of the society man, and the fervour of the devotee.

That solemn laws given by the Assembly or in the Senate should descend to trivial details relating to toilet or head-gear, appears incongruous to modern views. So intimate, however, was the association of State and Society in a Greek commonwealth that at Sparta, for instance, the woman's head-dress was fixed by law; at Athens the number of gowns of a travelling Athenian woman was legally restricted to three; at Rhodes and at Byzantium men were, by law, forbidden to shave their beards; and at Miletus women were prohibited from drinking wine. It is, therefore, quite consistent that as the law of the Greek State had a wider scope than is covered by our law, so their religion also should be incomparably more comprehensive. For, unlike our own religion, that of the Greeks comprised not only the worship of the Deity, but penetrated every phase of life, both public and private, both grave and gay. The very amusements were saturated with religion, and in addition to religious festivals performed with the most gorgeous pageantry, as the Panathenaea in Athens, the Amarynthia in the island of Euboea, the Delia for the inhabitants of the Cyclades islands, the Apaturia for the Ionians of Asia Minor, etc., they had sacred dances, performed either by men alone or by men and women. Of all Greek city-states, the Athenians had the greatest number of religious festivals, of which there was one nearly every sixth day. In Greece every function or transaction in the assembly, in the law courts, in war or in peace, was preceded, followed, or permeated by religious ceremonies. The religion of the Greeks, therefore, was not pure theology or liturgy,

but one of the elements of their commonwealth, and, accordingly, it could not have been a means of either instructing on the supreme questions of life and ethics, or of holding out hopes for after-life, the commonwealth as such having no after-life. Greek States, being small city-states, and the very familiarity of the citizens being naturally unfavourable to the spirit of respect and deference without which no commonwealth can be ruled, the Greek nation was most urgently pressed for a means of imparting solemnity to all public functions, and this they attained most effectively by clothing their public proceedings in a religious garb. Thus the demand of the Greeks for religious beliefs and ceremonies was greater than ours in proportion to the wider use which they made of it; and this may account for the fact of the most intelligent and sceptical people of Europe having acquiesced in a religion which taught the existence of numerous gods and goddesses, semi-gods and deified heroes, in the sky, in the sea, in the nether world, in every glen, valley, path, and spot both out of doors and indoors.

The Greek city-state was in reality what we should call a religious corporation—in Greek, a *thiasos*; and in the whole course of history no more essentially similar institution may be found than the monastic orders of the Catholic Church, a similarity not indistinctly noticed already by two of the acutest observers of man, the Abbé Galiani and Napoleon the Great. Hence the strong aversion of Greek city-states to any fusion amongst themselves. The foundation of one great Hellenic Nation and State was just as impossible for them as it has always proved with

regard to the fusion of all highly individualised polities, such as, *e.g.*, those of modern Europe or of the Catholic orders; although just as all the Hellenes recognised themselves to be of the same stock, so the orders all recognised themselves to be followers of one single *regula* or rule, viz. that of St. Benedict of Nursia; and, accordingly, the Greeks never seriously attempted, far less succeeded, in knitting together a considerable number of city-states into one powerful and united empire. Their leagues were of short duration, and either of loose consistency, or rapidly degenerating into the total subjection of one of the parties to the other. For purposes of a particular war, it is true, they frequently joined (*Symmachia*); some city-states would even occasionally have a common government and the same laws (*Sympoliteia*); and in some cases the citizens of one commonwealth by special treaty enjoyed protection when sojourning in another commonwealth (*Xenia*); nay, we also frequently hear of Amphictyonies, or confederations of city-states, generally twelve in number, for purposes of the common worship of a god or goddess, and the celebration of various other religious ceremonies. All this, however, left the political and social independence of each city-state practically untouched; and all through Grecian history we find every commonwealth either altogether isolated and self-sustaining, or in utter subjection to a temporarily victorious rival city-state, as were the Messenians to the Spartans. The political and military ascendency or "hegemony" that was wielded over Greece, first by the Spartans, then by the Athenians, then again by the Spartans, and temporarily by the Thebans; and likewise the temporary sway that the Cretans, Rhodians, Cyprians, Lesbians, Samians,

Eretrians, and Aeginetans in turn had over the sea (*thalassocracy*), were rather matters of prestige than actual domination.

In the *Introduction* to the present work it was remarked that amusements, the necessary complement to the graver aspects of communal or aggregate life, are the more intense, the greater are the static forces and the sharper the class distinctions. In Greece, and of course in all Hellenic countries, the antagonism between individual city-states was most intense. That in itself promised well for amusements of a higher kind to be derived from sports practised by such States in common. Nor must it be ignored that the stern discipline inside most Greek city-states made a periodical absence from the coercion of the State an eagerly hoped-for relief of Greek youth. Common amusements were, moreover, the only common tie left for the Greeks; and we find, therefore, that their national sports, doing duty, as they did, for religious and political institutions of common nationality, were invested with a solemnity, and attended with an interest, that in modern times we associate with the most solemn cults of religion. Such sports were the celebrated games at Olympia, in Elis; at Corinth, called the Isthmian games; at Nemea, in Argolis; and near Delphi, in Phocis, termed the Pythian games. The Olympian games were in historical times always arranged by the people of Elis, who announced and carried them through every four years during August and part of September; the "*hellanodikae*" or judges of the twenty-four contests (eighteen for men, six for boys) being also taken from among the Elians. The contests consisted in leaping, running, wrestling, diskos- (quoit-)throwing,

chariot-races, etc.[1] The competing men were all nude, and consequently married women, with the solitary exception of the priestess of Demeter, could not attend, although the Greeks deemed it barbarous to feel ashamed of one's nudity. None but Hellenes could compete, and victory in any one of the games was held to be amongst the sublimest objects of ambition, the victors being honoured by the commonwealth they belonged to with the most flattering eulogies and privileges, and poets like the immortal Pindar, a Boeotian, sang their praises in rapturous language. During the Olympian games a general truce obtained among Hellenic nations, and this abstention from all bloodshed during the period of those ideal contests accounts for the fact that the Greeks never indulged in gladiatorial games, or in bull-fights, bear-baiting, cock-fights, or similar barbarisms. The three other Hellenic games above mentioned were held as follows: the Pythian every fourth year; the Isthmian and the Nemean twice during an Olympiad. In addition to these general games for all Hellenes, there were numerous other games and festivals of a more or less national character. Such were the *Panathenaea* and *Eleusinia* at Athens, the *Iolaeia* at Thebes, the *Erotidia* at Thespiae, the *Hellotia* at Corinth, the *Aleaea* at Tegea, etc. As the public games were so numerous and gorgeous, and the whole of nearly every citizen's life was taken up by the public transactions of the commonwealth, the number of private games was

[1] Boat-races were practised at several places in ancient Greece, yet they did not form part of the sports at Olympian games, although the Alpheus river at Olympia is a "noble and broad river" (Pausanias), and water-sports should have been in intimate harmony with the importance of the sea for the Greeks.

small, and resorted to mostly by women, children, and slaves. Amongst private games indulged in by adults the most noteworthy were *Cubi* (dice), *Pessoi* (a species of draughts), and *Artiasmos* (odd and even). The development and spread of such absorbing private games as cards and chess were left for times when private life claimed nearly the whole of men's time.

In addition to their national games, the Hellenes had another common bond in their oracles, most of which were in Boeotia, many in Asia Minor and in the islands, none in Attica. Zeus and Apollo were the chief gods who were held to reveal the future—through signs, as at Dodona, or through the inspired utterings of a priestess or priest, as at Delphi. Dodona lay near modern Ioánnina (in Epirus), and the spot is said to be the stormiest in all Europe. There the rustling of the leaves of time-honoured oak-trees revealed the will of Zeus to the priests. From the most ancient times to its abolition in the fourth century after Christ, the oracle of Dodona was held in great awe. The most famous oracle, however, was that of Apollo, at Delphi, near modern Castri. The Pythia, who in historical times was a woman past her first youth, sat on the tripod over the sacred abyss, whence intoxicating and inspiring vapours were said to have risen; and the priestess, when in a trance, uttered connected or disconnected sentences out of which the attendant priest gleaned the answer of the god. Vast was the number of rulers, commonwealths, and private persons who consulted the Pythia, offering gifts of the most varied and precious kinds. The treasures of the oracle were very considerable, and its influence on the Hellenes, particularly on the direction of Hellenic colonisation and the establishment or amend-

ment of constitutions, was considerable. Although its answers were frequently ambiguous, and at times influenced by bribes or party spirit, yet such was the strength of the religious bent of the Greeks that the influence of the oracle remained unabated through all the periods of Greek history. Nor is this apparently strange fact out of keeping with the brilliant intellectual achievements of the Greeks. For, in reality, their oracles were *their* organisation of what we call "public opinion."[1] No period of advanced and intense political life is without its "public opinion." For the Hebrews from the eighth to the fifth century B.C. "public opinion" was represented by the prophets; for the moderns it is "voiced" by the press; for the Greeks by the oracles. As Delphi was situated in one of the least powerful Greek states, so, later on, the beginnings of Christianity were located in one of the least imposing countries, and the Papacy, too, had its "locus" in a distracted and, until quite recently, internationally second-rate country.

The very nature of the city-states compelled the Greeks, in nearly every one of their polities, to introduce the institution of slavery. It was so necessary a complement to their political constitution, as to entitle Aristotle to the famous remark that slavery was an institution of nature. The city-state was necessarily meant for the few, hence its exclusive character. As it was unable to grant the modern latitude of naturalisation to foreigners, so it was, without defeating its own ends, quite incapable of conferring the immense privileges of its franchise upon every one living within its precincts. Some states granted to

[1] We shall see, in the chapter on Lycurgus, the political *raison d'être* of the Greek oracles.

sections of their inhabitants a sort of semi-franchise, such as had the *perioeci* in Laconia, and the *metoeci* in Athens. On the whole, however, the Greeks were bound either to renounce their independence altogether, or institute slavery; just as the Jesuits, for instance, for identical reasons, confer the real privileges of their city-state or "society" on a few *professi* only, keeping the vast majority of their members in absolute bondage. In every high-strung polity there must be a large amount of coercion. On the Continent in our times, the officials of the civil service, together with the police and army authorities, wield enormous powers of coercion; in England, where these authorities are invested with very much smaller powers, other coercions are needed, such as, amongst others, the English Sabbath. The Greeks, being a people under an extraordinarily high-strung constitution, could not but introduce a coercion even more thorough-going than anything the moderns have applied. In their constant wars every free Greek ran the risk of being made a prisoner and thus becoming a slave himself; he could not, therefore, take inordinate pity on his own slave at home, without whose status neither master nor servant could have enjoyed Greek existence.

SPARTA[1]

About the city-states of Greece previous to the fifth century B.C. we possess very little knowledge. Sparta, Argos under Pheidon, Tegea, Corinth, Messene, and Athens seem to have been the most important.

[1] Add here the considerations on pp. 438 *seq.*

The Spartans who considered themselves descendants of the Dorians of the invasion, contrived, after various and arduous campaigns with the other States of the Peloponnesus, to acquire, in the sixth century B.C., a supremacy over their neighbours. The Spartans were certainly not more numerous nor wealthier than the other city-states of the Peloponnesus; nor had they then the advantage of sea-power. Their success, therefore, must have been owing to their superiority as warriors, and to the strength derived from a steady and well-balanced home government. As, originally, the border polities in Asia held their own against the overwhelming material forces of the Empires by acquiring superior mental and political organisation, so Greek city-states amongst themselves could, *a fortiori*, secure ascendency over their neighbours only by means of still greater superiority either mental or political. In the keen struggle for supremacy in the Peloponnesus from 800 to 550 B.C., that State alone could reasonably expect to win which by means external or internal had the greatest leverage of attack and endurance. The pressure, then, of the intense rivalry between the Peloponnesian States naturally led to the idea of defeating rivals, since their intellectual endowments could not easily be surpassed, by the establishment of a polity, every member of which was, by the most rigorous training, endowed with moral and physical powers of the rarest kind. Greek city-states for their very smallness readily lent themselves to such an experiment of wholesale education of an entire State during the life-time of each citizen. It is evident that such a permanent system of incessant and uniform education applying to all the successive periods of a

man's life can originate only in the mind, as it can be accepted only at the hands of one man. History knows of no case of such wholesale uniform education of large communities of men originating from a source other than that of one master-mind. That was the case with the Hebrews; with all ascetic sects; with all the monastic orders; with all armies in active warfare; and to the present day one man, and he alone, commands absolute obedience in matters relating to morality and religious education from millions of believing Catholics. Great moral impulses do not accumulate, as intellectual impulses very well may, from a variety of small impacts; they require a strong personality from which they emanate in broad currents, to thousands of needy souls. That Peloponnesian State, which from 800 to 550 B.C. could alone hope for success over its rivals, wanted, to this end, an enormous moral impulse, by which the submission of thousands of citizens to an excessively rigorous and uniform system of unceasing education might be secured. Argos, Tegea, Messene, and the other rivals of Sparta, themselves high-strung, intellectual and well-organised, brought by their very qualities such pressure to bear on Sparta, that when the latter once determined to outdo its rivals, it had in that very moment determined to submit implicitly to a state-creating personality. That personality was Lycurgus. He made the Spartan State; Argos, Tegea, and the other Peloponnesian city-states, and not Greek myths, made him. To deny the existence of Lycurgus and to accept as historical the existence of the Spartan State is equivalent to a psychological *contradictio in adjecto*. In every Greek State the influence of one imposing personality was, as we shall see, very great.

In Sparta, where it was most needed, it was greatest. The Spartan State already in the seventh century B.C. shows that striking convergence to *one* purpose, that identity of intention in each of its institutions which alone suffices to mark it off as a State founded and made by one idea of one man, not so much from the other Greek States which were also largely made and not evolved, as from mediaeval and modern States. In modern States there are the most unexpected *ricochet* effects of institutions, such as the so-called "survivals," and similar grotesque upshots of the latent conflict of institutions descending from disconnected planes of time and purpose. In Sparta, on the other hand, there is, as in all artistic and personal work, the strictest unity of purpose; nothing archaic, nothing "mediaeval," but all contemporaneous and actual.

For in the Spartan State each citizen was trained for one single purpose only: for the acquisition of an iron constitution, both physical and moral, with a view of rendering him incomparably superior to the citizens of the surrounding city-states in point of military qualities. The elders of his father's *phyle*, not his father, decided at his birth whether he should be permitted to live, or, if lacking in vitality, be thrown into one of the abysses of the huge Taygetus mountain-range near Sparta.

Nor could his mother devote her tenderness to him after his seventh year. As he did not belong to his parents, so he did not at any moment of his life belong to himself, to his wife, or to his children. He was most rigorously brought up with other boys, annually flogged at the altar of Artemis Orthia as a lesson in endurance, kept starving and freezing, taught very

little, and permitted to talk very seldom and only in *laconic* or very brief fashion. His bride was his neither freely nor exclusively, and his principal meal (one course of which was the famous black soup) he was, under penalty of forfeiting his citizenship, compelled to take in public (*syssitia* or *phiditia*). His helot was not his slave, but belonged to the State; and to debar him from acquiring personal wealth, the use of coined silver or gold money was prohibited, and iron money alone allowed. The most elemental of human desires were thus trodden under foot, and the Spartan became, like the Jesuit, an infallible instrument in the hands of his superiors, but at the expense of much that adorns human nature.

This uniform and levelling education sterilised the legislative functions of the Spartan State; as it sterilised intellectual elasticity by the excessive cultivation of will-power and character. One generation of Spartans being just like any other of the successive generations (just as modern Jesuits are of the same type as their colleagues of the sixteenth century), new laws were scarcely needed, and the magistrates enforcing the laws necessarily wielded the major part of the governing forces of the State. The five ephors, or chief magistrates, elected annually, were thus the central political organ of the Spartan state. They had the powers of the Roman Senate in foreign policy; that of the Roman *censor* in finance and moral superintendence; that of the Roman *praetor* in judicial matters; they were the presidents of the Spartan Assembly (*apella*), and the controllers of the two "kings" or chief generals; finally, they were only responsible to their successors. The "kings" were taken from the two families of the Agiadae and

Eurypontiadae respectively. Another organ of the State was the *gerusia*, or council of twenty-eight citizens, past their sixtieth year. The relentlessly uniform training of the bodies and minds of Spartans had, previous to the fifth century B.C., the additional advantage of precluding the easy rise of civil strife at Sparta. Hence the absence of *tyrants* or successful dictators at Sparta, and the greater unity between Spartan citizens.

The chronology of Spartan history in the eighth and seventh centuries is very obscure. The intellectual growth of the Spartans was not remarkable. Tyrtaeus and Alcman, their two great poets, were both foreigners. Yet the Spartans, too, shared the exquisite Greek sense of beauty, and their women were famous for unfeminine callousness and sculpturesque forms. The Spartan State, destined for a few citizens only, was by its very nature incapable alike of progressive development, or the foundation of a lasting empire. The Spartans have, however, laid down an ever-precious principle of education of citizens which, partially at least, is still at work in the English education of boys with results redounding to the glory of the Britons.

INQUIRY INTO THE PROBLEM OF THE HISTORICITY OF LYCURGUS

We intend to treat of the question of Lycurgus in elaborate detail. The problem of the historicity of Lycurgus, interesting enough in itself, is a *casus classicus* for all ancient history. The very method that has been used in most of the investigations and criticisms of Hebrew, Greek, and Roman history at the hands of modern philological historians, has been applied by nearly all German and but too many non-German scholars to prove the mythical character of Lycurgus. If, then, we can show that the method employed to destroy the historicity of Lycurgus is an inadequate and distinctly vicious method of historical research; if, moreover, we can show, by conclusive arguments, that Lycurgus's existence is a fact of absolute certainty, we may fairly claim to have established a strong *prima facie* case against a very large number, in fact, against well-nigh the totality of philological historians, who are trying to destroy the historicity of essential institutions, events, or persons of classical history by means of the very method by which Lycurgus has been sublimated into a "god." In thus treating of a special problem of Greek history at a relatively great length, we intend to abbreviate and facilitate the discussion of other and eventually even more important problems of Greek history, for the detailed investigation of which three times the space here allotted to Lycurgus would not suffice. These and numerous other problems of Hebrew, Greek, and Roman history we must, for the present, leave for subsequent special

monographs meant to bear out by elaborate criticism of each case the general statements advanced in the present work. However, an individual life will hardly be long enough to write all the requisite monographs, and therefore it has been thought advisable to expand the preceding short section on Lycurgus into a small monograph proper. This chapter, then, is intended to represent a specimen of the type of the new or psychological method in history destined, in due time, to remove the philological method so generally in use these one hundred and fifty years, especially with regard to ancient classical history.

In order to focus the attention of the reader at once upon the main issues, we shall, as concisely as possible, premise the two general statements dominating both the positive and the negative aspects of our view of the historicity of Lycurgus.

1. Like nearly all classical city-states, Sparta too is essentially cephalic; accordingly, her ἀγωγή, or the essence of her Constitution, cannot but be derived from one great Personality; that Personality being Lycurgus.

2. The "historical method" by means of which Zoëga (1817), Uschold (1843), Otfried Müller (1824, 1844), Fustel de Coulanges (1880), Trieber (1871), Gilbert (1872), Gelzer (1873), von Wilamowitz (1884), Busolt (1885, 1893), Eduard Meyer (1886), and so many other German, English, French, and Italian scholars have "proved" Lycurgus to be a mere myth, is identical with the "inquisitorial method" used in nearly all courts of justice on the Continent during the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, and part of the nineteenth century in criminal matters, and now

indignantly abandoned by all the States of Europe. The reason of this universal indignation is plain. By the "inquisitorial method," as has long been proved, we are practically never in a position to discover the real or psychological truth of a case; or as the Germans well call it, the *materielle Wahrheit.* Consequently judges employing the inquisitorial method can very seldom, if ever, find the truth, and thus are obliged to commit the gravest blunders and crimes of miscarriage of justice. The same miscarriage of historical truth is arising, we here contend, from the application of the inquisitorial method to questions of ancient history, at the hands of the above scholars.[1]

The first of the preceding two statements, requiring, as it does, more elaborate discussion, and depending to a certain extent on the second, will form the second part, or B, of this chapter. In part A we shall inquire into

1. What the "inquisitorial method" consisted in?
2. Why this method, long abolished in courts of Law, is still in use in courts of Historiography?

A

I. *The Essence of the Inquisitorial Method*

The essence of the criminal procedure rife in the continental courts of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and

[1] It is important to remind the reader that amongst English and French scholars Lycurgus has always found a number of staunch supporters. Grote (1846), Bazin (1885), Duruy and others continue to believe in the historical existence of Lycurgus. So do among the Germans, Duncker, Curtius, Hermann (editor of *Staatsalterthümer*), Holm, and a few minor writers. Toepffer, a Russian, admits the historicity of Lycurgus, but in a curiously modified fashion. At the present moment (1905) no aspirant for a "post" in Germany would dare to declare publicly his belief in the historicity of Lycurgus. This the author ventures to maintain from personal knowledge acquired in Germany.

eighteenth centuries consists in the fact that the judge was considered to be, and actually was, both judge and lawyer, juror (or jury) and party, prosecutor and attorney. In the modern procedure in criminal cases, the person accused, his defender, the jury, and the judge are separated from one another in the most distinct manner; in the age of the inquisitorial procedure, three of these four factors of a just trial were all confounded in one, in the judge. He started the trial; he continued and conducted it; he terminated it by his judgment. He "collected" the incriminating as well as the exonerating facts.[1] This meant, by implication, and as a matter of fact, that in those times there was no publicity whatever in criminal trials. Everything was arranged *in camera*; by written minutes; without any possible control of the "public voice." The judge, being given boundless power, and being subject to no check, naturally abused his position. His office was one depending on the Prince alone. The Prince was an absolutist ruler who, naturally enough, more than countenanced a class of public servants, the judges, who by their unlimited power as keepers of the peace could not but increase his prestige and authority. The judges, appointed for life, were learned pedants who knew very little of life. Yet they speedily became aware that their position was one of immense authority. To increase this authority; to supplement their meagre salaries by an augmentation of class-pride, was their natural and inevitable ambition. This they could do only by appropriating the whole of criminal

[1] Birkmeyer, Karl, *Deutsches Strafprocessrecht* (Berlin, 1898), p. 139, quoting especially the criminal code (*Halsgerichtsordnung*) of Emperor Joseph I dated 1707.

justice to themselves. Civil contentions must always depend on the initiative of private parties. But once, in criminal matters, the inquisitorial principle is admitted, accusations and trials are entirely dependent on the initiative of appointed and bureaucratic judges. If, however, the whole of criminal jurisdiction was to be in the hands of the judges, then criminal procedure must needs assume an aspect radically different from what we moderns are used to. In our own times, thanks to the spread of more equitable civic institutions, the criminal procedure of most European and American nations is based on two principles; in form, on absolute Publicity; in matter, on the desire to arrive at a knowledge of what had *really* happened in each case. It is unnecessary to show in detail that neither of these great principles was considered expeditious in the age of the inquisitorial principle. On the contrary, the judges then absolutely precluded publicity, and were opposed to any procedure guaranteeing the discovery of the real truth of the case. In lieu of our modern, or psychological, way of getting at the real fact, at the real perpetrators of the crime, and at the real responsibility; the Continental judges of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth (largely also of the nineteenth) centuries were bent on establishing only *formal* truth, or bureaucratic truth. Accordingly, they indulged in an endless array of *praesumptiones* and *praeclusiones*, based on a most intricate system of *Indicia*.[1] Truth was divided into half-truths and quarter-truths, in order to deduce

[1] See, for instance, in the *Peinliche Gerichtsordnung* of Emperor Charles V., ed. J. Kohler and W. Scheel (1900) (or *Constitutio Criminalis Carolina*, also quoted as C.C.C.), the articles 5, 6, 8, 11, 18-44, 131, 143, 144, 183, 184, 185, 201. Compare Martin, Christoph, *Lehrbuch des Teutschen gemeinen Criminal-Processes* (Heidelberg, 1836), §§ 74, 91, 148.

from the deposition of one witness the presumption of "partial" truth.[1] Witnesses were listened to with indifference, or altogether neglected; and the main object of the judge was to prevail upon the accused himself, by all descriptions of insinuations, ruses, menaces, and bodily tortures, to confess to the guilt which he, the judge, had once made up his mind to assume as undoubted. Psychological methods, by which the real truth can so frequently be established much more fully and rapidly than by the "frontal attacks" or direct evidence of documents and *corpora delicti*, were absolutely rejected. The most complete arbitrariness became the rule in the administration of criminal justice.

There is little doubt that the horrors of the most infamous abuse of law and justice ever perpetrated by the people, or rather the judges of Europe, *i.e.* the witch-trials of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries of our era, were practically owing to the establishment of the "learned judges" (*gelehrte Richter*) in those ages. The bewildering story of those witch-trials has exercised a strange and profound fascination over the minds of hundreds of scholars who have attempted to account for what now appears to us an inconceivable "aberration" of the human mind.[2] For it must never be forgotten that

[1] See the noble passage in Cujacius, *Recitationes solemnes in libr. IX. Codicis* (*Opera*, Modena, 1781, vol. ix. col. 1313, A): ". . . *ut veritas, ita probatio scindi non potest; quae non est plena veritas, est plane falsitas, non semiveritas.*" Cujacius, of course, expresses the true spirit of Roman Law.

[2] For a great number of general histories and local monographs on witch-trials see Jaussen, Johannes, *Geschichte des deutschen Volkes*, vol. viii. (1894), pp. 494-694; Lea, Henry Charles, *Histoire de l'Inquisition au moyen âge* (French ed. by S. Reinach), vol. iii. pp. 589-660 (pp. 492-549 of the English original). See also Hansen, Josef, *Zauberwahn, Inquisition, u. d. Entstehung d. gross. Hexenprocesse im Mittelalter* (Munich, 1900); by the same author

witch-trials *en masse* were quite unknown to, and witch-trials in single cases exceedingly rare in, the Middle Ages proper; and that the classical age of witch-trials *en masse* must be placed from about 1550 to 1650. During those unfortunate years, and in Catholic countries as well as in Protestant ones, hundreds of thousands of wretched women of all ages and ranks; women of 80, as well as girls of six or ten years of age, were fiendishly tortured, and then publicly burned as witches, that is, for sins that, as we know, they could not have committed. Even at this distance of time it is impossible to read the acts of witch-trials without a feeling of uncontrollable fury and despair at the cruelty, folly, and ignorance of a time when such abominable crimes were committed in the name of justice. No slave was ever so abjectly treated by a Greek or a Roman; and it passes comprehension how we moderns ever dare to reproach the ancients with their toleration of slavery. It must be added that neither the Greeks nor the Romans ever had "learned judges" appointed for life.

A careful study of the rise and spread of the "learned judges," first in the Italian principalities, then in France and Germany, etc., will clearly show the intimate correlation between such judges and the excesses of the inquisitorial procedure. The simple fact is that, for instance, the craze for witch-trials in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was created

there is a bulky work on the *Quellen* of the same subject (Bonn, 1901, 703 pp.). M. Yve-Plessis, R., has published a valuable *Bibliographie* of French witchcraft and witch-trials (Paris, 1900). The incredible fury of the belief in witchcraft from the sixteenth century onwards has been traced even to the narcotic influence of the *solanaceae* (nightshade and potato) introduced after the discovery of America into Europe.

and sedulously fostered by the new or "learned" judges, who thereby acquired a power such as no other un-military, poor, and *bourgeois* Estate could then possibly acquire. Playing, as they did, on the ever-present prejudices and superstitions of the people; introducing, with the help of the absolutist princes, a method of procedure that combined apparent erudition with an imposing show of intellectual refinement and subtlety, let alone disinterestedness; the judges worked unremittingly and relentlessly until they completed the most gigantic fabric of legal fraud and lust of power ever reared by the demoniac and ruthless forces of class-ambition.[1] It was they who spread the use of the torture on the strength of mere *indicia*, that is, of purely arbitrary assumptions of truth, and as a means of finding truth; although they themselves, as judges in civil matters, constantly taught the validity of the *exceptio quod metus causa*, or the nullity of contracts brought about by intimidation. In some countries the use of the torture as a means of discovering truth in criminal matters was not forbidden before well in the nineteenth century;[2]

[1] It is customary to look upon Machiavelli's *Principe* as a code of unscrupulous political ambition. The observant student of the following leading works of "criminal" jurists from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries will find Machiavelli's Borgia a weak-kneed sentimentalist beside the judges who took their legal inspiration (read: the means of gratifying their boundless class-ambition) from works such as the *Practica causarum criminalium* (Lyons, 1538) of Hippolytus de Marsiliis; *Sententiarum receptarum liber V.* of Julius Clarus (died 1575); *Praxis et theoria criminum* of Prosper Farinacius (died 1613); *Praxis rerum criminalium* (Antwerp, 1554) of Jodocus Damhouder; and the *Practica nova Imperialis Saxonica rerum criminalium* of the (in-)famous Carpzovius (first half of the seventeenth century).

[2] The torture was abolished in Bavaria by the "secret" decree of July 7, 1806; in Hanover, in 1822; in Gotha, in 1828. Birkmeyer, *l.c.*, p. 820, n. 30. Up to the time of its abolition in these countries, the torture was in actual use in criminal matters, *id. ib.*

and so terrible was the authority of the judges that neither Leibniz nor Spinoza, neither Pascal nor Pierre Bayle, nor any other intellectual "leader" of humanity in those times dared to criticise their inhuman and absurd procedure. The noble men who did openly challenge the justice of witch-trials and the torture were Jesuits (Fathers Spee and Tanner), and a few doctors and jurists (Wierius, Poncinibius, Beccaria, Thomasius, etc.).

This is not the place to give a connected history of criminal law since the Reformation. We shall find room and occasion for this important and deeply interesting subject in another volume of the present work. What we are mainly anxious to point out here is the psychological connection between the social and civic status of the judges in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and their method of procedure. We maintain that, given the then all but universal absolutism of the princes; given the bureaucratic nature both of a judge's previous education and subsequent mode of life; the rise of an inquisitorial procedure became inevitable. In England, all judges, or practically all, are late barristers; that is, men who have gone through the bracing conflict with the realities of life. On the Continent, to the present day the careers of judges and lawyers are quite distinct from the outset. The judge is invariably a man who, after purely theoretic studies at a college and at a university, is at once placed in a tribunal, there to judge, first on minor and then, in due course, on graver matters. His whole bringing-up is bureaucratic, and has never been tempered nor vitalised by personal experiences of life's real issues. To such an academic judge a pedantic and hypersystematic code

is absolutely indispensable. Without such a code he is practically lost. In him is none of that spontaneous insight into jural relations that is much aided indeed by a proper code, but can be quickened into real knowledge by contact with unofficialised life alone. He may be very logical and very systematic; he can never be a true jurist, in the sense of a Roman jurist. Unless organised public opinion, or a parliament, or some other estate of the commonwealth constantly control or check such a body of judges, the latter must sooner or later inevitably arrive at a stage where they will, in the paramount interest of their class, evolve that pernicious procedure which in criminal law is called the inquisitorial method. They will more and more indulge in insinuations levelled at every word of the "accused"; they will by assumptions and *praesumptiones*, finely chopped into subtle arrows of indirect calumny, discredit everything in favour, and aggrandise everything in condemnation of their unfortunate victim. Their *amour-propre* is so deeply engaged in each case that (as we have seen lately in the famous case of the supposititious child in Berlin, or in the Ofenheim case in Vienna) the judge or the public prosecutor, both equally bureaucrats, will lose all self-control, will eventually, even in our times, bully the jury, menace the press, and bandy threats right and left in order to make their case.

All this is inevitable; it follows from the constitution of Continental judges from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century (and sporadically even to-day) with psychological necessity. A man cannot possibly be judge, lawyer, and jury in one person all at a time. If he tries to do it, he will do it badly,

wickedly; for he will naturally efface the "lawyer" and "jury" in him in order to glorify the "judge," *i.e.* himself. The method by which this obliteration of justice is effected is the inquisitorial procedure. This method, while apparently keeping up the semblance of a fair discharge of duty as a "lawyer" and a "jury," yet destroys it, leaving in the field nothing but the arbitrary, ambitious, and sophisticated judge.

II. *The Inquisitorial Procedure in Modern Erudition*

It will now be, we trust, quite comprehensible why the inquisitorial procedure, long expelled from modern courts of justice, has nestled itself comfortably, more particularly in Germany, in the courts of modern historiography, theology, philology, and other branches of erudition proper. On the Continent such studies are almost exclusively in the hands of bureaucrats proper. In Germany, for instance, there has never been an historian of the greatness of a Macaulay, Grote, Buckle, or Lecky, recruited from among private gentlemen. They are all professors proper; that is, bureaucrats rising from the status of *Privatdocenten* or *agrégés* to that of *Professor extraordinarius* or *ordinarius*, appointed for life, and salaried by the State. As a rule, or to speak frankly, in 95 per cent of the cases the young historian or theologian on the Continent becomes a teacher or professor of his subject after an exclusively academic course of studies from books. Although as an historian he constantly treats of States, ministers, treaties, parliaments, churches, councils, law, nations,

women, ranks, classes, personalities, and all the other *dramatis personae* of history, he has never acquired any first-hand knowledge of the endless variety of types implied in these general terms. Real life is known to him in the abstract only ; or in a few poor concrete aspects. He thus stands to life proper in exactly the same relation that the former judges held to society. He does not know it. Yet he is called upon to pronounce on life, past or present, to analyse it, to lecture and write on it. Since he is by education unable to handle the methods of *materielle Wahrheit*, or objective truth, such methods requiring long contact and conflict with real life proper, he naturally inclines to methods making for *formelle Wahrheit*, this being fully within his reach. The psychological method, which alone can help us to find out the inwardness of events or institutions historical and theological, he must needs discard. He cannot wield it. Hence he discredits it; he stamps it as *dilettantic*, *unwissenschaftlich*, *sans méthode*, etc. There being, moreover, no organised public opinion, nor a parliament, nor any other powerful body to control the doings of the erudite professoriate, most of the Continental professors of history and theology, and many of their replicas in England and America, are legally, socially, and, chief of all, psychologically in the *état d'âme* of the criminal judges between the Reformation and the French Revolution. The *état d'âme* being the same, the method and procedure is also the same. True, there is much mutual criticism of professorial works on history and theology. Unfortunately, however, that criticism is practised by—other professors, or by bureaucrats who in their essential mental habitus and

resources are quite on a line with the professors they criticise.[1]

It is therefore a mere repetition of the story of the modern criminal judges previous to the French Revolution, when in most contemporary works on ancient history the method of inquisitorial procedure is applied in order to "solve" problems, the real solution of which can be obtained only by means of the psychological method outlined in the *Introduction* to the present work. The principal engine of most of modern "higher criticism" applied to ancient history is the proof *per indicia*, that is, by arbitrary assumptions. In addition to this, and intimately allied with it, is the other chief characteristic of the inquisitorial procedure, a trait that we prefer to characterise in the words of a contemporary German professor of Law. He says of the inquisitorial procedure that one of the most characteristic features of that procedure was the attitude of the judge to the accused as the judge's principal "source" of information about the crime. "The accused, the inquisitorial judge held, is worth more than witnesses and experts; more by far than any other mode of evidence; the accused himself can

[1] During the last six to seven years an animated discussion has been proceeding in Germany with regard to the true method of history. In the very numerous writings of Proff. Lamprecht, Below, Eduard Meyer, and others, the most conflicting views are broached. In one point, however, all the professors agree: in their total silence about the psychological requirements for the handling of methods making for the discovery of *materielle Wahrheit* in history. These primary requirements are chiefly extensive travels, long sojourn in different countries, and intimate contact and personal conflict with different nations, classes, professions in Europe, America, and Asia. Without such travels, sojourns, and conflicts during one's susceptible years, nobody will ever clear up his *Oberbegriffe*, or leading concepts, without which he cannot properly state the least important event of the history of Montenegro, let alone of Athens. The strength of the "exact sciences" is precisely in their firmly outlined and "true" *Oberbegriffe*, such as line, surface, triangle, inertia, gravitation, attraction, etc.

best instruct the judge about the truth or untruth of the accusation—provided he (the accused) is disposed to honour truth by recognising it. Accordingly, the accused is declared to be legally obliged to declare the truth, and the judge is provided with all the means of enforcing the fulfilment of this legal duty. The extreme means by which the accused was compelled to reveal truthfully the real facts of the case were the torture, the penalties for lying, the oath. But even when, later on, it was recognised that those means were reprehensible and ought to be discarded, it was still held admissible that the 'inquiring' judge shall try to obtain a confession from the accused by way of ruses and intimidation."[1]

It will be our chief object in this chapter to show that in the classical case of Lycurgus the great majority of German and French arm-chair historians have proceeded exactly on the lines of the principle just stated and dear to the judges of the age of the inquisitorial procedure. The accused — in this case Lycurgus — alone is pressed, harassed, twitted, bullied, or flattered. Witnesses of the first order are haughtily ignored; the evident conclusions of experts, or inferences from certain facts independent of

[1] Birkmeyer, Karl, *Deutsches Strafprocessrecht* (1898), p. 141 :—
Für die richterliche Wahrheitsforschung erscheint der Beschuldigte selbst als die vorzüglichste Erkenntnisquelle. Er ist besser, denn Zeugen und Sachverständige, besser denn jedes andere Beweismittel, im Stande, den Richter über die Wahrheit oder Unwahrheit der Anschuldigung zu informieren, —wenn er nur bereit ist der Wahrheit die Ehre zu geben. Hiezu wird er aber ebendeswegen für juristisch verpflichtet erklärt, während der Richter die nöthigen Mittel in die Hand bekommt, um die Erfüllung dieser Rechtspflicht zu erzwingen. Die Folter, die Lügenstrafen, der Eid waren die extremsten Mittel, um den Beschuldigten zu wahrheitsgemässer Aussage zu nöthigen. Aber auch nachdem sie als verwerflich erkannt waren, hielt man es noch für zulässig, dass der inquirirende Richter durch Ueberlistung und Einschüchterung des Beschuldigten ein Geständniss von demselben zu erlangen suche.

Lycurgus, are contemptuously laid aside or left unnoticed. All the numerous modes of evidence leading to *materielle Wahrheit* are dismissed with a sneer. "Lycurgus *is* a myth." "Mrs. Friedl *is* a witch." That must be proved; is proved; cannot but be true; for the *amour-propre* of the judge so wants it. But Mrs. Friedl, asked to confess to some act of witchery committed on June 25, at five o'clock P.M., at Strassburg, is able to prove an *alibi*; that is, that at that very moment she was at a place fifty miles from Strassburg. "*Alibi*," exclaims the judge, with a sneer; "*alibi*? Can witches not be in two places at the same time? If they can bewitch man, cannot they also bewitch Space? Have not Bodinus, Delrio, Zanger, Damhouder, Clarus, etc. etc. said they could?" "Lycurgus is a myth; a 'god.'" Does not Herodotus say that the Spartans built a temple for the worship of Lycurgus?[1] It is indeed true that the same Herodotus who visited Sparta and who mentions the temple erected in honour of Lycurgus, speaks of Lycurgus as of a "prominent man," δοκίμου ἀνδρός.[2] It is likewise true that the Athenians erected a temple to Sophocles, worshipping him after his death by the name of Dexion.[3] Nor can it be

[1] Herodotus, i. 66, where it is said that the Spartans built Lycurgus after his death a ἱρόν, or sanctuary. Annual sacrifices were offered at the "shrine," of which Plutarch says that they were meant as offerings to a god (ὡς θεῷ, *Lycurgus*, 31), whereas Nicolaus Damascenus says as to a hero (ὡς ἥρωι, *Frgm. Hist. Graec.* iii. 390).

[2] Herodotus, i. 65, Λυκούργου, τῶν Σπαρτιητέων δοκίμου ἀνδρός, ἐλθόντός ἐς Δελφούς, etc.

[3] This had been known long before from the so-called *Etymologicum Magnum*, *s.v.*, Δεξίων; now an inscription has been found (published in Michel, Ch., *Recueil d'inscriptions grecques* (1898-1900), No. 966, p. 761, and in Dittenberger's *Sylloge Inscript. Graecarum*[2] (1900), vol. ii. p. 562, No. 725), on which Sophocles appears as a divinity, the cult of which was practised by one of the numerous ὀργεῶνες.

denied that the Lacedaemonians, according to an express statement of Aristotle, were in the habit of calling a great man a "divine man."[1] It is, furthermore, well known that the Greeks at all times honoured great men by what we should call religious worship, the hero-worship of the Greeks being a religious act, and many a hero being first worshipped as a hero and subsequently as a god. The Thessalians crossed over every year to the Troas to celebrate there, with religious cults, the memory of Achilles. Brasidas, the great Spartan general, was worshipped, as we learn from Thucydides,[2] as a hero or semi-divine person by the citizens of Amphipolis; and Lysander was at once deified by numerous Greek city-states. All this is well known, not to say elementary. Yet the *heroon* built in honour of Lycurgus must necessarily have been a temple proper; a temple for a god; because "Lycurgus was a god." It is in vain that believers in the historicity of Lycurgus say: Could (and does) not the passage in Herodotus simply mean that the Spartans honoured Lycurgus, as the Chersonesians honoured Miltiades,[3] or the Egestaeans the beautiful Philippus of Crotona, by raising them a *hieron*, a sanctuary?[4] Is it not certain that "deification" of famous persons was one of the commonest traits of the Greeks?[5] It is; but all

[1] Aristotle, *Ethic. Nicomach.* p. 1145 a 27 (chap. vii. 1, 3): *ἐπεὶ δὲ σπάνιον καὶ τὸ θεῖον ἄνδρα εἶναι, καθάπερ οἱ Λάκωνες εἰώθασι προσαγορεύειν, ὅταν ἀγασθῶσι σφόδρα του (σεῖος ἀνήρ φασιν), οὕτω καὶ ὁ θηριώδης ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις σπάνιος.* See also, to the same effect, Plato, *Menon* 41 (p. 99 D).

[2] Thucydides, v. 11, *καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν οἱ Ἀμφιπολῖται, περιείρξαντες αὐτοῦ τὸ μνημεῖον, ὡς ἥρῳ τε ἐντέμνουσι καὶ τιμὰς δεδώκασιν ἀγῶνας καὶ ἐτησίους θυσίας.*

[3] Herodotus, vi. 38.

[4] *Id.* v. 47.

[5] See the well-known "handbooks" of Greek antiquities, such as Hermann's, Iwan Müller's (*Griechische Kultusaltertümer* by P. Stengel; [2]1898, pp. 124 *seq.*); and especially Rohde's *Psyche*,[2] i. pp. 146 *seq.*, ii. pp. 348 *seq.*

this conclusive evidence must be pushed aside, because it has not been derived from Lycurgus himself, *i.e.* from passages dealing directly with Lycurgus. If witnesses contradict the main thesis (the mythical character of Lycurgus), then the modern philological historian will say of them, what the judge in the witch-trial case of the mother of Kepler said (see above, p. 170):—*est enim prudentis providique judicis, testium dicta conciliare, ut valeant potius quam pereant!* meaning that all facts militating against the myth-theory of Lycurgus must be ignored.

And why indeed should the modern mythifiers of Lycurgus not ignore evidence taken from the somewhat obscure cults of the Greeks, since they ignore in this matter the greatest names, the most trustworthy witnesses that any fair judge can wish to hear? We mean that the explicit testimony of Plato, Aristotle, and Xenophon is absolutely ignored by the scholars who teach that Lycurgus was a myth. It is undoubted, and needs no corroborating quotation, that Plato, Aristotle, and Xenophon repeatedly, and to the exclusion of all doubt, ascribe the Spartan constitution in its essence to the genius of one man, called Lycurgus. Aristotle is so deeply convinced of the fact that Lycurgus and Lycurgus alone *made* the Spartan constitution that he, although necessarily aware of the worship of the law-giver at Sparta, yet reproaches the Spartans with having honoured the great man too little.[1] Let us now first consider Aristotle.

It is quite conceivable that Aristotle's authority in matters either of philosophy or natural science can

[1] Plutarch, *Lycurgus*, 31. 4.

legitimately be doubted. It is not impossible to assume that philosophers have, in the two thousand years since Aristotle, partially digested and eventually improved upon his powerful thought. It is not unlikely that on some points of philosophy we have now better knowledge than he had. It cannot be maintained that the authority of the great Stagirite in matters of natural science is equal to, let alone superior to that of Newton, Darwin, or Lord Kelvin. If in a modern treatise on biology the opinions of Aristotle are ignored, it is not quite unlikely, although far from certain, that such a neglect of the views of Aristotle does not necessarily entail a serious loss. The modern biologist must not, it would seem, incur blame for setting aside the *De Partibus Animalium*. It would be even so with Aristotle's opinions on Greek polities, their growth and decay, did our knowledge of ancient polities surpass that of Aristotle as much as does our information about institutions of vegetable or animal nature. However, there can be no possible doubt that our information about the incredible variety of Greek institutions and Greek constitutional life is incomparably more limited than was that of Aristotle. We pertinently know that Aristotle collected in two most extensive works, first all the facts representing no less than 158 different constitutions of Greek city-states,[1] describing each of them in full detail, historically and statistically, on the basis of contemporary observation and literature;[2] then the constitutional laws of non-Greek States

[1] At any rate 158 books of πολιτεῖαι, which, with the exception of a few fragments and of most of the section on Athens (see note 2), are lost.

[2] It is well known that in 1890 Dr. Kenyon of the British Museum was able to publish one of the above πολιτεῖαι, that treating of Athens.

(*νόμιμα βαρβαρικά*) of his time, together with other researches of a similar nature (*δικαιώματα περὶ τόπων*); and as if to exhaust the study of Greek political institutions both inductively and deductively, he wrote his great treatise on Politics, consisting of eight books of *πολιτικά*, the most suggestive, the most famous, and the most extensively studied work ever published on practical politics. It is, as may be seen, out of the question to credit any modern writer on Greek constitutions with anything like the equipment of facts and information possessed by Aristotle on that subject. And when we take into consideration that in addition to this grave deficiency of facts we are, by the utter dissimilarity of our modern polities from those of the Greeks, little if at all adapted to comprehend their peculiar structure and life, whereas Aristotle still lived in the atmosphere of vigorous Greek city-states, we cannot possibly suppose that Aristotle was more likely to go astray about the fundamental character of a Greek city-state than will modern writers. To put it plainly, it is absurd to assume that Aristotle did not know better than we can ever hope to know where a Greek city-state really came from; whether it was slowly "evolved" or made; whether one "founder" could or could not so deeply influence its vital organs as to be practically its creator. One may very well criticise and improve upon Plato's politics, in that Plato deals with polities as they ought to be, with laws *de lege ferenda*. But how we shall manage to correct Aristotle on the essentials of the practical constitutional law of Greek city-states, this is more than an unprejudiced mind can grasp.

Nevertheless, for completeness' sake, we may admit

that although Aristotle in Greek politics had infinitely more material to work from, and although he ranks amongst the greatest geniuses as to powers of generalisation, yet it is necessary to question even *his* general statements about Greek constitutions. We must concede, at any rate, that it is quite inadmissible both to acquiesce blindly in, or ride rough-shod over Aristotle's belief in Lycurgus as the sole founder of the Spartan State. If we do not want to accept his view of Lycurgus, we are yet bound to discuss it; to refute it; to show why and how Aristotle accepted a view that we are unable to recognise; in what particular manner, assumption, or idea of his he committed the mistake which we mean to avoid. But not to discuss Aristotle at all; not to heed his repeated and most explicit statements about Lycurgus as the creator of the Spartan State; that is precisely what the inquisitorial judges did with witnesses testifying adversely to their preconceived opinion. Those judges, as we have seen, simply ignored unpleasant witnesses; they did not refute them at all; they rejected them off-hand.

In none of the numerous works written on the problem of Lycurgus by scholars denying the historicity of the Spartan law-giver is there a trace of an elaborate discussion of Aristotle's belief in Lycurgus. Aristotle does not count; he is not refuted, he is rejected. So is, of course, Plato; nor is Xenophon taken more seriously. And since *all* known ancient writers unanimously concur in the opinion that the essentials of the Spartan constitution were made by one great law-giver,[1] the modern "critical school"

[1] It is superfluous to multiply quotations about Lycurgus's having been considered to be "the" law-giver of Sparta. Pindar and Hellanicus alone of

ignores all of them, just as did the inquisitorial judges with regard to all the writings disproving the existence of witches. It is scarcely necessary to add that the opinion of Plutarch in this matter has never been taken seriously by modern "higher critics." The incomparable works of the sage of Chaeronea are still disfigured by the foot-notes of men in no wise fit to understand the mellow wisdom of a mind so rich, so deep, so experienced, and so graceful. They consider him as a big child, or as an "omniscient" compilator. This is octavo-wise and folio-foolish. It is, in fact, this preposterous attitude of most philologians to the great writers of the Greeks that is, in addition to lack of ample experience, at the bottom of their incapacity to comprehend those great authors. They treat, as the inquisitorial judges did the accused and the witnesses, every writer or thinker of the ancients with contempt. Homer is a fraud; Herodotus a liar; Plutarch a prattler; Pausanias a plagiarist. Plato does not know that foreign policy is much more important (in a Greek State!) than home-institutions;[1] and Socrates' belief in his *daimon* is on a level with counting one's buttons to come to a decision.[2]

The "higher critics" of antiquity, without examination and disdainfully rejecting, as they do, the testimony of Aristotle, Plato, Xenophon, Plutarch, and all the other thinkers and historians of the Greeks, have

all the ancients ascribe the Spartan constitution to the mythical King Aigimios and to the Kings Procles and Eurysthenes respectively. In both cases, it will be noticed, the ancients differ from the modern critical school most essentially, in that they do not, as do the moderns, object to the Spartan constitution having been founded by one man, or by two contemporaneous rulers, but only to the names of these law-givers.

[1] Meyer, Eduard, *Geschichte des Alterthums*, vol. v. (1902), § 922, pp. 367, 368.

[2] *Id. ib.* vol. iv. (1901), § 623 *s.f.*, pp. 452, 453.

naturally not paid the slightest attention to the opinions of many a modern thinker on Lycurgus. Amongst these are men like Descartes, the Abbé Galiani, Napoleon, Grote, and others. Not one of them, it is true, was a philologian. Yet some authority might attach to the views of men who, like Descartes and Galiani, had drunk deep both at the sources of reality and from the founts of scientific thought; or who, like Napoleon, were makers of history on the grandest scale; or, like Grote, men practically conversant both with the greatest constitution of modern times and with the works of the ancients. Descartes, after having spent much of his youth in what was then the intellectual and political centre of Europe,—in Paris,—took part, deliberately, and with the purpose of enlarging his real knowledge of life, in the Thirty Years' War; observing men and their institutions at the critical moment of an immense crisis, when the true trend and purport of social and political measures and laws become manifest even to the superficial observer. To this, Descartes added a scientific mind so "true" in all its joints and sinews that he has long been recognised as the father of modern scientific thinking, not only by method, as was Bacon, but also by example. This great thinker (1596-1650), in the most important of his works, makes the following remark on Lycurgus:—

. . . *Ainsi je m'imaginai que les peuples qui, ayant été autrefois demi-sauvages, et ne s'étant civilisés que peu à peu, n'ont fait leur lois qu'à mesure que l'incommodité des crimes et des querelles les y a contraints, ne sauroient être si bien policés que ceux qui, dès le commencement qu'ils se sont assemblés, ont observé les constitutions de quelque*

prudent législateur. Comme il est bien certain que l'état de la vraie religion, dont Dieu seul a fait les ordonnances, doit être incomparablement mieux réglé que tous les autres. Et, pour parler des choses humaines, je crois que si Sparte a été autrefois très florissante, ce n'a pas été à cause de la bonté de chacune de ses lois en particulier, vu que plusieurs étoient fort étranges et même contraires aux bonnes mœurs, mais à cause que, n'ayant été inventées que par un seul, elles tendoient toutes à même fin.[1]

The Abbé Galiani (1728-1787) whose every word, dropped in the famous *bureaux d'esprit* of France, was at once eagerly taken up by the scholars and the intellectual aristocracy of Europe, and whose writings on economics, antiquities, and ancient literature are valued to the present day both for their exquisite form and the profundity of their substance; he, the intimate friend of Diderot and the Encyclopaedists, has, fortunately for us, left us a goodly number of letters. Although equally gifted for literary work, he yet responded perhaps more readily to the greater stimulant of conversation and correspondence; so that his letters abound in casual remarks which, in spite of their extreme brevity, contain judgments of inestimable value on history and human institutions. In his lifetime the greatest monarchs were anxious to receive a letter from him; and even now his correspondence ranks among the few books that afford as much pleasure by their perfect taste as

[1] Descartes, *Discours de la méthode*, 2e partie, "*Principales règles de la méthode*," the first paragraph (*Œuvres philosophiques*, ed. Aimé-Martin, Paris, 1838, p. 37, a). In these few weighty words, Descartes fully states both the true nature of a classical city-state and the fact that the Roman Catholic Church is essentially a classical State.

ample food for thought by their depth of insight. In one of his letters to Madame d'Épinay, dated Naples, November 6, 1773, he says :—

Vous me faites des questions politiques et métaphysiques qui demanderaient un volume pour y satisfaire. Dieu sait donc si j'y répondrai. Mais, assurément, je vous dirai que vous avez raison quand vous soutenez que la politique des anciens ne peut plus nous être bonne à rien. La nôtre doit être très différente. A quelques théories générales près, qui sont restées les mêmes, tout a changé; les détails sont différents. Or, les théories générales et rien sont à peu près la même chose . . . Lycurgue et Solon ne ressemblent qu'à saint François, à saint Ignace (de Loyola), *à saint Dominique; ils n'ont rien de commun avec Mazarin, Colbert, Richelieu, le czar Pierre, Victor-Amadée, Georges II., Frédéric. C'est dans ces ordres religieux et ces petites républiques que la politique est la science de l'éducation un peu plus en grand. Dans les grandes républiques, c'est autre chose.*[1]

By a decree of May 10, 1806, Napoleon declared that he wanted an *Imperial University* to be established. In the report on that measure, Fourcroy, the *Directeur* of Public Instruction, says that "His Majesty wanted to carry out in a State of forty million people what had been possessed by Sparta and Athens, and what had been incompletely done by the religious orders." It will be noticed that the great monarch here distinctly places himself

[1] Galiani (l'Abbé Ferdinand), *Correspondance*, ed. L. Perey and G. Maugras (Paris, 1889, tome ii. p. 275). Galiani's comparison of Lycurgus with St. Ignatius is, as will be seen subsequently, one of the most suggestive of his thoughts.

in the position of Lycurgus, deeming it a feasible and probable thing; he, moreover, clearly parallelises Lycurgus with the founders of the religious orders.

Finally, Grote (and so also Holm) fully recognises the historicity of Lycurgus.

In adducing the preceding names of great men of thought or action, we do not mean to have considerably strengthened our arguments in favour of Lycurgus as the sole founder of the Spartan constitution. All that we mean to imply at this preliminary stage of our examination of the problem of Lycurgus is the necessity of paying to the opinions and, as it were, depositions of "witnesses" so eminent the attention that, in modern times, is invariably granted to witnesses of infinitely lesser importance. Rather than simply ignore men like Aristotle, Descartes, or Galiani, we must well consider whether these men, and more particularly Aristotle, did not have some special reasons for their belief in Lycurgus as the exclusive founder of the essentials of the Spartan State. Surely, if we must examine at length, as we shall, the conflicting and evidently arbitrary opinions of modern philologians, we cannot, in common fairness, reject a consideration of Aristotle's views. We said "arbitrary." It is indeed, as it always was with the inquisitorial judges, a mere arbitrary statement that is the fundamental and exclusive argument of the mythifiers of Lycurgus. They say that it is absurd to assume that one man can found and establish an entire State. Not one of their remaining arguments is of consequence either to them or to others, since they are in hopeless contradiction on nearly every other point bearing on the question, as will be seen in the course of the discussion. There

is amongst them unanimity neither on the date of the Spartan constitution, nor on that of the rise of the ephorate; neither on the *rhetrae* or the official documents embodying much of the Spartan constitution and preserved in a poem by Tyrtaeus of the seventh century B.C., nor on the position or "evolution" of the ἀγωγή, or the Spartan system of education. On one point alone Wilamowitz agrees with Eduard Meyer and Busolt; and that is the "absurdity" of assuming the possibility of the thing they want to disprove. In another work the author has shown the extensive use, or rather abuse, made by "higher critics" and their spiritual forebears on the benches of seventeenth-century criminal jurisdiction, of the bald category of the Possible and its converse the Impossible.[1] The historian, daily confronted with the most unexpected phenomena of the most absurd of powers, the human heart, cannot afford to rush to the armoury of a category that must by its very nature always remain sterile. In England it is a usual argument of men unused to the methods of history to advance, as a "striking" example of the futility of general views, the argument regarding Cromwell's intended emigration to America. Had Cromwell, it is said, not been prevented from emigrating, the whole of English history would have been different. The arguers of this description conveniently forget that if it be allowable to indulge in such arguments taken from mere formal possibility, then it is certainly allowable to retort: "Granted that English history would have turned out quite different from what it has, had Cromwell in his youth emigrated

[1] Reich, Emil, *The Failure of the Higher Criticism of the Bible* (1905), pp. 112 *seq.*

to America; can any one prove that Cromwell, after ten years' stay in America, would not have returned to England strengthened and better equipped, through strenuous life in the Colonies, for his historic task, so that his very emigrating might have made him a man greater still than he actually was, but at any rate as great?" The facility with which every argument taken from purely formal categories can be silenced at once, shows the inanity of such arguments. In history we are not justified in saying that a certain institution is impossible or absurd *per se*. We may say, it is not likely; it is not plausible; but no more. To say of the Spartan State that it could not possibly have been made by one man, is to say that there never have been States other than the modern lay States, such as Prussia, England, France, etc. Already among polities ecclesiastic, we have the most absolutely convincing evidence that they have indeed been founded by single men, and by single men only. The Society of Jesus is a polity, if Prussia is one. Not one of the essential attributes, organs, functions, or ends of a polity is wanting in the work of St. Ignatius. Could not ancient city-states have been something similar? If Loyola was able to found single-handed the mightiest ecclesiastical polity of modern times, could not a Greek *νομοθέτης* do the same? The State of Geneva was completely overhauled by Calvin, both politically, ecclesiastically, and socially. Among the city-states of mediaeval Lombardy we find more than one that handed over the entire governance and legislation of the commonwealth to one man, preferably a saintly monk.[1] And the polity of the Teutonic Knights, who,

[1] The thirteenth century A.D. opened in Lombardy with the same

in addition to the ordinary features of ecclesiastical polities, *i.e.* religious orders, added even the possession of a political territory of their own; was it not founded by one man?[1] Was not the powerful State of the Mormons founded, practically, by one man?

How, in the face of these well-known facts, a serious scholar can declare absurd the statement that Sparta was completely organised by one man, it is impossible to see. He has no right whatever to say so. He has not the shadow of justification for such a declaration.

On the contrary, we must, in view of the explicit statements of Plato, Aristotle, Xenophon, and Plutarch, and with regard to the perfect and proved feasibleness of the thing, insist on assuming that Lycurgus might very well have done what Loyola, Calvin, and Joseph Smith, of Sharon, Vermont, have done in modern times. To say, without further investigation of the point, that Lycurgus could not have done it; that he was a myth, a god, a phantom; that is quite identical with the method of the witch-finding judges of former times. They too said that a woman X. *was* a witch.

interminable and relentless local wars and civil strifes that had filled the latter half of the twelfth century. In 1233 many Lombard city-states, despairing of every other means of pacification, handed over their entire polities to single men, such as John of Vicenza, the Brother (Frater) Leo (of the Perego family), or Gerard of Modena. The latter acted as a real Lycurgus to Parma, settling the fearful civil strifes of the Parmese, recalling the exiles, and overhauling the whole constitution and civil life of the city-state quite arbitrarily. Salimbene, in his important chronicle, says: *Huic tempore illius devotionis* (the "revival" year 1233) *Parmenses totaliter dominium Parme dederunt, ut eorum esset potestas* (ruler) *et concordaret eos.*" *Chronicon* in *Monumenta hist. ad provincias Parmens. et Placentin. pertinentia*, iii. p. 37, *apud* Winkelmann, Ed., *Kaiser Friedrich II.* (*Jahrbücher d. deutsch. Gesch.*), vol. ii. (1897), p. 442.

[1] Apart from formal law, the fact is, that that famous Order was made by Hermann von Salza, who alone raised it to the rank of a sovereign, powerful State.

They never cared to investigate whether witches were possible at all? Had they done so with becoming seriousness, they could not have condemned so many hundred thousands of innocent women as witches. This, however, they never did, and for a simple reason. What they were mainly trying to secure was the officially recognised method of inquisitorial procedure, which necessarily requires the assumption of phantastical beings. Once you grant the existence of such creations of fancy, the inquisitorial judge in his sphere, as most of the philological historians in theirs, can "make a case" out of the flimsiest material. In fact, the less solid material he has, the better. It cannot have escaped the notice of persons acquainted with the literature of the subject, that the works of philological historians are increasingly large in bulk in proportion to the greater lack of direct or solid information about a given subject. On the first five centuries of Roman history we have, as to events and persons, only exceedingly few sure data. About Aeneas, for instance, we have, outside poetical descriptions, only a few statements in the ancient historians. Yet Klausen contrived to write two portentously bulky volumes on Aeneas. Schwegler succeeded in filling up a closely printed volume of over 800 pages on Roman history previous to Numa, at a time when Italic or prae-Roman Italy had been scarcely touched by the systematic spade of modern times. It was even so in the times of the witch-trials. The less real evidence there was for the assumption of acts done by witch-craft, the more easily the judge managed to increase the *indicia* of the case. *Indicia* in such a crime are mere matters of fancy; and the fancy of the judge was allowed free scope.

Where he could not lay his hands on a fact, there he created, by insinuation, the probability, the *indicia* of a fact. It is in this manner that thousands of historical persons of antiquity have been declared to be mere myths, just as thousands, and hundreds of thousands, of women were declared to be mere phantoms, that is, witches. The incredible prestige of men like F. A. Wolf, Niebuhr, and their minor followers is, psychologically, based on the fact that by their adaptation of the inquisitorial method to the study of antiquity they enabled mere bookworms and arm-chair historians to assume airs of "scientific" insight into the past, and to write big books having the appearance of *Gründlichkeit*, or solid erudition. The immense praise squandered on such men is only another form of gratitude on the part of their followers who, without the Carpzovs and Damhouders of modern inquisitorial history, could have written not a line, and obtained not the tiniest chair in a college.

If we want to examine the view of Aristotle on Lycurgus, we must either find authentic documents older than such as he had at his disposal; that is, we must proceed by methods of direct research; or, if that be impossible or unlikely, as it is, then we must try to proceed by methods of indirect investigation. In the *Introduction* to this work it was said that all scientific research is mainly a substitution of indirect for direct procedures. This applies especially to the history of antiquity, regarding which our direct documents are but too often very unsatisfactory. The indirect "sources," on the other hand, are fairly satisfactory. By a cautious use of such "sources" we are frequently enabled to supplement our incom-

plete documents. In the problem of Lycurgus we have more than one "indirect" source. We are now going to investigate these sources.

B

I

Whether Lycurgus was, or was not the sole founder of the Spartan constitution, it is, first of all, necessary to establish the chronology of that constitution. We have it on the authority of Thucydides that that constitution was in existence in the ninth century B.C.[1] However, Thucydides was a writer; and although he is a *persona gratissima* with the professors in Germany, yet it is not impossible that his testimony in this matter may, by the well-tried methods of the inquisitorial procedure, be called in question and rejected. Much that Herodotus has said on Sparta has thus been relegated to the limbo of mere "fables"; and even Thucydides might be silenced in the same way. We must therefore attempt to find a fact independent of the political opinions of any author; a fact telling its story without any comment. Such a fact is the absence of any fortifications or walls in Sparta. Thucydides himself says that Sparta was in his time like a series of small villages. Such a statement, implying as it does no theory of politics, but a mere architectural fact, must be accepted as true. Moreover, all the ancient

[1] Thucydides, i. 18. 1: ἔτη γάρ ἐστι μάλιστα τετρακόσια καὶ ὀλίγῳ πλείω ἐς τὴν τελευτὴν τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου, ἀφ' οὗ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῇ αὐτῇ πολιτείᾳ χρῶνται. The Peloponnesian war, to which Thucydides refers, ended in 404 B.C.

writers unanimously confirm the fact.[1] Finally, no traces of very old wall-masonry have ever been discovered at or round modern Sparta, although the walls of Messene, built in the fourth century B.C., are still extant in ruins.[2] Nor can it be said that mighty walls surrounding towns or castles were unknown in Greece in the supposed time of Lycurgus, in the ninth century B.C. We still have the gigantic ruins of Tiryns, of Gulas (in Boeotia), of Argos, of Mycenae, and hundreds of Cyclopean walls in Crete, Epirus, Melos, Italy, etc. etc., all dating from a period very much older than that of Lycurgus. We saw, in a previous chapter, that although Aradus, Sidon, or Tyre were situated on islands in the sea, and although the citizens of those famous polities had sea-power to a remarkable, and at times to an extraordinary extent, yet the Arvadians, for instance, ran up walls, the mighty ruins of which still fill us with amazement. Why, then, should the Spartans, alone of all nations, have neglected to fortify their town? There is, furthermore, another circumstance that must indefinitely increase our astonishment at this curious neglect. Few places have had better opportunities and greater facilities for fortifications and walls than had Sparta. The valley and plain of the Eurotas, where the Spartans fixed their abode, are, as all travellers affirm, both in point of natural

[1] Thucydides, i. 10. 3; compare Plutarch, *Apophthegmata Lacon. s. Agesilaos*, 29. On the various attempts to fortify Sparta after the death of Alexander the Great, see Frazer, J. G., *Pausanias*, vol. iii. (1898), p. 324.

[2] Frazer, J. G., *Pausanias*, vol. iii. (1898), p. 429, says: "The circuit of the walls of Messene is about five and a half miles. Large portions of them remain and are the finest specimens of Greek fortification in existence." Messene, the new town, whose majestic walls we still admire, was built on Mt. Ithome by Epaminondas in 370 B.C. and successive years. In the first century A.D. it was still an important town.

beauty and from their historical associations, one of the most interesting and beautiful spots in Europe. "In this union of luxuriant verdure with grand mountain scenery the valley of Sparta recalls the more famous but not more beautiful Granada with its green-spreading Vega, its lilac-tinted mountains basking under the bright sky of Spain, and the snowy range of the Sierra Nevada lying like a great white cloud on the southern horizon. But Taygetus towers above the spectator at Sparta as the Sierra Nevada certainly does not over the spectator at Granada. To see it on a bright day with all its superb outline—its sharp peaks and grand sweeping curves—clearly defined in the pellucid air, its long line of snowy summits glistering in the sun, and the deep purple shadows brooding on its lower slopes, is a sight not to be forgotten. A recent explorer of Greece (Mr. Philippson) has observed that of all Greek cities Sparta enjoys the most beautiful situation. So far as my experience goes, the observation is just."[1] To this exquisite beauty of its landscape the valley of the Eurotas adds, from the military standpoint, the most favourable points of vantage in the form of elevations eminently fitted for castles, fortresses, or fortifications. Considering that the valley was naturally well protected from attacks on the west by the imposing range of the Taygetus mountains, and not inconsiderably sheltered in the east by the heights of the Parnon; a well-fortified town on one of the numerous and accessible lower peaks or elevations might have indefinitely strengthened the military

[1] Frazer, J. G., *Pausanias*, vol. iii. (1898), p. 323; see also Vischer, *Erinnerungen*, quoted by Frazer, *ib.* p. 362; also *Guides-Joanne, Grèce* (1903), pp. 249 *seq.*

position of a people that did not mean to mingle, nor ever mingled with the native population of the country. From the summit of the Taygetus (now Hagios Elias) the whole of the Peloponnesus, Attica, Boeotia, and southward almost as far as Crete, can be seen on a bright day.[1] Such a commanding view is in itself a great military advantage. An hour's ride from Sparta is a considerable yet quite accessible elevation, Mistra, from where, on a clear day, a view is offered, not only enchanting in its beauty, but very important on account of its strategic advantage. From the height of Mistra one can see as far as the bay of Vatika, the canal of Cervi, and, not too indistinctly, the outlines of the isle of Cythera (Cerigo); to the north it commands part of Arcadia.[2] Nor have the strategic possibilities of Mistra been ignored by the nations who took possession of the valley of Sparta after the Spartans. The Franks, under William de Villehardouin, prince of Morea, at once seized the great strategic value of the commanding position of the elevation, and in 1250 A.D. built on it a strongly fortified place, the remarkably preserved buildings of which have made it the Rothenburg of Greece, or, still better, a "mediaeval Pompeii" (B. Haussoullier). After the Franks, the Byzantines made Mistra the capital of Laconia; and the Turks and the Venetians, who possessed it successively after the Byzantines, raised it to a town of over 40,000 inhabitants.[3] To the south of the valley of Sparta,

[1] Petermann's *Mittheilungen* (1901), p. 285, with an interesting map for the area of "visibility" in Greece from high points, Table 21.

[2] *Guides-Joanne, Grèce* (1903), p. 268, a.

[3] Compare the passage in the *Archidamus* of Isocrates where, after the hard-pressed Spartans had to send away their women and children, he urges them to select a fortified place for the continuation of the war: "ὑπολει-

and not far from it, we are in the central peninsula of Southern Greece, the Maina or Mani. "The scenery of the peninsula is wild and savage; the villages cling like eagles' eyries to the faces of apparently inaccessible cliffs, and are reached by stony and exceedingly toilsome footpaths." "The (present) inhabitants, the Mainotes, Mainiotes, or Maniates, are a hardy and warlike race of mountaineers, who claim to be descended from the ancient Spartans—the Turks never succeeded in subjugating them. As pirates they are greatly dreaded. They are still notorious for the relentless ferocity of their blood-feuds, which are so common that every family of importance has a tower in which to take refuge from the avengers of blood. In these towers persons implicated in a blood-feud have been known to live for many years without ever coming out. . . . A village will contain twenty to thirty such towers of refuge."[1]

History has thus proved it that, to the present day, all the nations dwelling in or near the Eurotas valley availed themselves eagerly of the cliffs, elevations, or peaks of the territory, in order to secure a safer domicile by means of fortifications or inaccessible heights. The Messenians did the same as early as the seventh, if not eighth century B.C., as we read in Pausanias.[2]

The natural question then arises, why did the

φθέντας δὲ τοὺς βουλομένους καὶ δυναμένους κινδυνεύειν, τῆς μὲν πόλεως ἀφεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κτημάτων, . . . καταλαβόντας δὲ χωρίον, ὅ τι ἂν ἐχυρώτατον ᾖ καὶ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον συμφορώτατον, ἄγειν καὶ φέρειν τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν, etc., etc.; cap. 31 (p. 131, or sec. 74, Sauppe).

[1] Frazer, J. G., *Pausanias*, iii. (1898), pp. 392, 393, giving, as usual, numerous references.

[2] Pausanias, *Descriptio*, vii. 2.

Spartans proper not avail themselves of the numerous peaks or mountains that abound in Laconia, and of which all the nations occupying the country of the Eurotas at once availed themselves for the purpose of easier defence? Were the Spartan men not afraid of leaving their wives and children without any protection while they were absent on distant campaigns? Had they no money? Were they not anxious to place their moneys and treasures in a well-protected place? Did they never think of a surprise? In Pausanias, iv. 22, we read of a plan of the leader of the Messenians to surprise Sparta during the absence of the Spartan army. Surely the apprehension of such a surprise must have produced itself more than once. Or is it not proved that the Helots as well as the *perioeci* or subject dwellers of the other towns of Laconia were more or less always hostile to the Spartans, and therefore welcomed every opportunity to capture the defenceless town in the absence of the Spartan soldiers?

Such considerations compel us to conclude that if the Spartans, in spite of easy opportunities and pressing needs, yet did not run up walls round their town, then they must have done so intentionally. It was part of a scheme of a deliberate measure. If they did not rely upon any material bulwark, they must necessarily have relied upon a moral or spiritual bulwark. There is no third case with a spirited and independent nation. We cannot therefore but conclude, from the absence of walls and fortifications in Sparta down to the latter portion of the fourth century B.C., that the Spartans must have trusted to some moral or spiritual force for the maintenance of their independence. If, therefore, on consulting tradition,

we hear that the Spartans observed a most strict system of education, by means of which each Spartan was relentlessly moulded and formed both physically and morally, from the moment of his birth to his death, for one single purpose and end, namely, for the defence and aggrandisement of his country; we cannot but say that this tradition is in perfect accord with the psychological inferences made from the absence of all walls and fortifications round or in Sparta. And since these fortifications were absent in the Messenian wars (of which later on) in the eighth century, the Spartan system of exclusive education through and for the State must have been in operation even before the eighth century B.C.

II

It might, however, be said that although the absence of all fortifications does indeed betoken and prove the existence of a system of some carefully trained moral and military force in open Sparta, yet such a system must not necessarily have existed in the eighth or ninth century B.C. The Messenian wars, even if we accept their historicity in general, cannot be proved to have occurred in the eighth or ninth century; and although by the testimony of Tyrtaeus the second Messenian war may safely be placed somewhere in the seventh century B.C., the first cannot be confidently said to have occurred in the eighth, let alone in the ninth century B.C. The testimony of Tyrtaeus has been doubted, rejected by many a critic. That is no more than might have been expected; but we shall treat of Tyrtaeus later

on. At present we must try to secure another of those independent facts that allow us to infer, by ordinary psychology, some definite date of that *ἀγωγή* which, by an inference from our previous independent fact, we are sure must have existed at least in the seventh century. This new independent fact is the influence of the Lesbian musician Terpander on Sparta. We have it on the authority of Aristotle and of all the other writers mentioning Terpander, that the great musician was held in exceptional esteem by the Spartans. Aristotle and Heraklides Ponticus, together with other historians of the Greeks, tell us that Terpander was invited to Sparta on the advice of the Delphic Pythia; the purpose being, Aristotle says, to allay by his art some civil disturbances among the Spartans.[1] This has, of course, been denied by most modern historians. They cannot conceive that civil disturbances could be allayed by a musician. Music, it must be admitted, has not been used for such an effect in modern times. In various western countries it is considered rather as a nuisance itself, than as an efficient means of stopping political or civic nuisances. Among the Greeks, however, there was an unanimous belief that music possessed an *ethos*, a power of influencing the passions of men, so great that they did not hesitate to ascribe definite psychic effects to individual *modes* or *scales*. In modern music we note indeed a distinct psychic difference between *major* and *minor*, but we do not at

[1] Aristotle, in his *Fragmenta*, vol. v. of the Berlin edit. (1870), p. 1560, No. 502, where the parallel passages from Zenobius, *Proverbia* (5, 9), Photius (*s.v.* *μετὰ Λέσβιον ᾠδόν*), and others are given in full. Compare also the Fragments of Aristotle in Rose's edit. (1886), p. 336, No. 545 C. Heraklides Ponticus very briefly states that the Spartans were told by the gods to accept the Lesbian musician; see *Fragm. Hist. Graec.* vol. ii. p. 210, No. 6.

all feel any particular *ethos* in either. It has been said that Greek music is *Apollinic*, whereas modern music is *Dionysiac*.[1] There is no doubt much suggestiveness in this expression. Yet it does not help us very much in the comprehension of the *ethos* which the Greeks so unhesitatingly and positively ascribed to their music. It has also been pointed out that many of our early church songs are practically Greek melodies, and that we may thus more readily represent to ourselves the ethical effect said to have characterised Greek songs.[2] It is indeed certain that the Church, and particularly the Roman Catholic Church, has at all times paid very great attention to her music, and one of her grievances against heretics was that they had introduced "unholy" songs.[3] Even at the present day one can easily tell Protestant from Catholic Church music; and the Reformers at once grasped and utilised the powerful *ethos* of the new music that German, French, and English Protestants composed for the new creed. To this close *analogon* of the *ethos* of Greek music we may

[1] Gevært, Fr. Aug., *Histoire et Théorie de la Musique de l'Antiquité*, vol. i. (1875), p. 87: " . . . *en Grèce, au sein d'une société exclusivement virile, le principe apollinique l'emporte; dans l'art moderne c'est le principe dionysiaque.*"

[2] We here give a list of the more important monographs on that interesting subject. Beaulieu, D., *Mémoire sur ce qui reste de la musique de l'ancienne Grèce dans les premiers chants de l'Église* (in *Mémoires de la Soc. Statist. de Deux-Sèvres*, 1856, vol. 18, pp. 190-200). A similar essay by Magnien, Vict., in *Bulletin Athénien*, Beauvais, 1851-53, p. 267; Burnouf, Em., in *Revue d. deux mondes*, 1886, pp. 349-374; Gevært, Fr. Aug., *Les origines du chant liturgique dans l'Église latine* (Gand, 1890); Morin (Germ.) in *Revue Bénédict.* 1890, pp. 193-204; Vincent, A. J. H., in *Revue archéolog.* 1854-56, on the quarter tones in the Gregorian plain chant.

[3] The Nicolaites and Gnostics, as well as the Donatists and the followers of Meletius were repeatedly, and by councils and popes, branded as impious for having introduced alterations into the music of the Church. See Janssen, N. A., *Les vrais principes du Chant Grégorien* (Malines, 1845), pp. 5, 6.

also add the peculiar psychic effect of modern folk-music. In Hungary, for instance, the slightest alteration of the national scale, whether in rhythm or intervals, would be considered as an outrage on Magyar nationality.[1] Any attempt at introducing into Hungarian music bars of three beats ($\frac{3}{4}$, $\frac{3}{8}$, $\frac{3}{16}$, etc.) would cause as much uproar in Hungary as did in ancient Sparta the attempt at introducing new strings to the lyre.[2] The national *psyche* is so intimately wound up with the Magyar bar of two beats, or with its peculiar *recitativo*, that it would most energetically resent any change in a matter which Germans or Italians willingly accept, nay, welcome.

Now, of ancient Greek music we may then say with confidence that it had the character both of modern Church-music and folk-music. As Greek dances were not at all what ours are; as the Greeks never danced as a mere pastime in private circles, but only (or in the great majority of cases) as part of their religious, military, and paedagogic life; even so their music was at once more religious and more national. Music was very much more intimately connected with poetry and dance than it is to-day. In a formal sense it may be said that Greek music before the fourth century B.C. was resembling our

[1] Hungarian music differs from German not only in the minor scale, in which, as has long been noticed, the augmented fourth is used, but also in the major scale, in that this scale if sung in truly Magyar cadence cannot be sung in seven crotchets or quavers of equal intervals between them. Any attempt to do so completely divests the passage so sung of its Magyar character.

[2] Phrynis, who had introduced two new strings on his κιθάρα, was at once punished by the Ephor Ekprepes, who cut off the obnoxious novel strings (Plutarch, *Agis*, 10), and the same thing is said to have happened to Timotheas (*id. ib.*).

operas, if on a much simpler scale. Like all the arts, whether architecture, painting, or sculpture, music too had an organic relation with Greek States. According to the luminous explanation of Aristoxenus, all Greek art was either *apotelestic* or *music*;[1] that is, it was either such a representation of the beautiful as needed no third person (an actor or singer) to bring it before the public, or it did need such an intermediary. *Apotelestic* are architecture, painting, and sculpture; *music* are poetry, music, and dance. Of *apotelestic* arts architecture is subjective, sculpture is objective; while painting is both objective and subjective. Of *music* arts, dance is objective and music subjective; poetry is both. The Greek State itself is, as we shall see, in harmony with these categories of art. Accordingly, some Greek States are *apotelestic*, or largely so; others again *music*. Some will therefore naturally tend to cultivate architecture or sculpture in preference to poetry and music; others again the reverse. When therefore we learn that a Greek State laid the greatest stress on music as a national art, we may fairly infer that such a State was essentially *music* itself, and not *apotelestic*. Perhaps Selden overstated the case when he declared that of all Greek States the Spartans cultivated music most extensively.[2] Yet it remains true that in

[1] See, subsequently, p. 333.

[2] Selden, John, *ad Marmora Arundelliana* (in *Opera*, edit. Wilkins, 1726), vol. ii. col. 1507: ". . . *nulla Graecarum civitatum aeque ac illi* [Lacedaemonii] *musicam, sive bello, sive pace, curabant.*" Selden quotes Athenaeus, "lib. xiv."; Capella, "lib. ix."; Agellius (Aulus Gellius), lib. i. cap. xi.; Tzetzes and Sextus Empiricus. Athenaeus and A. Gellius do not bear out Selden's statement. The Locrians, too, were famous for their love of music (Pindar, *Ol.* xi. 14); and Aristotle says (*Problemata*, 19. 28) of the Agathyrsi, a tribe in modern Hungary (Herodotus, iv. 104), that they set their laws to music. However, in Sparta alone music seems to have been *officialised* (*étatisée*).

Sparta alone, as far as we know, music was *officialised* (*étatisée*) to an extent unknown in other States. If, then, Sparta was essentially *music*, and if Greek music, as all Greek writers state, had a powerful *ethos*, then the Spartans must have had already in the times of Terpander their peculiar rhythm as a *music* State, *i.e.* their *ἀγωγή*. Had they not possessed it in the beginning of the eighth century B.C., they could not have invited a singer to allay their civic strifes, nor would they have honoured him so signally. The mediaeval Italian idea of a *podesta* was not unknown to the Greeks. On the contrary, we hear of more than one *aisymnetes*, or a sage whom distracted commonwealths entrusted with the ordering and regenerating of their civic life.[1] If, therefore, the Spartans needed some wise man, they might have very well chosen an *aisymnetes* from abroad. Or, had Terpander been the only musician the Spartans sent for as a person likely to strengthen their constitution, one might be entitled to say that not much can be inferred from such an isolated case. However, Terpander was only one of many musicians whom the Spartans invited to come to them, and to whom they gave serious and influential positions in their State. After Terpander came Tyrtaeus; after Tyrtaeus, Thaletas; then, in succession, Alcman, Xenodamos, Xenocritos, Polymnestos, Sakadas, and others.[2] Not all of these musicians and poets are reported to have had the

[1] Thus, *e.g.*, Pittacus of Mytilene, Tynnondas in Euboea, Epimenes of Miletus, Phoebus in Samos, Chairemon of Apollonia (which?), and the well-known Zaleucus of Locri and Charondas of Catane, in Sicily. Compare Aristotle, iii. p. 1285, a, and p. 1295, a; Plutarch, *Solon*, p. 14; Strabo, pp. 259, 260; Theodorus Metochites, Τπομνηματισμοί (*Miscellanea*, a collection of essays and extracts by a Byzantine polyhistor of the fourteenth century A.D.), chap. ci.

[2] See Müller, Karl Otfried, *Die Dorier*[2] (1844), ii. pp. 314, 315.

deep influence upon Spartan social *ethos* as had Terpander, Tyrtaeus, and Thaletas. But, if we consider the great number of delicately rhythmic dances in Sparta, which by law were studied by young and old as a most serious part of their political constitution,[1] we are forced to admit that musicians in Sparta were able to satisfy a deep-seated need of the State. And if we take into consideration that the Spartans, although uncompromisingly hostile to all foreigners, yet invited the foreign musicians above enumerated to Sparta, we must, in common psychology, infer that good music was in Sparta a want so pressing, that the Spartans did not hesitate to relax the rigour of one of their fundamental laws in order to satisfy that want. For, it is well known, that all those musicians were foreigners.[2] That Sparta herself was unable to produce musicians of real genius is quite in harmony with her character as a distinctly imperialist nation. Such nations have so far never produced great musicians.[3] On the other hand, we need not wonder that the Spartans took their music *au grand sérieux*. In the *Introduction* (p. 46) we referred to the profound remark of Leibniz, that man takes his amusements much more seriously, and has manifested in their invention much more genius, than in his business affairs. But if a nation, such as the Spartans, notices that their strongest desire, that is, their imperialism, must be based on an exceedingly strict

[1] Among those dances were the ἀναπάλη (Athenaeus, xiv. p. 631, b); the βίβασις (Pollux, iv. p. 102), and its kindred dances, called ἐκλάκτισμα and θερμαυστρίς (*id. ib.*); the διποδία (*id. ib.* p. 101); the βρυάλλιχα (*id. ib.* p. 104); the δειμαλέα, ἰθυμβοι, τυρβασία, etc., etc., mentioned in Pollux, iv. p. 104.

[2] See Müller, K. Otfried, *l.c.*

[3] See the author's *Imperialism* (1905), especially pp. 67, 68.

system of *ἀγωγή*, and that their *ἀγωγή* is powerfully influenced by dances, military exercises, athletic festivals, and religious sports (*ἀγῶνες*), all of which receive their strongest stimulus as well as their rhythm and easier execution from music; then we have scarcely a right to doubt any of the statements of the ancients regarding the extraordinary honours done by the Spartans to Terpander, Thaletas, or Tyrtaeus.

It is thus clear that the remarkable *rôle* attributed by Aristotle and other ancients to Terpander in Sparta is in perfect harmony with all that we know about the real nature of that State. On what ground, then, shall we arrogate the right to doubt it? There is no ground. It is quite true that an event perfectly probable may, with all that, yet not have happened actually. However, if an event, absolutely probable by itself, is said to have actually happened by a witness who is positively known to have first-hand knowledge about that event, and who, being unfavourable to Sparta (as was Aristotle), has no reason or motive to invent an artistic scene in favour of Sparta; then he alone has a right to deny that event who can prove independently, not that the event was not probable, but that it really did not happen. This nobody has done; nor can he do it. All that he can advance is, that Aristotle could not have had first-hand knowledge about Terpander's time. This statement is purely arbitrary; it is one of those insinuations that form, as we have seen, the stock-in-trade of inquisitorial history. It assumes that the ancients had the same mania for erudite quotation and "systematic" fulness that modern scholars have. Plato, steeped in the charm and philosophy of beauty, yet

never says a word of the most beautiful work of art in his town, of the Parthenon; and, it must be remarked, we have nearly all his works. The ancients do not quote as we do. Strabo was not quoted at all by Roman writers, and, as far as we can see, exceedingly little by Greek authors, for centuries after he published his incomparable Geography.[1] Aristotle may very well have used authors whom he does not quote. But what is even more to the point, in Aristotle's time there were still in full existence all the secondary yet quite conclusive proofs of many of the great facts of the past, such as monuments, shrines, commemorative festivals, inscriptions, lists of magistracies, or of victors at the national games, tablets at Delphi, music pieces, songs, and many other material *souvenirs* of events in previous times. Singly, they may be said to have no absolutely convincing force; but cumulatively they strengthen one another and establish real truth.

At any rate, it is certain that we cannot advance any fair argument against the unanimous statement of the ancients regarding Terpander's coming to Sparta as an artist entrusted with a great "political" task. Terpander, we know pertinently, lived at the beginning of the eighth century B.C. Therefore the ἀγωγή of the Spartans, which alone rendered them needful of a man like Terpander, must have been founded in the ninth century B.C.

As a final argument we will now consider the measures taken by Greek States to *officialise* (*étatiser*,

[1] Neither Pausanias nor Pliny the Elder quote him. Marcianus of Heraclea, Athenaeus (iii. p. 121, xiv. p. 657) and Harpocration (*sub* Λεσχαῖον and Λευκάς) alone quote him; see Chr. Gottlieb Groskurd, *Strabos Erdbeschreibung* (1831), i. p. xlvii.

verstaatlichen) the various institutions of private or public life. As will be seen more fully when treating of the Roman constitution, the classical ancients made an official organ of the State proper of many an institution that the moderns do not hand over to the State. Religion with us is frequently considered, and even with great pride, as a matter indifferent to the State as such. The ancients could not conceive of a State that did not appropriate the forces of religion as one of the principal institutions of the polity. Accordingly, they officialised religion. They did so, however, not with regard to dogmas, as we do, but with regard to ceremonies, festivals, and what they called *mantics*, or the power of predicting events by the right interpretation of "divine" signs. The Greeks agreed to leave *mantics* chiefly in the hands of a few oracles, more particularly of that at Delphi. In other words, although each Greek State had its *mantis* or soothsayer, and although those interpreters of the divine will were often employed in a semi-official manner, yet no Greek State desired to officialise the whole of the *auspicia*, as did the Romans. In fact, we may say that, from the Roman standpoint, Greek magistrates were *magistratus sine auspiciis*. However, just because Greek States did not officialise one great department of their State religion, which was nevertheless an indispensable organ of their State, they were naturally compelled to officialise other departments. In Sparta, where the officialisation of life was carried farthest, the dances, gymnastic exercises, and religious sports received necessarily a far stricter officialisation than in other Greek States. All these athletic and *orchestic* displays were then, as they are largely to-day, dependent on and bound

up with music. This art, then, which to-day is relegated, amongst *music* arts, to the rank of wood-carving amongst the *apotelestic* arts, was with the Spartans what the *auspicia* were with the Romans. The *auspicia* clearly prove, as will be readily admitted, the officialisation of all public life at Rome, just as they were meant to control and check it. Even so music at Sparta clearly indicates that there all private life was officialised, or subjected to that musical and strict rhythm which both in the art of music and in Spartan education was called ἀγωγή. If, therefore, Terpander was invited to Sparta at the beginning of the eighth century B.C.—and everything is in favour of a full belief in such an invitation—Sparta must some generations before Terpander have developed that peculiar *music* character for which Terpander's music was as indispensable, as was the Etruscan lore of the *auspicia* for the Romans.

For all these reasons the Spartan ἀγωγή must have existed as early as the ninth century B.C.

III

Once we ascertain, as we have done, that the Spartan ἀγωγή was in practice as early as the ninth century B.C., we are in a position to penetrate into the real or inward, not to say psychological, history of that State. A system of national education such as the Spartan ἀγωγή can, for its very unnaturalness, be the outcome neither of slow "natural evolution," nor of a long series of legislative measures. It is plainly a system by which most of the elementary

and natural desires of man are not only ignored but positively crushed. It is, in other words, a system of browbeating Nature. Man's most spontaneous and apparently irresistible desires are ruthlessly trampled upon. Ordinary experience has made it a matter above dispute that man wants to acquire property; to have a wife and children of his own; to talk freely with his friends; to avoid unnecessary hardships of body and mind; to follow the suggestions of his own will. The Spartan *ἀγωγή*, however, categorically refused the gratification of these elemental desires to the youths and adults of the Spartan commonwealth. No monastic order could have exacted a more complete self-abnegation than that expected on the part of each Spartan citizen. He could call his neither his own will, nor his own wife; neither his estate, nor his slave. He was absolutely and unconditionally in the power of an abstract State, both in his youth and in his mature age.

Such a wholesale de-humanisation of all the citizens of a State can be the result only of a popular determination dictated by overwhelming circumstances. Men in ordinary circumstances of peril or exposure cannot find the measure of persistent energy and self-sacrifice required for the successful establishment of such an extraordinary system of national monasticism. Single traits of the Spartan *ἀγωγή* can indeed be found in more than one nation outside ancient Sparta;[1] but in their totality they can be

[1] Frazer, Dr. J. G., says (*Pausanias*, iii. [1898], pp. 341, 342): "Although tradition [among the Greeks] averred that scourging of the youths was instituted as a substitute for human sacrifice, analogy suggests that it was simply one of those cruel ordeals which, among savage tribes, youths have to undergo on attaining to manhood." In proof of this view of the flog-

met with in no State proper other than Sparta. The Hellenes themselves admired but did not imitate the Spartan constitution as a whole. They were far too intensely bent on preserving the human capital unstinted and undiminished, to imitate a system built up on a serious truncation of human nature.

If, now, we inquire into the psychological motives of this strange bent of the Spartans, and if, for readier analysis thereof, we study other public systems of wholesale browbeating of human nature, we soon arrive at the conclusion that the Spartans were

ging of Spartan youths, Dr. Frazer quotes the *boguera* of the Bechuanas in South Africa, and similar customs among the Australian tribes, the *Kolosh* (a tribe) of Alaska, the Mandan Indians, etc. (See the numerous quotations, *l.c.*) However, these customs of savage tribes cannot, we suggest, be regarded as complete *analoga* of the Spartan custom. The Spartans kept up the custom in Roman times too, as witness the inscriptions lauding the *βωμονίκης*, that is, the boy who at the altar of Diana (which has been excavated in April 1906) had stood the greatest number of strokes without flinching (Le Bas-Foucart, *Péloponèse*, pp. 88 *seq.*). A mere reminiscence of "savage" times—over a thousand years previously—is not likely to have preserved a custom so cruel. More conclusive still is the fact, that the pretended analogy between flogging of youths at Sparta and similar customs of various savage tribes in our time, does not appear to be based on an identity of motives in both cases. The Spartans evidently wanted to steel their boys by ordeals of endurance, because the Spartan State, isolated and small, was daily confronted by the possibility of final disaster. The savage tribes of our time have no State proper; nor any very highly developed organisation at all. To find real analogies to Spartan flogging, we must search amongst civilised nations who were in similar circumstances, and therefore were prompted by analogous motives. Such was the case with the German *Hansas*, or commercial settlements of the Middle Ages, at Bergen in Norway. They consisted of none but men; and being located in a foreign and hostile country, they were arranged according to a most minute and very severe system of control extending to all the daily doings, meals, amusements, etc., of the inmates. At Whitsuntide the boys of the Hansas were first treated to a heavy meal, then stripped of all their clothing, and so dipped into the cold sea. On being taken half frozen out of the icy waves, they had to run for their clothes, while every one present hit them mercilessly with birches. Any boy that could not stand the ordeal was on the next day again dipped into the cold sea. See Falke, J., *Geschichte des deutschen Handels* (1859), i. pp. 221-230.

moved principally by that powerful passion for Imperialism which has in all ages entailed a fierce and uncompromising concentration of nearly all human faculties upon the one cold purpose of Rule and political Ascendency. In another work of the writer (*Imperialism*, 1905), it has been shown that this great, noble, and unbending passion is in no case a mere matter of choice. It is at the outset invariably a matter of necessity, gathering indefinite strength in the course of its realisation from the strongest and most absorbing of all human passions —self-assertiveness. Thus the Norman kings of England, taking a lesson from the distracted history of their Anglo-Saxon predecessors, soon grasped the salient fact of all English history, to wit, that an island can, as a rule, not hold its own against the larger powers of vast continents, unless that island expands into an empire. The Norman-Plantagenet kings acted upon this political truth, and spent gigantic efforts (from 1066 to 1453) on the keeping up of imperial provinces in France. When they were finally baffled in that, their successors betook themselves to the establishment of a vast empire beyond the Atlantic. In both cases the relatively poor resources of an island were increased and immensely fortified by the wealth accruing from an empire; and while in the first millennium of our era England had been repeatedly taken, conquered, or possessed by a long series of foreign invaders, she has been, during the subsequent nine centuries, held by one people only. The Irish, who never expanded into an empire, naturally lost their hold on the powers of history, just as did all islands absorbed in mere home matters. It will also be noted that the men who firmly grasped

the true destiny of England—that is, her vocation to expand into an empire—were foreign invaders, Normans and Frenchmen. In the *Introduction* to this work we have dwelt at some length upon the superior energy and historic importance of "foreigners"; and it may now be added that the whole fate of Ireland would have been altogether different, had the geographical disposition of land and sea in and round Ireland been more favourable to the invasion of a strong foreign people and its rulers. This favour was reserved for England; and, accordingly, English (Norman) kings, by driving English history into imperial channels, corrected the geo-politically poor chances of the island of Great Britain; while Ireland, unfavoured in that respect, remained distressed like Crete, Corsica, Sardinia, or Sicily, by petty home strifes. England, by expanding into an empire proper, soon developed the irresistible tendency of all empires towards a more or less wholesale browbeating of Nature. Already, at about 1570, there began an ever-rising sombre wave of Puritanism; and at present, when the British Empire has long been solidly established in all the five continents, we cannot but notice (as set out in the writer's *Imperialism*) the singularly persistent and massive attempts made in England to browbeat Nature in some of her most elementary desires, such as in the wish for stimulating drinks, for a cheerful outlook on life, for dancing, and for other innocent amenities of society. In fact, the undeniable mental and emotional divergence between an Englishman and a Continental is, *in ultima analysi*, due to the secular fact that Englishmen have, like the ancient Spartans and Romans, long been swayed principally by the somewhat desiccating

force and pride of imperialism, while the Continental nations have not.

This great object-lesson, which in due course will be discussed in detail, gives us, we hold, a ready key to the true psychology of the Spartans. They too were originally foreigners in the Peloponnesus; not indeed in an island, but nationally an island in a small sea of other tribes. Like all the other "Dorians" coming to the Peloponnesus in the twelfth or the eleventh century B.C., they had rather a precarious position of unsafety from attack or revolt. They too, in order to fortify the materially poor resources of their small "island" nation, were inevitably driven into aggressiveness and imperialism.[1] Like, later on, Rome on an incomparably larger scale, the Spartans were compelled to be dominant in order to be safe. They were not numerous; emigrants seldom are. They were surrounded by peoples whose civilisation, wealth, and power had shed lustre on Greece for centuries before the Spartans settled in Laconia. Their position could be maintained only by an inordinately strenuous life of watchfulness, fight, and organisation. To the west, the Messenians; to the north-west, north, and north-east, the Arcadians, the Tegeans, and Argives were ever ready to oust the handful of Spartans from the beautiful and valuable valley of the Eurotas. Under these circumstances the Spartans resorted to the broadest and most direct feature of success as an imperial nation: they introduced a system of national education by means of which all the forces of the human body, mind, and heart were adapted to the objects of imperialism. This may seem little likely in a small nation living, a

[1] The reader is asked to add the considerations on pp. 438 *seq.*

thousand years before our era, in an obscure corner of the Peloponnesus. However, we must once for all drop the idea of the Germans about a "Hellenic Middle Age," that is, that the Hellenes of the beginning of the first millennium B.C. were on the level of the French or English in the tenth century A.D. The fact is, that the Hellenes had at that time long passed through untold struggles as border nations proper. This had at an early date made them essentially different from the Burgundians or Bretons of the tenth century A.D. They had in those incessant struggles against numerically superior and civilised nations acquired a vitality, an intensity of mental and moral energy raising them head and shoulder above mere tribes in geo-politically less favoured portions of Europe or Asia. This accounts for the otherwise incomprehensible fact, that all that the Hellenes did from the eleventh century B.C. downwards partakes not only of the nature of a bare event, but of that of a typical historic occurrence. The deep instructiveness of all Greek history is vested and founded in that central feature, that Greek institutions or events are almost invariably typical. What the Spartans were compelled to do in the tenth or ninth century B.C., the Romans were reiterating during the time of the Republic, the English in the seventeenth century, and the Americans in the nineteenth. All the four systems of imperialism were obliged to lessen the influence of, and thereby somewhat to defeminise, women; to overdo the muscular education of their men; to insist on at least the appearance of an over-rigorous Puritanism; and, generally, to browbeat Nature extensively. The empire of a Tamerlan was established by mere successful butchery of many a

nation. The empire of the Spartans was founded on the root-principle of all abiding imperialism—the conquest or browbeating of one's own nature.[1] We shall see later on how the Catholic Empire, aiming as it did at an absolutely universal domination over man, resolutely negatived Nature, or the Realm of Nature, altogether, putting in its place the Realm of Grace.

Given, then, the intimate and psychologically inseparable connection and co-relation between Spartan

[1] The well-known passages in the *Laws* of Plato (Book vi. p. 780-81) and the *Politics* of Aristotle (ii. 9, 5 *seq.*) both explicitly state that the Spartan woman was what we should now call defeminised. The stern judgment passed by Aristotle on the Spartan women in general, and on those of his time (fourth century B.C.) in particular (*ζῶσι γὰρ ἀκολάστως πρὸς ἅπασαν ἀκολασίαν καὶ τρυφερῶς*), is confirmed by Plutarch for the Spartan women of the third century (. . . *τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐπισταμένας κατηκόους ὄντας ἀεὶ τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ πλεῖον ἐκείναις τῶν δημοσίων ἢ τῶν ἰδίων αὐτοῖς πολυπραγμονεῖν διδόντας*, Plutarch, *Agis*, cap. 7); and the passage in Plato quoted above, together with other passages (such as *Laws*, vii. p. 805, D, E, and p. 806, A, B), cannot but be taken as direct evidence for the unwomanliness of the Spartan female. Woman, herself the principal representative of Nature, as against the more political and artistic, hence hypernatural, tendencies of man, will always indicate the consequences of the incomplete character of a constitution (or, to use the language of Aristotle, the fact, that *ὁ νομοθέτης . . . τῶν γυναικῶν ἐξημέληκεν*, *Politics*, ii. 9, 6) more glaringly than will men. The Spartan State being by necessity an imperialist State, that is, one that could never acquiesce in natural and definite boundaries, was at all times anxious for indefinite expansion, and thus wanted pre-eminently men, hard and restless men. Under these circumstances woman was neglected, and so deviated from her proper path. This browbeating of woman in distinctly imperialist States, which the author has tried to show in detail in a chapter of his *Imperialism* (1905), is as indispensable a consequence of the Spartan State as was the flogging of its youths, the extreme self-restraint taught all citizens at Sparta, the Laconic speech, or the practical abstention from free conversation, and similar efforts to browbeat elementary features of man's natural desires. Spartan *laconism* is on a line with the prohibition of free talk amongst the early Cistercians, the Trappists, the Carthusians, and other severe orders. Nor need we be astonished at learning from Plato that of all the ancient nations the Spartans came nearest to the ideal of the modern teetotaler: see the interesting discussion in the *Laws* of Plato, beginning i. p. 637, where (*ib.* E) it is said that the Spartans were practically total abstainers (*ὑμεῖς μὲν γάρ, ὅπερ λέγεις, τὸ παράπαν ἀπέχεσθε*). The passage in Athenaeus, *Deipn.*, chap. iv. pp. 155, 156 (Casaub.), confirming Plato's view of Spartan teetotalism, is evidently taken from Plato.

imperialism and the Spartan ἀγωγή, we may state it as a certain fact that the Spartans were, at least as early as the ninth century B.C., and probably long before, in a position essentially similar to that of the English in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries A.D. In both cases there was a nation irrepressibly driven into imperialism, and meeting resolute, eventually fatal, resistance on the part of non-imperial, yet high-strung nations. Had the Spartans and the English, on the one hand, not been confronted by the Messenians and the French on the other; the rise of the Spartan ἀγωγή and of the English constitution and system of male education would remain an impenetrable enigma. As the Spartan ἀγωγή indicates and proves Spartan imperialism, so it does the singular superiority of the Messenians. Had the Messenians not been a nation of extraordinary vigour, elasticity, and substance, the Spartans would never have resorted to the extreme measure of their ἀγωγή. Had the French been of a mettle inferior to that of the English, the latter might have won battles over them, but would certainly not have won battles energising them into a nation worthy of an empire. All history is, as was stated in the *Introduction*, binary. Without the Messenian wars, the ἀγωγή of Sparta becomes infinitely less plausible, than is anything that Pausanias relates about those wars in the fourth book of his work. It need scarcely be added, that as the French were not the only stimulating adversary of the mediaeval English; as the Scotch, Welsh, and the Spanish too had a large share in the vitalisation of the English; so it was also with the Spartans, whose other numerous adversaries undoubtedly contributed much to the formation of

the Spartan *ἀγωγή*, by rendering it an institution indispensable for Spartan safety. It is now scarcely necessary to discuss the view of Otfried Müller, who describes the Spartans as a nation given up to ideals of art, and essentially averse to aggression.[1] Spartan imperialism is, as may be seen even at this stage of our investigation, the very life-blood of the Spartan polity, its inherent and all-dominating tendency. Nor were the great Greek thinkers slow to note this chief trait of the Laconian State.[2]

We may now state it as a safe psychological inference from the existence of the Spartan *ἀγωγή* in, at least, the ninth century B.C., that the Spartans must have been confronted by neighbouring nations of the greatest vigour as early as the ninth or eighth century B.C. Their *ἀγωγή* was like the ramparts and walls of fortified towns. The higher and the more elaborate the ramparts and walls, the greater must

[1] Müller, Otfried, *Die Dorier*,[2] ii. pp. 245 *seq.* and 329. It is here not meant to deny that the Spartans, as well as nearly all the Hellenes, never quite neglected the artistic aspect of military movements; it cannot, however, be admitted that with them the artistic impulse prevailed over the imperialist one. The view of the German historian Schlözer to the effect that Lycurgus turned 12,000 Spartan peasants into so many Don Quixotes (Müller, *ib.* ii. p. 10, note 1); or the opinion of Engel, *de reb. milit. Spart.* (Göttingen, 1790), according to which the Spartans were on a line with the Cossacks (Müller, *ib.* ii. p. 15, note 1), misses the whole point. The neighbours of the Cossacks were not high-strung Messenians and Argives; compare Plutarch, *Lycurgus*, cap. vii., about the superiority of the Spartan over the Messenian and Argive constitution.

[2] Herodotus indeed holds the opposite view; he thinks that the Spartans became so bellicose in consequence of their prosperity under the constitution of Lycurgus: *καὶ δή σφι οὐκέτι ἀπέχρα ἡσυχίην ἄγειν, ἀλλὰ καταφρονήσαντες Ἀρκάδων κρέσσονες εἶναι, ἐχρηστηριάζοντο ἐν Δελφοῖσι ἐπὶ πάσῃ τῇ Ἀρκάδων χώρῃ* (i. cap. 66). However, both the fact of the Messenian wars, of which Herodotus scarcely speaks, the Argive wars (see Pausanias, *Descriptio*, iii. 7, 3), and the decisive passage in Aristotle's *Politics*, ii. 9. 11 [p. 1270, A], clearly prove that the constitution given to the Spartans by Lycurgus was nothing short of an organisation of their indispensable imperialism and aggressiveness.

be the state of danger in which the inmates of the fortress think themselves to be. The stricter the Spartan ἀγωγή appears to be, and the more resolutely it exacted on the part of the Spartan citizens a self-sacrifice of the most extraordinary character; the safer one is in concluding that some one or two of the neighbouring nations must have been endowed with forces of aggression far beyond those of mere primitive tribes. This, we take it, unanswerable inference is confirmed by very numerous passages in Tyrtaeus, Plato, Aristotle, Isocrates, Alcidamas, Pausanias, and other Greek writers, telling us of a series of great wars between the Messenians and the Spartans during the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. Before entering into any detail regarding the criticism of our "sources" of these famous wars, we may, from the very outset, lay down with absolute certainty two broad and helpful statements.

First, that the belief in the historic occurrence of such wars is one carrying with it a very great internal probability; the Spartan ἀγωγή becoming an incomprehensible and absurd oddity, unless we assume antecedents, such as wars similar to those of the Messenians and Spartans.

Secondly, that those wars between the Messenians and the Spartans must necessarily have been wars, not between two equally obscure tribes, such as the Matabeles and the Zulus, but between an essentially imperialist State and a high-strung border nation. In such wars there is infinitely more than mere desultory or furious fighting, ending with some treaty of peace or another, with the payment of an indemnity, or the cession of women or land. In such wars great driving principles are implied. On the part of

the imperialist nation the war must end by completely absorbing or imperialising the adversary. If that aim is not realised, the war cannot end. The imperialist nation must, in its own vital interest, put an end to the very soul of the adverse nation; and it must do so especially when it is itself a small nation. On the part of the nation on the borders of the imperialist State, the fight becomes one for the higher goods of that nation, and speedily turns into an heroic struggle. So it was in the Middle Ages in the case of the Lombard towns, and of the Scotch clans; in modern times, in the case of the Dutch and the Caucasians. Such wars are infinitely more than wild fighting. Ideas step in. Ideas, when espoused with fervour by a whole nation, rapidly make for embodiment in a great personality. In such a war of a border nation against a distinctly imperialist, if small nation, we may therefore rightly expect the rise of some striking personality, focussing and realising the ideas and ideals of his nation. Such personalities are aware, that in the struggle of their nation with an imperialist State a compromise is practically impossible. Could any Messenian hope that the Spartans, themselves chained in the iron bonds of their ἀγωγή, will treat the beaten Messenians with lesser rigour? For the Messenians, it was evident that they had, in case of defeat, only the choice between submitting, at best, to the intolerable hardships of the Spartan ἀγωγή, or to the infamy of sinking to the status of helots. In their struggles with the Spartans there was therefore present the very concourse of forces and circumstances, that has in all history produced striking personalities.

It follows from the preceding, that what we cannot

but expect in the Messenian wars is, at any rate, one striking personality, such as was Arnold of Brescia in Italian, Robert the Bruce in Scottish, William of Orange in Dutch, and Shamyl in Caucasian, history. Far from arbitrarily doubting the historicity of Aristomenes, the reported hero of the Messenians, *from the outset*, we should rather be much amazed had Pausanias told us nothing about such a psychologically indispensable personality. Such personalities cannot be invented; in them is a life of their own, reflecting historic forces of a particular time and place in a highly individualised form. A Homer, indeed, may invent an Ulysses, although even this is still far from certain. What is absolutely certain is, that neither a Rhianus nor a Myron (see later) ever invented a personality so intensely striking and complete as that of Aristomenes.

We have so far surveyed only the outskirts of the jungle of the Messenian wars. We have arrived at psychological inferences which do not, indeed, establish either the chronological or the military and political details of those wars; but which help us substantially in fixing our bearings with regard to those wars in general. The Messenian wars, proving as they do the singularly imperialist nature of the Spartan State, are our third and final evidence respecting the early existence of the Spartan ἀγωγή, a study of which, as we shall see, fully corroborates the all but unanimous view of the ancients, that the Spartan State was the work of Lycurgus. In view of this, our principal object, it is thus necessary to enter into the details of the "*Quellenkritik*" hitherto applied to the "sources" of the Messenian wars. That "criticism of the sources" has, as is well known,

led nearly all modern writers on Greek history to assume the unhistoric character of almost all that we are told about those wars in Pausanias, our principal source for the details. In the elaborate works of Grote, Niese, Busolt, Eduard Meyer, Wilamowitz, to name only the better known amongst the modern historians of Greece, the Messenian wars are treated with scant courtesy.[1] The story of those wars, whether as given in Ephorus, Pausanias, or Diodor of Sicily, is said to be a mere fabrication of writers who "threw back" the image of events of the fourth century B.C., when the Messenians were again restored to national autonomy, to the screen of the eighth or seventh century B.C. It is by this process of *Rückspiegelung*, as the Germans call it, that our extant reports of those wars and their heroes were made by writers anxious to please the newly restored Messenians. Nor is Niese or Busolt at a loss as to the book from which the reports of the oldest Messenian history were, by *Rückspiegelung*, "reflected" into shape. That book "evidently" is the drama *Kresphontes* of Euripides. Professor Busolt writes: "The drama *Kresphontes*, by Euripides, exercised an essential influence upon the formation of the extant later tradition [on early Messenian history]."[2] Upon this broad statement, for which not the slightest proof is given, Busolt, on the basis

[1] Grote, *History of Greece*, ii. (1862) chap. vii. p. 180, calls Pausanias's report "a string of *tableaux*, several of them indeed highly poetical, but destitute of historical coherence or sufficiency." Niese, in *Hermes*, vol. xxvi. (1891), holds that the early history of Messenia was concocted after 370 B.C.; in that view concurs Busolt, *Griech. Gesch.* i.[2] (1893), pp. 223 *seq.*, 579, 580; and all the moderns.

[2] Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*[2] (1893), i. p. 224: "*wesentlichen Einfluss auf die Gestaltung der uns vorliegenden spätern Ueberlieferung hatte das euripideische Drama Kresphontes.*"

of Niese's treatise (*Hermes*, 1891), builds up his elaborate theory of the "reflection" of Messenian history after 370 B.C. by the concocters of that time. Except a very few fragments, we do no longer possess the drama of Euripides. We do not know in what manner it was received by the general public in Greece. There is no direct trace indicating any influence of that drama on Ephorus, the historian, or on Acusilaos, Polyzelus Messenicus, Hecataeus, or any other Greek historian of the fifth or fourth century B.C. In the speech of Isocrates for Archidamus, who is supposed to deliver that speech at Sparta in the interest of the continuation of the war of 365 B.C. against the Messenians,[1] there is no direct allusion to the drama of Euripides. Nor are we aware that the orator Alcidamas, who wrote a speech (*Messenikos*) against the *Archidamus* of Isocrates, took any heed at all of the drama. Yet, we are to accept the *dictum* of Busolt, that Ephorus and his successors did take most of their relation about early Messenian history from the drama of Euripides. Busolt's chief reason is, that the Messenians had no real tradition about their early history, in that, until their restoration at the hands of Epaminondas, they had been only helots.[2] This, indeed, is a reason, the psychological force of which cannot altogether be denied. It may be strengthened by a passage from Pausanias[3] (iii. 13. 2), where it is said that "the Messenian exiles have been restored to their homes, their calamities and long exile from Peloponnese have effaced from their memory much of the ancient

[1] This imaginary speech was much admired in antiquity; *see* Dionysius Halicarn. *περὶ Ἰσοκράτους* (in *Oratores Attici*, ed. Dobson (1828), iii. p. 57 (*ια'*).

[2] Busolt, *l.c.* pp. 223, 224, note 4.

[3] Pausanias, *Descriptio*, vi. 2, 10.

history of their country, so that it is now open to any one to lay claim to traditions to which the true heirs have forgotten their right" (Dr. Frazer's translation). It might be added, that few Messenians from towns not situated in the Peloponnese won victories at the Olympian games. If, however, after having stated Busolt's contention in its possibly strongest form, we consult another series of facts, we cannot but conclude that his statement is based on insufficient material. For, although no doubt the Messenians remaining in Messenia were in the end reduced to bondage by the Spartans, yet a considerable number of other Messenians, who had left their native country, established free and prosperous polities both in and outside Greece. Thus by about 456 B.C. Messenians settled at Naupactus, and on December 21, 1875, in the course of the German excavations at Olympia, was found that exquisite statue of a (female) Victory, by which the Messenians and Naupactians commemorated their victory over the Lacedaemonians, probably in the first part of the Peloponnesian war.[1] It is well known that modern Messina was originally called Zancle, and obtained its present name through its falling (during the first quarter of the fifth century B.C.) into the hands of Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium, who was by origin a Messenian.[2] We read, moreover, in two passages in Pausanias (iii. 3. 4, and iv. 23. 1) of maritime towns in the Peloponnese whose Messenian inhabitants were no helots, and of other places where free

[1] See a photographic reproduction of that beautiful statue in Dr. Frazer's *Pausanias*, iii. p. 644, where all the references relating to the date and character of that graceful work of art are given in full.

[2] Herodotus, vi. 23; Thucydides, vi. 4.

Messenians settled; let alone Messana (Messina), where, as the mere name shows, there must have been very numerous Messenians, whatever we may think of sections 6 to 9 in chapter xxiii. of the fourth book of Pausanias.

It is therefore quite positive that in addition to bonded Messenians in Messenia, who may perhaps have forgotten their ancient history, there were numerous free and prosperous Messenians who, if we admit the inference of oblivion from bondage, must be credited, on account of their liberty, with a fair reminiscence of their early history. And were those bonded Messenians really so degenerate? Would they have recovered their ancient energy so rapidly after Epaminondas' victory, if they had really sunk so low before? Would Epaminondas have considered them his strongest card against a possible revenge on the part of the Spartans, had he known them to be helots proper, men quite forgetful of their former glory? Would he have given them Messene, the finest and best-fortified new town in Greece, built by his order?

A short consideration will lead any unprejudiced student of Messenian history to the conviction that in Messenia, in the times of Epaminondas, that is, by the middle of the fourth century B.C., there must have been numerous persons authentically informed about the history of their country.

In modern times records and ancient documents are almost invariably in the possession of public offices.[1] In ancient Greece, on the other hand, such

[1] Formerly that was far from being the case. In the times of King Charles I., the private collection of Sir Robert Cotton contained so many originals of State and Church documents that "without him, it will not be

documents were frequently guarded by private individuals. The reason thereof was the peculiar constitution of religious cults in Greece. Many of these cults were left in the hands of private individuals, in whose families the administration of such cults was hereditary. Such families were the Eumolpidae and Kerykae, the Phyllidae and Eteobutadae in Attica; the Clytidae at Cos; the Aigidae in the isle of Thera;[1] and many others. These cults were, by their very nature, very conservative, and were, moreover, fixed by old records, or *βιβλία καὶ ἀρχαῖα ἔγγραφα*, carefully preserved in the families. The privilege of being entrusted with such cults, many of which referred to the "great gods" and to national interests, was always considered a signal honour; and when, for instance, Messenia was restored to her pristine independence, after 370 B.C., the old family cults were revived by the very families who had centuries ago been in their possession. It is therefore nothing but fair to assume, and in the highest degree probable, that such families in Messenia had authentic knowledge of true traditions, considering that in ancient Greece religion was so intimately bound up with all political affairs as to be practically inseparable from them. This was especially so in the second century B.C. and also in the following centuries, when Greece, having lost her former prestige,

too much to say, the struggle [of Parliament against the King] could not have been successfully closed. From his books and manuscripts, which formed the germ, and are still the noblest part of our national library, were drawn the precedents by which exclusively the Commons were guided up to the achievement of the Petition of Right. From his small house in Palace Yard were unrolled, in gradual succession, the statutes and records that were held to be the title-deeds of English freedom" (Forster, John, *Sir John Eliot* (1865), vol. i. pp. 412, 413).

[1] See Toepffer, Johannes, *Attische Genealogie* (1889), under the names of the Athenian families; Schoemann-Lipsius, *Griechische Alterthümer*[4] (1902), vol. ii. pp. 434, 435.

was, in the times of Roman supremacy, filling the void left by the absence of great political life by an intenser development of religious practices. Of this we have numerous indications in the extant inscriptions; and with regard to Messenia, we are fortunate enough to be able to study one of the most remarkable and elaborate inscriptions illustrating the "service" of important "mysteries" at the hands of a private family. The inscription dates from about 91 B.C., and records the "mysteries" of the "great gods" and other gods at Andania in Messenia.[1] They were originally in the hands of the family of one Mnasistratus, who ceded them to the commonwealth of Andania, by which State they were then regulated in detail. It is impossible to believe that families[2] such as that of Mnasistratus, who over two hundred years after the restoration of Messenia still kept up the old rites, should have let their ancient traditions fade into oblivion. Family pride and patriotism both united with religious zeal to preserve records and memories of traditions, with which the glories of the past were intimately connected, not to say identified. These glories were indeed of no mean nature. As Toepffer has well shown, the Neleidae, a noble family of Messenians, played a most important part in the early history not only of the Peloponnesus, but also of the Hellenic States in Asia Minor. The nobility of those towns in Asia Minor all traced their origin to the house of Neleus; Homer, who barely mentions

[1] The inscription was found near the modern Greek village of Konstantinoi in Messenia, and was, after Kumanudis, edited, with an elaborate commentary, by H. Sauppe, *Die Mysterieninschrift von Andania* (Göttingen, 1860, and in *Ausgewählte Schriften*, p. 261 *seq.* It may be found also in Dittenberger's *Sylloge*,[2] vol. ii. (1900), p. 461, No. 653).

[2] Compare Pausanias, *Descriptio*, iv. 14. 1.

Athens and Attica, lovingly dwells on Messenia and Messenian lords.[1] It is hardly possible to assume that descendants of houses so famous in the tenth and ninth centuries, and so intimately related to religious cults which in ancient Greece ranked among the most sacred institutions of life, should have altogether forgotten the outlines or principal facts of their early history. On the contrary, all the preceding facts contribute to strengthen the belief in a continuous tradition of the great facts of early Messenian history, carefully preserved by a number of Messenian families before and after the time of the restoration of Messenia in the fourth century B.C.[2]

If, then, Busolt's and Niese's wiping out of the traditional ancient history of Messenia cannot be based, as they have tried to do, on the alleged lack of such a tradition among the Messenians, we cannot fail to see that the theory of "reflection" or *Rückspiegelung* is a purely arbitrary method of dealing with a "source." It comes in reality to this, that since the extant reports of ancient Messenian history from Ephorus to Pausanias *might* have been concocted from the drama *Kresphontes* by Euripides, they probably were so concocted. Now, it is here not advanced that the argument from the Possible to the Probable is under all conditions a wrong argument. It is certainly not so, when for the transition from the Possible to the Probable there is a bridge made up either of a few

[1] Athens occupies quite a secondary place in the epics of Homer; whereas the Messenian house of Neleus, his abode at Pylus, and the noble qualities of the Neleids are dwelt upon by Homer in very numerous passages.

[2] It is well known that since the eighth century B.C. there were kept so-called *ἀναγραφαί* or lists of magistrates, of victors at the various national games, of high-priests and priestesses, kings, etc., by means of which the chronology of events was kept alive. See the ample bibliography of these lists in Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*,[2] i. pp. 582 *seq.*

solid facts, material or psychological, or of valid conclusions from facts. But where there are no such facts, nor conclusions from them, there is no bridge, and hence the step from the Possible to the Probable cannot be made. It is just possible, that in going out in the street at this moment, a brick will fall on my head and gravely injure me. But unless I have more to consider than this void possibility, I will not think it probable to come off. Should, however, a period of earthquakes come over my town, then the void possibility may speedily turn into a probability, and I shall prefer to leave my town. In the present case the *Rückspiegelung* of Messenian history has no fact, material or psychological, to stand upon. In reality, had Messenian early history been a mere concoction from a drama, then Isocrates, whose speech we still possess, could not possibly have failed to point it out with somewhat of a triumphant sarcasm. In his speech *Archidamus*, he exhausts all arguments to incite the Spartans to a vigorous continuation of the war against the Messenians in 365 B.C. He tries to make out the justice of the Spartan cause, and discusses for that purpose ancient Messenian history in sufficient detail.[1] If that history had been, as Niese and Busolt suppose, a mere concoction from Euripides' *Kresphontes*, why did Isocrates, whose interest could be served by nothing more effectively, not point it out? Surely he knew of the drama. He also knew even such of the Greek historians as we no longer know. What would have been easier for him than to prove, by direct testimony, that very *Rückspiegelung* or fabrication of ancient Messenian history which Niese and Busolt are at such pains to

[1] Isocrates, *Archidamus*, capp. 7, 8.

prove so unsatisfactorily? If he did not do it, as we can still convince ourselves that he did not, then he must have been afraid lest such a theory of *Rückspiegelung* would speedily be disposed of by Alcidamas, his opponent, or any other orator hired by the Messenians. In violent political discussions partisans easily go to the extreme of denying one another attributes of the simplest kind. A State is denied to be a State; a nation is called a tribe; a minister of State is termed a hireling. But no heat of political passion can blind people to broad facts of the past; and whatever Whigs may have reproached Tories with, they never could deny with any chance of success the fact that William, Duke of Normandy, won the battle of Hastings.

Such, however, is the *vogue* of the method of discrediting "sources" by making them out to be a piece of "reflection" or *Rückspiegelung*, that an amazing number of passages, sections of chapters, and whole chapters of Greek and other ancient historians have in recent years been "proved" to contain not facts, but mere reflexes of events of a much later period. Thus, to give only a few examples, the description of the battle between the Messenians and the Spartans in Pausanias, iv. 7. 5, is a mere reflex from Thucydides;[1] the traditional history of Thessaly

[1] We shall presently discuss the *Rückspiegelung* of Pausanias's description of an old Messenian battle in iv. 7. 3 *seq.*, from Thucydides. This reflex theory is, it will be seen, a purely bookish and unpsychological means of discrediting as many "sources" as one pleases. Where it does not work, there unmitigated insinuation, this, the chief weapon of the inquisitorial judges, is freely resorted to. Thus Busolt, who is bent on discrediting Pausanias—in other words, Busolt, who wants to credit himself with the attribute of "penetrating sagacity," which is the chief glory accorded by one arm-chair historian to another—Busolt coolly writes that it is "questionable" (*fraglich*) whether Pausanias ever looked up or perused the poems of Tyrtaeus themselves ("*ob er daneben selbständig Tyrtaios eingesehen hat*"). If this is

is only a reflex of events of the fourth century B.C.;[1] so is the history of Draco's legislation;[2] so is, of course, the legislation of Lycurgus a reflex from a political memoir of King Pausanias in the first quarter of the fourth century B.C.;[3] even so is the coming of the Dorians in about the eleventh century B.C.;[4] let

not pure insinuation, then nothing else is. Why should not Tyrtaeus have been read by Pausanias? In the times of Pausanias, Tyrtaeus was as easily accessible and as famous as most other poets. One has only to glance through pp. lxvii. and lxviii. in the admirable preface of Dr. J. G. Frazer to his work on Pausanias to acquire the conviction, that a man so candid as Pausanias can never have committed the childish fault of not reading a famous poet whom he quotes. Dr. Frazer quotes a large number of passages from Pausanias, in which the honest Greek frankly confesses to his having missed seeing certain monuments (viii. 41. 5 *seq.*; x. 35. 7; vi. 26. 1 *seq.*; ix. 25. 3; ix. 18. 3; ii. 35. 8; viii. 10. 2; iv. 31. 5 ["that he had neither seen the walls of Babylon and Susa, nor conversed with any one who had"]; viii. 9. 7 ["that he had never seen Antinous in life"]; viii. 21. 2 ["that he had not heard the trout sing like thrushes in the river Aroanius, though he tarried by the river until sunset, when they were said to sing loudest"]); or where Pausanias tells us when he quotes a book at second hand (ix. 29. 2 ["this poem of Hegesinus I have not read; but the verses are quoted . . ."], and ix. 38, 10). "These statements," Dr. Frazer says, "like the foregoing, will hardly be disputed even by the most sceptical. No one will be likely to insist that Pausanias read books which he tells us he did not. Therefore in fairness we are bound to believe him when he says that he did read certain other works, such as the memoirs of some obscure historians, etc." (p. lxviii.).

[1] Hiller von Gärtringen in *Aus der Anomia* (1890), pp. 1 *seq.*, has tried to make out that there never was a united Thessaly in the sixth century B.C., presided over by one Thessalian king; and that the whole story, in spite of the contradicting statement by Aristotle (Fragments 113 and 114 in ed. Rose, or 453 and 456 ed. Berlin Acad.), is a mere *Rückspiegelung* of the State of Thessaly in the third decade of the fourth century B.C. at the hands of Jason of Pherae.

[2] Cauer, Eduard Meyer, and J. Beloch all declare the fourth chapter of Aristotle's *Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία* as a mere *Rückspiegelung* of circumstances prevailing by the end of the fifth century B.C., and accordingly all the three historians deny the authenticity of the "constitution of Draco" as given by Aristotle.

[3] Eduard Meyer (in his *Forschungen zur alten Geschichte*, i. (1892), pp. 215 *seq.*) has traced the so-called oracles of Lycurgus to a political pamphlet of King Pausanias, at the beginning of the fourth century B.C.

[4] See Beloch, J., *Die dorische Wanderung* in *Rheinisches Museum* (Neue Folge), vol. xlv. pp. 555 *seq.*

alone the death of Codrus;[1] the old writings of the Eleans;[2] Genesis xiv., as we have seen before;[3] the stories of Romulus,[4] etc.

It will be noticed that by means of such methods most passages in ancient writers can be made to appear as reflexes from later writings. Contemporary, or nearly contemporary, witnesses are simply ignored, as we have just seen in the case of Messenian history. Isocrates, Alcidamas, and Ephorus are not regarded at all; they are simply declared to be copyists of older "concocters." From mere possibilities it is at once proceeded to probabilities; and internal motives or psychological considerations are pushed aside as sheer dilettantism. Does not all this remind the student of history of that terrible mode of procedure, by which in former ages the judges of the Inquisition invariably made out their case, after depriving the accused of the elementary conditions of a fair trial? We saw above that few things characterised the inquisitorial procedure more signally than its neglect of witnesses, especially of witnesses for the defence. We likewise learn that the inquisitorial judges, although they professed to inquire mainly into the opinions of the alleged heretic, that is, into an internal,

[1] Busolt, in *Griechische Geschichte*, i. p. 72, note 3, is quite satisfied that the self-sacrifice of King Codrus is "visibly imitated" ("*sichtlich nachgeahmt*") from the story of Leonidas. Toepffer is unable to see that (*Attische Genealogie* (1889), p. 231, note 1).

[2] Professor Mahaffy, in his "*On the Authenticity of the Olympian Register*," *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, vol. ii. (1881), pp. 164-178, has given the reflex theory of the "ancient Elean writings," quoted by Pausanias (iv. 4. 6), and at numerous other places, saying that they were nothing but the register of Olympic victories compiled by Hippias of Elis, the sophist, who flourished about 400 B.C.

[3] See the author's *Failure of Higher Criticism* (1905), pp. 95-112.

[4] See Trieber in the *Rheinisches Museum*, vol. xliii. p. 569, where it is "proved" that the whole "fable" of Romulus is a *Rückspiegelung* from the *Tyro* of Sophocles.

psychological phenomenon, yet practically never troubled themselves about that belief, contenting themselves with a minute and arbitrary estimation of external acts done by the accused.[1] In the same manner Busolt and Niese do not even take into consideration the psychological fact that Isocrates did not discredit old Messenian history by declaring it to be a mere reflex from the *Kresphontes* of Euripides, although to do so was a matter of great consequence to him. Nor will these scholars seriously weigh the significant circumstance that no Greek writer ever advanced such a connection between the drama and Messenian historians. Such psychological considerations which in modern criminal law are admitted to be of a decisive character were, by the inquisitorial judges, left out of consideration as unworthy of their high profession. Need one, then, wonder that the modern process of *Rückspiegelung* is only a mere variation of one of the essentially identical methods of conviction taught by the inquisitors? We read indeed in one of the Treatises officially prepared for the guidance of inquisitorial judges: "Mark, that the inquisitor must always presuppose the fact (the deed) . . . and ask about the circumstances of the deed;

[1] "*C'est un fait notable que dans de longues séries d'interrogatoires on cherche vainement une seule question relative aux* croyances *de l'accusé. Toute l'énergie de l'inquisiteur tendait à obtenir des informations sur ses* actes *extérieurs. Il en résultait nécessairement que presque tout était laissé à la discrétion de l'inquisiteur et que la sentence finale dépendait plus de son humeur que des preuves de culpabilité ou d'innocence.*" Lea, H. C., *Histoire de l'inquisition au moyen âge* (French Translation by S. Reinach), vol. i. (1903) p. 487 (p. 433 of the English original). To this add the most instructive, if incredibly revolting, piece of "instruction" given to the inquisitorial judge as a model of judicial cross-examination of the accused, in *Tractatus de haeresi Pauperum de Lugduno* (Lyons) *auctore anonymo, de libro Fratris Stephani de Bellavilla accipiuntur ista*, cap. "*Qualiter examinantur*," in Martene and Durand *Thesaurus novus anecdotorum* (Paris, 1717), vol. v. coll. 1789-1792.

for instance, How many times have you been convicted as a heretic? In which chamber of your house were (heretics) lodging? and similar questions. Item, the inquisitor may look into a book, as if the life of the heretic were described in it and also all the questions asked of him."[1] What can be more essentially similar to the theory of reflexes? Here is a judge, in an age when books carried infinitely more "authority" than they have now. He is told to act as if all the misdeeds of the accused were already so well established, as to admit of their being read out from a book into which they had been "reflected." Should the accused submit an exonerating statement, then he will be told that it is only a "clever circumvention" of the true facts, *i.e*, the facts as they stand in the "book" of the judge. It is in this way that discrepancies between Ephorus and Isocrates which would weaken the reflex theory are explained away out of the interested motives of Isocrates.[2] And in order to meet the objection that Euripides, after all, might have followed authentic traditions, so that the historians using him did not invent facts, it is peremptorily stated that Euripides "without a doubt" freely invented the details of the plot of his drama.[3] Is this not logically identical in drift with the usual practice of the inquisitorial

[1] *Ib.* col. 1793: "*Nota quod Inquisitor semper debet supponere factum, sine aliqua commendatione, et quaerere de circumstantia facti, ut dicat, quotiens fuisti confessus haereticus? In qua camera jacuerunt in domo tua? et similia. Item, potest Inquisitor respicere in aliquo libro, quasi ibi scripta sit vita haeretici et quicquid quaeretur ab eo.*"

[2] Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*[2] (1893), i. p. 226.

[3] *Id. ib.* p. 225: "*Euripides hat gewiss zu seiner Fabel eine bereits vorhandene Sage benutzt, aber die Handlung derselben ist zweifellos von dem Dichter nach dem Vorbilde der Orestie frei erfunden und gestaltet worden.*"

judges? When an accused, misled by blandishments, admitted the fact of having lodged a certain person on a certain day, or of having given him alms or having conversed with him; then the inquisitorial judge triumphantly retorted that that lodger or taker of alms was a heretic himself, although the judge really had no such proof of the latter's heresy.[1]

We have so far seen that the destructive criticism passed on early Messenian history by Niese, Busolt, and their numerous followers, misses its point altogether, and is only another example of that modern resuscitation of the procedure of the inquisitors which has long stood condemned by the modern mind. On approaching now the criticism of the sources of the Messenian wars, we are in a position to state that Pausanias, our principal authority, had indeed a sufficient number of authorities from whom a fair amount of authentic information could be gathered. He repeatedly mentions that he derived part of his material from contemporary Messenians;[2] and if we consider the numerous monuments, traditions, records, and religious cults then extant in Messenia, as well as in the rest of Greece, it is not unreasonable to conclude that Pausanias was very well able to learn of many an important event and person of Messenian history.

The known sources of the Messenian wars are, in the first place, an inscription in the Arcadian temple of Zeus Lycaeus communicated by Polybius from Callisthenes, in which the treason of the Arcadian Aristocrates is commemorated. Although our reports

[1] The *Tractatus* quoted above, col. 1788 *supra*, where it is said that *vulpes enim astutae sunt subtili astutia capiendae.*

[2] Pausanias, iv. 4. 5, compared with iv. 5. 1.

about the precise character, place, and time of that treason do not quite agree, yet they all declare that Aristocrates, one of the rulers in Arcadia, betrayed the cause of the Messenians in one of their wars against the Spartans.[1] Grote is of opinion that it is not possible to determine the age of that inscription;[2] and that therefore it cannot be taken as a fair or contemporary evidence of the alleged treason of Aristocrates. Callisthenes does not say that the *stele* (slab) and its inscription struck him as being a recent fabrication or a copy made in his time, that is, by the middle of the fourth century B.C. Nor does Polybius breathe the slightest doubt as to the antiquity of the inscription.[3] Why, then, should we do so? Whose interest would it have served to "concoct" such an inscription by the middle of the fourth century B.C.? Certainly not that of the Messenians who were then the allies of the Arcadians,[4] and were thus little likely to place in a temple of Arcadia an

[1] Polybius, iv. 33; Pausanias, iv. 17, viii. 5, viii. 13; Diodor. S., xv. 66; where two kings called Aristocrates are mentioned, both committing crimes, but each one of a different nature.

[2] Grote, *History of Greece*, vol. ii. (1862), chapter vii. pp. 193, 194.

[3] Polybius, counselling amity and alliance between the Messenians and the Arcadians of his time, goes on saying: *ὁ δὲ λόγος οὗτος ἔχει μὲν ἴσως καὶ διὰ τῶν πάλαι γεγονότων πίστιν. οἱ γὰρ Μεσσήνιοι πρὸς ἄλλοις πολλοῖς καὶ παρὰ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Λυκαίου βωμὸν ἀνέθεσαν στήλην ἐν τοῖς κατ' Ἀριστομένην καιροῖς, καθάπερ καὶ Καλλισθένης φησί, γράψαντες τὸ γράμμα τοῦτο* . . . and then he quotes the inscription quoted above, iv. 33. Polybius proceeds to say that Arcadia was a second home to the Messenians, adding, *οὐ γὰρ μόνον αὐτοὺς Ἀρκάδες ὑποδεξάμενοι κατὰ τὴν ἔκπτωσιν τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας ὑπὸ τὸν Ἀριστομένειον πόλεμον ὁμεστίους ἐποιήσαντο καὶ πολίτας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς θυγατέρας ἐψηφίσαντο τοῖς ἐν ἡλικίᾳ διδόναι τῶν Μεσσηνίων.* Referring after that to the treachery of Aristocrates at the "battle of the trenches" (*ἐν τῇ μάχῃ τῇ καλουμένῃ περὶ Τάφρον*), Polybius says, *οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ χωρὶς τῶν πάλαι τὰ τελευταῖα*, etc. The preceding passages clearly prove that Polybius never entertained the faintest doubt as to the historicity of Aristomenes and the Messenian wars.

[4] Compare Diodor. xvi. 39, with Pausanias, viii. 27. 9; iv. 28. 2; and Demosthenes' oration *ὑπὲρ Μεγαλοπολιτῶν* (352 B.C.).

inscription commemorating the vile treason of an ancient Arcadian king. Nor could the Arcadians think of doing so. In fact, had that inscription been from the fourth century, that is, from a period when the ascendency of the Thebans gave rise to very strong hopes of reducing the hegemony of Sparta which both Arcadia and Messenia were suffering under, Callisthenes and Polybius could not but have noticed the strangeness of such a tactless and bootless forgery. There are therefore several valid considerations for accepting that inscription, for what Polybius evidently took it, as an ancient record; while there is no specific reason whatever to doubt the antiquity of it.

The second monument, which for centuries kept up the memory of the Messenian wars and their greatest hero, was the tomb of Aristomenes, at which the Messenians, we are creditably told,[1] annually celebrated those cults for dead heroes which were with all Hellenic people as much part of their religiousness as are the celebrations in honour of their saints to the Roman Catholics. Our reports about the manner and the place of Aristomenes' death are, it is true, not in agreement with one another.[2] Such discrepancies can, however, not destroy the value of the report as to the annual celebration of Aristomenes' hero-cult. Identical contradictions can easily be found in the reports of the lives of Catholic saints, who nevertheless cannot be seriously doubted to have lived. In the inquisitorial procedure, indeed, anything by which an

[1] Pausanias, iv. 27. 6; iv. 32. 3.

[2] Pliny the Elder, *Naturalis Historia*, xi. 184-185 (or *sect.* 70), and others make Aristomenes fall into the hands of the Spartans, who killed him; while Pausanias (iv. 17. 1) makes him die a natural death at Rhodes.

exonerating witness might be discredited was eagerly welcomed by the judge, who, as we have seen, discouraged and mostly even discarded witnesses altogether. In an unprejudiced study of ancient history we cannot legitimately adopt such methods. When Pausanias tells us that he saw the shield of Aristomenes at Lebadia, in Boeotia, where it was deposited at the shrine of the famous oracle of Trophonius,[1] we can nowise invalidate this statement, which is somewhat borne out by an inscription,[2] by merely casting ridicule on the credulity of Pausanias. A man, like Pausanias, who had seen so much, and with such great interest, especially in regard to all antiquities of Greece,[3] could not easily be taken in. Shields in ancient Greece were signally characteristic of the State and the people with whom they were in use. It is well known that on the shields of the various Hellenic States the initial letter of the name of the State was inscribed, and that emblems or scutcheons were frequently applied. Pausanias repeatedly notices those scutcheons;[4] and if we consider that the shape, decoration, and material of Greek shields changed according to the different periods of their history, it is not likely that an experienced

[1] Pausanias, iv. 16. 7; compare Pausanias's visit to the oracle of Trophonius, ix. 39. 14.

[2] See *Corp. Inscript. Graecarum Graeciae Septentrionalis*, i. No. 2462, and the literature bearing on it in Frazer's, J. G., *Pausanias*, vol. iii. (1898), pp. 435, 436.

[3] Pausanias is still considered in Germany a poor *Sündenbock und Prügelknabe*, on whose wretched corpse the great Scaligers of our time, from Wilamowitz downward, exercise their masterly deftness in discrediting reputations. Dr. Frazer, in the powerful and luminous Preface to his vast commentary on Pausanias, has done all true students of ancient history a very great service by showing that nearly all the incriminations levelled at Pausanias by German philologists are without the slightest serious foundation.

[4] Pausanias, iv. 16. 7; iv. 28. 5; v. 19. 4; v. 25. 9; viii. 11. 8; x. 26. 3.

student of antiquities, such as Pausanias undoubtedly was, should have been deceived by the pseudo-archaic appearance of a Messenian shield said to have been made over eight centuries before his time. We are thus in a position to state that the inscription relating to Aristocrates, the annual hero-cults at the tomb of Aristomenes, and the shield of the latter, constitute a fair archaeological argument for the historicity of the great hero.

Of literary "sources" of the Messenian wars, the elegiac poet Tyrtaeus, of the seventh century B.C., whom the Spartans accepted as their official bard and energiser, is the most important. The fragments of his poetry which we still possess are clear and contemporary evidence of two great wars waged by the Spartans with the Messenians in the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. The authenticity of the fragments of Tyrtaeus has, of course, not been accepted by all modern scholars.[1] This fate the fiery bard necessarily shares with all the other poets and writers of ancient Greece. The inquisitorial method, so freely used by modern philologists, cannot but lead to the discrediting of writers who, like their fellow-sufferers in the prisons of the Inquisition, are not allowed to appeal to witnesses, or to considerations of the simplest psychology. Yet, with all that, it is still the "correct thing" to accept the authenticity of the fragments of Tyrtaeus.

Next to Tyrtaeus, we know the names of the

[1] Wilamowitz teaches a slow transformation of the poems of Tyrtaeus, and Verrall (*Classical Review* for 1896) determines that that transformation took place in the time of the Messenian rising in 490 B.C. Eduard Schwartz (in *Hermes*, vol. xxxiv.) declares the poems to be neither more nor less than a forgery at the hands of some Attic *farceur* during the Peloponnesian war, etc.

following writers in whose works the Messenian wars were treated in detail: Ephorus the historian; Myron of Priene; and Rhianus the poet. Of Ephorus's chapters on the Messenian wars we have no direct knowledge; but it can hardly be doubted that Pausanias availed himself of the well-known work, although he names as his authorities only Myron and Rhianus. Of Myron, Pausanias himself falls foul, and there can be little doubt that Myron, who wrote probably in the second century B.C., was more of a rhetorician than a historian. Yet it is impossible to admit that the authorities of Pausanias, whether they were Ephorus, Myron, or Rhianus, only "reflected" the reports of later events in Greek history, as told by Thucydides and Xenophon. This strange contention, another case of *Rückspiegelung*, is made by Busolt without any foundation whatever. He says (*Gr. Gesch.* i.[2] 580) that the report of a Messenian battle in Pausanias iv. 7. 5, is copied from Thucydides' account (v. 66-73) of the battle of Mantinea. Dr. J. G. Frazer, who confesses to his inability "to see this" (*Pausanias*, iii. p. 412), yet admits that "the remark of Pausanias as to the slowness of the Lacedaemonian pursuit [in Pausanias, iv. 8. 11] certainly agrees with the statement of Thucydides (v. 73)." It is not easy to see why even this should be admitted, in the sense of implying a doubt as to Pausanias. Few things are more certain in Greek military history previous to Epaminondas and the Macedonian kings Philip II. and Alexander the Great, than the slackness with which Greek victorious armies followed up their victory by energetic pursuit. For this, the lack of ample cavalry was a sufficient motive. It is precisely the more

energetic pursuit of the beaten adversary that forms one of the innovations introduced by Epaminondas. The Spartans being the most aggressive of the Continental Greek powers, this half-hearted treatment of the final stage of the drama of a Greek battle came to be more frequently noticed in their tactics. It was, however, a trait common to all Greeks previous to Epaminondas; and the Athenians in their naval wars observed the same custom.[1] Had therefore Pausanias, or his authority, spoken of a hot pursuit of the enemy in the seventh century B.C., such as had, after Epaminondas in the fourth century B.C., become the rule of warfare, then, and then alone, could we possibly suspect his report of a battle fought centuries before Epaminondas. But his statement of a slow pursuit on the part of the Lacedaemonians, expressing, as it does, the regular feature of battle tactics in the seventh century B.C., can under no circumstances be suspected as unauthentic.

Myron, no doubt, committed many an inaccuracy; but so did Pausanias in matters where he might have easily known better.[2] As to the poet Rhianus, we have no valid reason to assume that his poem was, although with an allowance of poetic fancy, not in accordance with many a broad fact then currently known from more than one "source." The stories told in Pausanias of the exploits of Aristomenes are

[1] Compare Thucydides, ii. 92.

[2] In iv. 9. 2, Pausanias says that Mount Ithome is as high as any mountain in Peloponnese. To this Dr. Frazer makes the following remark (vol. iii. p. 412): "A strangely inaccurate estimate of the height of the mountain. Ithome is only 2630 feet high; whereas Mount *Elias*, in the Taygetus range, which is in full view from Ithome, is 7900 feet high. Mount Cyllene in Arcadia is 7790 feet; and Mount Chelmos (the ancient Aroania), also in Arcadia, is 7725 feet. Moreover Ithome is not an imposing mountain, and hardly looks its height. The ascent is perfectly easy."

ringing with a truth of sentiment that no minor poet can invent. The greatest Greek dramatist could not have painted more poignantly the grief and despondency of Aristomenes on learning the treachery of the Arcadian Aristocrates, than do the few lines in Pausanias, iv. 22. 7: ". . . the Arcadians proceeded to stone Aristocrates with their own hands, and exhorted the Messenians to do so also. The Messenians looked to Aristomenes, but he kept his eyes on the ground and wept."

In the preceding three sections it has been tried to prove, that the system of Spartan education, or the *ἀγωγή*, was in force at least as early as the eighth century B.C. This proof was made, first by a consideration of the singular lack of any fortification round Sparta, although nature offered the Spartans more than one ready means of running up strong fortifications on convenient heights near Sparta. The second argument was taken from an analysis of music at ancient Sparta, where that art was made one of the principal politico-social powers of the State. The third argument was based on a study of the Messenian wars, a close and impartial examination of which confirmed the statement that the Spartan *ἀγωγή* dates from at least the eighth century B.C.[1] This one chronological statement will, if supported by other and converging considerations, allow us to give a final and, we take it, unanswerable proof of the historicity of Lycurgus.

[1] While writing the above lines (May 1906), the newspapers bring the important news that the excavations made by the "British School" at Sparta have led to the discovery of thousands of small votive figures and objects of all kinds, together with inscriptions, etc., round the altar of Artemis Orthia at Sparta, where, as we know, boys were scourged annually. These idols, it is reported, date at least from the seventh century B.C.

IV

Plato, Aristotle, Xenophon, Ephorus, Plutarch, and, in fact, all Greek writers on Sparta firmly believe in the historicity of Lycurgus; most modern historians (and in Germany, practically all) believe that Lycurgus is a myth. More especially, in contemporary Germany, the leading professors openly teach that to believe that one man, such as Lycurgus, or any other ancient Greek "founder of States" could and did really found and organise a State, was too absurd to be taken seriously. In other words, since States founded by and impregnated with the spirit of one personality may, with fair accuracy, be called cephalic States, it may be said that nearly all moderns refuse to believe in such States; and that Aristotle as well as Plato are severely taken to task for their belief in cephalism.[1]

[1] The belief of Aristotle in the cephalic origin of most Greek States has been severely condemned by German scholars and their but too numerous disciples outside Germany, although not a single German historian has ever had an opportunity of learning something about States other than the bureaucratic State of Central Europe which, it need scarcely be mentioned, is *toto coelo* different from an Hellenic city-state. It thus happens, that Eduard Meyer, of Berlin University, has actually committed the enormity of denying the historic reality of an old Spartan charter (*rhetra*) because its contents could not be applied to—the modern Prussian State! (*Forschungen zur alten Geschichte*, i. [1892], p. 265: "*Ist denn das ein Gesetz oder ein Vertrag durch den beispielsweise der preussische Staat oder das deutsche Reich begründet oder geordnet werden könnte?*") We say "enormity"; and it is to be feared that a much stronger word is required. Is it not indeed exasperating, if not exhilarating, that Prof. Meyer is not aware of the incredible absurdity of comparing the polity of the ancient Spartans with that of the modern Prussians? Between these two States there is, except a general tendency to Imperialism in both, not a single feature in common; not their situations in historic space; not their origin; not their social or political structure; not the number of their populations; not their religion. To use the terms here (see pp. 333 *seq.*) first introduced with regard to States, Prussia is absolutely, uncompromisingly, and exclusively *apotelestic*; Sparta was absolutely and exclusively *music*. How, under such circumstances, can any one expect an

On reading the very considerable literature of the present problem, it will speedily be seen that the ancient Spartan charter to apply to the Prussian State? If it did, it would certainly be a forgery. The charter of a French *Parlement* is essentially different from a charter organising or regulating an English *Parliament*; and an old Spartan *rhetra* shall be a fit *Rechtsquelle* for the State of Prussia? Can any one be called deaf because he cannot hear the light? However, this is what invariably happens, more especially in Germany. By the immense force of association of ideas, so fatal to most of our judgments, we cannot wean our minds from certain correlations that we have constantly seen around us. A German scholar has no idea whatever, nor can he have it, of States other than his own. Having no real *Anschauungen*, or varied object-impressions of States different from his own, the term State becomes a mere abstract notion for him; a notion which moves glibly in the thin air of his historical aeronautics. The Spartans had a State; the Prussians have a State. Why, then, could not one be measured by the other? Is not such measurement quite *correct*, quite *schulgerecht*? The objection, that the Spartans had a State essentially different from that of the Prussians, is no proper objection; it is "dilettantic." It may be perhaps an objection to the professor of Politics; but it cannot, *reglementsmässig*, be raised against the professor of History. *Ce n'est pas de son ressort.* The tearing asunder of one reality into several academic specialities or *Fächer* has, in all the studies relating to the Humanities, played havoc with truth. The great Wilhelm Riehl, in the last century, and Lessing and Justus Möser in the eighteenth century, have repeatedly proved, by deed as well as by method, the futility of breaking up historic events or institutions into disconnected fragments. He who treats of the Spartan State must in the first place know what a State really is; as he who treats of Athenian finances must first of all know what Finances really mean. This comes to saying, that knowledge of the subject-matter must precede and support knowledge of the documents. If the Spartan State was really quite different from the Prussian State, no legitimate analogy can be established between the two. One cannot serve for an interpretation of the other. We might just as well try to discover the organism of a plant from a study of the organism of a cat. And yet this elementary mistake is made by men who sit in judgment on Aristotle with regard to the nature of Greek polities. Such incredible blunders can happen and can pass unobserved only because all German scholars are alike guilty of them. As already remarked, all these historians start from the assumption that cephalic States are "impossible." This is their only argument against the historicity of all State-founding Personalities in classical Antiquity. Every other argument they advance against ancient cephalism is living only by the grace of this one assumption. As in all discussions, so in that about the historicity of Lycurgus, there is one underlying general assertion; this assertion is the impossibility of a cephalic State. And this impossibility is taken for granted exclusively for this reason, that modern States are not cephalic. In his essay on Lycurgus, Professor Meyer repeatedly harps on that impossibility. On p. 266 of his *Forschungen*, quoted above, he says that the belief in the cephalic origin of States was in Antiquity as general

modern scholars chiding Plato and Aristotle for an "unhistorical" belief in cephalism, agree on no detail

as it was "totally unhistoric.' ("*Und liegt es denn im Uebrigen nicht auf der Hand, dass dieser Rhetra die zwar dem ganzen Alterthum allein geläufige aber völlig unhistorische Anschauung zu Grunde liegt, eine Staatsordnung entstehe durch den Willen eines Gesetzgebers, der sie aus dem Nichts oder dem Chaos hervorzaubert?*") On p. 271 *ibid.* he declares the belief in cephalism a "monstrous notion" ("*wie es denn ja auch eine ungeheuerliche Vorstellung ist, dass ein Mann durch weise Vorschriften die ganze Lebensweise eines Volksstammes umgestaltet*"), although all the Greek writers constantly record facts of such a wholesale transformation of the life of an entire nation by the legislation of one Personality. Herodotus, for instance, does not hesitate to report that the Lydians "changed their whole mode of life according to the regulations of Cyrus" ("*ἐκ τούτου δὲ κελευσμοσύνης Λυδοὶ τὴν πᾶσαν δίαιταν τῆς ζόης μετέβαλον*," i. cap. 157). Aristotle ascribes even matters of custom, or of "unwritten law," to individual law-givers, as is quite evident from his *Politics*, ii. 9. Oncken and Susemihl, on the passage just quoted, are kind enough to condone for this "weakness" of Aristotle. (*The Politics of Aristotle*, by F. Susemihl and R. D. Hicks, [1894], i. pp. 285, 286, note 296.) Such kindness is only proof evident of the weakness of the moderns in treating Greek history. The facts, the very numerous facts commonly grouped under the heading of *συνοικισμός* speak as plainly as possible for Aristotle and a belief in cephalism. By *συνοικισμός* we understand the action of a number of villagers and solitary farmers of ancient Greece to unite into one polity, the seat of which was to be at one given centre. In many cases the villagers actually left their villages and set up their abode in that centre; in other cases they did not. But in all cases they were unanimous in locating or focussing most of their political and religious life in one and the same centre. Of such measures we have direct historic evidence in a number of inscriptions, such as that referring to the *synoecismus* of Lebedos and Teos (Dittenberger, *Sylloge*,[2] No. 177, or in Michel, Ch., *Recueil*, No. 17); the *synoecismus* of Melitea and Perea (Dittenberger, *l.c.* vol. ii. No. 425, Michel, *l.c.* No. 22); that of Stiris and Medeon (Dittenberger, *l.c.* vol. ii. No. 426, Michel, *l.c.* No. 24). Moreover, we have in the ancient historians sufficient if not always contemporary evidence about this reorganisation of scattered villages (*δῆμοι* or *κῶμαι*) into one abstract State. In all these attempts at recasting the original divisions of Greek peoples into *gentes* or clans, a great strain was put on the habits and associations of individuals and families. We read in Thucydides that when the people of Attica were persuaded by Pericles to leave the country and repair to Athens, they bore it with great hardship. He says (ii. 14) *χαλεπῶς δὲ αὐτοῖς διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ εἰωθέναι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς διαιτᾶσθαι ἡ ἀνάστασις ἐγίγνετο.* Xenophon, speaking of the *synoecismus* of Mantinea, expressly says (*Hell.* v. 2) that the people of the various country-places were very much opposed to the idea of leaving and demolishing their old houses in order to concentrate at Mantinea. Nothing was more natural. The *synoecismus* entailed in many ways a complete breach with all the ancient mode of life, both political and religious. In fact, it was so great a change, that neither the peoples of India, Assyria, Babylon, or

of Spartan constitutional history, except the one negative disbelief in the cephalism of Sparta. They

Egypt, nor the mediaeval Italians or Germans ever reached the degree of energy and resoluteness required by such a wholesale transformation of the daily life of a people. The Greeks were indeed the first to introduce the State as such; that is, a polity clearly differentiated from any association based upon the family, the *gens*, the clan or tribe, or the feudal baron. The Greeks did retain much of these *gentilician* institutions; yet their States were States proper. The Italians in the Middle Ages never knew how to assimilate or focus their subjects living in the "country," or the *contado*, in the city-state. They gave their subjects in the country a separate mode of government, and separate names. Thus, in the city-state of Milan, the *contado* was called *Faggia*; in Siena, *Masse*; in Arezzo, *Cortine* and *Camperie*; in Tortona, *Camparizia*; in Brescia, *Chiusura*; in Piacenza, *Vallera*; in Genoa, *tre Potesterie*, etc. (Rezasco, *Dizionario del Linguaggio italiano storico ed amministrativo* [Florence, 1881], p. 407, *s.v.* Faggia). In Attica, on the other hand, the *demes*, as introduced by Clisthenes, comprised both Athens and all the places in Attica. In mediaeval Germany we find no trace either of the Greek high-strung *synoecismus*. Some *Gaue*, or *Landschaften*, or *Marken* did indeed unite; but this union did not produce any new and well-organised polity at all. See Gierke, *Genossenschaftsrecht*, vol. i. [1868], pp. 527 *seq.* "*Die Bewegung, welche diese ausgebildeten Landesgemeinden in der Schweiz und an der Nordsee hervorrief, war auch im uebrigen Deutschland nicht ohne Parallelen. Allein ihre Resultate waren hier ueberall nur von untergeordneter Bedeutung.*"

It is quite clear that the Greek *συνοικισμός* was indeed a wholesale change in the entire life of the individuals concerned. The question now arises, in what way were these changes brought about? To assume that they were made a matter of resolution by majorities, is to beg the whole question. For, in the case of such a fundamental change of life, majorities can be made the test only where practically all are of the same opinion. To leave such a question to the mere chance of a few votes is quite incompatible with the sacrifices a *synoecismus* entails. As in Congresses decisions are never taken by majorities, because the interests involved are of far too grave a character; so in the transformation of the whole of national life majorities cannot possibly be accepted. Nor is there any evidence as to the existence of any political machinery amongst the Greeks of the tenth, ninth, or eighth century B.C., enabling them to obtain such majorities. On the contrary, such profound alterations of a people's habits, institutions, and mental attitudes must be the outcome of circumstances rendering all the individual members of that people nearly of one and the same mind, and equally desirous of the great change. This uniformity of wish necessarily leads to the choice of one prominent man as the executor of the people's will. In this psychological inference we are confirmed by numerous passages in Greek writers who trace the *synoecismus* of towns to the person of one eminent State-founder. Thucydides (ii. 15) ascribes the *synoecismus* of Attica to Theseus; Strabo (p. 337, Casaub.) says that Heraea was made out of nine *δῆμοι*, by either Cleombrotus or Cleonymus; and on p. 389 (end of

agree neither as to the origin of the ephorate;[1] nor as to that of the double kingship at Sparta;[2] one

the VIIIth book) Strabo gives us a whole list of Peloponnesian towns founded by single men, saying that it will be "not out of place" (*οὐκ ἄτοπον δέ*) to mention these *οἰκίσται*. Corinth was founded by Aletes; Sicyon by Phalces, Argos by Temenus. This passage, compared with that of p. 337, clearly shows that Strabo (or perhaps Ephorus, from whose *History* Strabo may have taken his data) meant to indicate that these Peloponnesian towns were, like most Greek towns, the result of a *synoecismus* at the hands of one man, or founder. At no time of Greek history can the "territorial factor" be said to have dominated the "personal factor" in the way in which this has been the case in Continental history. Acharnae, which was the most populous *demos* of Attica, had no particular influence on Athenian history; in fact, it had scarcely any, in that it never produced a striking or important personage. Its inhabitants were used by Aristophanes as the type of what now in France is called *un Auvergnat*. Hellenic history is one eminently making for intensity, and not for extension or massiveness.

The State of the Athenians was in the Athenians, and was not tantamount to Attica. Prussia, on the other hand, is not tantamount to the Prussians. It is, in the first place, a certain accurately delimitated large territory, on which a number of people are living, subject to the Prussian Government. If all Prussia should suddenly be peopled by as many non-Prussians, the Prussian State would remain the same. A Greek State is distinctly personal, and not territorial. It has the impress of personal forces on every one of its organs; just as a work of art is all permeated by the personality of the artist. This is why the Athenians laid such extreme stress upon the purely Athenian descent of their citizens. This is why Greeks were so profoundly averse to granting *isopolity* or their respective franchise to members of other States. This is why Greeks, *i.e.* a nation of artists, could never blend into one big State; artists never make such "combines." This is why their palmy days lasted so short a time. In short, this is what made and unmade Greek history. Instead of strengthening themselves, as moderns think the Greeks ought to have done, by assimilating as many outsiders as possible; that is, by increasing both their territory and the number of the citizens of their respective States; the Greeks preferred to strengthen themselves by wholesale transformation of themselves, whether by a *synoecismus*, by new constitutions, or by submitting to one great personality amongst them. All this is radically different from modern ideas; but all this is thoroughly Hellenic, *i.e.* artistic. To Aristotle, then, the cephalism of Greek States was just as much a foregone conclusion, as cephalism still is with every one of us with regard to works of Art. It is still absurd to assume that a harmonious and fine painting was painted by a syndicate; and not by one artist.

[1] See the conflicting opinions of Eduard Meyer, *Rheinisches Museum*, vol. xli.; Niese, *Historische Zeitschrift*, vol. lxii.; Grote, *History of Greece*, part ii. chapter vi.; Otfried Müller, *Dorier*,[2] ii. pp. 111 *seq.*; Curtius, *Griechische Geschichte*, i.[6] p. 187; Spakler, *De Ephoris apud Lacedaemonios* (Amsterdam, 1842), etc. etc.; in Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*, i.[2] p. 557, note 3.

[2] See Wachsmuth, *Die Entstehung des spartanischen Doppelkönigtums* in

holds that the *rhetrae* are forgeries, the other declares them to be authentic;[1] one holds that the ἀγωγή reflects archaic Greek customs,[2] while the other does not admit that at all;[3] one holds that the ἀγωγή has nothing to do with the Spartan constitution,[4] the other thinks it is an important portion thereof,[5] etc. etc. Where opinions are so utterly divergent, common sense will tell any unprejudiced person that there must be something radically wrong in the very way or method in which the whole problem is studied. As everywhere else, so in history too, the angle from which events and institutions are viewed, is absolutely decisive for the final results. Where opinions differ so widely; where arbitrary ways of thinking are so frequent; there we cannot but assume that the proper point of view has not yet been applied. Nor can there be much doubt about the misconstruction of the Spartan State at the hands of men who have, as a rule, no knowledge of unbureaucratic States whatever, and least of all of polities remotely resembling the State of ancient Sparta. In modern text-books of

Jahrbuch für klassische Philologie, 1868, pp. 1 *seq.*; also Niebuhr, *Vorlesungen*, i. p. 278. Compare Busolt, *Die Lakedaemonier und ihre Bundesgenossen*, i. p. 52; Eduard Meyer, *Geschichte des Alterthums*, ii. p. 343; Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, i. (1893), pp. 300 *seq.*; and particularly Schmidt, Richard, *Allgemeine Staatslehre*, ii. (1903), p. 98.

[1] See the opinions of Wilamowitz (*Philologische Untersuchungen*, vii. pp. 280 *seq.*), Eduard Meyer in the essay on "Lycurgus," in his *Forschungen*, i., as against Toepffer, Johannes, *Beitraege zur griechischen Altertumswissenschaft* (1897), pp. 349 *seq.*

[2] and [3] Pöhlmann, *Grundriss der griechischen Geschichte*[3] (1906), pp. 33 *seq.*, and Niese, *Historische Zeitschrift* for 1889, pp. 65 *seq.*; Eduard Meyer in *Forschungen*, i., on "Lycurgus"; and particularly Schmidt, Richard, *Allgemeine Staatslehre*, ii. (1903), p. 99, note 1.

[4] Gilbert, Gustav, *Handbuch der griechischen Staatsalterthümer*, i.[2] (1893), p. 16: "*die . . . mehr socialen Einrichtungen* [the ἀγωγή] *in diesem* [Gilbert's] *Abriss der politischen Entwickelung des spartanischen Staates keine Berücksichtigung finden können.*"

[5] Niese, *l.c.*, Busolt, *Griech. Gesch.* i.[2] p. 557, note 3.

political science, the differences pointed out between the various kinds of States are generally merely formal differences. When Sparta is called an oligarchy, it is held to have been characterised correctly. However, the bald categories of monarchy, oligarchy, or democracy do not advance us very much in the comprehension of an ancient Greek city-state. For Aristotle and his hearers those terms connoted a hundred things that escape us altogether; Greek writers on Sparta, Athens, or Argos may therefore have applied those terms with impunity for them and their hearers. For us moderns it is different. Those terms have become, especially for Continental scholars, more or less empty frames rather than substantial connotations. If, then, one speaks of Sparta as an oligarchy, or as a democracy of nobles, one has in reality said very little. One has not at all touched upon the vital and ever-instructive organs of that State. It is far more to the point to consider and call the Spartan State a polity, in which the legislative and judicial powers were practically discounted in favour of the executive.[1] Whatever form a State may take, it is always true that it has, in one way or other, means of doing the threefold business of functions legislative, administrative-judicial, and executive. In ancient Sparta the latter functions alone were, in the office of the Ephors, highly developed, and took up, at the expense of the two other functions, most of the vitality of the State proper. Such a State is fundamentally different

[1] This principle is manifest even in the statement of Plutarch, *Lycurgus*, cap. xiii. 3: τὸ δὲ ὅλον καὶ πάσης νομοθεσίας ἔργον εἰς τὴν παιδείαν ἀνῆψε. Where discipline and education are the life of the State, there a strong executive alone is needed.

from a Continental State, in which the administrative-judicial functions are the very soul of the body-politic. It is less alien to the British polity, in which these functions do not form the bulk of the State power. It is essentially analogous to the polities called the Orders of the Catholic Church. In those Orders the most essential point was not in the legislative organisation; nor in the *administration*, taking this word in its French meaning (in German, *Verwaltung*). It was embodied in the discipline, or *regula* of the Order, and in the officials or *superiors* entrusted with the continuous control of that discipline. The Cistercians, in the twelfth century A.D., had hundreds of monasteries in many a country intimately affiliated with one another and with the "mother convent" at Citeaux in France.[1] They were, if anything, a real polity. In that State the *regula* or discipline took the place of most of the legislative and administrative functions of the State.

That *regula* was, as in the case of Sparta, a system of browbeating nature in her most elementary desires and appetites. There can be no doubt that such a system cannot possibly be the result of a slow, natural evolution. It is essentially and distinctly a willed system. Being willed it is, after all, natural, in that it follows from human nature under certain historical conditions; being a system it is pre-eminently artistic. If, now, we want to get at the very soul of the Spartan State, we must regard it, in the first

[1] In less than a generation after the (real) establishment of the Order, in 1132, there were 300 Cistercian abbeys; St. Bernard alone founded 65. Compare the interesting work of Janauschek, Leopold, himself a Cistercian, *Originum Cisterciensium Tomus I.* (*vn.*), *Fundationes veterum abbatiarum* (742 in number) *ad fidem antiquissimarum fontium prim. descriptae* (Vienna, 1877).

place, as a work of art just as we do with the Orders of the Roman Catholic Church. To penetrate therefore to the real essence of that old Greek State we must view it from the angle of an artistic appreciation. This is, as may readily be seen, fraught with great danger. The divisions and classifications of art-works are so numerous, and so varied, that a criticism and analysis of the Spartan polity from the aesthetic standpoint may easily degenerate into mere rhetoric. In this predicament we are saved by a profound remark handed down to us by Aristoxenus, a pupil of Aristotle, and probably the greatest art-connoisseur of the Greeks, more particularly with regard to the *music* arts. This remark which we take to be more illuminating and instructive than any of the current observations on the Spartan polity taken from the principles of political science proper, is to the effect that all art is either *apotelestic* or *music*; in other words, that all art-works express Platonic ideas of beauty, goodness, and power either in space or in time.[1] This classification of arts has

[1] Of this exceedingly important classification of arts, which all modern great thinkers on metrics and music, such as Westphal or Gevært, have long made their own (Westphal, *Theorie der musischen Kuenste der Griechen*, i. [1885], pp. 26 *seq.*; Gevært, *Histoire et Théorie de la Musique de l'Antiquité*, i. [1875], pp. 21 *seq.*), we find a succinct yet sufficient statement in a *scholion* to a work of Dionysius Thrax, published in the *Anecdota Graeca*, edited by I. Bekker (1814-1821), p. 653: "*πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ πρακτικαὶ τέχναι* (by which are meant *music* arts) *κριτὴν ἔχουσι τὸν τῆς πράξεως καὶ ἐνεργείας μόνον καιρόν. καὶ γὰρ τῷ καιρῷ, ἐν ᾧ καὶ γίνονται, ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ εἰσίν.* P. 655: *πρακτικαί εἰσιν ὅσαι μέχρι τοῦ γίνεσθαι ὁρῶνται, ὥσπερ ἡ αὐλητικὴ καὶ ἡ ὀρχηστική. αὗται γὰρ ἐφ' ὅσον χρόνον πράττονται, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ ὁρῶνται. μετὰ γὰρ τὴν πρᾶξιν οὐχ ὑπάρχουσιν.* P. 670: *πρακτικὰς δὲ, ἃς τινας μετὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν οὐχ ὁρῶμεν ὑφισταμένας, ὡς ἐπὶ κιθαριστικῆς καὶ ὀρχηστικῆς. μετὰ γὰρ τὸ παύσασθαι τὸν κιθαρῳδὸν καὶ τὸν ὀρχηστὴν τοῦ ὀρχεῖσθαι καὶ κιθαρίζειν, οὐκέτι πρᾶξις ὑπολείπεται. ἀποτελεστικὰς δὲ λέγουσιν, ὧν τινῶν τὰ ἀποτελέσματα μετὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν ὁρῶνται, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδριαντοποιίας καὶ οἰκοδομικῆς. μετὰ γὰρ τὸ ἀποτελέσαι τὸν ἀνδριαντοποιὸν τὸν ἀνδρίαντα καὶ τὸν οἰκοδόμον τὸ κτίσμα, μένει ὁ ἀνδριὰς καὶ τὸ κτίσθεν.*

the immense advantage of being unforced, natural, and comprehensive. In fact no one can deny that certain arts do not want a skilled interpreter who plays the middleman between the creative artist and the passive "public"; such are sculpture, architecture, and painting. Other arts again absolutely need interpreters of that kind, such as music, poetry, dancing. This fundamental difference between art-works applies to any work of art, and even to States, inasmuch as they are works of art. Evidently a Catholic Order, considered as a State, is a work of *music* or executive art; that is, an art the success of which depends on the persons executing it. Unless each member of the Order strictly practises the *regula* of his Order, the Order will be in a state of decadence, just as a drama, if badly played by the actors, will fail of its effect. A piece of fine sculpture, on the other hand, needs no interpreter, no executant; it is there; it speaks for itself; its effect cannot be heightened nor lessened by an executant. In the same way the Spartan State was a *music* or executants' State, in that everything depended on the complete conformation of every individual Spartan to the discipline or *ἀγωγή* of his State. In a modern State, more especially on the Continent, the absolutely strict discipline of every citizen is rendered largely superfluous by a fixed system of bureaucratic officials. In other words, modern Continental States are largely and predominantly *apotelestic*; they are not executants' States. In Sparta the town itself, as we know from Thucydides, was as insignificant as possible;[1] everything depended on the citizens. As

[1] Thucydides, i. 10. 2, 3: *Λακεδαιμονίων γὰρ εἰ ἡ πόλις ἐρημωθείη, λειφθείη δὲ τά τε ἱερὰ καὶ τῆς κατασκευῆς τὰ ἐδάφη, πολλὴν ἂν οἶμαι ἀπιστίαν τῆς δυνάμεως*

in all *music* or executive arts, the staging in Sparta was indifferent. Fine *music* art can be enjoyed with the most primitive staging. As long as each individual Spartan strictly and fully conformed to the dictates of the *ἀγωγή*, the Spartan State was safe and powerful. There were no impersonal "institutions" to save it. A modern country like the kingdom of Saxony may be and has been saved, firstly, by the play of international interests, and secondly, by the mere inertia of its institutions at a time when, as in the first half of the eighteenth century, the wretched citizens or subjects in Saxony were, politically speaking, amongst the poorest specimens of the "political animal." Such institutions are for the State, what custom (*les convenances, Sitte*) is for society; they tide over untold difficulties. In a *music* or executants' State, as in Sparta, there can be no such institutions. As a matter of fact we do not hear of them. There were indeed the *gerusia*, or the Senate; the *apella*, or the Assembly; and a number of minor offices. However, they were of exceedingly little influence. The Ephors alone, being *the* executants of an executants' State, wielded supreme power. Athens, on the other hand, is rather *apotelestic*, although with a strong infusion of *music* elements. Accordingly Athens in her struggles for equipoise in her Constitution worked more for symmetry; while Sparta aspired for rhythm. In Athens we see many an institution proper, an *ἀποτελεστικόν*, as the Greek writers on metrics and art called it. In Sparta there is very little of it. In Athens when trouble sets in,

προελθόντος πολλοῦ χρόνου τοῖς ἔπειτα πρὸς τὸ κλέος αὐτῶν εἶναι . . . ὅμως δέ οὔτε ξυνοικισθείσης πόλεως οὔτε ἱεροῖς καὶ κατασκευαῖς πολυτελέσι χρησαμένης, κατὰ κώμας δὲ τῷ παλαιῷ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τρόπῳ οἰκισθείσης, φαίνοιτ' ἂν ὑποδεεστέρα.

the Athenians at once turn to men who are expected to change the institutions of the State themselves; to take away, for instance, power from the Areopagus and shift it over to the *strategi*, to a law court, or to the Assembly; or to give the franchise to certain new classes; in one word, to alter the symmetry of the State organs. After the sixth century B.C. it seldom occurs to them to ask individual reformers to introduce a change in the Athenians themselves. As a natural consequence the Athenians had a series of men like Solon, Clisthenes, Ephialtes, Pericles, Theramenes, who made architectural changes in the State proper, thereby essentially altering the aspect and functions of the several parts. The "revolutions" in the Athenian constitution, of which in Aristotle's counting there were no less than eleven, have been attributed to the fickleness of the Athenians. In reality fickleness had very little to do with it. An *apotelestico-music* State, such as Athens was from its very beginnings, cannot but go through similar "revolutions." It is its very nature. Since symmetry for such a State means force; and since a new symmetry must from time to time become necessary in a State, the population and international situation of which is constantly changing; it is evident that such a new symmetry, entailing, as it does, widespread architectural alterations, will frequently amount to an institutional "revolution." This truth has become painfully manifest in the magnificent attempt of the French to endow their monarchical and exclusively *apotelestic* State with a new symmetry of its organs. They did do so, but only by means of the greatest revolution of modern times. Where, however, as in Sparta, the State works not for symmetry but for rhythm, there

such structural revolutions are neither required nor easily possible. He who should like to change the rhythm of a State would have to change the very nature and temperament of the individual citizens. This is not easily done. Rhythm in a State means the measure and cadence of the actions, amusements, occupations, or movements of the citizens. These, by the immense force of habit, become almost inaccessible to reforms. As in music, rhythm is the last thing to change in a nation's songs and harmonies; so in a State the cadence of the movements of individual citizens cannot be easily altered. In language, or in the polity of words, we note the same thing. In the matter and rules of accidence, changes can be and are constantly being made; in the rhythm of syntax, changes are difficult to introduce.

This mode of judging a Greek city-state which, like everything Greek, was imbued with an abundance of artistic forces, will perhaps be made more plausible by showing its usefulness in the analysis of other great States; and in order to bring out its working power more fully, we shall, before applying it closely to the Spartan State, show its effects on other polities. In the first place, there is little doubt that the British polity is much less *apotelestic* than *music*, or executive. There are, of course, numerous institutions in Great Britain; but it is a common secret that they have deliberately been left, through the centuries, in a state of indefiniteness and vagueness which practically defies any attempt at formulating them completely and correctly.[1] This may, according to the

[1] The statement in the text is a matter of common knowledge to every one living in England and acquainted with the institutions of the country. For the sake of reference it may be useful to add the testimony of one of the most painstaking and observant of foreign students of the British polity.

standpoint chosen, be called their "elasticity" or their "mediaevalism." Yet it remains true, that British institutions have a very much larger amount of *sous-entendus* than has either the French, German, or any Continental constitution other than the Hungarian. In England it is not the institutions and their corresponding *personnel, i.e.* the officials, that really decide matters; it is, as everybody knows, the personality of a given bishop, judge, M.P., justice of the peace, manager, editor, etc. This simple statement, it must be remarked, cannot be said either in German or in French. The terms that one could use do not at all

M. le Comte de Franqueville, who in about twenty weighty volumes on the various aspects of British public life has shown his careful study of the theory and practice of British institutions, says: "*Vingt fois, il a fallu remanier un travail presque achevé* (meaning his three volumes on *Le Gouvernement et le Parlement Britanniques* [1887]), *et cette continuelle mobilité a singulièrement aggravé l'extrême difficulté qui résulte du caractère presque insaisissable, des institutions britanniques*" (*Préface* to the work mentioned). It is singularly instructive to compare this candid statement of a man studying contemporary institutions of a European nation, with the criticism passed by Professor Eduard Meyer on the charters called the *rhetrae* of Lycurgus ordering the Spartan State nearly 3000 years ago. Professor Meyer disbelieves in the historicity of those *rhetrae*, because, among other reasons, he finds them so hopelessly vague. He asks, Do the *rhetrae* tell us which matters belonged to the competency of the *demos*? Do they tell us whether administrative ordinances alone (*Verwaltungsmassregeln*) or legislative measures proper were put before the *demos*? (*Forschungen*, i. p. 266.) Professor Meyer would probably be astonished to learn that such questions, if put with regard to Great Britain, could not generally be answered by the most learned *connoisseur* of the British Constitution. The Berlin Professor is, as we have seen in a previous note, quite unable to conceive of a State other than the Prussian State. No wonder he disbelieves the *rhetrae*. In fact, the whole trouble about Lycurgus and the Spartan State originated from the fact that the Germans, as usual, never consulted the principal witness in the case: the Spartan State. They consult only words and passages of words; they disdain, like their predecessors on the benches of the seventeenth century, to consult witnesses. We know enough about the Spartan State to be able to characterise it fully, and thereby to obtain an unprejudiced standard for the acceptance or rejection of witnesses. Unless we start from this one safe point, we shall always lose ourselves in arbitrary opinions about the value or worthlessness of passages in Ephorus, Xenophon, Aristotle, or Plutarch referring to Sparta.

connote what, in modern English, is meant by personality. It is for this reason that Continental scholars have had no means of penetrating into the nature of a State such as the British at present, or the Spartan in ancient Greece. Such *music* or executants' States are eminently endowed with rich seeds of that great force that in England we call personality. Their institutions may be poor, or grotesque, incoherent, and formless; but their power of giving rise to men who are personalities is unlimited. For they are in reality built up, not on *apotelestic* institutions, but on the personal value of many of their citizens. In them there may be little symmetry; as certainly in England there is not much of it. But there is much rhythm; and this is, by the way, the political reason why the English excel rather in poetry than in prose, while the French, living in an *apotelestic* State, excel rather in prose than in poetry.

The immense vitality of the Roman Catholic Church, to give another illustration of the view of States here discussed, has been a marvel to thousands of Protestants, and a cause of despair to unbelievers. Without at the present trying to solve this problem fully, it may be said from the purely political standpoint, that the Roman Catholic Church derives its unparalleled strength from its being both perfectly *apotelestic* and perfectly *music* at the same time. That church consists, as is well known, of two vast organisms; one composed by the *seculars*, or priests, the other by the *regulars*, or monks. The seculars are housed, so to speak, in the most elaborate hierarchy of offices and institutions of all ages, and their organisation is thus completely *apotelestic*. It has

been proved long ago that the modern Continental system of Civil Service (*administration* in French, *Verwaltung* in German) is only a lay transformation of this, the *apotelestic* part of the Roman Catholic Church. As against this *apotelestic* organism, there is in the Catholic Church the purely *music* organism of the regulars. The Roman Catholic Church, then, combining, as it does, both the *apotelestic* and the *music*, that is, all the forces of any sort of polity, must necessarily be endowed with an extraordinary vitality.

To show the force of the distinction of States into *apotelestic* and *music* by a further illustration, it is important to note how much light may be shed by it upon the obscure problem of the Greek Oracles. No unbiassed student of Greek history will easily persuade himself that a nation so intensely civilised as were the Hellenes of, say, the sixth, fifth, or fourth century B.C., believed in oracles out of sheer stupidity or blind superstition. They had and believed in oracles; this much is certain. It is equally certain (see *Introduction*, pp. 12-15) that such a belief must have been forced upon them by circumstances. In other words, in accepting Oracles the Greeks chose, as nations do in all such apparently "absurd" customs, the lesser of two inevitable evils. The Greek States were, in comparison with modern Continental States, pre-eminently *music* or executants' States. Compared among themselves they were indeed, some largely *apotelestic*, others largely *music*. Compared with the modern Continental States, they may roughly be called *music* States. For, among Hellenes, there was no trace of a permanent bureaucracy, the members of which are appointed for life. Nor had they fixed and elaborate systems of

bureaucratic institutions. Being *music* States, the personal element was very strong in them; and personality was, more or less in all of them, certainly in Sparta, Athens, Syracuse, Tarentum, and a number of other centres of Greek historic life, the factor of all factors. Now, considering that Greek States were small in size, and that therefore any strong or fascinating personality had a relatively easy task to attach to himself or to subjugate the handful of citizens of his State; the Greeks evidently moved in a vicious circle out of which they found it at times impossible to extricate themselves. Their States, being frequently *music*, naturally gave rise to strong and ambitious personalities. These personalities again, likewise naturally, were a constant danger to the liberties of their State. In this predicament the Greeks, with whom religion was an inseparable part of political power, had recourse to a simple, if probably unconscious stratagem. Already in early times they had suffered, as we have seen, many a religious cult to remain exclusively in the hands of single private families. By this they meant to prevent the State, or its officials, from wielding too much power. For, since religion was then an organic part of political power, the Greek State would, had religion been quite *officialised*, have become autocratic. On the other hand, this handing over of the cult of great gods and goddesses to private people was also a dangerous matter. In a given family, such as the Eumolpidæ in Attica, the cult of great religious ceremonies might easily be turned to political ends by a powerful personality of that family. Under these circumstances, then, it was manifestly the most expedient method to deprive

any budding "tyrant" or towering personality of the supreme power in politics, that is, of deciding the future course of measures and events, by submitting such cases to a third party, outside the State. This third party was found in the various Oracles. These, to us, rather strange institutions were the necessary outcome of the conflict of the two indispensable political factors in most Greek States, (1) Greek Religion, (2) the *music* character of so many Greek States, which invariably gave rise to gifted and aggressive personalities. To give up religion as an inseparable organ of every political force was impossible for the Greeks. For, living as they did in small communities, continuous familiarity with one another, unless dignified by the awe of religion, would have rapidly destroyed amongst them that seriousness and mutual respectfulness without which States proper cannot exist. To sterilise the source of personalities amongst them was equally impossible, owing to the *music* character of most Greek States. To avoid the greater evil of constant disruption at the hands of powerful personalities, the Greeks chose the lesser evil of acquiescing in Oracles. Once these Oracles were officially and solemnly acknowledged by the States of the Greeks, private Greeks could not well hesitate to consult them.

This construction of the character of most Greek States assists us very much in comprehending the extraordinary value they set on victories gained in their national athletic games. The greatest poets celebrated the victorious wrestler or discus-thrower; statues were erected in his honour; his fellow-citizens honoured him in every possible manner. We moderns, and more especially we of the twentieth

century, have also a great interest in athletic national games, and much honour is bestowed upon victorious cricketers, runners, leapers, or wrestlers. Yet our interest is practically nothing in comparison with the flaming enthusiasm of the Greeks. Much light is shed, we take it, on this, to us, curious feature of Greek life; and its correlation with other Greek institutions is shown more clearly, by considering it from our present standpoint with regard to Greek States. If we contemplate in all its meanings and connotations the term "*music State*" which, as we have seen, is for so many Greek States the term most characteristic of them, as against modern States, we cannot fail to see that such "executants' States" depend almost exclusively on the individual "fitness" of each citizen; on his muscles, nerve, endurance, strength, agility, etc. This, as was remarked above, is the common feature of all *music* polities.[1] We find it even so in the *music* "States" of the Catholic Orders. With them the chief points of individual "fitness," on which depended the success and power of the monasteries of the Order, were self-humiliation; self-mortification by abstinence from all bodily pleasures, including continuous sleep; voluntary poverty; absolute submissiveness. When one or

[1] Meyer, Eduard, in his *Geschichte des Alterthums*, vol. v. [1902], pp. 367, 368, lectures Plato on the latter's idea that the home-constitution of a Greek State is more important than its foreign policy. "No," says the Professor, "the reverse is the case." "*Die äussere Politik ist der Nerv des Staates, nicht die innere*" (*l.c.* p. 268). So it is—in Prussia; that is, in an exclusively *apotelestic* State. But *music* or executants' States cannot possibly prosper unless their rhythmic ἀγωγή is continually kept up to the mark. No theorem in arithmetic can be plainer; and Plato, rightly considering, as he did, that Greek States were *par excellence* States *music*, could not but teach that the home development was to them infinitely more important than foreign policy. Compare the remarks on the lack of a law of nations, of permanent ambassadors, etc., in ancient Greece, in the chapter on Demosthenes, pp. 459 *seq.*

another of the inmates or superiors of the monastery had carried these qualities to perfection he was, to the jubilant triumph of his Order, declared to be a Saint, and the greatest honours were showered on his memory and tomb. Greek States being essentially *music*; and some amongst them, like Sparta, being eminently *music* not only in comparison with modern, but even in contrast with other Greek States; it is quite comprehensible that any public and solemn recognition of the superior fitness of their individual citizens was to them what canonisation of one of their brethren was to the members of a Catholic Order. The victor at Olympia showed not only his individual superior fitness, but also that of his State. A Spartan who won a prize at Olympia for his strength, endurance, or agility, was glorified not as an individual, but as the representative of a State whose very existence was founded upon and maintained by the strength, endurance, or agility of its citizens.

By examining Greek institutions from the hitherto neglected standpoint of the division of States into polities *apotelestic* or *music*, we have thus been enabled to bring home to our modern comprehension matters apparently so different from one another as Greek Oracles, Greek national athletic competitions, Greek Religion, and Greek Personalities. We have connected these four manifestations of the Hellenic mind by one common correlation with the fundamental character of Greek city-states.

If now we gather up all the threads of this lengthy investigation of the Spartan State, we are entitled to say that the Spartan State was at least as early as the beginning of the eighth century B.C.

a *music* or executants' State *par excellence*. Its ἀγωγή or strict system of education, extending to every age, and with unbroken continuity, was the essence of that State.[1] This ἀγωγή was, in fact, a system of education applied to each Spartan with absolute uniformity. This uniformity or unity it could have derived in one way only: by accepting it at the hands of one man. They so accepted it, not because they thought that man was a god, or because they had some superstitious belief in the godlike nature and divine wisdom of that one man. Had such a superstition or blind belief guided them at the beginning, they might very well have altered that system of education in the second or any later generation. For, a god is immortal, *i.e.* always present to all generations; and the fifth or tenth generation might very well have been persuaded to change or even to abandon the original ἀγωγή, "at the behest" of the god. However, the Spartans accepted that ἀγωγή at the hands of one *man*, because in their peculiar geo-political situation all of them instinctively and irresistibly felt that what they needed most was a *music* State *par excellence*, and a permanently *music* State too. This permanency they secured most safely by accepting their principal *music* features at the hands of a mortal man, and of one man only. He was needs a mortal; otherwise, for the reason just given, alterations might be introduced at any subsequent time; he must be one man,

[1] See the passage in Gilbert, G., in his *Handbuch der griechischen Staatsalterthümer*, 1[2] [1893], p. 16, quoted above, p. 330. That amounts to saying that in treating of the Order of Citeaux we must leave out of consideration all those sections of the *regula* or constitution of the Order, that prescribe the prayers, labour, conversation, meals, costume, or daily routine of a Cistercian friar. One might just as well leave out the whole Order altogether.

because absolute uniformity and unity is as essential to a *music* State proper as is permanency of its "rhythm."[1] In saying that the Spartans accepted their ἀγωγή, that is, the most essential part of their constitution, at the hands of one man, we only say, that the Spartans of the ninth century B.C. were geo-politically forced to build themselves an excessively *music* State. It will be noted, that the establishment of such an excessively music State implies psychologically its origin at the hands of one man. In all history we find it so. The excessively *music* polities of the Catholic Great Orders were all founded by single men. They could not have been founded otherwise. This correlation between excessively *music* States and single founders is not dependent on any historical proof whatever. It is founded in human nature. It is a matter of psychology. As intensely *music* States at all times of their existence produce singularly strong personalities, so for their inception they also need a State-founding personality. They are not slowly "evolved"; they are made. In that, of course, they are radically different from modern "territorial" or "national" States. These States are indeed "evolved," that is, they need centuries for the piecing together of either their territory or their constitution. They are, all of them, infinitely more *apotelestic* than *music*; personality plays in their history a part radically different from the one it played in the life of Greek, or prevalently *music* States. It is for this reason that modern scholars, more particularly on the

[1] It is as if in a Cistercian monastery they tried to introduce, in addition to their *regula* as Cistercians, the *regula* of the Praemonstratensians too. The whole "rhythm" of such a Cistercian monastery would be thrown into hopeless confusion.

Continent, where there is practically no opportunity of getting familiarised with the "atmosphere," or singular nature of *music* polities; it is, we say, especially on the Continent that the unanimous belief of all Greek thinkers and historians in State-founding personalities, or, briefly, in the cephalic character of most Greek States, has been declared to be an absurdity. And, indeed, unless a modern scholar has duly learned to feel and to see the vast difference between States *apotelestic* and *music*, he may and will, in all sincerity, discredit the belief of Aristotle in the cephalic character of Sparta.

That, therefore, an excessively *music* State, such as Sparta, must have necessarily been made by one State-founder, is, the more one thinks of the nature of such a State, a mere foregone conclusion. As such a State has an origin different from that of all modern Continental States, so it has also a different life altogether. When trouble sets in, the citizens of such an excessively *music* State will do the very reverse of what modern citizens are doing. Continental nations, when profoundly agitated by home troubles, do not doubt that the best of remedies will be to make of their old institutions and laws as much *tabula rasa* as possible. Not so the Spartans. Whenever they had such troubles, their first measure was to renew, in all its pristine rigour, the constitution of their original founder. Instead of being "progressive," they were deliberately ultra-conservative. They indeed carried out the old English *music* principle: *Novas leges non facimus*, "we make no new laws." Not only did they *not* hold that their ancestors were befogged in "mediaeval" notions, but they at once harkened back to the very law of their

first ancestor.[1] This, as will be seen in the foot-note, effectively disposes of any possible "Reflex-theory" in Spartan history.[2]

If one neglects to study the profound differences between a State like Sparta and a State like Prussia,[3] one places one's self inevitably in an attitude of *non possumus* to all Greek history. It is the attitude which an ancient Greek would have taken up with regard to the one universal Pope of the Middle Ages. An ancient Greek, as we have seen, had never in his life met with anything remotely similar to a Roman Pope in the Middle Ages. In classical Greece there was no hierarchy of priests whatever; and the claim of one priest to be the head of all the priests in the world would have appeared to a Hellene the most absurd and the most dangerous thing in the world. For him, such a personality was as incomprehensible as is Lycurgus for scholars ignoring the character of *music* States.[4]

[1] Repeatedly in the history of Sparta, when grave internal troubles had broken out, the classical remedy was considered to consist in restoring the ancient Lycurgean constitution in all its archaic rigour. It is needless to give references for this well-known fact, which even in the third century B.C. is confirmed by the reforms proposed by Agis III. and Cleomenes III.

[2] From all that has been said in the text, it is evident that the reflex-theory or *Rückspiegelung* is practically inapplicable to *music* States. Such States are necessarily very conservative, as was ancient Sparta and as is modern England, for the simple reason that the "rhythm" of a nation is, as was remarked above, exceedingly recalcitrant to broad changes. In *apotelestic* States, the reflex-theory is, at least, possible; in *music* States it is practically impossible. It is, in the latter States, a contradiction in terms. No wonder it has led German historians to the interesting discovery of a reflected reflex-theory, or a reflex of the second power. Thus in the *Index lectionum* of Rostock University (for Summer 1893) Schwartz holds that Meyer's *Tendenzschrift* of King Pausanias, which is supposed to have, by reflex, invented the fable of Lycurgus, was in itself a sub-*Tendenzschrift* of a Sophist, directed *against* Lycurgus, and foisted on to or "reflecting" King Pausanias' pamphlet. One must not despair to hear shortly of a sub-sub-*Tendenzschrift* "reflecting" that Sophist; and so *ad infinitum*.

[3] See above, foot-note, p. 325.

[4] See the chapter, *The Discussion of the Roman Constitution.*

It is now, we hope, quite evident that the concrete question whether Lycurgus was or was not the original founder and organiser of the Spartan polity, is, in a manner, a secondary question. It cannot be seriously doubted that Sparta, being an excessively *music* State, was in reality founded and organised by one man. Whether that man's name was Lycurgus or some other name is, generally speaking, immaterial. Whether we know or do not know much of his personal life[1] is equally immaterial. If any of the modern *Lycurgomachoi* had legally or conclusively proved that the indispensable "law-giver" of the Spartans was one Leonidas, and not the hackneyed Lycurgus, we should be but too glad to accept Leonidas as the *νομοθέτης* or State-founder of Sparta. But, since that has never been done, and since the ancients all but unanimously report that the *νομοθέτης* of Sparta was one Lycurgus; it is, in common fairness, impossible to dispute the rights of Lycurgus. The whole problem, then, of the historicity of Lycurgus is one that touches upon the very soul of Greek history, upon its cephalic and *music* character. It is sad to see how nearly all the innumerable philologists and historians of the last three centuries have persistently misread this, the vital feature of all Greek life. One may easily imagine the incredible devastation wrought in all the fields of Grecian studies by this neglect of the most essential trait in all Greek history. Greek history, together with the history of all the other classical border nations, is cephalic and *music* in the first place. From its cephalism it takes the origin and trend of

[1] Plutarch himself admits that he knew very little, if anything, about the life of Lycurgus; and that all the reports about the Law-giver's personal history were contradictory. Plutarch, *Lycurgus*, i. 1.

all its course. This cephalism and *music* character colours or discolours its Religion, its Politics, its Laws, Games, Arts, and social life. To ignore it is to ignore the House of Commons in English History.

The strangest thing in this secular neglect of the very life-force in Greek history is the fact, that not one of the Germans availed himself of the hint indicated in one of their most perfectly beautiful and profound classical essays. The immortal Lessing in his *Laokoon*, published about 140 years ago, has, in the opinion of all writers on the theory of Art, once for ever vindicated the rights of the division of all Art into *apotelestic* and *music*. It is true, Lessing does not mention these terms, nor does he refer to the works of Aristoxenus, the pupil of Aristotle. Yet it is common knowledge that Lessing deduces the essential features of poetry, from its *music* character, as an Art in Time; and even so the principal rules of sculpture or painting, from its *apotelestic* character, as an Art in Space.[1] Various Germans, more especially the incomparable Otfried Müller, had clearly discerned that Greek States were works of Art,[2] and that, therefore, one would think, considerations of aesthetics are not out of court in a study of Greek States. However, the hint thrown out by Lessing was left unheeded. When the author of the present work, at the end of over twelve years' occupation with the problem of Lycurgus, and after he had been led to the right path by Aristoxenus, noticed (April 22, 1906) the striking resemblance between what Lessing had done for the theory of Greek Art and what he hopes to have done for the

[1] See especially chapters xvi., xvii., and xviii. of the *Laokoon*.

[2] Müller, Otfried, *Dorier*, ii.[2] pp. 245 *seq.* and p. 329.

theory of the Greek State; he underwent the shock of a "sudden revelation."[1] Indeed most of our notions of Greek history have been so utterly falsified and are so radically out of gear, that when one finally emerges out of that "sea of errors," as Goethe calls it, one feels inordinately amazed at what one ought to have known all the time. What, in reality, can be simpler than that the Greeks, the most artistic nation of the world, had artistic States? The principles underlying Lessing's arguments apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to Greek States too; they give us not only a means of demarcating neatly the boundary "between Poetry and the Fine Arts," but also the inner boundary between one kind of Greek States and the other.

Once we firmly seize the essential character of the Spartan State, we can no longer doubt that the *ephorate* in Sparta is almost contemporaneous with the foundation of the Spartan State. We saw that as the ἀγωγή was practically the principal organ of the Spartan polity, so the relentless maintenance of the pristine rigour of that ἀγωγή was the indispensable corollary of the Spartan constitution. It can, therefore, not be called in question that the Spartans, needing as a matter of fact nothing but a very strong executive, must at all times have had the *ephorate*, or some differently named, yet identical office to that effect.

[1] The author's views on the Lycurgus problem found their first expression in print in the *Verhandlungen der 45ten Versammlung deutscher Philologen und Schulmänner* (published in 1900), where the lecture, given by the author at Bremen, on September 27, 1899, before the said *Versammlung*, was published, pp. 102–105, under the title of "*Der antike Stadtstaat und die Persönlichkeit.*"

ATHENS BEFORE THE PERSIAN WARS

The history of Athens is not the history of a town; it is the history of the best forces of humanity. What Athens did or tried to do is the very thing that all the rest of the European nations have tried to do ever since. The eternal problems of the harmony between order and progress; aristocracy and democracy; wealth and equity; physical power and mental advancement; science and religion; art and utilitarianism; empire and local government; they were one and all broached, launched, or solved by the Athenians. Athenian history is typical, symptomatic, and hence permanently interesting and instructive. Other Greek States also contributed to what might be called the text of all human history; Athens, as far as we know, wrote the major part of that text. He who could write Athenian history, fully and completely, would immeasurably facilitate the task of the historian of any other nation. Unfortunately our information about many a period of Athenian history is very poor, and even the startling discovery of Aristotle's treatise on the Athenian constitution, first published by Dr. Kenyon of the British Museum in 1890, has added more to the puzzles of, than to the insight into, Athenian history.

Athens, as a city-state, arose by the concentration of the various communities in Attica in the city of Athens. This *synoecismus*, ascribed by tradition to Theseus, left its indelible mark on the Athenians who annually celebrated it. For, unlike the Spartans proper, the Athenians consisted of heterogeneous groups of people, each group having interests of its own. Moreover, Athens was, since the beginning of

the sixth century, at any rate, the centre of a considerable seafaring trade by which the economic, and hence the political conditions too, of the people were affected to an extent unknown in Sparta and other inland States. Finally, Athens did not suffer from the strain imposed upon other States by the very extensive expansion commonly called Greek colonisation, during the eighth and seventh centuries B.C.; and, accordingly, the development of the Athenian polity was during that period very much less interrupted or interfered with. In Spartan constitutional history the most important institution is the *ἀγωγή* or education of the citizens; in Athenian, it is the distribution and mutual relation of offices, embodying the legislative, administrative, and executive powers of the State. At first Athens seems to have been under kings controlled by *archontes*, or chief magistrates, one of whom was the *polemarch* or minister of war. Later on, royalty proper was abolished, and Athens became an aristocracy governed by the richest and most influential of the patricians or *eupatridae*. The people were divided into four *phylae*, each of which was subdivided into *phratriae* and again into *genê*. The precise meaning of these terms is a matter of great doubt.[1] It seems, however, fairly certain that the stratification of the people according to their economic condition was, even previous to the sixth century B.C., of more

[1] On the Attic *phratriae* see especially Gaetano de Sanctis, ΑΤΘΙΣ, *Storia della Repubblica Ateniese dalle origini alle riforme di Clistene* [Rome, 1898], pp. 39 *seq.*, in whose opinion the *phratriae* are of very ancient date. The most instructive inscriptions on *phratriae* are Nos. 438 and 439 in Dittenberger's *Sylloge*,[2] vol. ii., one on the Labiadae, the other on the Demontionidae. The *genê* seem to have originally comprised noble families only. On the *phylae* the most elaborate monograph is that of Szanto, in the *Sitzungsberichte der Wiener Akad. d. Wiss.* for 1901, who shows that the *phylae* were not a general feature of all Greek States.

import than any classification according to *phylae* or *phratriae*. The *agroikoi* or *geomoroi* and the *demiurgoi* comprised the small landowners or farmers and the small trades-people. The *eupatridae*, such as the Alcmaeonidae, the Philaidae, etc., naturally endeavoured to appropriate all the power in the State; the lower classes were, in the first half of the seventh century, deeply in debt to the rich patricians, and owing to the rigour of the then law of debts, practically their slaves. However, a reform was arrived at (about 624 B.C.) by the legislation of Dracon, who limited the power of the *eupatridae* and fixed the laws of the State (it is said in a most rigorous or "Draconic" fashion) by committing them to writing. Already in his time the right of citizens to the higher offices was, or was made, dependent on the amount of property owned; in other words, Athens was already, in the seventh century B.C., a timocracy. There were, as ordered, shortly after Dracon, by Solon, four classes according to property—(1) the *pentacosiomedimnoi*, or such as had from their estates an annual income of 500 measures of dry or liquid produce; (2) the *hippeis*, or knights, who had at least 300 measures; (3) *zeugitae* (teamsters), who had an annual income of at least 200 measures; (4) *thetes*, the lowest free class, who had no income from real estate. For purposes of supplying ships to the State the tribes were also divided into forty-eight *naucrariae* or administrative circles.

Athens, by the end of the seventh century B.C., was, in spite of Dracon's legislation and after the failure of Cylon to establish a "tyranny" (royalty), in a condition of unrest; and the citizens, as in the case of Dracon, entrusted one man, Solon, who had defeated

Megara, the rival of Athens, and thereby brought the important isle of Salamis under Athenian sway, with the task of reconstructing the State.[1] This Solon did with great success in 594 B.C. His was a mind free alike from the narrowness of the mere practician and from the doctrinarianism of the theorist. A true Hellene, he esteemed moderation and serenity above everything else. The impress of his personality on the Athenian State remained to the end of all Athenian history. He wanted to save, for the benefit of the State, both the wealth and political experience of the aristocracy and the freedom and energy of the industrial and labouring classes. To enfranchise the latter he cancelled all mortgages and such debts as entailed servitude of the debtor; he also reduced probably all their other debts too. This measure is called *seisachtheia*. He, moreover, gave each citizen the right of going to court on his own behalf, as well as on behalf of any other citizen. This measure nipped the growth of any *clientela* in the bud. To the *thetes* too he gave a vote in the assembly, although the higher magistracies (*archontes*), the senate of the 400 (*boulê*), the Areopagus, he recruited from among the wealthier classes only. In sharp contrast to the Roman timocracy, Solon circumscribed the rights of possible candidates for offices much more strictly than the rights of the voting electors; or, in other words, Solon restricted the passive franchise, the Romans the active. Hence Athens had no regular *lustra*, such as we see in Rome. By endowing the country-people of Attica with timocratic rights, Solon consummated the complete union of Attica and Athens.

[1] Professor Bury holds that Solon reconquered Salamis after his work as a legislator had been done. *History of Greece* (1900), p. 191.

There were no regular direct taxes; the only funds levied by taxation were called *leiturgia*, which were made up of the "ordinary," for festivals and public amusements, and the "extraordinary," for the building of ships and other public purposes. Solon probably controlled the power of the Assembly by granting intervention on the part of the Areopagus, as he certainly accorded appeal from the judgments of the official courts (the *thesmothetae*) to the *heliaea* or popular jury. He likewise reformed many a department of the civil law of Athens. His reforms, which were not only proposed by him, and discussed by others, as are the Bills of modern reformers, but which were his own in inception, execution, and in legal power of binding the citizens,—his reforms, we say, show in an unambiguous way the influence of personality on a city-state.[1]

Shortly after Solon's reforms Athens fell under the "tyranny" of Pisistratus, a very able man, who did much for the poorer classes, and for the material prosperity of the polity. Although vigorously combated and twice foiled by his antagonists, Pisistratus was able to recover his ascendency, and even to transmit it to his sons, Hippias and Hipparchus. The latter was assassinated by Harmodius and Aristogiton, and Hippias went in search for intervention to the mighty king of Persia. Meanwhile, Athens was by Clisthenes, an Alcmaeonid, endowed with further reforms in the direction of sound democracy. Clisthenes wanted to break the power of the old aristocracy, and the clannish *phratriae*. To that

[1] Or as Aristotle expresses it in the Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία (vi. 1), Solon was κύριος τῶν πραγμάτων. Compare the remarks on Solon in the chapter on Demosthenes, pp. 454, 455.

effect, he "gerrymandered" Attica in the following fashion. Accepting the territorial divisions of the ancient *demes* or villages in Attica as a basis, he made of every three (or more ?) contiguous *demes* a group called *trittys*; three such *trittyes* were formed into a *phyle*, but in such a manner that one *trittys* was recruited from amongst the people living on the coast, the other from Athenians proper, and the third from country-people. There were ten such *phylae*. The *trittyes* were, however, mere framework; the real political and administrative units were the *demoi* or villages (better parishes), by joining which denizens became citizens. In that way the old local "tribes" and kinships were severed and broken.[1] Edward I. of England employed in 1284 the same measure with a view of breaking the power of the Welsh clans by the introduction into Wales of the system of English counties. The Athenian *boulê* or council (senate) in the time of Clisthenes consisted of 500 members, fifty from each *phyle*, elected by lot in the *demoi*, and sitting for the tenth part of the year as the acting *prytany*, or committee. Thus the country members had as great a share in the government as had the urban members of the *phylae*. New military leaders (*strategoi*) of the *phylae* were constituted in 502 B.C.; the chief command changing day by day. Clisthenes did not materially alter the prerogatives of the wealthier classes; yet, by the introduction of *ostracism*, any unpopular or dangerous politician could be sent into exile on 6000 citizens placing their potsherds, with the name of the person to be ostracised,

[1] The fullest investigation into the Attic (and other) *demes* is in the article Δῆμοι in Pauly-Wissowa's *Realencyclopaedie der klassischen Alterthumswissenschaft*, vol. ix. (1903).

in an urn. The introduction of ostracism proves that the power of the Areopagus to control the assembly and the political life generally was reduced. Ostracism was in reality what "opposition" both in parliament and in the press is to-day; and still more, what it was in the time of regular "impeachments" and bills of attainder.

The Classical Conflict with the Empires

The same causes that quickened into life the first great beginnings of the Greeks in the twelfth, eleventh, tenth, and ninth centuries B.C., brought all their gifts to the highest pitch of energy and force in the fifth century B.C. As stated above (p. 139), the empire dominating western Asia at the end of the sixth century was Persia. It was inevitable that the Persians, like all their predecessors in imperial policy, should try to possess themselves of the Mediterranean. After the destruction of the Lydian empire by Cyrus, the doom of the "Ionian" city-states on the coasts of Asia Minor was close at hand. Their inner disorganisation and their disunion, both shortcomings being but poorly remedied by faint-hearted assistance from Athens and Eretria alone of all Hellenes in Greece, led to their speedy subjugation at the hands of King Darius, son of Hystaspes, whose generals defeated the fleet of the Ionians off Lade (497 B.C.?) and captured Miletus (495 B.C.?). Aristagoras of Miletus, who was at the head of the "Ionian revolt," proved unequal to his task. The Ionians, having preceded the Hellenes in Greece in the establishment of city-states by a century or two, reached also the termination of their independence a

century or two earlier. In both cases Greek States, too intensely individualistic to unite, were in the end defeated by the united forces of powerful empires.

Fortunately for Greece, her city-states were at the beginning of the fifth century very far from the exhaustion caused by generations of civil strifes; they were mostly in the prime of political vigour. When, therefore, Darius, son of Hystaspes, king of the Persian realm, after an abortive attempt in 492 B.C., sent an expedition under Datis and Artaphernes, in 490 B.C., for the conquest of Greece, the Athenians under Miltiades, aided only by the Plataeans, succeeded in defeating the Persians in the glorious battle of Marathon. This is the first directly verifiable of the numerous battles fought by the border nations against the Empires, battles that alone rendered possible the rise of European civilisation. The Persians, who now held most of the Aegean islands, could not relax in their attempts at reducing Greece. The danger temporarily averted was sure to threaten Greece before long. Fortunately for the Athenians they found in Themistocles, a Lycomid, a statesman and military organiser of the very first order. Supple, resourceful, patient, and endowed with the intelligent energy of the highest form of statesmanship, Themistocles knew how to avoid the pitfalls prepared for him by his enemies, the powerful Alcmaeonids and Philaids, and the influence of his great antagonist Aristides, who seems to have possessed all the vigour if also the narrowness of a virtuous doctrinaire. Themistocles persuaded the Athenians to build more ships, and to rely, in the coming war, on their fleet rather than on their land army. The silver mines of Laurium in Attica, still

worked, furnished the necessary funds. Darius died in 485 B.C. His successor Xerxes invaded Greece by land and on sea in 480 B.C. at the head of a very large army and a powerful navy; and several Greek states, such as Argos, Thebes, and others, renounced any hope of combating the mighty king. Athens, Sparta, Plataea, Thespiae, and twenty-seven other Greek city-states, on the other hand, determined to oppose Xerxes. King Leonidas of Sparta, with a few hundred Spartans, withstood at the pass of Thermopylae several onslaughts of the Persian hordes, and on being finally surrounded by the enemy, sacrificed himself and his men to his exalted notion of patriotism, rather than surrender to the barbarian. The moral effect of this ever-famous holocaust was very great. It was immeasurably heightened by the still more glorious success of Themistocles, who, off Salamis, on September 20, 480 B.C., completely defeated the Persian fleet under the eyes of Xerxes. The remains of the Persian fleet retired towards Asia, and the Greeks now turned inland against Mardonius, who, at the head of a large Persian army, had devastated Attica and Athens even more completely than after Thermopylae, and who now (479 B.C.) awaited the Greek army under the Spartan Pausanias near Plataea. The battle was a complete victory for the Greeks. The western Greeks too had their Salamis, and in the same year as the great battle of Themistocles. For the Carthaginians were in 480 B.C. signally defeated at Himera, by the Sicilian Greeks under Gelon, ruler of Syracuse, and Theron, ruler of Acragas. Most probably there was a connection between the two vast attempts on the independence of the eastern and western Greeks. The Hellenes stood the trial

magnificently, and all the forces released and intensified by their titanic struggles against vast empires in the past now received such powerful stimuli, that empires intellectual and artistic were conquered by them with the same irresistible genius. When budding Themistocleses found no second Salamis to fight, they turned to art, literature, philosophy, and science, with equal success. At Salamis the great tragedian Aeschylus was fighting for Greece; his greater rival Sophocles, then a beautiful youth, danced at the celebration after the victory; and the third of the great Hellenic tragedians, Euripides, was born, it is said, in Salamis, on the day of that unparalleled triumph. Within a little over two generations after Salamis, the Greeks produced the two incomparable masters of historiography, Herodotus and Thucydides; the greatest satirist and writer of comedy of all ages, Aristophanes; the greatest ethical and philosophical personality of mortal men, Socrates; the founder of the science of medicine, Hippocrates; the greatest sculptors of all ages, Phidias, Polyclitus, Myron, Pythagoras of Rhegium, Scopas, and Praxiteles; some of the greatest philosophers of all times, Democritus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Plato; the founders of the great philosophic schools of Megara, Elea, Cyrene, and also the Cynics; and, finally, less than a century after Salamis, was born Aristotle of Stagirus, who carried, at Athens, all the branches of philosophy to a height of systematic finish such as no other thinker has ever surpassed. These were the palmy days of mankind indeed; but just as Shakespeare could not be thought of without the English Salamis, or the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, even so the

intellectual Miltiadeses and Themistocleses of the Hellenes cannot be severed from the victors of Marathon and Salamis, Plataea and Himera.[1]

[1] It is necessary to say here a few words about the treatment of Herodotus, our chief source with regard to the Persian wars, at the hands of the Germans. The vast authority which the German way of handling such questions has exercised over the minds of British and American scholars, makes it imperative to consider, if ever so shortly, whether that manner of investigating historical events is or is not "scientific." In the author's opinion it is not only not "scientific," but the very reverse. It is, as already stated, essentially identical with the inquisitorial method practised by the judges on the Continent, previous to the French Revolution. It is the most arbitrary, dilettantic, and inanely learned method imaginable. With the aid of such a method one can prove anything one pleases.

One preliminary remark, touching upon the psychological nerve of the whole problem, must be premised. It is absolutely certain, and has (with one exception, of which at the close of this note) never been doubted, that a number (thirty-one) of Hellenic city-states completely defeated the Persians, both on land and on sea, from 490 B.C. to 479 B.C. It is equally certain that close upon these victories a number of Hellenic States, more especially Athens, started a period of mental, artistic, and political splendour, such as has rarely, and in the opinion of some of us, never been seen in history. Between these two series of broad historical facts there is, we contend (most people contend), an intimate and causal connection. Had the victories of the Greeks been easily-won advantages over a wretched foe, the Hellenes, we submit, could not have developed that rare, and in some lines unique, energy of thought and action which, shortly after Plataea, they did develop. Such energy can come only from one cause, from a most inspiriting series of triumphs energising a nation. Such among modern *pacifistes à outrance* as absolutely deny the stimulating effect of great military triumphs, will, of course, not admit that Marathon, Thermopylae, Salamis, and Plataea were the true parents of Sophocles, Herodotus, Socrates, Phidias, and all the other intellectual glories of the Hellenes. However, this modern pacifism is simply the consequence of the fact that at the present moment (1906) all the armies of Europe, except one, are beaten armies. It is also precisely in Germany, that is, in the country of the one unbeaten army, where contemporary pacifism has made very little headway. The other nations, acting on the principle of "*δμφακές εἰσιν*," pretend to detest war and to deny its undeniable effects of superior energisation, provided it was waged for the triumph of national ideals. If historical evidence is needed, it abounds on all sides. No nation has ever given rise to intellectual greatness of a superior kind unless it has by national struggles for great and hard-won ideals so energised its individual members that some of them were able to reach the highest sort of mental energy—that is, mental creativeness. Warring or skull-breaking alone does not do it; ideals, national ideals, must be fought for. Without such fights there is no intellectual greatness. First is Salamis, and afterwards Sophocles. First is the agitated birth of the Republic of Florence, and the

From 478 to 449 B.C. the Greeks attacked the Persians in Europe, Egypt, and Asia Minor, in five great campaigns, of which the Egyptian alone ended,

endless struggles of Italian city-states against Empire and Papacy, and afterwards is Dante. First is the defeat of the Armada, and then comes Shakespeare. First are the innumerable feats of the *conquistadores*, and then follows Cervantes. There is no Lessing without the national victories of Frederick the Great, as Lessing's own letters amply prove, although he was a Saxon. Nor can Descartes, Pascal, and Molière be thought of without the triumphs of Richelieu and Mazarin. When Italy, from about 1640 to the end of the eighteenth century, ceased to be a political or military force, she also ceased to produce men of first-class intellectual greatness. Nor was Germany, for identical reasons, more fortunate in the seventeenth century; and even the genius of Bach could not, as witness his heaviness and frequent uncouthness of inner form, shake off the torpor of the first half of the eighteenth century in Germany. The example of Sparta and Rome does not in the least militate against the general statement. Sparta, as we have seen, was *a limine*, an imperialist, that is, a State, the wars of which were its daily necessity, and did not therefore constitute struggles fought for ideals. Its ideals were destructive of culture and anti-national. It was necessarily and constantly aggressive. This caused the Spartans to concentrate all their efforts on war, and on war alone. Rome, in this respect, was Sparta written large. When she went to the extremes of Imperialism proper, she drained all her intellectual forces by devoting them exclusively to the labours of Imperialism on the grandest scale.

That, therefore, Sophocles and Phidias, and the other Greek glories, were preceded by Salamis and Plataea, is not only a *post hoc* but, *per eminentiam*, a *propter hoc*. From this alone it follows with irrefutable cogency that Salamis and Plataea must have been victories of a singularly glorious, because exceptionally energising, kind. In other words, these victories were triumphs either of quality over quality, or victories of quality over quantity, or victories of quality over both quantity and quality. Energy and startling progressiveness, such as, for instance, is witnessed in the case of modern Germany in the last thirty odd years, cannot be commanded or legislated or lectured into existence. Had the Germans beaten only the Danes, or the Belgians, or Swiss, they could never have raised their nation to its present stage of exceeding vitality. But they defeated the French; and this realisation of a secular great hope electrified even such of their forces which neither their literature or the universities, nor their governments could teach or legislate into life.

This, then, is the preliminary remark and, at the same time, the central fact of the Persian wars. It is quite independent of this or that equipment of Herodotus as an historian. It is based on an evidence that we are enabled to test independently of Herodotus; in other words, on a psychological truth that holds good to-day as it held good in the age of Themistocles. As usual, the German school of historians does not pay the slightest attention to it. They deal, as did the inquisitorial judges, only with the

in 453 B.C., in disaster for the Greeks. Of the rest, the first, led by the victor of Plataea, terminated in 477 B.C. with the recapture of Sestus, Byzantium,

accused (see above, pp. 257, 258). In a series of monographs, A. Kirchhoff, E. Ammer, P. Knapp, Eduard Meyer, Adolf Bauer (see the latter's *Die Forschungen zur griechischen Geschichte*, 1888-1898 [Munich, 1898], pp. 197-208) and others have "analysed" the graceful body of the Muses of Herodotus so efficiently, that several amongst them have, as was to be expected, discovered the "piecemeal," "incoherent," and "unsystematic" way in which Herodotus compiled his book. To men of the sagacity of the German professors no artifice on the part of Herodotus could save him from the favourite pastime of these gentlemen, which consists in "unmasking" (*entlarven*) these puny Greek writers. Herodotus, Professor Hans Delbrück holds, is, after all, on a level with a Bullinger, or any other "*dunkler Ehrenmann*" and obscure chronicler of the fifteenth century, and it is, the Professor opines, "past comprehension" ("*nicht einzusehen*") why Herodotus should be more trustworthy than the "rough and honest" chroniclers of the Swiss ("*weshalb Herodot und die Griechen glaubwürdiger sein sollen als die biderben schweizer Chronisten*": Delbrück, Hans, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst* [1900], p. 40). Bullinger, the Swiss chronicler of the Burgundian wars of the Swiss, has, on reference being made to some contemporary and official lists of the then combatants, been found sadly wanting in accuracy. Consequently, Delbrück teaches, Herodotus too is likely to be equally inaccurate. To study the Swiss campaigns of Grandson and Morat (Murten) against Charles the Bold is "a methodological preliminary" to the study of the sources of the Persian wars of the Greeks, that is, principally of Herodotus. So says Delbrück. The reason of this analogy is to be found, Delbrück holds, in the fact that in both cases militia fought professional soldiers; and moreover, in the circumstance, that in both cases a small nation defeated a powerful sovereign. And since ordinary people (such as the fifth century B.C. Greeks undoubtedly were, as witness their commonplace Parthenon, their trivial drama and comedy, and their trite philosophy) invariably mix up "the category of quality" with that of "quantity" (Delbrück, *l.c.* p. 39), the Greeks as well as the Swiss of the fifteenth century A.D. invented, by auto-suggestion rather than by deliberate mendacity, the huge masses of the Persian hordes and the vast Burgundian armies.

In the country of the "limited mind of the subject" ("*beschränkter Unterthanenverstand*"), as the mentality of Prussian citizens is termed by their governing officials, such a view of the Persian and Burgundian wars is not surprising. It is, indeed, a view not unworthy of the "official mind" of a Prussian bureaucrat. However, in the court of History, such a view cannot be maintained for a single moment. Neither the Swiss nor the Hellenes of the fifth century B.C. can, in any sense of the word, be called mere militia or *Bürgerheer*. The Swiss of that time were so highly trained as soldiers that, as we read in Bodinus, *De Republica*, while in France, Germany, and England the carrying of arms was merely tolerated, in Switzerland "*legibus necessarium est*" (Bodinus, *l.c.* lib. iv. cap. vii. § 487, p. 762); and Speidelius,

and of parts of Cyprus; the second, led by the rich and able Cimon, son of the victor of Marathon, resulted in 476 B.C. in the expulsion of the Persians

in his *Notabiles s.v. Geschütz*, p. 417, tells us, that the Swiss were by law held to carry arms even while milking their cows (for more references to this interesting point see Pfeffinger's, J. F., vast commentary on Vitriarius' *Institutiones juris publici*, vol. iv. [Gotha, 1731], p. 49). In the history of the military institutions of Bern, by Rodt (E. von Rodt, *Geschichte des bernerischen Kriegswesens*, 3 vols. 1831-1837), we see, in elaborate detail, that the Bernese had a highly organised army made up of their own citizens; and their great successes, together with those of other Swiss cantons in the famous battle of Morgarten, against the Austrians, as well as at Grandson and Morat against the Burgundian sovereign, were owing to their singular skill in all that appertains to military training. No wonder that in the Burgundian campaigns the Swiss took the offensive instead of the defensive. As to the Hellenes, the picture that Delbrück (*l.c.* p. 39) gives of their total lack of military experience in the generations previous to the Persian war is completely false. The "masses of the Greek people," far from being "peaceful peasants, mariners, merchants, or artisans," were one and all highly trained soldiers. The Spartans were so, as Delbrück himself admits (*ib.*). As to Greeks other than Spartans, and especially as to the Athenians, it would be misconstruing simple facts if one were to ignore the singular military strength and trained experience of those States in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. We saw above that the Spartans, admittedly a nation of professional soldiers, were sorely tried by a series of long and exceedingly perilous wars when they attempted to conquer Messenia. We know that even the Argives signally defeated them at Hysiae (in about 669 B.C.; Pausanias, ii. 24. 7), and the Tegeans resisted Spartan power in the sixth century for many a long year, and even in the end, under the Spartan kings Anaxandridas and Ariston, Tegea was not completely reduced. Similar lengthy and vigorous resistance was shown by Pisa to Elis. These facts unmistakably bear out a remark made on pp. 301, 302, to the effect that the wars of the Hellenes in Greece during the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. cannot be taken as mere raids between neighbouring tribes, but as military affairs of very great importance. What the combatants lacked in numbers, they fully made up in intensity and quality. When we learn of the long wars in the sixth century B.C. between Athens and Megara, Athens and Boeotia, Athens and Aegina, or Athens and Chalcis; when we hear that in 507 B.C. even a Spartan army entered Attica, then we may be sure that those wars were, in point of military significance, quite on a level with the wars between Argos and Sparta, or Tegea and Sparta. They were, we may confidently say, wars in which high-strung quality was of decisive importance. Wars waged by States whose inhabitants had then for centuries devoted an enthusiastic, not to say fanatic, cult to all the muscular resources of the body, and for whom a victory at the Olympian or other athletic games was a subject of extraordinary national admiration, such wars are no mere raids and *Nachbarfehden* (Delbrück, *l.c.* p. 39); they are wars proper, that have in them all

from Eion, on the river Strymon, in Macedonia, their last possession in Europe; the third, in 466, again under Cimon, closed with the double victory

the instructiveness and educative power of wars in which masses of combatants are engaged. The military training imparted by wars does not at all depend on vast numbers of combatants; and the first Italian campaign of Napoleon, in which he did not dispose of more than a relatively very small army, has always been considered more instructive than his Russian campaign, in which he employed hundreds of thousands of men. It is, moreover, impossible to assume that the Greeks of the eighth, seventh, and sixth centuries B.C. should ever have seriously thought of founding, as they did, hundreds of city-states in far-off and unsafe countries all round the Mediterranean, had they not long been highly trained in the art of military defence and aggressiveness. As the Swiss early in the sixteenth century became the mercenaries of the Powers, because of their previous long national training in the art of war, even so the Greeks became the greatest colonisers of prae-Roman times, on account of their exceeding military skill. Their States, as we have seen, were no mere haphazard and incoherent contrivances, but systematic and deep-laid political fabrics; to this highly finished form and substance of the State corresponded an equally highly finished form and substance of their armies. Polities that brought forth the Spartan ἀγωγή, with its ever-important principles of Imperialism; systems of legislation, such as Solon's or Clisthenes' reforms, the underlying ideas of which touch upon the fundamentals of all politics; personalities such as Lycurgus, Aristomenes, Solon, and Themistocles; such polities are too high strung to content themselves with a slipshod system of militia. We saw that the *synoecismus* of so many Greek city-states clearly indicates, as it proves, an amount of political energy that we rarely meet with in history. Such States cannot be placed on a level with even Bern or Nuremberg. To speak of the citizens of such high-strung Greek States as of some stodgy mediaeval *bourgeois*, is to disrespect one's readers. The whole tone and atmosphere of Greek life in the seventh, sixth, and fifth centuries B.C. were radically different from a life such as Delbrück wants his readers to attribute to the Greeks. In saying, as he does, that most of the Hellenes were mere tradespeople, artisans, and business men, he means to impress the reader with the unmilitary character of most of the Greeks in the sixth century B.C. This is at once disproved by the slightest study of that all-pervading feature of Greek life which the Hellenes called *agones*, or races and competitions for prizes in all physical or mental exercises that man is capable of. Leaving out the innumerable competitions for prizes in poetry, recitations, dancing, singing, playing on instruments, and even kissing, let alone the endless competitions for schoolboys; the *agones* in which the competitors were vying with one another in point of physical strength, gymnastic, *hippic* (equestrian), or boating efficiency, military training in lance-throwing, running while heavily armed, pugilistic exercises, leaping, wrestling, etc., were in all the Greek city-states the most vital feature. It is well known that something of that kind exists in England, where from the post of the Prime Minister or Poet Laureate down-

on land and on sea, at the mouth of the Eurymedon river in Pamphylia, on the southern coast of Asia Minor; the fifth, also under Cimon, was victoriously

wards, a great number of dignities, emoluments, honours, offices (such as nearly all the posts in the Indian Civil Service) are matters of competition or rivalry, whether in the form of competitive examinations or of popular elections. Hence, in England, a man will always publicly mention the honours that he obtained when a boy at a university,—a thing that no Prussian nor a Frenchman will ever do. But between a "wrangler" and the post of Secretary of State there is an essential similarity, both being the results of competition. Accordingly, England too (and we may add largely America also) is pervaded by a spirit of competition and admiration of success very much akin to that love of ἀγωνιστική which influenced every organ of Hellenic life in every Greek State. We saw above that victories at the national games counted among the most exalted honours that could possibly be bestowed upon a mortal. Although all the gymnastic exercises at Olympia were constantly practised, and analogous prizes competed for in every Greek State, it was yet only at Olympia and a few other national "races" where the great and exalted prizes could be won (see especially Schmidt, Leopold, *Die Ethik der Griechen* [1882], i. pp. 190-196).

A nation so permeated by the energising spirit of constant mental and physical competition for ardently coveted prizes cannot for a moment be called an unmilitary nation, or one whose members can legitimately be put on the level with mediaeval *bourgeois*, to whom the spirit of Greek ἀγωνιστική was completely unknown. A Greek of the seventh or sixth century was daily exercised, and under the action of most powerful stimuli too, in all that makes a good fighting soldier. We saw above how exceedingly difficult the Spartans, a nation of professional soldiers, found it to conquer a few neighbouring Greek States. This clearly shows that all Greek States were by their *agones* in a position enabling them to turn out high-strung military units; and Greek armies must be estimated as having been, as early as the sixth century B.C., of exceptional quality. When, then, the immense conflict with the greatest Empire of the day was imminent, it could not but appear to each Greek as *the* ἀγών of all possible ἀγῶνες. To win it was to win the Olympian prize, not only for Greece, but for the entire world. To come out victorious from that greatest of ἀγῶνες was sure to be honoured not only, as were Olympian or Pythian prizes, by civic and poetic honours of a very elevated and singularly distinguished kind, but by the special recompenses, honours, and graces showered upon men by the Olympian gods. It is quite imaginable that a half-savage tribe may occasionally beat back the attacks of an Empire without otherwise getting unusually electrified by its success. We do not learn that the Massagetae, who defeated Cyrus, or the Parthians, who repeatedly defeated the Romans, were thereby inordinately stimulated into a higher spiritual activity. But a nation like the Greeks, whose entire life was one continuous effort to win prizes for bodily or mental excellences; the Greeks, to whom all life was one big ἀγών; the Greeks, who expiated sins done by dead people by establishing ἀγῶνες on their tombs

waged near Salamis, in Cyprus, and terminated with an understanding, somewhat incorrectly called the "peace" of Cimon (or of Callias), in virtue of which

(Herodotus, i. 167); the Greeks, who had for generations inured themselves to the art of tasting intense triumphs in peaceful competitions; the Greeks, we say, on defeating their formidable national enemy, could not but feel all their vitality powerfully restimulated, electrified, and indefinitely increased and intensified. And *vice versa*, had their ἀγών for Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea been only more or less easily won, such as were the prizes competed for in the local little ἀγῶνες of little Greek city-states, they would have felt no more energised through their victories over the Persians than through prizes won at the Τακίνθια at Amyclae, at the Ἀλεαῖα at Tegea, or the Θεοξένια at Pellene.

Delbrück's whole attitude to the Persian wars and to Herodotus is that of the sneering, *schnodderig* inquisitorial judge to the accused. A moment's consideration will suffice to convince any fair-minded student that the constant habit of attending ἀγῶνες, of competing in them, and of judging and estimating their results, must inevitably have produced among the Greeks a power of fine literary criticism, of weighing arguments, and appreciating gymnastic and military exercises far beyond anything that even a modern average gentleman can hope to attain to. Herodotus lived all his life in this atmosphere of high-strung criticism, art, conversation, and intellectual stimulus completely unknown to a mediaeval chronicler. We moderns are so accustomed to books, that the mastery of Herodotus as an historian appears to us a sheer miracle, considering that before the great Halicarnassian there were practically no Greek historians proper. We forget, however, that literature in Greece was matured and richly fed by what the writer has ventured to call *parlature*, which at all times was, amongst the Greeks, their greatest mental stimulant. Their prose-literature is largely their *parlature* or artistic conversation fixed more carefully. This is the reason why even their philosophers, such as Plato, use in their most abstruse writings the very idiom of daily life. In a country where ordinary conversation was held to have sufficient linguistic resources for the purposes of deep philosophic thought, in such a country a man like Herodotus was on a level incomparably higher than that of a Bullinger or a Matthew Paris. To suppose of him that he mixed up "the category of quality" with that of quantity, is fatuous mockery.

We treat here of Delbrück's assertions at greater length, because they have been, with small modifications, accepted by the totality of the Germans, and most of the non-German writers on the Persian wars. Delbrück, after reducing Herodotus to the level of a Bullinger, and after stamping thirty of the thirty-one armies of the Greeks in the Persian wars as mere raw militia, comes to the conclusion that all the data in Herodotus about the numbers of the Persian soldiers and their allies and ships must once for all be thrown overboard; and that, taking it all in all, the Greeks had perhaps more soldiers than had the Persians. Thus at Marathon the Persians were, Delbrück says, about 5000 to 6000 strong, with a goodly number of "*Ungewappneter*," or such as had no

the Persian king Artaxerxes I. (called Longimanus) made substantial concessions to the Greeks, and practically abandoned any serious attempt on their independence.

armour. The Greeks were about equally strong. This computation of the Persian numbers is, of course, quite arbitrary; it is confessedly based on the "methodical" assumption that as the Swiss exaggerated everything connected with their victories, so did the Greeks.

Now it is quite evident that if Delbrück's method is taken as the right one, then a future Delbrück will easily prove that the story of the Boers about the war in 1899-1902 is a tissue of absurd exaggerations. The Boers too must, after Delbrück's manner, be denied the character of "professional soldiers." The Boers too were a small nation, fighting a big empire. The Boers too won signal victories. If, then, the analogy of the Swiss chroniclers is to be a legitimate one for the Greek case, it cannot be denied to hold good also for the Boers. The statement, then, of the Boers, that Great Britain sent 450,000 soldiers to conquer not quite 50,000 Boers, and that at the end of nearly three years neither of the three great Boer generals—Delarey, De Wet, and Botha—had been beaten or captured, must be declared to be a gross exaggeration, a mixing-up of "the category of quality" with that of "quantity." *Quod erat demonstrandum.*

Yet we positively know that Great Britain did send 450,000 soldiers to conquer about 50,000 Boers. Great Britain had no more difficulty in sending half a million men to South Africa, than Xerxes had in sending a million or more to Greece. The empire of Xerxes, comprising all western and central-western Asia, together with Egypt, was immense. Repeatedly we read of huge armies led by Assyrian or other western Asiatic rulers; and even a Syrian prince was able, in 854 B.C., to rally about 160,000 soldiers from among his friends and allies against Salmanassar II. (Maspero, *Histoire ancienne*, iii. pp. 70 *seq.*, where the details are given from inscriptions). Sanherib, in 700 B.C., incorporated over 70,000 men of a conquered nation with the Assyrian army. And what indeed could be more natural? In a mostly fertile country, such as the Persian empire, there must have been a teeming population. To untold thousands of them war was the most coveted opportunity of raising their status. In fact nothing is more likely than the resolution of Xerxes to lead a vast army against the Hellenes. His father, Darius, had been worsted by the Greeks at Marathon. This rankled in his heart, as did Majuba Hill in the hearts of the British, as all contemporaries know. By the defeat of the Greeks, Xerxes hoped to acquire the one thing without which no empire in Western Asia could possibly continue as a Great Power for a long time—sea-power. Once master of the Greek seas, Xerxes had to fear no one, and to gain everything. Such a goal was worth an extraordinary effort. With means infinitely poorer, the Crusaders rolled all through Europe huge armies against the Seldchucks in Asia. When Delbrück objects that the columns of Xerxes, as described by Herodotus, must have been so long, that while the vanguard was at Thermopylae the rear would just leave Susa in Persia, he is conveniently forgetful of the fact that columns such as those of Xerxes

Of the Hellenic States to whose exertions the discomfiture of the Persians was chiefly due, Athens and Sparta were the most prominent. Athens now united about two hundred city-states into a maritime

do not advance on one route, but on several parallel routes. Surely, if we are to take an analogy or "methodical preliminary" from modern history wherewith to guide us in a right estimate of the Persian wars of the Greeks, the defeat of the Armada at the hands of the English is a far more appropriate event. As, in the English case, quality defeated quantity; and as Philip II. really did bring together the mightiest fleet of his time and of the preceding centuries in order to conquer England; even so in the Greek case, the Persians were defeated by quality, and Xerxes did bring together the biggest army of his or any previous time. Whether the number of his men exceeded, as Herodotus relates, four millions, or whether it did not exceed the first or second million, that is, properly speaking, immaterial. At any rate, we have at present no means whatever of deciding this question definitely. The fact remains that the Persians arrived in enormously superior numbers. This alone can account for the unparalleled intensity of the triumph and the energising power it had on all departments of Greek life. Had the Persians been few in number, the Greeks could never have undergone that new vitalisation which spells the fifth century B.C. Ἀγῶνες against enormous odds called the Greeks into historic existence at a time when, as we saw, they were in constant conflict with the empires of western Asia and Egypt, from probably the thirteenth century B.C. upwards. Constant ἀγῶνες at home kept up, by the keenest competition, their muscular and intellectual efficiency; and the Titanic ἀγών with the Persian Empire brought their civilisation to its highest expression in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. It was in this way that the Greeks won the Olympian prize of all history. The ἀγῶνες of the Greeks, and not the Burgundian wars of the Swiss, are the proper "methodical preliminary" to a study of the Persian wars. It was not their race, not the enormous coastline of Greece, nor the Greek climate, that made the Hellenes what they were. It was through secular ἀγῶνες with their enemies and with one another, in which, for reasons indicated above (see chapter on Archaic Greece), the Greeks were, by geo-political circumstances, compelled to lay the greatest value imaginable on the joint development of body and mind, as on the only possible salvation for them. To misread this, another of the fundamental features of the history of the Greeks, is to misunderstand them completely. In the chapter on Lycurgus we saw that all Greek history is cephalic. If, now, we co-ordinate Greek *agonistics* with Greek *cephalism*, we cannot but note that both are expressions of one vast national trait of the Hellenes. If ἀγῶνες made for one thing more directly and forcibly than for another, it was precisely the glorification of the personality of the winner. It hardly needs further explanation that ἀγῶνες of all kinds led straight up to an ever greater number of striking personalities; and in ancient Greece, where all life was considered to be one big ἀγών, towering personalities and consequently Art were the natural outcome. Therefore to sneer down the greatest of all Greek ἀγῶνες, the defeat of the Persians, or

league, called the Delian or Athenian confederacy, the common treasury being at first in Delos. The number of ships, or, in lieu of ships, the amount of the contributions to be made by the members, was

to reduce it to the beating back of a mere raid, is tantamount to a stultification of the whole of Greek history. In the same way, to treat Herodotus with contempt because he may be mistaken about some figures, or because he, in common with most writers on military events, is not sufficently clear and consistent in his battle-descriptions; what is that but the old attitude of the inquisitorial judges to the accused? Is it not notorious that no one living is able to give a clear, full, and consistent statement of the battle of Trafalgar, as has only lately (Sept. 1905) been shown in a long correspondence in *The Times à propos* of the centenary of the battle? And shall Herodotus be held up to general opprobrium because his descriptions of battles do not satisfy the Prussian Staff College? No student of Greek or Roman antiquities but has noticed that the Greeks as well as the Romans state things in a manner radically different from ours. In the chapter on Lycurgus we saw that modern criticism of Aristotle's way of considering all institutions as the work of a νομοθέτης was quite wrong. By an interpretation of the text of Herodotus made in greater conformity with the Greek spirit, many a so-called inconsistency and vagueness in his description of the Great War can be shown to be only apparent and not real. This, however, we must leave to a separate monograph. Here we can only state that Herodotus' *Musae* are fully worthy of their great subject. We called the Great Persian wars the greatest Greek ἀγών. As Pindar is the poet of individual victors at the national ἀγῶνες of the Greeks, so Herodotus is the historian of the greatest of all ἀγῶνες, in which Greece herself was the victor. In this one circumstance are rooted both his exceeding excellences and his pardonable shortcomings. He has undoubtedly been unfair to Themistocles, and occasionally negligent in detail. However, we can never think too highly of the consummate art and infinite charm with which Herodotus not only related the deeds and feats of the Greeks on their Olympian battlefields at Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea, but also how, in the first four books of his history, he built himself a magnificent background by premising an ever-interesting history of all the empires and nations over whom the Greeks soared, Apollo-like, to a higher humanity. If his work is frequently belittled by pedants incapable of appreciating the *naïveté* and art of Herodotus, the world of taste will never cease admiring the incomparable story, nor wonder at the fact that the greatest ἀγών of the Hellenes was related by a Greek as what it was —a work of art. In such works more is often indicated by omission than by direct expression; and if self-conscious political discourses are almost absent from Herodotus, it can by no means be said that his work, rightly understood, is more lacking in lessons of deep political wisdom than is the work of Thucydides. To scholars, of course, to whom Herodotus' firm belief in Greek cephalism, in Greek oracles, and in his peculiarly expressed but true view of the "envy of the gods" is uncongenial, because they fail to understand the proper meaning of these beliefs; to such scholars Herodotus will

fixed by Aristides, whose honesty and great services before and after Salamis had earned him general respect. Soon, however, the federal council as well as the federal treasury came to be entirely under the sway of the Athenians, who interfered freely with the constitutions of their confederates, and even succeeded in making Athens the seat of a supreme federal court of justice. At about 445 B.C. the islands of Samos, Chios, and Lesbos alone had still some independence left, while Euboea and all the city-states on the southern coast of the Balkan and on the western coast of Asia Minor were in reality in strict submission to Athens. The democracy of Athens indulged—witness the Egyptian expedition—in far-reaching plans; and the might of Venice during many a century is a satisfactory illustration of the soundness of a maritime policy based on constant maritime expansion. But like Venice in the fifteenth century

necessarily appear a writer of inferior stamp, and they do not feel the ridicule of their lecturing, "school-mastering," or patting the back of one of the greatest historians of the world. Modern Oriental research has very largely confirmed the reports of Herodotus; and when he is still pitied for believing (see v. 59) in an inscription from the time of Amphitryon (Christ, Wilh., *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*[4] [1905], p. 344, note 1), one can only suggest a timely reversal of such pity to closer quarters, in that Dr. Evans has long since unearthed Greek libraries written centuries before Amphitryon.

From whichever standpoint, then, we examine the fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth books of Herodotus, provided we do not try to construe or interpret Greek States as if we treated of German principalities or municipalities of the fifteenth century A.D., we shall invariably arrive at the result that the story of the greatest ἀγών of the Greeks has by Herodotus been given in a manner at once charming and substantially true. As a curiosity of modern inquisitorial history, we may here mention that H. Welzhofer has, in a series of writings (*Jahrbücher f. klass. Philologie*, vols. 143, 145; *Historisches Taschenbuch*, vi.e Folge, vols. 11 and 12), practically denied Marathon, Salamis, the heroism of the Athenians, the desire of Xerxes to conquer Greece, etc. The Greeks did, Welzhofer admits, great things in literature, but their military successes against the Persians are sheer humbug.

A.D., so Athens in the fifth B.C. would not restrict herself to expansion by sea-power alone. While her confederacy made her the mistress of the eastern Mediterranean, Athens unwisely sought for expansion on the continent too. The Peloponnesus was then mostly under the hegemony of Sparta, and in view of the growing sea-power of Athens, Sparta could not but desire an increase of the Lacedaemonian league over inland city-states outside the Peloponnesus. However, Athens worsted Sparta here too. In spite of a defeat at Tanagra (458 B.C.?) at the hands of the Spartans and Thebans, Athens very soon retrieved her position by her victory at Oenophyta (near Tanagra), and liberated the Boeotian city-states from the ascendency of Thebes, which the Spartans had imposed upon them. Thus Boeotia, and soon after Phocis and eastern Locris, were forced, or persuaded, to join the Athenian league. Megara, close to two seas and the door of the Peloponnesus, likewise joined, and was fortified by, Athens. The disaster in Egypt and the great expedition to Cyprus, however, so weakened Athens that most of her inland acquisitions had, especially after the defeat of Tolmides at Coronea in 447 B.C., to be abandoned by her, and in 445 B.C. a formal peace for thirty years was made with Sparta. By that peace the antagonism of Athens and Sparta was legalised. It soon became manifest that that peace was nothing but a pause before the inevitable conflict between the two rivals. It was during the *pentecontaetia*, or the period from 479 B.C. to 429 B.C., that the Athenian constitution, under the influence of the expansion of Athens on sea and land, assumed its intensely democratic character. In the following section we shall attempt to give the essential

features of that constitution as it developed in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.

The Athenian Democracy.—It would serve no reasonable end to describe the democracy of Athens by giving a learned string of Greek terms of state offices, loosely connecting them by our modern terms of "office," "parliament," "senate," "jury," or "court of justice." These modern terms have spheres of meaning radically different from those attaching to apparently very similar Greek terms. Even the system of judicature in modern England could not be correctly stated in German or French by using German or French terms for "judge," or "justice," or "court." It is for these reasons absolutely necessary to premise a remark on the utter difference of the whole structure of the constitution of a classical city-state in general, and of that of Athens in particular, from modern Continental and even Anglo-American constitutions.

In the modern Continental State we notice two essentially different sets of institutions: one hierarchically arranged, permanent, strictly regulated in every detail of its activity, and thus full of routine, slow, pedantic, methodic, rigid, and necessarily lacking in initiative. It is called by the general name of *administration* in French, *Verwaltung* in German ("Civil Service" in English), and its incumbents, not elected by the people, but appointed by the "Government," are *fonctionnaires* or *Beamte*. As against this we see the second set of institutions, the parliaments, consisting of elected members, acting freely and according to no set rule, being in power only for a short time, and claiming a very large share of initiative. The contrast between the two sets of

institutions is far less pronounced in England and America than on the Continent, in that the Civil Service, particularly in England, is neither numerous nor does it interfere with most departments of state-life. Keeping that contrast in mind we must, in the study of classical city-states, first of all observe that that all-pervading distinction between State institutions essentially rigid and static, from such as are "liquid" and dynamic, applies to city-states too, but in reversed order. The "liquid" character of modern parliaments applies very much more to the classical *fonctionnaires* (*Beamte*), than to the classical Assembly. Hence in many a classical city-state, and most of all in republican Rome, the *ἀρχαί*, *magistratus*, or incumbents of public offices, formed amongst themselves a quasi-assembly essentially similar to our parliaments; whereas the classical parliament very much resembled a meeting of modern state-officials. Classical city-states did not, nor could they introduce representative institutions, such as our modern parliament, each member of which represents the whole nation, or in the abstract an integral portion thereof. The classical city-state has indeed representative government — not, however, in the sphere of the parliament, but in the sphere of the magistrates and officials. Their parliaments being essentially in the nature of a meeting of modern state-officials, they could not constitute it by popularly elected members. Nor could they have modern parliamentary parties; their parties, operating as they did, not in a debating parliament, but in the courts and offices of magistrates, were necessarily quite different from our parties. For similar reasons their "Cabinet," or the most influential

men in the State, did not depend on the movements of parliament; and last, not least, their parliaments could never become, as are ours, the depositaries of the greatest and final legislative, administrative, or political powers of the State. In fact, classical parliaments were most effectively controlled, checked, and eventually foiled by means of actions brought before various magistrates, such as the *heliastae* in Athens, or by such magistrates themselves, as the tribunes in Rome.

Applying these remarks to Athens we shall now be able to express the real political value of Greek terms of politics. In Athens the *ecclesia*, or public assembly, meeting about four times every month, was, in theory, constituted of every free Athenian citizen as soon as he came of age; in practice, about one-fifth of them attended the meetings. New laws were made, not by the *ecclesia*, but at their bidding, by the *nomothetae*, a committee of *heliastae*; and bills or questions could be discussed only on the basis of a preliminary or *probouleuma* report thereon, given by the members of the *boulê* or council of 500. The president of the *ecclesia* was, in keeping with the magisterial rather than parliamentary character of the Assembly, not one of the real leaders of Athens, one, that is, of the *strategoi*, but taken from the members of the *boulê*. In theory most of the business of the State could be made a subject of voting in the Assembly. In reality, however, any citizen could by actions brought against the "speaker," the pleader of a bill, or against the voting of a bill, stop or eventually frustrate measures taken in the Assembly. Of these brought before the great assize of the *heliastae*, the most usual was the γραφὴ

παρανόμων, graphe paranomon. It was, if successful, in essence equivalent to the tribunician *veto* in Rome; only in Athens that vetoing power, instead of being vested in a magistrate, was vested in any citizen, and hence had to be exercised by a contradictory procedure before a magistrate.

The *ecclesia*, it will be seen, was not the most essential focus of political power in Athens; young ambitious statesmen invariably essayed to win popularity, not in the *ecclesia*, but in the law-courts of the *heliastae*, by denunciating or arraigning some less popular politician or magistrate. The essence of power in Sparta and Rome lay in the magistrates. In Sparta, where their number was very small, they necessarily wielded an immense and little differentiated power; in Rome, where they were more numerous, the sphere of each was more differentiated. In both States the individual citizen had few chances of bringing his will to bear directly on the political events. In Athens the magistracies were exceedingly numerous, each consisting of from nine or ten to a huge assembly of one to six thousand incumbents. By this extraordinary dispersion of the power vested in each magistracy at Athens, the individual Athenian citizen was necessarily given immense political initiative, by being allowed to question, examine, stop, frustrate, denounce, or eventually punish a vast number of acts and actions of every magistrate, as well as of the *ecclesia*, or any private individual, through bringing one of the numerous "public" actions, such as the much-abused *eisangelia*, the *probolê*, the *graphe xenias, graphe doron, graphe agraphiou*, etc. In this remarkable power of the Athenian citizen, which has a counterpart in the right

of an American citizen to question before the supreme courts of States or the Union the "constitutionality" of any law legally passed in the Assemblies or in Congress; it is, we say, in this right that the intense democracy of Athens was founded. The magistracies themselves, although mostly remunerated, were as a rule held by the richer classes.

If now we turn to the history of the magistrates of Athens, we find that the Areopagus lost the political ascendency it had long won and maintained during the Persian or Medic wars, and was, to use Lord Halifax's pregnant phrase, "kicked upstairs." Its moral prestige remained for centuries. The nine *archons* had their chief importance in six of them, called the *thesmothetae*, who presided at, or themselves conducted, most of the judiciary business, referring both to public and private actions. The *boulê* practically remained what it had been before Clisthenes, and its time was engrossed chiefly with administrative and *probouleumatic* matters. The court of the *heliastae* soon became the centre of the political struggles, in that Athenian party strifes for reasons above given were fought out mostly by means of actions with contradictory procedure, brought either directly or indirectly before the *heliastae*; ostracism being, until its disuse after 417 B.C., another mode of deciding party struggles. The greatest power given to individuals was vested in the *strategoi*. They alone could be re-elected any number of times. The other magistrates, except the Areopagus, whose members were chosen for life, and the *heliastae*, who held their office *ipso jure*, were elected as a rule by lot, or where experts were needed, by election proper, every year. As they had after their election to submit to

an examination of their character (*dokimasia*), so they had, after expiry of their office, to give an account of, and were responsible for, their actions. The number of minor offices was exceedingly great; in fact, all Athens was officialised, and for attendance both at the Assembly or the courts the citizens were paid. Nor need we wonder at that. The reversed relation of citizen to government officials in Athens resulted, quite naturally, in a reversed order of things: several offices were unpaid, but citizens attending at the theatre received payment therefor.

In a State where the tenure of an office did not imply a possession of very substantial power, individual influence was necessarily obtained by sheer force of personality; and thus, with the rise of Athenian democracy, we notice the rise of extraordinary personalities, such as Ephialtes, and more especially Pericles, son of Xanthippus, an Alcmaeonid; Alcibiades; and others. The Spartan polity required a commanding personality for its establishment; the Athenian required it even more urgently for its maintenance. In Athens the youths were not levelled out by an iron system of education, and the citizens, being granted as they were an immense initiative, easily developed a power of individuality that could be controlled only by an individual commanding a personality more fascinating, more masterful, and more accomplished still. Such a personality was Pericles. Ephialtes and Pericles were responsible for the wholesale reduction of the powers of the Areopagus and for the democratisation of the Athenian State. Pericles was repeatedly elected *strategos*, and both in the inland wars of Athens (see pp. 372 *seq.*) and in the firm consolidation of the

maritime league (subjection of rebellious Samos by Pericles, 439 B.C.), he proved his superiority as strategist and statesman. His wife Aspasia, endowed with the most exquisite charms of body and mind, may fairly claim a considerable share of his greatness. Pericles escaped the Athenian Sycophants and his other numerous enemies; he has not escaped modern historical criticism. So intimately have the modern higher critics of Greek history assimilated the spirit of ancient Athens, that, like the Athenians, they are irresistibly impelled to foul the fair reputation of, to ostracise, or to execute posthumously the great men who, in working for the power and glory of Athens, increased the glory of mankind. Pericles, says Pflugk-Hartung,[1] was a poor strategist, and altogether an inferior general-in-chief.[2] In the opinion of Wilamowitz, Pericles was not a creative statesman, in that he took all his ideas from Aristides, Ephialtes, and Damon.[3] More especially his law of 451, which was for Athens, if in a much higher degree of intensity, what the *Serrata del Maggior Consiglio* proved to be for Venice, was, Eduard Meyer says, together with other institutions introduced or shaped by Pericles, the ultimate cause of Athens' downfall.[4] All that at present, or at any rate for the next few years, remains of the son of Xanthippus, are his commendable gifts as a book-keeper and financier.[5]

[1] Pflugk-Hartung, *Perikles als Feldherr* (Stuttgart, 1884).

[2] In the *Preussische Jahrbücher* for 1889 (vol. lxiv.), pp. 258 *seq.*, 450 *seq.*, Hans Delbrück successfully rehabilitates Pericles' military greatness; A. Bauer consenting.

[3] Wilamowitz in *Hermes*, xiv. p. 319, and in his *Aristoteles und Athen*, i. p. 134.

[4] Eduard Meyer, *Geschichte des Alterthums*, iv. (1901), pp. 14 (§ 392), 335, 336 (§ 563).

[5] His praise as a financier has a transparent origin. It so happens that

It is hardly necessary to refute Wilamowitz; Pöhlmann having done so in a few telling words.[1] Pöhlmann rightly advances that a statesman, to be great, must not at all have invented the ideas embodied in his policy. There are very few inventions to be made in politics. What can be done, and what Pericles did accomplish with most admirable genius, is to bring about such an *état d'âme* in a nation as will give to each citizen an abiding and supreme motive for the resolute maintenance of the idea carried out, if not invented, by the statesman. Had Bismarck not insisted on the cession of Alsace, the Germans would have soon lost the strongest motive for their ardent desire to keep up the unity of Germany. The cession of Alsace and part of Lorraine would, Bismarck rightly thought, keep up in France such an hostility against Germany, that no possible separatist cravings of this or that State of the Germans could ever override their common apprehension of the French. Napoleon III., when in captivity, blamed Bismarck for estranging the French for ever by the incorporation of Alsace and German Lorraine. From that alone one may see how inferior Napoleon III. was to Bismarck. The law of 451 B.C., by which none but the sons of Athenian fathers and Athenian mothers were recognised as citizens, far from being an act of mere party manoeuvre, was, on the part of Pericles, its author,[2] an act of profound and statesmanlike insight

we possess about 180 original documents, that is, stone-tablets from the times of or near to Pericles, on which records of the treasury of Athena Polias, of Nike, of other gods, of the syndics (ἐπιστάται Ἐλευσινόθεν) of Eleusis, and of the sixtieth due to the Temples from the tributes of the confederate States, are engraved. See a complete calendar of these records in W. Larfeld's *Handbuch der griechischen Epigraphik*, ii. (1898), pp. 14-44.

[1] Pöhlmann, *Griechische Geschichte*[3] (1906), p. 125, note 4.

[2] Before the publication of the Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία of Aristotle, in 1890,

into the real needs of the Athenian State. The law of 451 B.C. was made by Pericles for reasons both unimpeachable and profound. He stood, at the beginning of his political career, before two vast and inalterable *faits accomplis*: first, the incipient Athenian Empire; secondly, the irrepressible bent of the Athenians for intellectual interests, pleasures, and pursuits. He was, in the interest both of his State and of all the Greek States in the islands and on the coast of Asia Minor, compelled to widen and strengthen the Athenian Empire. But for such an increased power of resistance, the Greeks could never be safe from attacks on the part of the Persians. In consolidating the Delian League, or the Athenian Empire, Pericles did what any other statesman would have been obliged to do. The union of the Greeks alone had won Salamis and Plataea; a large and imperialised union of many Greek States was sure to keep Greece immune from new Persian invasions. To attribute Athenian imperialism to mere grasping arrogance, is to do the Athenians the greatest possible injustice. Imperialism, if it is something above mere brigandage on a large scale; if it is above the raids of a Jenghiskhan or a Tamerlan, is not at all a matter of "racial vocation," choice, or sheer will-power. It is, as we have tried to show,[1] a policy dictated by pressing necessities, by circumstances that man can, as a rule, not control at all. The rise of the Persian Empire, of which the Athenians were quite innocent, was in-

most writers on Greek history, especially Duncker, denied Pericles' authorship of the law. They did so, as may now be seen with instructive fulness, on the basis of the same inquisitorial method which, as we have seen, they constantly apply. Aristotle (*l.c.* 26) clinches the question once for ever in favour of the authorship of Pericles.

[1] See our *Imperialism* (1905).

evitably leading to the rise of an Aegean Empire; just as the extraordinary advance and increase of power in France under Philip Augustus II., Saint Louis, Philip III. and Philip IV., all in the thirteenth century, was sure to provoke the hundred years' war between England and France in the fourteenth century; or, in other words, the rise of English Imperialism, a prelude to British Imperialism, was a correlative and necessary complement to French mediaeval Imperialism.

However, Imperialism had very numerous and influential adversaries at Athens. What are now called "Little Englanders" with regard to British Imperialism, have always existed in all the imperial countries. Their headquarters are among the intellectuals. The greatest imperialist venture of the Athenians was, after the Egyptian expedition, the invasion of Sicily; but, as we shall see, this most justified and, from the imperial standpoint, quite legitimate enterprise was absolutely condemned by the then representatives of Athenian intellect, whether they were philosophers or writers of comedy or tragedy. This, indeed, is the irrepressible tendency of the intellectuals of all times. When they actually possess much social and public influence, they are naturally averse to the military, by whose ascendency they must lose in prestige. If they have no such influence they claim it, considering themselves, as they do, the born leaders of their nation by virtue of the alleged superiority of the intellect over mere passions. Accordingly, whenever a high-strung nation meets with severe and irretrievable military defeats, the chances of the intellectuals, pacifists, and universal humanitarians are grossly increased. The present intellectualist wave passing over Europe can hardly be

disconnected from the fact that all the great armies of Europe, with the exception of one, have in the last thirty-six years suffered severe and humiliating defeats. At Athens, all the currents and counter-currents were, if possible, more intense and more differentiated than in our time. During the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. Athens went through nearly all the crises political, religious, and social that have convulsed Europe in the last 2000 years. This intensity of life provoked an intensity of measures. We saw that Athens was largely an *apotelestic* State (see pp. 333 *seq.*); that is, a State in which strong tendencies will naturally form themselves into clear-cut institutions. And, *vice versa*, unless tendencies imperial, social, or artistic crystallise themselves into definite and, as it were, well-worded, explicit institutions, they will, in an *apotelestic* State, rapidly lose all their force and disappear. In a *music* State, like Sparta, and in many ways in modern England, such tendencies must not necessarily embody themselves in definite institutions. They may, and frequently do, remain mere tendencies inarticulate and formless, yet endowed with great impelling force. Thus in England, that is, the most distinctly imperialist of European States in modern times, there was, even in the nineteenth century, outwardly an all but general indifference shown to the interests or even the existence of the colonies. Ancient Sparta, being both *music* and imperialist, possessed scarcely any distinct organisation or institution for her imperialist objects. Yet every single Spartan was an out-and-out imperialist by his education. All the influences that generally counteract the desire for imperialism, such as an intense popular interest in the arts, in literature, and in science,

were *eo ipso* absent in a Spartan, in consequence of his education. They were, to a large extent, absent in the average Englishman too previous to 1832, when a small beginning was made with compulsory education. Therefore a Spartan needed no explicit institutions meant to fortify his imperialist tendencies; an Athenian did. The Athenians were so instinct with the love and admiration of Art; with the passion for artistic talk, or *parlature*, as it might be called; with the noble curiosity in and the appetite for discussions of all the intellectual problems appealing to the human mind, that for this reason alone they were largely unfitted for the work of imperialism. Two thousand years of history have taught us that empires centred in small, and hence little populous city-states, cannot, in the long-run, be grafted on men whose artistic and literary propensities are very strong. Too many among them will devote their forces to the ever alluring cult of the Muses, instead of the arid and dangerous tasks of the State proper. Nowhere was this in many ways fatal fascination more readily succumbed to than at Athens. The Athenians, in persecuting both Anaxagoras and Socrates, acted upon a deep and unfailing instinct. It is still an open question whether Socrates had not acted more patriotically by devoting his vast powers to the State. He took the hemlock, he said, in obedience to his State. Perhaps he would have done better to live for his State, by serving it exclusively. The Athenians were not so much concerned in the particular philosophical doctrines of either of these philosophers as in the man-stealing fascination of both. Goethe beautifully says: "No one walks free from punishment beneath palm-trees" (*Es wandelt niemand ungestraft unter Palmen*). In

modern Germany too one can easily draw a sharp line of demarcation between the territories in which the great German poets, artists, and thinkers were born, and those in which arose the imperialist Prussians; it does not, with very few exceptions, exceed the 52nd degree of latitude. This view of the relation of imperialism and intellect will, we doubt not, strike most people as very paradoxical and incorrect. We have been treated to wall-shaking criticism for having stated this view in our *Imperialism* (1905). Yet nothing can be more certain. The two greatest examples of Imperialism proper, the Roman and the British, one over white and highly civilised, the other over less white and less civilised nations, prove the statement conclusively. The Romans, whose imperialism is the classical and greatest type, practically disdained science and philosophy, and had, during the first five centuries of the Republic, no regard for and no interest in the arts or literature either. The English, having a very much less intense type of imperialism, yet manifest this persistent trait of all imperialism in the fact that their greatest poetical genius was the child of a time when English imperialism was only *in petto*, and did not exist as a fact. No sophistry can argue that away; just as no sophistry can revive the mediaeval belief in the absolute superiority of the Roman poet Virgil over Homer. The Romans had good poets, but not one of them can compare with their Greek prototypes. The ultimate reason of this is that imperialism always absorbs a vast amount of talent and character, in that it appeals to the strongest of all the cold and somewhat desiccating passions of men, to pride, *amour-propre*, and the glory of rule. By enlisting in its service an extraordinary number of men, it

leaves few recruits for intellectual pursuits. Thus Roman Imperialism being, as it was, the highest, and strictest, and vastest species of lay imperialism, absorbed such an amount of genius and character that practically very little was left for the arts, the sciences, or literature. It is, of course, quite conceivable that German scholars who have never lived in an empire proper, or in what they call a *Weltreich*, are quite unaware of this evident correlation between imperialism and the intellectual interests and pursuits of a nation. Being quite unaware of it, they disbelieve it on hearing of it. So will all people who have not lived the life of an imperial nation for many years. Nor ought such people to write on or to judge Pericles or the Romans. Unless one has seen and felt, in thousands of concrete cases, how the dark pride, power, and *morgue* of imperialism eat into nearly all the other forces of the human mind; how they alter the men and women of an imperialist nation; how, in one word, they give the keynote to all the dominating features and institutions of such a nation, one can indeed not see what the Spartan system of education, the Spartan aspect of womanhood, or the Spartan *mutisme* has to do with the Spartan imperialist State; or whether Pericles was, or was not, right in passing the law of 451 B.C. Unless one has a living knowledge of this correlation between imperialism and the development of literature and the arts, one must perforce altogether miss the point in judging Spartan, Athenian, Roman, or British imperialist statesmen. This knowledge cannot be gleaned from the reading of books. It must be acquired by living with, suffering from, and observing people and things in an imperialist country. This preliminary struggle for life in such a country is the true "criticism

of sources" (*Quellenkritik*) for an adequate appreciation of a man like Pericles. To pass judgment on him without having real insight into the correlation of the public and private doings in an empire proper is to write idle pedantry; and all merely literary criticism of the sources is, in the best case, a mere side-issue. For us moderns, the true sources of a right appreciation of Pericles are in a study of England, as the hitherto only imperialist country of modern Europe; and not in Thucydides alone.

Pericles, prompted by that deep instinct of great statesmen which is surer and hence more valuable than any theoretic speculations of the learned; Pericles, probably enlightened by Anaxagoras and the musician-philosopher Damon, and certainly learning from the object lesson of the great Spartan success in imperialism; Pericles clearly saw that the over-great artistic and literary propensities of the Athenians were a very serious obstacle in the way of consolidating the indispensable empire. He felt that by establishing the Delian league no reliable guarantee was established for the perpetuation of that league. More than that was required to give the Athenians a permanent and strong interest in the Empire. If some measure could be devised attaching the serious and abiding interest of the Athenians in the empire, they would be very much more likely to maintain it even in case of disasters. That interest Pericles discovered in the financial emoluments accruing to all Athenians from the very considerable tributes paid by the confederate States. These tributes enabled him to give, under various heads, what was in reality a regular pension to each Athenian. However, if Athenian citizenship was made too easily obtainable; that is,

if the number of Athenians was indefinitely increased, the financial advantages of individual citizens derived from the empire would necessarily decrease at a very rapid rate. Accordingly, in the interest of the Empire, Athenian citizenship had to be made a rare premium; and this is what the law of 451 B.C. was intended to achieve. To blame Pericles for the apparently retrograde exclusiveness of that law is to ignore the correlation between empire and intellect. Empires can be maintained only when the great majority of the governing people have a solid and permanent "consideration" or motive to maintain them. All the genius and all the victories of Napoleon were unable to establish a European empire of long duration, because the French had no serious interest in the maintenance thereof. Had they really felt the necessity of a European empire, nobody could have prevented them, after their marvellous successes from 1794 to 1807, from establishing and keeping it. But no sooner had Napoleon, in 1813, lost a battle or two than the French deserted him and his cause, and so lost the Empire. For instance, had Napoleon been able to convince the Spaniards that by remaining his loyal allies they would save their American colonies, as undoubtedly they would have done; whereas, by allying themselves with the English against him they only precipitated, as they did, the secession of those vast colonies; the French would have had a most serious interest in Napoleon's imperialist enterprises. With Spain and all her immense colonies as their true ally or suzerain State, the French people would have found that Napoleon's ambition was in effect identical with their material interests. Instead of fighting a hopeless and extremely destructive series of campaigns against the

Spanish, the French would have at once commenced the very profitable exploitation of the Spanish empire. However, Napoleon did not succeed in persuading the Spanish to accept his policy; and thus the French soon disinterested themselves in his gigantic plans, and in the end forsook him. If now we apply these observations to the Athenian empire, we cannot but approve with admiration the political wisdom of Pericles, who knew how to attach a naturally unimperialist nation to the idea of maintaining an empire at all costs. To say of Pericles that the institutions he introduced or modified were the ultimate cause of the downfall of Athens, is mere school-talk and wisdom of "exam.-papers" written by boys. Pericles placed Athens on the only basis on which it could be placed. The Athenian empire, for two overpowering reasons, was bound to be exceedingly democratic. The first reason is, that it was a maritime empire; the second reason is, that it was won too rapidly. A maritime empire is in its first stages more endowed with forces making for a popular government than is any other polity. It is based on sea-power, which consists not only in greater naval leverage, but particularly in greater commercial resources. It seems pretty certain that trans-marine commerce produces a more rapid and more ample accumulation of capital. In this production a great number of citizens can take a share, and thus wealth is spreading more widely. The citizens being richer, they will, especially in a city-state, hardly be likely to stand undue oppression at the hands of a caste or class. The undemocratic constitution of Venice dates only from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when the commerce of the Venetians was carried on with such huge capitals as to exclude

the mass of the citizens from it. The Athenians had in the fifth century B.C. no such dominating capitalists. Their commerce benefited all classes of citizens; and that alone gave their constitution an irresistible bent to democracy.

The second reason was even more powerful. The Athenians had liberated their country by their common efforts. It was impossible that a people who had defeated the Persians should submit to the yoke of an oligarchy or a tyrant. Unfortunately for the Athenians, they had done their greatest deed with far too few sacrifices. While even the Spartans had been compelled to fight desperate wars, entailing very grave losses and lasting for many years, against the Messenians alone; the Athenians were able to rush to the height of the greatest triumph by means of three happy days. This naturally gave them such an absolute confidence and pride in themselves as a nation, that they could not possibly introduce that saving institution without which the Romans could never have done what they did: the Roman magistracy. It was indeed the lack of such a magistracy that sterilised all the efforts of the Athenians to keep up their empire. This statement requires a few words of explanation.

As we shall see in the study of the Roman constitution, a Roman high magistrate was, during the time of his office, a practically omnipotent and absolutely independent ruler in his sphere. One may say that the Romans, after having deposed one king, replaced him by appointing, by and by, some sixteen annual kings. The Athenians never gave any single magistrate anything like the same power. The vast influence of Pericles was purely personal or sub-

jective. No one at Athens had great objective power given to him by his office. However, without such intensely concentrated and independent or unassailable power vested in one or several officials an empire cannot be maintained. In an empire where the issues are frequently of the utmost importance, and just as frequently hang in the balance, tumultuous popular assemblies, especially when composed of highly impressionable, artistic people, cannot efficiently pilot the ship of the State. This can be clearly seen in the rise of the British Cabinet in the eighteenth century. It arose, as is well known, in the teeth of all the persons concerned. It arose through the gigantic wars founding and consolidating the British Empire. The Premier in England is practically her uncrowned king. To this rise of the legally non-existent office of an English premier, the disastrous wars in America and in all the seas, from 1775 to 1783, contributed very much more than has the political wisdom of individual kings or statesmen. It was so with the Romans. It was in consequence of the fearful disasters inflicted upon them by every nation in and out of Italy, that they were hammered into the willingness of vesting immense powers in their magistracies. Without these countless and continual disasters the Romans would have been no wiser than the Athenians. There was, of course, also the fact that Rome was, by giving "foreigners" facilities of full or semi-citizenship, very much more populous than Athens. This, however, is only the other side of the same phenomenon. The Athenians, reaching the supreme glory far too rapidly, and without any aid from non-Hellenes, could not reasonably be expected

to depreciate their citizenship by throwing it away on whosoever cared for it.

If then we go to the ultimate cause of the downfall of Athens, we find that it was in the feebleness and yet imposing greatness of the Persian empire. The Persians, unlike the Samnites or the Carthaginians, did not, after their first great failure, return to the charge. Had they done so, the Athenians, or the Corinthians, or some other Greek city-state, would have done what Rome was forced to do; that is, establish a *magistratus* proper. As was said in the *Introduction*, all history is binary. Not Pericles, but the Persians were the ultimate cause of the downfall of Athens. Their weakness gave the Athenians an enormous victory far too rapidly. This again prevented the Athenians from giving their political institutions that thoroughly *cephalic* nature which the Romans, taught by untold disasters, and so *malgré eux*, had introduced. We can see the same causes, and consequently the same effects, in the history of English Imperialism in the middle ages. As remarked above, the rise of a most imposing "Kingdom of France" in the thirteenth century was far too great a threat for England to be left untested. So Edward III. in the fourteenth century rightly commenced his great campaigns from 1346 to 1360, or to the peace of Brétigny. Unfortunately for the interests of English Imperialism, his heroic son, the Black Prince, settled the apparently gigantic difficulty on two happy days—at Crécy (1346) and at Poitiers (1356). The relatively over-easy victories over all mighty France nipped all possible germs of a strong cabinet-government in the bud. Nobody could seriously think of anything approaching a

Roman magistracy. It was superfluous. When then, from 1415 to 1420, the English made their second great imperialist invasion of France, they, unfortunately for their imperialist interest, again won immense victories within a few months; accordingly, a proper imperialist organisation of parliamentary government was impossible, and everything remained in the power not of high-strung, well-tried, *cephalic* institutions, but of the hazard of the king's personal capacity or incapacity. Had Pericles been able to introduce into Athens anything like the *cephalic* magistracy of the Romans, Athens would have become Rome. This, however, is not a matter of wisdom or genius; it is only the result of secular fights and struggles against disasters threatening the very existence of a polity. Not every State is honoured with such disasters; certainly Pericles could not make them to order for Athens. This was his only "mistake." He was as great as a financier as he was as a statesman, orator, and general. It was not his fault that Athens, instead of combating a Pyrrhus, a Hannibal, and the masters of the Macedonian phalanxes, was given only to combat Xerxes. The victory, too rapidly won, went to electrify Athenian intellect more than the Athenian imperial polity. The inherent contradiction and conflict of these two forces did the rest.

The "Periclean age" has always been considered the heyday, not only of Athenian, but of all history. Then, and then alone, all the faculties of man were given free scope for harmonious development. The unparalleled buildings that rose by the influence of Pericles on and near the Acropolis of Athens, such as the Parthenon, or temple of Athena Polias, the Odeon

for musical performances, the beginnings of the Erechtheum, the Propylaea, etc., covered with sculptures by the master hand of Phidias and his great pupils, rendered Athens the most beautiful city of all ages. Together with the artistic, we note an intellectual exuberance, a humanity and urbanity of every one Athenian citizen such as has since only been feebly imitated by the Italians of the Renaissance and by the modern French. There were blots and stains in that glorious picture of true civilisation; but have they been absent from the life of any of the post-Grecian nations? The Athenians, Pausanias says, were the only nation that set up an altar of Mercy (Pausanias, i. 17. 1); they never had civil wars proper; their slaves were well treated, frequently emancipated, and hardly ever known to revolt against their masters; animals were treated with the utmost kindness and protected by law; free men were never tortured; the *habeas corpus* writ long obtained at Athens; a man's house was inviolable, so were his letters, and even in the fury of war women were never massacred by the Athenians. Add to that the unique splendour of their intellect, their wit, their military glory, their power of commerce, and it is impossible not to bow before the citizens of a small commonwealth who united in them all the qualities for which a score of modern European nations are severally famous. As the Parthenon towers over all products of human ingenuity, so does Athens over all polities known to human history.

The Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.)

That great contest between the oligarchic States of the Greeks led by Sparta and Corinth, and the democratic States led by Athens, ended with the temporary subjugation of Athens—just as the great contest between absolutistic or oligarchic Europe and democratic France, from 1792 to 1815, ended with the temporary downfall of the latter. The combatants were small Hellenic States; the principles underlying it and the leading personalities, however, were such as to invest every event of that war with the very greatest importance. Between Sparta and Athens the rivalry was political; between Corinth and Athens it was commercial. It is impossible to go here into the details of this great war. Our readers will find them graphically represented, together with a full text, in six elaborate maps of our *Atlas Antiquus*. Strategically with regard to Athens the main line of action on land was in Megara, where the few passes of the Geranean mountains offered a powerful bulwark to any hostile advance on Attica. On sea the strategical line was near Pylus, where the Messenians, ever hostile to their Spartan masters, could be most easily roused into rebellion; and in the Corinthian Gulf, by the blockading of which the power of Corinth could be most conveniently checked. However, owing to the old antagonism between Athens and Megara, the latter remained obstreperous, and Pericles, by a *psephisma*, or law excluding the Megareans from the Athenian markets and ports, then the greatest in the Greek world, rendered them still more hostile. The Geranean passes were thus lost for Athens, and Attica became

constantly exposed to Spartan invasions. The above strategic lines on sea were at first so effectively used by the Athenians, that Sparta, in 421 B.C., was compelled to accept the "peace of Nicias," or the *status quo ante*. For the Spartans, there were two main strategic lines: one through Megara to Attica; the other near any one of Athens' numerous and discontented dependencies in Thrace, Asia Minor, or in the islands. Of these dependencies, the isle of Euboea and the Hellespontine possessions of the Athenians were the most important; in that, in case of the occupation of Attica, first Euboea, and then the colonies and subject States round and near the Hellespont were by the Athenians drawn upon for their food-supplies. This simple strategic structure of the war was marred, to their detriment, by the policy of the Athenians who (like Great Britain from 1775 to 1783) constantly enlarged the maritime theatre of war, until finally they were unable to cope with all their antagonists. For, in addition to the sea-wars already mentioned, the Athenians launched, already in 427 B.C., and on a grand scale in 415 and the following years, several expeditions to far-off Sicily, whither they had been called by the oppressed democratic States of Leontini, Catane, Egesta, and others, against overbearing Syracuse. The Athenians were first under Pericles, whose wise policy was defensive on land and offensive on sea; after the death of Pericles (429 B.C.), under the honest, pious, but neither sufficiently energetic nor really capable Nicias, and under the bold and efficient demagogue Cleon, a tanner. Since 420 B.C. Alcibiades dominates the fates of Athens, whether as leader or exiled intriguer. Rich,

intelligent, beautiful, intensely ambitious, Alcibiades combined the cleverness of Themistocles with the boundless ambition of the victor of Plataea; the charm of a true Athenian with the ill-starred temerity of the "*over-man.*" In the latter part of the war Cleophon, a reckless demagogue, Thrasybulus, and Theramenes must be added. The Spartans were first under King Archidamus I., then, 427 B.C., under their able leaders Brasidas and King Agis, and finally under Gylippus (in Sicily) and Lysander in the Aegean Sea, who definitely defeated the Athenian fleet at Aegospotami (405 B.C.), and forced Athens to surrender to Sparta. The Corcyraeans, whose troubles with Corinth started the war; the Macedonians; the Persians (the latter through the diplomatic and subsidising agency of the satraps Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus), and many a minor power, were also engaged in this Mediterranean war. It is customary to call the period from 431 to 421 the Archidamic war; and the period from 413 to 404 the Decelean war, from Decelea in Attica, where the Spartans had established their headquarters in 413. In 411 the Athenians, somewhat demoralised by the constant agitations of the oligarchic *hetairiae* (party-clubs) under Pisander, Antiphon, Phrynichus, etc., and by the reverses abroad, indulged in new constitutional experiments, accepting, as they did, a purely oligarchic constitution for a time. The strategic and tactical details of the Peloponnesian War may be found, as already remarked, in our *Atlas Antiquus.* In the following *Excursus* on the Sicilian Expedition, and on Alcibiades, we are endeavouring to discuss, from the standpoint of general history, one of the most important events of that war.

Excursus on Alcibiades and the Sicilian Expedition

The great Sicilian expedition of the Athenians during the Peloponnesian war has the nature of a test-case both for the Athenians and for their historians. In the expedition itself was manifested and realised all the subtle and profound intellect, together with the daring courage and perseverance so singularly characteristic of the "frivolous" and "light-hearted" Athenians. In it were likewise manifested the insufficiency and incompleteness of the political institutions of the Athenians for purposes of imperial expansion. In the writings of modern historians on that famous expedition, we see mostly the same mixture of subtle thought and profound erudition, with an incomplete and inadequate understanding of Athenian institutions. For most historians, especially of the German school, the Sicilian expedition of the Athenians was a piece of criminal folly, or at least an act of grabbing policy.[1]

[1] See Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*, iii. 2. (1904), p. 1279, who says that Nicias "*unterschätzte . . . die Gefahr einer Reichsbildung der Korinthischen Pflanzstadt* [Syracuse], *im übrigen waren jedoch seine Gründe unbedingt zutreffend.*" Eduard Meyer, *Geschichte des Alterthums*, iv. (1901), § 649, p. 499: "*Unterlag Athen, so war für die Peloponnesier die Möglichkeit gegeben, es zu vernichten; gewann es Erfolge, so zwang es sie dadurch erst recht, bei Zeiten mit aller Macht in den Kampf einzutreten, um ihre Existenz zu retten.* SO MUSSTE ATHEN IN JEDEM FALLE AN DEM NEUEN KRIEGE VERBLUTEN." It is instructive to note that on the strength of Professor Meyer's judgment on the Sicilian expedition, any campaign ever waged against strong adversaries may conveniently be declared to be one in which the aggressor is bound "in any case to bleed himself to death." Ranke, *Weltgeschichte*, i. p. 335, condemns Alcibiades on the same grounds on which he condemns Napoleon. Even so Pöhlmann, *Grundriss der griechischen Geschichte*[3] (1906) pp. 153 *seq.* Fokke, *Rettungen des Alcibiades* (1883), is favourable to Alcibiades; so is Professor Bury, *History of Greece* (1900), pp. 484: "*It is often said that it* [the

In reality it was neither. It was, *per se*, as legitimate a piece of sound policy as there ever has been. It was the very policy that every one of the more successful States on the borders of the Mediterranean did in course of time attempt to realise—until one of them, Rome, actually carried it out. They all attempted it, we say, because from the dominant geo-political situation of all these Mediterranean States they were all bound to attempt it, or else perish. This point must be cleared up first, otherwise no analysis of our sources, and principally of Thucydides, can advance us very much.

The Greeks, as well as formerly the Phoenicians, and subsequently the Latins, had, by the sixth century B.C., established a very large number of polities, which were all situated either on the coast of the Mediterranean, or quite close to it. Not one of these States had sway over any considerable part of the vast *hinterland* stretching behind them into the continents of Europe, Asia, or Africa. Yet these *hinterlands* were teeming with very populous and very aggressive nations, who were naturally gravitating to the coasts of the Mediterranean, where centuries of a high-strung civilisation had accumulated infinite treasures of wealth and art. Had the border-states of the Greeks round the Mediterranean (to speak of these states first) been able to unite into a well-knit confederation, it is safe to assume that no number of *hinterland*-nations could have caused them serious harm or apprehension. This, however, they were unable to

Sicilian expedition] *was a wild venture, an instance of a whole people going mad, like the English people in the matter of the Crimean War. It is hard to see how this view can be maintained. If there were ever an enterprise of which the wisdom cannot be judged by the result, it is the enterprise against Syracuse. All the chances were in its favour;*" etc.

do. The very cause that, from the twelfth to the tenth century B.C., forced the Greeks to build themselves single, limited city-states, was, as we have seen, the cause of their excessive individualism. City-states accelerate the growth of all the human capital very much more than does any other form of State; but this very intensifying of all institutions and personalities produces such an extraordinary individualism and strong differentiation that the peaceful blending of two or three, let alone more, of such high-strung city-states has always been a psychological impossibility. Here then was the great dilemma or "question" of the Mediterranean—a "question" so pressing and important at that time as was the "Eastern question" repeatedly in the last two centuries. The *hinterland*-nations were a constant and very real danger to each of the border States round the Mediterranean, which, singly, could not hope to hold their own; yet they were unable to unite by peaceable means. Under these circumstances nothing remained but to bring about such a union by means non-peaceable. A further consideration will make this still clearer. We saw before (pp. 294 *seq.*) that islands, owing to their relatively poor resources, have at all times been compelled to attempt imperial expansion of their political territory, or else were obliged to accept the rule of more powerful States. Now, all Greek city-states were islands in this sense, that their territory had on the whole a fixed limit. To advance the boundary line was exceedingly difficult. Owing to excessive individualism, a Greek State, the territory of which was, like that of Oropus (on the borders of Attica and Boeotia), a mere trifle, was not infrequently made the subject of secular

contention. In modern Europe, which is, potentially at any rate, Greater Hellas, we see the same thing; and infinitely more blood has been shed for an area of a few square miles in Artois or Hainault than for half of the United States. Attica was a very small territory, and neither to the west nor to the south-west was expansion a matter of possibility. Under these circumstances each Greek State was potentially inclined, and in several cases actually driven into imperial expansion. The imperialism of the Spartans we have discussed separately. At Syracuse a series of great rulers from Dionysius I. to the marvellous Agathocles,[1] strenuously laboured at the imperialisation of Magna Graecia, or South Italy and Sicily. In Epirus rose an imperial ruler of singular genius, Pyrrhus. Several of the South Italian city-states repeatedly attempted to found empires; and Carthage never ceased in her secular policy of imperialising the *hinterlands* of the central and western Mediterranean. It is sufficient to mention Rome as the great imperialising State of all the *hinterlands* of the Mediterranean. This imperialisation of the vast lands and peoples settled round the "Great Lake," as Plato calls the Mediterranean, and stretching far into its *hinterlands*, was the dominating tendency of all classical history. We are justified in saying that all classical history is a movement from the periphery to the vast hinterlands it borders; just as all modern history is essentially the same periphero-central movement from Europe to the immense *hinterlands* called Asia, Africa, and other continents. Geographically, Europe is a peninsula of

[1] See the cartographic representation of the numerous campaigns of Agathocles, with the text thereto, in the author's *Atlas Antiquus*.

Asia; geo-politically, Asia is mostly the *hinterland* of Europe. It is only by emigrated Europeans, or by Europeanised Asiatics, that parts of those *hinterlands* in America and Asia have fallen into the possession of non-European States proper.

When, therefore, the Athenians decided to undertake the expedition to, or to speak plainly, the conquest of Sicily, they acted not so much upon the charm or blandishments of Alcibiades, as from motives that were suggested and fortified by the trend of all Mediterranean history. Much might have been said, and no doubt was said, about the melancholy lessons apparently taught by the failure of the previous great imperialist move of the Athenians in Egypt. However, the failure of one move could not discredit the whole policy of Athenian imperialism. The chances of the enterprise were very great. Perhaps Alcibiades in his speech to the Athenians underrated the power of resistance which the Syracusans were able to offer.[1] Yet, on close

[1] See Thucydides, vi. 17. 2 (from the speech of Alcibiades): *καὶ τὸν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν πλοῦν μὴ μεταγιγνώσκετε ὡς ἐπὶ μεγάλην δύναμιν ἐσόμενον. ὄχλοις τε γὰρ ξυμμίκτοις πολυανδροῦσιν αἱ πόλεις καὶ ῥᾳδίας ἔχουσι τῶν πολιτῶν τὰς μεταβολὰς καὶ ἐπιδοχάς· καὶ οὐδεὶς δι' αὐτὸ ὡς περὶ οἰκείας πατρίδος οὔτε τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὅπλοις ἐξήρτυται οὔτε τὰ ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ μονίμοις κατασκευαῖς, ὅτι δὲ ἕκαστος ἢ ἐκ τοῦ λέγων πείθειν οἴεται ἢ στασιάζων ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ λαβὼν ἄλλην γῆν, μὴ κατορθώσας, οἰκήσειν, ταῦτα ἑτοιμάζεται· καὶ οὐκ εἰκὸς τὸν τοιοῦτον ὅμιλον οὔτε λόγου μιᾷ γνώμῃ ἀκροᾶσθαι οὔτε ἐς τὰ ἔργα κοινῶς τρέπεσθαι· ταχὺ δ' ἂν ὡς ἕκαστοι, εἴ τι καθ' ἡδονὴν λέγοιτο, προσχωροῖεν, ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ στασιάζουσιν, ὥσπερ πυνθανόμεθα. καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ὁπλῖται οὔτ' ἐκείνοις ὅσοιπερ κομποῦνται*, etc. It would be difficult to prove that Alcibiades was consciously underrating the power of the Syracusans. In fact, the "perhaps" of the text above is merely meant to suggest the possibility, and not the probability of Alcibiades doing so independently of what he did or could know. In one respect alone Alcibiades was, as we now know, seriously mistaken; he did not count with the force of Sicilian cavalry, which proved to be very great: compare Thucydides vi. 63. 4; 64. 12; 65. 3; vii. 4. 6; 5. 3; 6. 2; 44; etc. But no Hellene from Greece was at that time acquainted with this mode of warfare, and therefore no special blame can fall upon Alcibiades for neglecting it. Nicias, it is true warns the

consideration, we cannot but admit that Alcibiades was quite right in thinking that the Athenians were far superior to the Syracusans. They were admittedly so in point of sea-power; for the Syracusans had then practically no fleet whatever. They were certainly superior in point of civic virtue, patriotic enthusiasm, and infantry, if not with regard to cavalry. Syracuse, unlike Athens, was a town of which it may be said in strict truth that more happened in it than through it. The Syracusans were, as a rule, not the natives of Syracuse. They were a strange conglomeration of members of the non-Greek or half-Greek tribes from the interior of Sicily; of refugees driven from Messana, Rhegium, Tarentum, and other city-states, by internal party strifes; of Africans of all sorts; of descendants of the very numerous mercenaries from Italy, Gaul, Sardinia, or Iberia, who had at all times been hired by the rulers of Syracuse.[1] The majority of their great leaders in council and war were foreigners. Timoleon, the great Corinthian, who reformed their tyranny-smitten commonwealth (344-337 B.C.); Acestorides, another Corinthian; the Spartans Acrotalos, Aristoteles (leader of mercenaries), Aristos, Pharacidas, Gylippus, Dexippus were some among the foreigners who played decisive parts in Syracusan history.

Athenians, previous to the departure of the fleet, of the danger of the Syracusan cavalry, but he does so only very vaguely, without insisting on the singular superiority of that arm. He says, Thucydides, vi. 22. 1, 2: . . . *μοι δοκεῖ χρῆναι ἡμᾶς ἀγειν καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων . . . καὶ τοξότας πολλοὺς καὶ σφενδονήτας, ὅπως πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνων ἱππικὸν ἀντέχωσι. . . .*

[1] Compare Diodorus Siculus, xi. 67; xiii. 44, 95, 109; xiv. 41, 72; xvi. 9, 70; and in many other passages. Compare what Strabo says of the decline of the once great power of the Tarentines in South Italy, who hired foreigners as their generals (vi. p. 280 Casaub.): *ἐν δὲ τῶν φαύλων πολιτευμάτων τεκμήριόν ἐστι, τὸ ξενικοῖς στρατεγοῖς χρῆσθαι.*

Finally, Agathocles, likewise a non-Syracusan, became the mightiest ruler that Syracuse and Sicily ever possessed. This in itself would not have necessarily been harmful to Syracuse. As was remarked in the *Introduction*, the influx of foreigners is one of the greatest boons to a country. However, it is evident that if the foreigners of the most varied origin so prevail that the nation is unable to develop a homogeneous type, the foreigners are likely to disaggregate rather than strengthen the civic organism of a nation. This was the case at Syracuse. In addition to the testimony of Alcibiades just quoted, there is an indirect way of proving it satisfactorily. We refer to the Sicilian dramatic literature in general and to that of Syracuse in particular. Such inferences from the dramatic literature of a given State to the character of the people can be made, with regard to modern States, only with great caution and, as it were, tentatively, although even in the case of modern States much might be inferred with safety. For instance, it is certain that the greater dramatic lilt in the works of modern Prussian dramatists, as against dramatists from South Germany or Austria, is indicative of a more animated public life in the northern parts of the German Empire. It is equally certain that the absence of great drama in modern England is in correlation with the high-strung nervosity of the modern Englishman. Nerves jaded and fagged out by constant business worries and overdone spirits, lack that vigour and grit which alone will enable men to stand heartshaking dramas. One does not like to listen to *Richard III.* after months of harassing work in the City. No wonder that the dramatist whom so many critics declare to

be the greatest among modern dramatists, Ibsen, comes from gritty, strong-nerved Norway. But what, with regard to modern States, can be done only with difficulty, in that the study of the social forces making or unmaking modern literature has not yet been sufficiently advanced; that can be done with much greater freedom and safety with regard to a classical city-state. In such a State, as we have seen, Religion, Society, and Public Life were concentric, if not quite identical. Instead of each of them moving with a rhythm of its own, in a sphere of its own, and with a complexion and in details of its own, as do our modern Religion, Society, and Public Life, these institutions of a classical city-state were largely the expression of one and the same phenomenon. Under these circumstances, literature, or the intellectual reflex of the life of the city-state, may very well indicate the nature and temperament of the people. We read that the satirical plays introduced into Athens by Susarion, of Megara, a hundred years before the Persian wars, were altogether discontinued under Pisistratus, the 'tyrant'; and, generally, as Platonius says, "the comedy with a *parabasis* was played in times of democracy."[1] A *parabasis* was that part of the old Attic comedy in which the author himself talked to the public, freely criticising the public men and life of his time. It may be likened, in character and drift, to a leading article in an influential newspaper

[1] Platonius, *περὶ διαφορᾶς κωμῳδιῶν*, a short "introduction" generally preceding the scholia to Aristophanes, *e.g.* in the edition of Fr. Dübner [in the Didot collection, 1877, p. xiii.], *ἡ δὲ παράβασις ἐπληροῦτο ὑπὸ μελῳδρίου καὶ κομματίου καὶ στροφῆς καὶ ἀντιστρόφου καὶ ἐπιρρήματος καὶ ἀντεπιρρήματος καὶ ἀναπαίστων. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχοντα τὰς παραβάσεις κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἐδιδάχθη, καθ' ὃν ὁ δῆμος ἐκράτει.*

of our own day. The absence of such a *parabasis* is proof certain that the "freedom of the press," as we now call it, was temporarily or permanently suppressed.[1] The whole character of the old comedy at Athens clearly shows that it had essentially the same scope and the same high aim as the tragedy. It meant to cure the soul of its vices and failings by peals of laughter—a laughter that was not the product of the hilarity of a clown, nor that of the drastic humour of modern comedy-writers. The Athenians had no humour in the modern sense; and in all the eleven remaining comedies of Aristophanes, in spite of their immense *vis comica*, there is not a trace of humour proper. Aristophanes is intensely witty, incredibly charming and delicate,[2] majestically

[1] In the "Frogs" (*Ranae*) of Aristophanes the *parabasis* is of minor importance; and in his *Ecclesiazusae*, *Lysistrata*, and *Plutos* it does not occur at all. This effacement of the *parabasis* is intimately connected with the rising oligarchy at Athens.

[2] In all literature it is impossible to find sweeter and more musical poetry than the two "addresses" of (the bird) hoopoe (ΕΠΟΨ), in the *Birds* of Aristophanes, one to his wife, the nightingale, the other to the birds in general. He sings to his wife (vv. 209 *seq.*):—

ἄγε, σύννομέ μου, παῦσαι μὲν ὕπνου,
λῦσον δὲ νόμους ἱερῶν ὑμνων,
οἷς διὰ θείου στόματος θρηνεῖς
τὸν ἐμὸν καὶ σὸν πολύδακρυν Ἴτυν·
ἐλελιζομένης δ' ἱεροῖς μέλεσιν
γένυος ξουθῆς
καθαρὰ χωρεῖ διὰ φυλλοκόμου
μίλακος ἠχὼ πρὸς Διὸς ἕδρας,
ἵν' ὁ χρυσοκόμας Φοῖβος ἀκούων
τοῖς σοῖς ἐλέγοις ἀντιψάλλων
ἐλεφαντόδετον φόρμιγγα θεῶν
ἵστησι χορούς,
διὰ δ' ἀθανάτων στομάτων χωρεῖ
ξύμφωνος ὁμοῦ
θεία μακάρων ὁλολυγή.

When then the hoopoe asks the birds to convene at his place, he sings the

outspoken and obscene, and mercilessly scathing; but he is never humorous in our modern sense. Behind all his laughter and comical *verve* there is a dead earnestness of purpose; and if the wit of his comedies is the lightning of Rabelais, his thunder is

following, in sound and poetical feeling alike inimitably charming verses (vv. 229 *seq*):—

Ἴτω τις ὧδε τῶν ἐμῶν ὁμοπτέρων·
ὅσοι τ' εὐσπόρους ἀγροίκων γύας
νέμεσθε, φῦλα μυρία κριθοτράγων
σπερμολόγων τε γένη
ταχὺ πετόμενα, μαλθακὴν ἱέντα γῆρυν·
ὅσα τ' ἐν ἄλοκι θαμὰ
βῶλον ἀμφιτιττυβίζεθ' ὧδε λεπτὸν
ἁδομένᾳ φωνᾷ,
τιὸ τιὸ τιὸ τιὸ τιὸ τιὸ τιὸ τιό·
ὅσα θ' ὑμῶν κατὰ κήπους ἐπὶ κισσοῦ
κλάδεσι νομὸν ἔχετε,
τά τε κατ' ὄρεα, τά τε κοτινοτράγα, τά τε κομαροφάγα,
ἀνύσατε πετόμενα πρὸς ἐμὰν ᾠδάν,
τριοτὸ τριοτὸ τοτοβρίξ·
οἳ θ' ἑλείας παρ' αὐλῶνας ὀξυστόμους
ἐμπίδας κάπτεθ', ὅσα τ' εὐδρόσους γᾶς τόπους
ἔχετε λειμωνά τ' ἐρόεντα Μαραθῶνος,
ὄρνις πτέρων ποικίλος τ'
ἀτταγᾶς ἀτταγᾶς,
ὃν τ' ἐπὶ πόντιον οἶδμα θαλάσσης
φῦλα μετ' ἀλκυόνεσσι ποτῆται,
δεῦρ' ἴτε πευσόμενοι τὰ νεώτερα,
πάντα γὰρ ἐνθάδε φῦλ' ἀθροΐζομεν
οἰωνῶν ταναοδείρων.
ἥκει γάρ τις δριμὺς πρέσβυς
δεινὸς γνώμην
καινῶν ἔργων τ' ἐγχειρητής·
ἀλλ' ἴτ' ἐς λόγους ἅπαντα
δεῦρο δεῦρο δεῦρο δεῦρο.

The text is taken from the edition of Blaydes (1882), pp. 29 *seq*. This is not the place to go into the aesthetic beauties of this incomparable song. Yet, it may be allowed to remark, that the two lines describing the twittering of the birds while tripping on both sides of the clod of earth between two furrows (*βῶλον ἀμφιτιττυβίζεθ'*, etc.) is in sequence of dark and light vowels, in crisp gracefulness of expression, and in tenderness of touch such as could be expressed in no modern language, not even in Hungarian, singularly rich and felicitous as that language is in the onomatopoeic rendering of the sounds of nature.

that of the old Hebrew prophets.[1] At Athens, humour in the modern sense was impossible. Our humour, as we remarked, grows out of and feeds on the deep mendacity of our modern life; a life that abounds in false positions, in absurd contrasts of what one is, and what one appears to be; in conflicts between religion and science, etc. etc. Of all this there was at Athens no trace whatever; or, at any rate, such conflicts were in the times of Aristophanes only incipient. From his comedies, then, we may safely conclude that his very thundering against the vices of the Athenians; his very unblushing *naïveté* of expression; his very pride as the laughing prophet of his State, amply prove that Athens was then grafted on a nation unified, sound, great, and unbroken.

If now we apply this method of gauging the people of an ancient city-state to Syracuse, we find that neither Epicharmus, Sophron, Dinolochus, nor any other dramatic writer of Syracuse can be classed with Aristophanes in point of dramatic grandeur or deep earnestness of purpose. Epicharmus himself, a contemporary of Aeschylus, wrote famous and probably good comedies, which we should now term character-comedies, or representations of social types of private life. Deeply versed in the philosophic system of the Pythagoreans as Epicharmus was, he

[1] One of the most telling characterisations of Aristophanes is that by the epigrammatist Antipatros of Thessalonica. He says the 'writings of Aristophanes' are "full of the fearful Graces" (*φοβερῶν πληθόμενοι χαρίτων*, *Anthologia Palatina*, ix. 186). See also the powerful passage in J. L. Klein's great *Geschichte des Dramas*, ii. [1865], p. 47: ". . . *wie Pallas aus dem Haupte des Donnerers, so ward auch diese Komödie* [the 'old' comedy, or chiefly Aristophanes] *von des Dichters Kunsthammer aus dem harten, gewaltigen Schädel des Demos geschlagen, des Theaters-Erschütterers mit donnerndem Gelächter; und wie Pallas Athena, die Aegis-Schüttlerin, Gorgoschrecken, so blitzte diese Komödie von ihrem Medusenschilde schüttelndes Lachen.*"

studded his comedies with many a jewel of felicitous philosophical remarks. But his comedies were, compared with those of Aristophanes, tame works of one of the 'laughter-makers' (γελωτοποιοί), as the Greeks called them. In the work of Athenaeus, where we still have many an instructive detail about the comedy-writers of Syracuse, we learn that these dramatists belonged to the class of the *hilarotragedians*, *magodia*-writers, or *phlyakes*, who wrote to amuse, to distract, or to tickle the fancy of the mob.[1] This lack of real, great comedy at Syracuse, a town of many hundred thousand inhabitants; a city-state of great power, boasting wonderful buildings, some of which, as we may still convince ourselves, nearly vie with the temples of Athens;[2] a town in a strategic position, that made it the most important town in Sicily;[3] this lack of great comedy

[1] Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae*, at various places, more particularly xiv. cap. iv. (p. 621 Casaub. 1657), and Casaubon's note to it. In that passage (p. 621 D) Athenaeus tells us that according to Sosibius, a Laconian historian, the Spartans too had a very drastic kind of mimic entertainments; but he adds that it was very primitive and moderate. Compare also Athenaeus iii. 9, and Casaubon's note on *phlyakes*.

[2] See Reclus, Élisée, *Nouvelle Géographie Universelle, L'Europe Méridionale* [1887], pp. 594, 595: "*Jadis, le sommet d'Ortygie, ainsi nommée en souvenir de la Délos des Cyclades, était couronné par une acropole où se dressait un temple de Minerve, rival du Parthénon d'Athènes, et que les marins sortis du port contemplaient en tenant à la main un vase plein de charbons ardents pris sur l'autel de Jupiter. Ce temple existe encore en partie; mais ses colonnes de marbre ont disparu sous un masque de moellons et de mortier qui sert de muraille à une église du plus mauvais goût; du monument superbe les modernes ont fait une bâtisse informe.*" See also Wilkins, W., *The Antiquities of Magna Graecia* (Cambridge, 1807), chapter ii.; and the work of Mr. Douglas Sladen, *In Sicily* (2 vols. 4to, 1901).

[3] The southern coasts of Sicily are very poor in good harbours; in fact, on the coast facing Africa there was in classical times no harbour proper. On the coast facing the Ionian Sea there were only two good ones, one at Syracuse, the other where now is the town of Agosta, or the bay close to and north of ancient Megara Hyblaea; and since Megara frequently came to be under the rule of its close neighbour Syracuse, the latter town may be said to have possessed the only good harbours on the southern and eastern coasts of Sicily.

at Syracuse, we say, is indicative of serious shortcomings in the people of Syracuse. Like the people of Tarentum, who likewise enjoyed only the works of *phlyakes*, or writers of low, farcical travesties,[1] the Syracusans must have been immersed in gross pleasures, and callous to the stern tasks of civic freedom. An ancient city-state may have had no dramatic performances at all, in that it preferred lyrical, epical, *orchestic* or other *agonistic* representations; but if it had dramatic performances, the nature of such dramas clearly reveals the nature of the people. The Syracusan comedy is the comedy of a people more interested in the petty intrigues of family-life, or the life of trade and commerce, than in the grand political tasks of a potential Athens in Sicily. This indifference evidently came from the fact that the bulk of the Syracusans were newcomers, who had not yet identified themselves with the life of Syracuse; a shifting, floating set of people, bent only on enriching themselves rapidly; in short, a harbour population. Syracuse, on looking at it geographically or "racially," might have, or perhaps ought to have become the Athens of the western

[1] The licentiousness of the Tarentines, who, according to Strabo (vi. p. 280), had more days of feasting than of work, is dwelt upon by Plato (*Leges*, i. p. 637 Steph.); and Rhinthon, who introduced the *phlyakes*, was a Tarentine. We still see many of the scenes of the lost comedies of these western Hellenes represented on vases found in Magna Graecia; see Heydemann, *Die Phlyakendarstellungen auf bemalten Vasen*, in *Archaeologisches Jahrbuch*, i. pp. 261-313. In keeping with the inferiority of State-life at Syracuse, we find that the one art in which Syracusans excelled was the noble but small art of coin-engraving. Evaenetus, whom Lenormant called *le Phidias de la gravure en monnaies*, Cimon, and others (see Head, Barclay V., *Historia Numorum* [Oxford, 1887], pp. 154, 155, where, however, the reproduction of the famous head of Persephone, and the *quadriga*, is not quite successful) have left *pentecontalitrae*, *dekadrachms*, etc., of which it may be said that many a modern will, through them, obtain more readily a sense of Greek beauty than through the sculptures of Athenian artists.

Mediterranean. However, as laid down in the *Introduction*, the fate of peoples is not decided by "racial" factors; nor is it determined by geographical influences alone. It is much more to the point to search for the fundamental, or driving forces of a nation's history in circumstances of geo-politics. What baffled all efforts to raise Syracuse, if only temporarily, to the height of Athens, was her geo-political situation in historic space. Syracuse was in the centre of a great number of Greek and Carthaginian polities, none of which was weak enough to be readily absorbed by Syracuse; and none of which was the centre of an imposing and powerful empire, by the defeat of which Syracuse might have energised herself into the vitality of Athens. Tarentum, Sybaris, Crotona, Locri, Rhegium, Cumae in South Italy; Messana, Megara, Acragas, Selinus, etc., in Sicily, were all during the fifth and fourth centuries rich, populous, vigorous city-states. Neither Dionysius I., of Syracuse,[1] nor Agathocles, tyrant of the same town, succeeded in absorbing them. On the other hand, Carthage, while undoubtedly a strong State, was yet not sensibly stronger than Syracuse. Syracuse was thus bound to fail in any enterprise aiming at the permanent imperialisation of Magna Graecia. She had neither the luck of combating successfully a Persian Empire, nor the opportunity of dealing with Greek States long drained of their vigorous vitality. She defeated,

[1] The only city-state in South Italy that Dionysius I. of Syracuse was able to attach to his interests, or, properly speaking, to annex, was Locri; Aristotle, *Politics*, p. 1307 a 38, calls the connection between Locri and Dionysius a κηδεία, on account of Dionysius' marrying a Locrian girl. It is well known that Dionysius, on the very day of his wedding with Doris, the Locrian, also married Aristomachia, a Syracusan girl.

indeed, Athens; and this immense triumph, which the Syracusans celebrated until the eighteenth century of our era, would have energised them as much as Salamis energised the Athenians, had that triumph not been secured by Gylippus, a Spartan. The Syracusans were good material for an able tyrant, but unstable and shifty in their home policy, on account of their heterogeneous population. They could never produce a sufficient number of great statesmen or generals of their own, and therefore never rose to the political, nor to the intellectual level of the Athenians. Last, not least, Syracuse was a colony; that is, its founders had not transmitted to their progeny the great forces of intellect and character which the founders of Athens had accumulated in secular struggles as a border nation in their fights against powers in the Aegean Sea and in Asia Minor. For all these reasons Syracuse was positively inferior to Athens; and once we admit that Athens was justified in her attempt at imperialising Sicily, the power of Syracuse was certainly not such as to deter the Athenians from their enterprise. Alcibiades, then, did not substantially underrate the difficulties of the expedition against Syracuse.

He was, however, opposed by the oligarchic party at Athens, which was decidedly un-imperialist. In absolute contrast to modern States, the imperialist party at Athens was democratic, and the non-imperialist or "Little Englander" party was oligarchic.[1]

[1] It is not necessary to prove the statement in the text with regard to England and Venice; with regard to Holland, it is sufficient to quote R. Fruin, the greatest student of Dutch constitutional history. He says (*Tien Jaren uit den tachtigjarigen Oorlog*, 1588-98 [Leyden, 1856-8, 4to], chapter iv.): "*Inderdaad die vroedschappen sijn de souvereinen, de Koningen van het republikeinsch Holland.*" The *States* of the province of Holland consisted of

The intellectuals at Athens were, of course, all anti-imperialist. This is not a specific or singular feature of Athenian party life; it is the regular feature of all periods of imperialism. The intellectuals are naturally hostile to a policy that requires soldiers, politicians, and other men of action, and relegates intellectuals to the background. We read that Aristophanes resolutely opposed the imperialist enterprises of the *demos* of Athens,[1] and that he wrote no less than seven comedies in the interest of an

seven representatives of the knights (noblemen, *Edelen*), and of eighteen representatives of big and small towns; and as A. Kluit puts it (*Historie der Hollandsche Staats regering tot aan het jaar* 1795 [Amsterdam, vol. iv. (1804), pp. 597, 598]): "*En 't is dan ook in dien zin, dat in 't bekende* VERTOOG *over de Regering van 's* LANDS STATEN *in 't jaar* 1587 *openbaarlijk voor 't Volk verklaard werd, dat alles, wat bij de Vroedschappen als* STEDELIJKE VERTEGENWOORDIGERS, *en wat bij* DE STATEN *als 's* VOLKS *Vertegenwoordigers, verricht, besloten, en verordend werd, zulks uitmakte* DEN WIL EN 'T BESLUIT VAN 'T GANSCHE VOLK, *zonder dat daartegen ooit iets van de zijde der burgeren en ingezetenen gedaan, getwijfeld, of ondernomen zij.*" Now, these city representatives, who had practically all the power, were continued by co-optation, and their office remained, as a matter of fact, in the hands of a few patrician families (J. B. Westerkamp, *Das Bundesrecht der Republik der Vereinigten Niederlande* (1890), p. 22, note 9). As in the province of Holland, so it was, with rare exceptions, in the other six provinces too.

[1] No one can read the sixth book of Thucydides without being aware of the fact, that in the first half of the year 415 B.C. the Athenians could neither think nor talk of anything else than the Sicilian expedition; and Blaydes (F. H. M.) has well remarked that it is hardly credible that Aristophanes ignored in his *Birds*, produced during that time, the all-absorbing subject ("... *tecta allusio subest* [in the *Aves*] *ad rem quae omnium animos eo tempore maxime movebat, scilicet expeditionem Siculam, rem tam gravem et tanti momenti ut omnem mentionem eius aut allusionem ad eam praetermisisse Comicum vix credibile videatur, quamquam propter excitatos animos Atheniensium leviter et tecte eam tangere cogeretur*") (Blaydes' edition of the *Aves*, Halle a./S. 1882, p. xiii.). This view of the political tendency of the *Birds* of Aristophanes, which Süvern was the first to advance in an elaborate manner, and which was promptly rejected by Droysen, by J. W. Donaldson, and others, is too patent to require much proof. One has only to read the following dialogue (in the *Birds*) between Peisthetairos and Prometheus, in which the latter, with transparent sarcasm, makes fun of the passion for imperialism then so characteristic of the Athenians. Imperialism is represented by Basileia.

early peace with Sparta. Socrates was opposed to the Sicilian expedition, and so was Meton, the mathematician.[1] Euripides wrote his *Troades* as a warning against it.[2] It is almost needless to add

Aves, vv. 1537 *seq.* :—

ΠΕΙΣΘΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ. *τίς ἐστιν ἡ Βασίλεια;*
ΠΡΟΜΗΘΕΥΣ. *καλλίστη κόρη,*
ἥτερ ταμιεύει τὸν κεραυνὸν τοῦ Διὸς
καὶ τἄλλ' ἁπαξάπαντα, τὴν εὐβουλίαν,
τὴν εὐνομίαν, τὴν σωφροσύνην, τὰ νεώρια,
τὴν λοιδορίαν, τὸν κωλαγρέτην, τὰ τριώβολα.
ΠΕ. *ἅπαντα τἄρ' αὐτῷ ταμιεύει·* ΠΡ. *φήμ' ἐγώ·*
ἢν γ' ἢν σὺ παρ' ἐκείνου λάβῃς, ἅπαντ' ἔχεις.

[1] Plutarch, *Alcibiades*, chapter xvii.; *Nicias*, xiii. Plutarch relates that Meton was so sure of the coming disaster, that he burnt his own house, and prevailed upon the Athenians to leave him at least his son, who was exempted from service.

[2] Already in his *Supplices*, or "The Mothers' Supplication," Euripides warmly pleaded for peace, not because he had joined the "party" of Nicias, but because it was his personal conviction. In his *Troades* he gave unrestrained expression to his despair at what appeared to him the sinful, extravagant imperialism of the Athenians. His drama is both so grand and so pessimistic that it may not inadequately be compared with the terrible fresco painting of Michelangelo called "The Last Judgment." The more Euripides risked in giving such thinly veiled expression to his rationalism and pessimism, the more, it is evident, we are bound to recognise his sincerity and spontaneity. For, in those days, it was no light matter to touch upon the religious beliefs of the Athenians. Thucydides, sticking, as usual, a trifle too much "to the point," does not give us any information about the "religious revival" at Athens during the Peloponnesian war. In fact, a wave of something that one is entitled to call Puritanism had surged over the city of Minerva. In addition to the great national temples and sacred buildings erected or completed during that time, such as the Erechtheum, the Nike Apteros, etc., we learn from the extant inscriptions of a considerable number of religious acts all testifying to an increased interest in religion. Such acts are, for instance, the introduction of the celebration of the Hephaestia, in honour of Hephaestus, with torch processions every five years. Celebrations of Hephaestus were among the most archaic festivals at Athens, so that we must assume that this *penteteric* festival, of which we read in the inscription (*Corpus Inscr. Atticarum*, iv.[1b] 35[b], first published, by Kumanudis, in the Ἐφημερὶς ἀρχαιολογική for 1883, pp. 167 *seq.*), had some distinctive character. Another inscription (*C.I.A.* iv.[1b] 53[a]; also in Dittenberger's *Sylloge*,[2] ii. [1900], No. 550, pp. 237 *seq.*), from the year 418-7 B.C., gives us an elaborate decree regarding the *ἱερόν* of King Codrus, of Neleus, and of the chthonic goddess Basile, an old Athenian divinity reigning in Hades. Further inscriptions, or rather fragments of inscriptions, referring to the

that both Plato and Aristotle strongly denounce

great religious activity during the Peloponnesian war, are *C.I.A.* iv. [1c], 66, 68, 90, 91, 92, 93; a lengthy inscription (*C.I.A.* iv. [1b], 27[b], and Dittenberger, *Sylloge*,[2] i. No. 20) dating (as Körte seems to have proved [*Mitteilungen d. kaiserl. deutschen archaeol. Instituts, Athenische Abth.*, xxi. pp. 320 *seq.*]) from about 418 B.C. shows the greatly increased significance attributed to the cult of Demeter; and from the inscriptions containing statements of accounts on the part of the officials of public works, we may mention *C.I.A.* iv. [1a], 318, 319, 320; let alone the fragments 321, 322, 323, 324, referring to the accounts for the building of the Erechtheum. In addition to this epigraphic evidence, we know from Pausanias that the cult of Asclepius was introduced into Athens by the poet Sophocles, at about 420 B.C., from Epidaurus (ii. 26. 7). His sanctuary was excavated in 1876; compare the inscription in Dittenberger, *Sylloge*,[2] ii. [1900], p. 562, No. 725. So intense had the religious earnestness of the Athenians become, that they condemned Diagoras, a native of the isle of Melos, and old Protagoras of Abdera, both living at Athens, for atheism. The writings of Protagoras were publicly burnt; and both thinkers were compelled to flee from Athens. No wonder that the mutilation of the *Hermae* appeared to the Athenians, then at the maximum of their religious tension, an unpardonable and revolting crime.

This zeal for the old religion of their forefathers appears, to modern historians, somewhat singular. Wilamowitz speaks of the Athenian zealots ("*Eiferer*," "*Zeloten*," in *Introduction* to his translation of Euripides' *Troades*, *Griechische Tragoedien*, iii. [1906], p. 294) with scorn; and others affect to see in the religious indignation of the Athenians a mere pretext for political measures. The truth is, that this rising "Puritanism" is a natural and invariable complement of imperialism. In the most resolutely imperialist State in Greece, in Sparta, it had long eaten its way into the whole life of the Spartans. In modern times it has, as we have tried to show in our *Imperialism* (1905), invariably accompanied all true attempts at imperialism. At Athens, where, owing to the intensity of life, all social, religious, or political movements at once assumed typical and very pronounced articulation; at Athens, where, in the second half of the fifth century B.C., the first attempts even in science or literature at once grew into full-fledged maturity; at Athens, we say, imperialism too, like all the other phenomena of human activity, manifested all its characteristic features, and so also, among others, its inevitable tendency to Puritanism of some kind. Even the school of the Cynics is intimately allied to the imperialism of Athens and Corinth. The late Professor Schvarcz, of Budapest, ascribed the persecution of Diagoras to the evils inherent in Athenian or any other democracy; see his *Die Demokratie von Athen* (1891), p. 360. However, imperialist democracy alone is necessarily bigoted. Had the Athenians been less "reactionary," they could never have kept up their empire for more than a few years. There is, as we tried to show in our *Imperialism*, a vital correlation between imperialism and religious zeal. Imperialism needs a very strong national pride, and a strong prevalence of volitional powers over intellectual ones. The Athenians were quite right in placing most of their confidence in Nicias, who was profoundly pious, nay bigoted; unfortunately he was not also a

all imperialism.[1] There is in Plutarch's *Life of Alcibiades* a passage in which this perennial play of repulsed attraction between imperialism and intellect is, in the manner of the Greeks, related as a story of the love between Alcibiades and Socrates. The brilliant youth, all beauty, wealth, and ambition, despises his flatterers and 'friends'; but the words of Socrates pierce his heart and make him cry like a child. Socrates, to "harden the iron" of Alcibiades' character, "hunts" him like one chasing a noble game; but Alcibiades, as Plato put it, for fear lest he never leave Socrates once he heard him talk,[2] flees from him, and devotes himself to his ambition.[3] It is the scene that later on passed at Corinth between Diogenes and Alexander the Great; and which, raised to the sphere of religious emotion, we read of in the New Testament as between Christ and Magdalen.

However, far more formidable than any opposition on the part of the intellectuals or the oligarchs, was the inherent vice of the Athenian constitution as an instrument of imperial expansion. We saw in the discussion of that constitution, that it was based on

good general. The instincts of a great nation are infallible in such matters. The intellectuals of Athens were therefore opposed to the great imperialist venture in Sicily, because imperialism lowered their personal prestige, and because it naturally induced the Athenians to heed religious precepts more than the dictates of enlightened science or philosophy.

[1] For Aristotle, it is sufficient to refer to *Politics*, vii. cap. iv. *s.f.* (p. 1326, ll. 2-7); as to Plato, the entire *Republic* and *Laws* are one continuous proof of his idea that the true State, in which the citizens can be rendered happy and good, is of necessity a small State.

[2] Plato, *Symposium* (*Banquet*), xxxii. (p. 215 Steph.): *ὅταν γὰρ ἀκούω, πολύ μοι μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν κορυβαντιώντων ἥ τε καρδία πηδᾷ καὶ δάκρυα ἐκχεῖται ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων τῶν τούτου . . .* ; and p. 216 *ib. βίᾳ οὖν ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τῶν Σειρήνων ἐπισχόμενος τὰ ὦτα οἴχομαι φεύγων, ἵνα μὴ αὐτοῦ καθήμενος παρὰ τούτῳ καταγηράσω. . . .*

[3] Plutarch, *Alcibiades*, vi. 1.

the idea that no single person was to wield great power for any length of time. If any single man at Athens ever succeeded in exerting a great and lasting ascendency in the councils of Athens, he could and did do so only by dint of his personal or subjective qualities. Themistocles and Pericles had much, and at times exceeding influence. This they had, not because they were incumbents of an office vesting such great influence in them, but simply in virtue of their own personality, of their talents, fascination, and gift of rule. In other words, the Athenian constitution recognised only subjective personality. It never vested in an office, nor in any incumbent of such an office, a power of absolute, if temporary rule. As we shall see in the section on Rome, this was not the case with Roman offices. Rome had a series of immensely powerful *objective* personalities; that is, a number of State officers in Republican Rome gave their incumbents, whosoever they were, a practically unlimited power. Thus, to illustrate this cardinal point, we read in Thucydides that Alcibiades, who had together with Nicias and Lamachus been placed at the head of the Sicilian expedition, was suddenly recalled from Sicily a few weeks after he had landed in the island, in order to exculpate himself at Athens for an alleged profanation of the sacred mysteries. This means, that a legally appointed general and admiral of the Athenians, who was absent on an expedition, an integral part of which had officially been placed under his conduct, was suddenly, and before he could have possibly finished the initial stages of his expedition, recalled to Athens, there to defend himself against the accusation of a common crime, absolutely discon-

nected with his official charge. Such a proceeding clearly implies that the official or objective personality of Alcibiades as admiral and general was not superior to, but, as it were, merged in his private personality as a citizen of Athens. The authority given him by his office was slight, and he had no right to claim at least temporary exemption from being summoned before the criminal court for a crime of common law. This was quite different in Rome. There no man who was for the time being representative of the State, or who was absent "*reipublicae causa*," that is, in State matters, could possibly be recalled in consequence of an accusation of a crime of common law. There were special laws (the *lex Memmia*, and others) against such interference with generals, proconsuls, or other State officials during their office and while they were officially absent. Even under the emperors this consequence of the *objective* personality of a Roman magistrate or general was strictly observed.[1] Without such power

[1] We read in Valerius Maximus, *Facta et Dicta memorabilia*, iii. 7, 9: *Quaestor* [M. Antonius, the great orator] *proficiscens in Asiam, Brundusium iam pervenerat: ubi literis certior factus incesti se postulatum apud L. Cassium praetorem, cuius tribunal propter nimiam severitatem* SCOPULUS REORUM *dicebatur, cum id vitare beneficio legis Memmiae liceret, quae eorum, qui reipublicae caussa abessent, recipi nomina vetabat; in Urbem tamen recurrit.* The name of the law, which both Mommsen (*Römisches Strafrecht* [1899], p. 353) and Ludwig Lange (*Römische Alterthümer* [²1867; the author's copy is Lange's own copy, with Lange's very numerous marginal remarks in pencil], ii. p. 648; iii. 53, 58) accept as authentic, appears to be doubtful; see a full note in the edition of Valerius Maximus, by Abraham Torrenius (Leyde, 1726—a *Variorum* edition), p. 301, note 62. When Cneius Servilius Caepio, Consul, had repaired, during the second Punic War, to Sicily, the Roman Senate wanted him to return to Italy, and accordingly asked the Praetor to write to that effect to the Consul. The Praetor, however, expressed a fear lest the Consul would simply shelve the letter and remain where he was (*quum praetor, spreturum eum literas suas, diceret*, Livy, xxx. 24). Thereupon a Dictator was appointed to force Servilius to return; that is, the normal working of the Roman Constitution was interrupted in order to enable the Senate to make good their will (Livy, *ibid.*). The Pandects are quite explicit on this point: "*Hos*

given to single offices no country can be at once imperial and free. In imperial autocracies such power is vested in the autocrat alone; and if he is an able man he may very well keep up and increase the empire. In imperial democracies such power must be given to single offices and their incumbents, or otherwise the people will retain indeed their freedom, but not their empire. In Great Britain, as every one knows who has studied her constitution in England, and not merely from books or occasional trips to London, there is, as was remarked in treating of Pericles, p. 392, quite a number of State offices, the incumbents of which are given practically unlimited power within their several spheres. This way of constituting State offices in England is essentially Roman. On the Continent—in Germany, for instance—no member of the Imperial Diet has a legitimate expectation to become minister,—ministers being chosen purely bureaucratically. And even when a minister, he has, in reality, only a delegated and precarious power. The Athenians had no such Roman offices; they had no *objective* personalities; consequently they had no organs for imperial expansion. Had Alcibiades been left in command, as Themistocles had, he might very well have captured Syracuse; but the Athenians would have unfailingly undone him, as they undid Miltiades, Themistocles, Cimon, Aristides, and, briefly, down to Demosthenes,—nearly

accusare non licet: . . . Item, Magistratum populi Romani; eumve, qui rei publicae causa abfuerit" (*principium legis* 12 D. *de accusationibus et inscriptionibus*, 48, tit. 2). This exemption from criminal proceedings extends even to him who is still at Rome, but is preparing to leave *Reipublicae causa: "Neque foemina, neque miles, neque qui Reipublicae causa abfuturus est, . . . aut magistratum initurus est, . . . idoneus defensor intelligitur"* (*pr.* 54 D. *de procuratoribus et defensoribus*, iii. tit. 3).

every one of their great men. This they did, not from sheer vulgarity of mob-envy, but simply because they had stronger forces for the maintenance of their civic liberty than for the preservation of their empire. To be able to produce a Themistocles, a Pericles, an Alcibiades, or a Theramenes, without being able to endow offices to be filled by such men with a power worthy of their mettle, this was the evil cankering Athens. They were not at all, as one of the German writers thinks, in permanent anarchy from B.C. 430 to B.C. 355.[1] They were all through that great time in a state of healthy tension, of vigorous party government, which might and would have finally brought about that Roman fulness of official personality which alone they lacked for the consummation of a lasting Athenian empire. The Romans, too, built up their efficient organisation of State offices only after, and partly in consequence of secular tensions, strifes, disasters, faults, and blunders. No nation goes into the land of promise by orderly procedure. It falls into it, geo-political circumstances permitting, by work and intelligence indeed, but also, and concomitantly, by anarchy, errors, sins, overreaching conceit, aimless activity,—but by activity, by constantly higher strung tension of all its forces. The Athenians failed in their imperial policy, in the first place and chiefly, not because they had no imperial men, whom they had

[1] "*Wollen wir es scharf formulieren, so müssen wir aussprechen, dass Athen sich vom Sturz des Perikles bis auf die makedonische Zeit oder vielmehr bis auf Eubulos* (355 *v. Chr.*) *in einem Zustande permanenter Anarchie befunden hat, der immer nur ganz vorübergehend unterbrochen wurde, wenn ein Demagoge auf kurze Zeit, im günstigsten Falle auf wenige Jahre, die Herrschaft über die Massen gewann;*" Eduard Meyer, *Geschichte des Alterthums*, iv. (1901), § 563, p. 335.

in plenty, but because they insisted on acquiring and maintaining an empire without fitting their constitution to imperial tasks. Even the Syracusans made once a fair beginning towards such an imperialisation of their constitution.[1] Not so the Athenians. It has been said that the folly of the Athenians in insisting on keeping the incapable Nicias as chief commander in Sicily, was the principal cause of the Sicilian disaster. Nicias *was* incapable; but a capable general would have at once filled the Athenians with desperate apprehensions for their liberty. They wanted, as it were, victories, but no victorious generals. To this must be added two other facts intimately connected with the predominance of democratic over imperial forces at Athens. We mean their persistent refusal of intermarriage with non-Athenians, or at any rate, their refusal to give full recognition to such marriages.[2] This naturally so lowered their numbers that by the middle of the fourth century they were

[1] This seems to follow from Thucydides, vi. 41. 1, where τῶν δὲ στρατηγῶν εἷς evidently conducts the Assembly of the Syracusans at will.

[2] In Moritz Voigt's *Das jus naturale, aequum et bonum und jus gentium der Römer*, iv. [1875], pp. 186-250, there is an elaborate treatise on the law of the classical as well as the hellenistic Greeks with regard to *conubium* (ἐπιγαμία), *commercium* and the resulting procedure or *recuperatio*, between the Greeks and their allies or confederates. It follows from Voigt's researches, which are based both on the study of the ancient writers and inscriptions, and on the modern literature of the question, that cases of *conubium* granted by the Athenians are very rare, and form quite the exception. The Romans observed the opposite policy. They gave *conubium* and *commercium* with relative facility. Already Machiavelli in the 3rd chapter of the 2nd book of his profound *Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio* (ed. Florence, 1887, p. 147) treats of *Roma divenne grande città rovinando le città circonvicini, e ricevendo i forestieri facilmente a' suoi onori.* Compare the identical remark in Bacon's *Union of England and Scotland* (Works [London, 1837], vol. i. p. 451 b). Compare also Diodorus Siculus in the *Vaticana fragmenta* (ed. by L. Dindorf [Leipsic 1828, in his edition of Diodor.], p. 130), *à propos* of the Marsian War. See also Moritz Voigt, *l.c.* ii. [1858], pp. 103-252.

far too few in number to compete with the populous imperial nations arising in the Balkans and in Italy.

If, now, we focus all the preceding remarks and facts on a study of Alcibiades, we are, we take it, completely justified in regarding him as a truly great man, who clearly saw the possibilities of Athenian imperialism; and who had the personal prestige and genius to carry out all the military plans and political measures required for the foundation of an Empire, under which the world would have enjoyed the peace of Rome with the intellect of Athens. To have an ambition so vast, so universally beneficial, so beautiful, is not a crime. Whatever private excesses may or may not have disgraced Alcibiades—and who ignores the endless avalanche of lies falling on public men?—it is certain that, in continuing the traditions of Pericles, a relation of his, he aimed at a consummation devoutly to be wished for by humanity. He failed. No single man can be greater than his nation; and the nation of Alcibiades had been spoilt by being raised too rapidly to the heights of the greatest glory and triumph. The Romans became the Romans precisely because every nation in and outside Italy repeatedly inflicted heavy and frequently terrible defeats upon them. Man, unless he suffers like Prometheus, can obtain neither his light nor his force. Alcibiades wanted to do what the Hellenes ought to have done, had they been privileged by the hard experience of the Romans; that is, to Hellenise, by the foundation of the Hellenic Empire, the whole of the Mediterranean countries. He wanted to do in the West what Alexander the Great did in the East, in incomparably less promising countries. Had Alcibiades succeeded, centuries of

aimless and bootless barbarism would have been spared the world; and the great discoveries, inventions, together with the Renascence of all Europe, might have been inaugurated in the first instead of the fifteenth century of our Era. The Romans had not only the inestimable favour of fighting great and stubborn nations, but also the advantage of combating mostly non-Greek States. A Hellenic Empire could be made only after the defeat of a very large number of the most high-strung and desperately unassimilative Greek city-states. Had Alcibiades finally taken Syracuse, he would have found Acragas and a dozen other city-states in Sicily equally obstinate, and he might have spent forty years in reducing all Magna Graecia. In the time of the Romans, the Greeks had lost most of their vitality. They offered to the Romans pretty nearly the same spectacle of decline and disaggregation that the English found in India in the second half of the eighteenth century. Rome was rather the "receiver" in bankruptcy of Hellenic polities than their conqueror. High-strung white nations, like the Hellenes of the fourth century B.C., or the modern Europeans, cannot be imperialised. Neither the British nor the French have ever been able to imperialise white nations of the high-strung type. On the other hand, a small nation like the contemporary Dutch have over 50,000,000 coloured subjects. We may thus, from the standpoint of General History, sum up the problem of Alcibiades to the effect that he failed, technically, or as to proximate causes, on account of the insufficiency of the Athenian constitution as an engine of imperial expansion; historically, because neither he nor any

one else could, in the fifth century B.C., imperialise the Greek city-states of Sicily and South Italy, these States being then far too vigorous and far too full of the high spirits of Hellenic individualism. It is probably the wise influence of Aristotle that directed the genius of Alexander of Macedon into Eastern channels, instead of into attempts at setting a poor precedent to the adventures of Pyrrhus in the West. Alcibiades committed the great error in judgment of placing the Sicilian towns on a level with the Ionian cities; and accordingly he chose a theoretically true, but an untimely measure. It is for this reason that, while recognising his greatness, we must yet deny him the attribute of statesmanship of the first magnitude.

Spartan Supremacy.—In 404 B.C. Athens was practically reduced to the position of a helpless subordinate ally of Sparta, and both in Greece and in Asia Minor the *decarchies* (oligarchic committee of ten) and *harmosts* (regulators = Spartan governors) were a visible proof of Spartan hegemony. However, Sparta had, as repeatedly remarked, poor resources for organising provinces, owing to her constitution as an unprogressive and *music* empire. The Athenians, first under Theramenes, who, however, failed and was executed by the oligarchs (about Jan. 403 B.C.), then by the successes of Thrasybulus, rid themselves of the "Thirty" or the terrorising committee of the Athenian oligarchs under rich and masterful Critias and his Spartan abettors, especially Lysander (403 B.C.); and under the archon Euclides restored the democracy and the spirit, if not the letter, of the Solonian constitution. From the end of the Peloponnesian war to 386 B.C. Greek history is dominated by two chief influences: (*a*) the constant attempts

of Athens, Thebes, Corinth, and other Hellenic States to shake off the yoke of Spartan supremacy; and (*b*) the diplomatic and military interference of Persia in Greek affairs, chiefly through the satraps Tissaphernes and Tithraustes. Already, in 401 B.C., Cyrus, the Younger, had engaged some 13,000 Greeks to help him in the dethronement of his brother, Artaxerxes Mnemon, King of Persia. Cyrus and the Greeks marched from Sardis, through Tyana, Myriandrus, Thapsacus, to the Tigris river; Artaxerxes was defeated at Cunaxa, but Cyrus fell in the battle. The "ten thousand" Greeks now made their famous retreat through Mesopotamia and Armenia amidst excessive hardships. Their experiences of the inherent weakness of the Persian Empire were to be of decisive importance for the fate of Asia fifty years later. In the so-called *Corinthian war* (394-386 B.C.) waged with Sparta by Thebes, Argos, Corinth, and Athens, the Persians actively interfered by subsidising the allies, and placing Conon, an Athenian admiral, at the head of a fleet which signally defeated the Spartans off Cnidus, 394 B.C. Sparta, in spite of some successes, was far from really strong. At home, conspiracies of the *perioeci* and the helots under Cinadon, and grave dissensions between King Pausanias and the dangerously ambitious Lysander, kept the State in constant ferment; abroad the victories of their noble and strong King Agesilaus over the allies at Coronea (Aug. 394 B.C.) were neutralised by the victorious progress of Conon, who rebuilt the "long walls" of Athens, which had been razed by Lysander. The continental war was mainly for the possession of the Isthmus. The Athenian Iphicrates, by introducing more mobile and lightly

armed *peltasts*, considerably increased the efficiency of the allied army. Finally, in 389 and 388 Thrasybulus launched a large Athenian fleet into the Aegean, and successfully worked at the rebuilding of another maritime league between Athens and the Greek coast and insular States, on the lines of the Delian league; Sparta retained only Abydos. Now Sparta offered the Persian king to abandon to him the Ionian Greeks, which the king accepted; and by that *coup de Jarnac* the rest of the Hellenic States were forced to meet at Sardis and acquiesce in the shameful treaty of Antalcidas (the name of the Spartan negotiator), by which a vague ascendency of the king over the Greeks was practically legalised, 386 B.C. The new Attic empire and the Boeotian league were dissolved; the Laconian league under Sparta alone was permitted to exist. Sparta, where, by the timely concessions of Agesilaus, home troubles had been appeased, now ruthlessly combated democratic attempts at Mantinea (385 B.C.) and Phlius (380 B.C.); separatist leagues in connection with the rapidly rising confederacy founded by Olynthus were abolished, and Olynthus, after a siege from 382 to 379 B.C., was captured; a Spartan garrison was placed in the Cadmeia, the citadel of Thebes (383 B.C.), and the Theban democratic *régime* was suppressed.

Rise of Thebes and Revival of Athens.—Thebes, as mentioned above (p. 360), had not partaken in the glorious struggle against the Persians, and did not therefore share the immense impetus imparted to Athens and Sparta. After 387 B.C., however, when the rivalry of the two leading Hellenic states had lost much of its poignancy and power, Thebes, secretly aided by the Athenians, sought to shake

off the Spartan yoke. The liberation of Thebes and her quick ascent to great power was due to the great personality of her leader Epaminondas, as general, statesman, and citizen—one of the sublime types of classical antiquity. The Thebans were not the Athenians; and hence Epaminondas, although officially aided by his friend Pelopidas, could not raise Thebes to a position of lasting greatness. Moreover, Thebes was shut up inland, hard pressed by the rulers of Thessaly in the north and the Spartans in the south. The new tactics and the genius of Epaminondas enabled the Thebans to override all these difficulties. The Spartans were signally defeated, first in the battle of Leuctra, 371 B.C., then in four expeditions into the Peloponnesus, finally at Mantinea, 362 B.C., where the victorious Epaminondas was killed. The Messenians were liberated by the Thebans; the Arcadians united and given a centre at the new town of Megalopolis; in Thessaly and Macedonia, Pelopidas intervened with success.

Meanwhile the Athenians, practising at times a *politique de bascule* between Thebes and Sparta, built up their second maritime confederacy on a genuinely fair basis; Chabrias totally defeated the Spartan fleet off Naxos, 376 B.C.; Iphicrates and Timotheus proved ingenious and successful generals; and the power of Athens, seriously lessened at the beginning of the fourth century B.C., was largely restored; while the lustre of Athenian philosophy (Plato, Aristotle), oratory (Isocrates, Lysias, Callistratus), poetry (the "Middle Comedy"; comprising about three scores of writers of brilliant comedy), history (Xenophon, the continuator of Thucydides and Ephorus, born at Cyme, educated at Athens,

the first author of a universal history), and art (the painters Zeuxis and Parrhasius, by birth not Athenians; the sculptors Scopas, Callimachus, Leochares), still outshone that of all the other Greek centres of intellectual and artistic brilliancy, such as Sicyon and Syracuse.

Socialistic Class-Struggles; the "Younger Tyrannies."—In the first half of the fourth century B.C. the antagonism between oligarchy and democracy, tantamount in numerous States (especially of the Peloponnesus) to the struggle between the wealthy and the poor, assumed very violent forms. In 370 B.C. the *demos* or lesser people of Argos massacred some 1500 of the rich (*scytalismus*, from σκυτάλη, a cudgel), and in default of sufficiently numerous positive data about those class-wars, we still have in the political writings of Plato and Aristotle a reflex of the socialistic wave and excessive individualism sweeping over Greek States of that time. The *demos* or commons wanted to add material to legal equality, and constructors of Utopian States were not wanting. Grecian politics went in the course of a few generations through many a phase for which the larger and less intensely organised States of mediaeval and modern Europe have required from three to six centuries; and modern socialism, anarchism, and even Nietzscheism (see Plato, *Gorgias*, 484 A) cropped up then too. Democracy, degenerating occasionally, as it did, into ochlocracy, easily led to the victory of a "tyrant." We know of 128 "tyrants" of this period, and some of them were indeed powerful, if unscrupulous men. The most famous, probably, is Dionysius I. of Syracuse, who reigned from 406 to 367 B.C., and succeeded in repulsing the Cartha-

ginians, who had oppressed or subjected Himera, Acragas, Gela, Selinus, Camerina, and many another Greek city-state in Sicily. His power, dependent on his personality, remained, in the end, not with his weak and incompetent son Dionysius II., nor with the noble and luckless Dion, his brother-in-law, but with another great and lucky personality, Timoleon of Corinth, whom the Syracusan *demos* solicited (344 B.C.) to guide them. Timoleon signally defeated the Carthaginians at Crimisus, 339 B.C., against great odds, restored the States devastated by them, and repeopled Sicily.

Macedon, the new Inland Empire, and Greece. —During the fifth century B.C. the Macedonians consolidated a strong State, north of the Hellenic polities, in the Balkan peninsula. Like the Greeks, they were in a sense a border people; however, their antagonists were not civilised and powerful empires, but uncivilised, disunited tribes, such as the Odrysae, Pieriae, Odomanti, Getae, Triballi, etc. Accordingly, the Macedonians needing, as they did, great material force, very much more than intense political organisation, coalesced into absolutistic monarchy. This, and not the idle consideration whether they were or were not Hellenes by "race" or speech, is the decisive circumstance of their history. Midway between the ferocious tribes mentioned and the aggressive Greeks, the Macedonians were, by their geo-political position, destined to play eventually the same *rôle* of a power uniting north and south of the Balkan peninsula, as was that of the Romans with regard to the Apennine peninsula. Under Philip II. (359-336 B.C.), an ingenious statesman and great general, the Macedonians were given all the conditions to carry out their historic task. The Greeks

were then unable to avert persistent attacks of a great power on their independence. Disunited by the deepest cause of their existence as Greeks, a people of over-individualistic artists, each of their States was in mortal enmity with its neighbours. So were Sparta and Argos, Messene, Elis; so were Thebes and Phocis, Athens and Thebes. Many of the Hellenic States carried on war by mercenaries, that is, inefficiently; and factions hated one another more than the common enemy. Nor must this hatred be thought insensate or unpatriotic. Each Greek State rightly felt that union with the others under one government, Hellenic or other, would at once dry up the very source of their unique life. As modern Europe cannot possibly become a "United States of Europe," except at the expense of all that makes Europeans greater than the peoples of any other continent, so the Greeks were too intensely individualised to coalesce into one nation. Union, as was shown after the victory of Philip over the Greeks, dismantled the fabric of Greek genius. The Germans for nearly a millennium were disunited like the Greeks, and for analogous reasons. Their unity was brought about by the pressure from secular processes of Unification in France, Italy, and Russia. Similar processes were wanting around Greece, and thus the Hellenes could unite neither from inner want nor from outward pressure. Philip succeeded only as did Dionysius I. of Syracuse, who was overlord of numerous Greek city-states of Sicily and south Italy; he did not unite the Greek nation, he only weakened certain Greek States. His monarchy derived no new strength from his ascendency in Greece, and the apogee of his dynasty was reached

and placed, not as that of the Valois or Hohenzollern, in the defeated dependencies, but outside them, in Asia, conquered by his still greater son Alexander.

From the preceding considerations it is easy to construct a true judgment of Philip, his Athenian partisans, chief of whom were the orators Isocrates and Aeschines, and his immortal Athenian antagonist and implacable enemy, Demosthenes, the greatest orator and one of the most illustrious statesmen of the Hellenes. The "Philippics" of Demosthenes contain, no doubt, many a misstatement. Their underlying principle, however, is unassailable. It is the principle that animated William Pitt and the philosopher Fichte against Napoleon. It is the principle that caused, developed, and immortalised all that is Greek. Demosthenes failed, and ended by suicide (322 B.C., at Calauria); Philip, too, failed, and ended by assassination. There is, in the struggle of Athens' official orator and the King of Macedon, infinitely more than the alternative between two policies. There is an abiding principle overriding both parties. The Macedonian victor did not derive any substantial benefit from his triumph over Greece; Demosthenes was thwarted, not, however, because he espoused a wrong cause. Neither could win. Greece could not be united, nor could she indefinitely continue in her individualism. The material prosperity of Athens might have been greater had the Athenians adopted the policy of Isocrates and Aeschines; her intellectual and spiritual lustre could not but have been tarnished by it. Monarchies proper are necessary at certain preliminary stages of a people's history; individualism within and without is the final goal of every true State. Demos-

thenes raised his voice in favour of the goal; and to the present day the most advanced nations are more inclined to raise statues to Demosthenes than to Aeschines. In the same way Napoleon failed to establish his universal empire; but so did his antagonists in their attempts to establish oligarchies and despotisms. Both were overpowered by the European or neo-Hellenic principle of individualism.

The conquest of the Greek cities on the coast of Macedon and Thrace at the hands of Philip was accomplished from 357 to 348 B.C. Philip's subtle diplomacy; the neglect of the fortifications in the Athenian colonies of Pydna, Methone, and Potidaea; and insufficient support of Olynthus on the part of Athens, precipitated the Macedonian advance. Meanwhile, Philip obtained means of intervening in the so-called Holy War (356-346 B.C.) between Thebes and Phocis. The latter, bold and energetic, defied the attempt of Thebes to reduce it to a vassal State, and did not recoil from plundering the treasury of the Delphian oracle with whose authority Thebes had cloaked her aggressive policy. Philip, in 353, completely defeated the Phocians and their allies, the Thessalians; and although the Phocians continued their war with the Thebans in the most ruthless manner, for seven more years, yet Philip was, in 346 B.C. able to dictate the so-called "peace" of Philocrates, an Athenian, according to which Philip's conquests were acknowledged, his succession into the two votes of the Phocians in the Council of the Amphictyonic league accepted, and his ascendency over both Thebes and Athens clearly revealed.

Now Philip was the most powerful personality amongst the Hellenes, and even Phocion, chief

strategos of Athens, was inclined to consider him as the only salvation for the Greeks in Asia oppressed by the Persians, and for the numerous *déclassés* in Greece, impoverished by economic reverses. But Demosthenes never tired in his attacks and intrigues against the king. In 344 B.C. he harangued to that effect numerous cities in the Peloponnesus. In 342 B.C. he succeeded in leaguing together Corinth, Argos, Messene, Arcadia, Achaia, and Acarnania, and in 341 B.C. all Euboea was liberated from the Macedonian rule. Philip bided his time; first he terminated the subjection of Thrace, 340 B.C.; after this he at once made for the centre of all Greek enmity, for Athens and her allies. Byzantium he was unable to take, 339 B.C., but in August 338 B.C. he totally defeated the combined Theban-Athenian army at Chaeronea. The victory was probably due to the genius of Philip's young son, Alexander. Philip treated the Athenians in the "peace of Demades" with the utmost consideration, and Athens became Philip's ally. In a triumphant march through the Peloponnesus, Philip extended his influence there too; Sparta alone stubbornly refused negotiations. A pan-Hellenic congress at Corinth established a federal *synedrion*, with Philip as *hegemon* at the head. The general belief was that Philip would head the Greeks against the Persians. In the summer of 336 the king was assassinated by one Pausanias, probably for a private grievance.

The times of Philip and Demosthenes are of such fundamental importance for a right understanding of Greek history, that we will, in the following chapter, discuss in detail both the facts and their causal relations bearing on the downfall of Athens.

DEMOSTHENES AS A STATESMAN, AND THE DECLINE OF ATHENS

I

The right appreciation of Demosthenes is one of those problems of Greek history in which all one's expressed and unexpressed views of that marvellous series of events become manifest. The great orator-statesman lived in what was practically the period of the decline and fall of Athens. For, although more than one Hellenic State showed much vitality in the period from the death of Demosthenes (322 B.C.) to the conquest of Greece by the Romans (146 B.C.), yet Athens and Sparta and Thebes, or the three leading States in the fourth century B.C., never again rose to anything like their former greatness. It does not need much thinking to discern that a Greek city-state which, as we saw, was not the product of slow and straggling "evolution," but of almost systematic thought and unity, could not, by its very nature, be terminated by some accidental disease. When the institutions, by the normal and healthy operation of which a Greek city-state had been preserved, were drained of their power to suit new circumstances, then the State naturally ceased to exist. A Hellenic city-state being, as we saw, largely of the nature of a work of art, has for this reason alone a strictly limited adaptability to surroundings. A modern State may, and frequently does, have a practically boundless elasticity and adaptability. Not so a Greek city-state. Of such a polity, as of the similar polity of the great and strict Orders of the Catholic Church,

one may say: *Sint ut sunt; aut non sint*—that is, let them be as they are, or let them not be at all. Under these circumstances it is evident that the comprehension of the end of, say, Athens depends largely on the comprehension of her beginnings. It is for this reason that Demosthenes, the greatest figure of declining Athens, can be fully appreciated only by him who has an adequate knowledge of the beginnings and initial nature of Athens. In a former chapter ("Archaic Greece") we tried to clear up the dark origins of Hellenic city-states. At present we mean to add a few further remarks on this important subject, believing, as we do, that a fair and complete appreciation of Demosthenes cannot be hoped for except after a careful investigation into the causes both of the rise and the fall of the major cause of Demosthenes, that is, of Athens. The better one understands the causes of the rise of Athens, the more one is in a position to understand the causes of her downfall; and, therefore, the more one is enabled to judge whether Demosthenes, as his modern critics say, did or did not precipitate the decline of Athens. The following sections will, therefore, treat of the original causes of the rise and fall of Greek city-states in general, and of that of Athens in particular; after which we shall consider in detail the pros and cons of the anti-Macedonian policy espoused by Demosthenes. On the basis of these two sets of investigations we shall then decide whether Demosthenes was or was not what we hold him to have been: at once the wisest, the most honest, and the most eloquent of Greek statesmen of the fourth century B.C. It may be seen that we do not even mean to treat of his character as a private

individual; this side of his personality being practically irrelevant to our purpose.[1]

For clearness' sake it may be premised that, speaking quite generally, the Greeks were overpowered first by the Macedonians and their successors, and then by the Romans, because they were unwilling to introduce into their political life the idea and force of Nationality. Had they been willing to unite into one strong and populous nationality, no ancient king or republic could have deprived them of their independence. This much is admitted on all hands. People, like the Greeks of the fourth century B.C., who in body and mind had reached the acme of development, were, to say the least, exceedingly likely to constitute, if united by the political bonds of one strong nationality, a force greater than that of any other State in antiquity. Why, then, did they not unite? Were they unaware of their surpassing power as a united nation? We have express testimony to the contrary in the writings both of Aristotle and Isocrates.[2] They knew the force of

[1] In the speeches of Aeschines and Dinarchus, both of whom were uncompromising enemies of Demosthenes; in the anecdotes of Plutarch (in his life of Demosthenes), who disliked the great orator as the man who brought about the defeat at Chaeronea, the native town of Plutarch; in stray remarks of Valerius Maximus (vii. 2, 10), Aulus Gellius (*Noctes Atticae*, xvii. 21), and a few others, the student will find all the scandalous gossip retailed against the man whose fate Pausanias (ii. 33) compares with that of Homer. In the *Die Demokratie von Athen* by the late Julius Schvarcz, of Budapest, vol. i. [1891], pp. 453 *seq.*, the reader will find nearly all that can be advanced against any man, including the learned professor, if testimony given by one's greatest enemies is to pass current for truth. See also the sixteenth chapter in the third volume of Holm's otherwise valuable *Griechische Geschichte* (1891), more particularly p. 275, where it is said of Demosthenes (and not of, say, the tragic actor-legate Aristodemus) that his "cunningness" (*Geriebenheit*) prevented him from becoming a truly great statesman. Poor Demosthenes cannot, even after more than two thousand years after his death, escape the Hegemons, Cephisophons, and Phrynons of his time.

[2] Isocrates, v. 30, 31.

union full well. Were they then so corrupt, degenerate, or immoral, as to remain indifferent to an ignoble and avoidable fate? Their modern detractors say so.

In our opinion, the Greeks of the fourth century B.C. were neither so corrupt or immoral, nor so callous to their fate. They succumbed to it because by the very nature of their polities they could not maintain their surpassing greatness for a period longer than three to four generations. They were not diseased, but short-lived. In everyday modern life, too, we find that while some business establishments, say that of a successful grocer, tailor, or banker, may very well be handed down from father to son for a great number of years; the "business" of a great writer, artist, or thinker cannot be so handed over to his children. It is distinctly personal. It is even so with States. We saw that, broadly speaking, all great Greek States were *music* (see pp. 333 *seq.*). This alone implies that they were highly personal, and therefore short-lived. We hold that a real political union of the Hellenes of the fourth century B.C. into one nation was technically impossible; just as impossible as is a real political union of modern European States into a United States of Europe; or just as impossible, as is to-day, as it was seven hundred years ago, the real union of the various orders of the Catholic regular clergy into One Great Order of regulars. It will be our endeavour to show why such a union of Greek city-states was technically, that is, psychologically, impossible.

Already in a former chapter we dwelt on the exceptional nature of the formation of most Greek States which go by the name of *synoecismus*

(see pp. 327 *seq.*). As a matter of fact, city-states are, in history, outside the Greeks and Romans, the greatest exceptions. The rule is, that a "nation," that is, a large number of people who firmly believe in their common blood, myths, language, and interests, occupies by force or otherwise a more or less large territory, which henceforth they consider as their "land" or "country." In other words, the history of nearly all parts and periods of the world, outside Graeco-Roman history, consists of the life of "nations" based on two distinctly material factors: common blood, or belief in it, and a definite territory. The more there is of either of these material foundations, the better it is held to be. Now, the distinctive sign and symptom of all great Greek city-states was the very reverse of these conditions. The Greeks were supremely indifferent to expansion in space. Territory did not enter into the constitution of their States as a primary factor. Social or political life in the rural districts remained, as we shall see, a matter of less than secondary consideration with them. While all mediaeval history is practically rural; certainly up to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in Lombardy and the rest of Europe respectively; Greek history, already in Homer's poems, is almost exclusively urban. And although the ruling classes in each Greek city-state prided themselves on their noble blood; yet from the restriction of this material factor to a very small number of *gentes* alone, one may see that *gentes* too were held to be a subordinate organ of the State. The Greek city-state, then, was, in the first place, not reared on the material basis of common blood and territory. It had, in reality, a non-material basis; one that cared less for earth or

soil or masses of "common blood," than for finely inter-adapted institutions. It was, *a limine*, non-material, or spiritual; at any rate, it was endowed with a predominant bent towards mental forces.

We saw, in the chapter on Archaic Greece, that and why Greek city-states arose first on the western coast of Asia Minor. We found, that in the twelfth and eleventh centuries B.C., the Hellenes in the Aegean Sea, constantly menaced by, and in turn menacing the rich, powerful, and relatively cultured inland-empires of western Asia and Egypt, soon learned the immense practical value of organisation and intellect, by means of which they were enabled to do what the Phoenicians and Jews alone had succeeded in doing; that is, to maintain their moral, mental, and frequently also their political individuality intact from the aggressiveness of the empires, where intellect and organisation were at a discount. The exceeding premium thus placed on organisation, system, and intellect forced the first Hellenes in the Aegean Sea and on the coast of Asia Minor to split up into small, highly differentiated polities; in that the very effective organisation and mentalisation imperatively required by their geo-political situation could not conveniently be carried out with hundreds of thousands of people. So was born the "unterritorial" Greek city-state on the coast of Asia Minor and in various islands of the Aegean Sea. It is now necessary to consider why the Greeks on the continent of Greece likewise built themselves unterritorial States, that is, city-states only. Why Sparta, for instance, instead of at once desperately differentiating herself from the Messenians, Argives, and Tegeatae, and then even

so desperately combating them, did not rather do everything in her power to persuade the Messenians, Argives, or Tegeatae, all of them "Dorians" like the Spartans, to unite into one powerful "nation," which might easily have won the upper hand on sea and on land over the numerous but mutually hostile small city-states in the Aegean islands and in Asia Minor. The famous story of the Trojan War is not a poor example of what might have been done by a Sparta continuing the policy of King Menelaus and King Agamemnon, instead of shrinking from all but hostile contact with people other than the few Spartans. It might, of course, be said that the same causes that drove the Aegean Greeks into the contraction of their States, brought about the disruption of any incipient big national State in Greece proper too. Yet it cannot be denied that the continental Greeks were, by their situation inland, very much less exposed to the attacks either of imperial or Phoenician aggressors, than were the Greeks in the Aegean islands or on the coast of Asia Minor. Nevertheless, it can still be clearly seen why the continental Greeks, say the Spartans or Athenians, did not rather prefer to unite with than to stand in uncompromising antagonism to their immediate neighbours. To put it plainly, these continental Greeks of the tenth century B.C. had no other choice left. Had they seriously attempted to unite into one populous and strong nation, the Aegean Greeks, long and better trained to war of aggression as well as defence, would have at once attacked them; and since these Aegean Greeks (or some of their States) then had the naval supremacy, they could have easily stopped any contemplated "national

monarchy" in the Peloponnesus, in Attica, or in Boeotia. The safety of these Aegean Greeks required it absolutely that their flanks and rears, that is, that Greece proper remained in the hands of a great number of small States. These Aegean Greeks evidently observed what is now called in America the Monroe Doctrine: they could not admit that new and really very powerful States should arise on the continent of Greece. Under these circumstances, the continental Greeks were by pressure from the Aegean Greeks driven into excessive individualism. We shall see that the rise of the Lombard city-states in the twelfth century A.D. was caused by an identical series of circumstances. In modern times, England, owing to her sea-power, has split up the territory between the Meuse and Ems rivers into little Belgium and Holland, and has, generally, always prevented the formation of a very powerful State in the Mediterranean.

The continental Greeks of the tenth and ninth centuries B.C., then, were forced to give up any idea of forming one big nation. Nothing remained for them but, in view of their high-strung neighbours in the Aegean Sea, to turn their attention to the ever greater intensity of their States, which they were in no position to extend in space or numbers. Thus arose the high-strung individualism of the continental Greeks too. The preceding facts can be read from a political map of South-eastern Europe, Egypt, and Western Asia in the tenth century B.C. They stand in no need of special references from inscriptions. As to-day none but the unwilling can ignore them; in the tenth century B.C. not even the

unwilling could afford to neglect them. They are patent facts of elementary geo-politics. Not the numerous and mutually little accessible valleys of Greece induced the Greeks to establish mutually inaccessible States. Nor are the very numerous and ample indentations, or in a word, the singularly extended coast-line of Greece as such the cause of Greek individualism. This trait, this all-decisive trait of the Greeks, comes from pressure from without; from those Aegean Greeks who, in turn, were driven into individualism of their States by pressure from the inland-empires of Asia and Africa upon the south-eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea. Inasmuch as that pressure from the island Greeks on the continental Greeks was very considerably facilitated by the numerous indentations, that is, by the long coast-line of Greece, this latter circumstance, otherwise one of pure geography, becomes for the early period of Greek history one of geo-politics. With these limitations, the long coast-line of Greece may indeed be said to have been, not the cause, but one of the indirect circumstances precipitating Greek individualism.

We again dwelt on the origin of the excessive individualism of Greek States at some length, because all Greek history, and especially the downfall of Athens, Sparta, and Thebes, is potentially contained in that one trait. The experience of European history in the last two thousand years shows few things with greater clearness than the predominance of the territorial principle over the abstract idea of a State. Repeatedly in history one can note the formation of small polities, whether they are called Duchy, Margraviate, Landgraviate, Mark, March, etc., or by any other name. In Central Europe this tendency

towards the establishment of diminutive polities was and still is very remarkable. Under pressure from France and Austria, neither of which would permit the consolidation of a large and strong State on the Rhine, Main, or Elbe rivers, the Germans were given ample opportunity for the establishment of small principalities; just as, at present, the small Thuringian and other tiny States in Central Germany are the resultants of the pressure of Prussia in the north and that of the relatively large States in the south of Germany. But small as all these and similar States were or are, they yet had some territory. Very many of them had at least twenty times the territory of ancient Sparta. The inhabitants of none of these small principalities so much as thought of withdrawing into an abstract State, with very little or practically no territory whatever. Certainly none of them seriously thought of so uncompromisingly differentiating itself from its neighbours as to be, for all intents and purposes, an altogether different nation. In Central Europe there always has been an astounding variety of customs, costumes, dialects, folklore and similar features of social life. At no time, however, can we observe there that radical differentiation, that willed and complete segregation from all the institutions of one's neighbours, that we see in Sparta. Surely this singular and absolutely exceptional procedure of the Spartans is a phenomenon which we cannot pass by with indifference. To state it without at all attempting to understand it, is to abandon all hope for a real comprehension of Greek history. Sparta carried Greek individualism to the extreme. In Sparta therefore this all-dominating trait of Hellenic history

becomes most manifest. Unless therefore we arrive at some kind of comprehension of the causes that produced Spartan individualism, we cannot expect at all to understand the origin of other Greek city-states, in which individualism is less clear-cut and less plastic.

We said that the pressure from the Aegean Greeks, themselves most intensely developed builders of city-states, inevitably forced the continental Greeks into equally high-strung individualism. This much, therefore, is sufficient to account for the fact that the Argives, Tegeatae, Messenians, Arcadians, Laconians, etc., did not unite in one strong monarchy or confederation. Union being impossible, local and individual growth alone was feasible; and since the danger from the Aegean Sea was of no ordinary calibre, these local polities in the Peloponnesus were forced to meet it by an organisation of no primitive character. If, now, we try to inquire into the causes that impelled the Spartans to make their organisation one of extreme intensity, we may, even in the absence of all direct evidence, note the following circumstances. In studying a map of ancient Greece we notice, that the great and famous towns on the eastern side of Greece, that is, on the side most exposed to the Aegeans, were none of them built on the seacoast itself, but at a place somewhat receding from the sea. This is the case, to proceed from the north to the south, with Athens, Megara, Epidaurus, Troezen, Hermione, Tiryns, Argos, Mycenae, and Sparta. But while the first eight of these towns are relatively very close to the sea, Sparta is relatively very far. In fact, of all cities on the eastern half of Greece readily accessible from the seaside, Sparta is the

farthest from the sea.[1] This undeniable fact justifies the conclusion that the inland situation of Sparta was chosen chiefly from apprehensions of danger from the seaside. Which of the Aegean States was then in possession of the *thalassocracy* and thus menaced the Laconians; whether it was the Cretans, as is most likely, or some other Hellenic people in the Aegean Sea;[2] it remains certain that the Dorians who settled on Sparta as their permanent and central town must have had some very grave motives inducing them to depart from the example of so many other Hellenic towns in the Peloponnesus. Since the Spartans, as we saw, did not avail themselves of the natural points of vantage offered by their country, such as mountains, rivers, ravines, etc. (see pp. 276 *seq.*), there was no reason whatever preventing them from settling more closely to the sea. If nevertheless they withdrew from the sea, they must have learned of the great perils to which a seacoast town in the south of the Peloponnesus then exposed itself. Of these perils we may still judge from a consideration of the fact, that in neither of the three extensive peninsulae of the Southern Peloponnesus were there in the tenth, ninth, or eighth century any towns of remarkable size, power, or importance. Evidently the south of the Peloponnesus was too much exposed to the aggressions

[1] From Sparta to modern Marathonisi or ancient Gythium, which was the harbour of Sparta, there is about eight hours on horseback; from Argos, Epidaurus, Corinth, Athens, etc., there is not more than from half an hour to about two hours.

[2] The isle of Cythera, or as it is now called, Cerigo, at the entrance of the Laconian Gulf, had at all times much attraction for the Phoenicians, Cretans, and other trading and seafaring peoples, on account of the well-known mollusc, a rock-shell or *murex*, which contained the much-coveted dye for purple garments. The Spartans obtained possession of the "isle of Venus," as Cerigo was also called, in about the first quarter of the sixth century B.C. See Dedekind, A., *Ein Beitrag zur Purpurkunde* (2 vols. 1907).

of people whose sea-power the inland Greeks could not meet adequately. Sparta was of all great or important Greek towns in Greece the southernmost; that is, it lay nearest to the zone of danger just indicated. No wonder Sparta took the greatest precautions to fortify herself against what was at that time the greatest danger for the people of the southern Peloponnesus. If to these great perils from the sea-side we now add the perils from the land-side, represented by the aggressiveness of the Messenians, Arcadians, Argives, and Tegeatae, and if we consider that this aggressiveness, being, as it was, the result of Greek individualism, was as deep-seated and incurable as that inevitable individualism or particularism itself, we can, we submit, see with much greater clearness why the Spartans, of all Greeks, were driven into the formation of an excessively *music* State. They were, in the tenth and ninth centuries B.C., the most imperilled of all Greek peoples;[1] accordingly they raised, for their defence, the strongest fortification that a high-spirited small nation can possibly raise: their peculiar constitution, or a fabric instinct with indomitable forces of will-power and ethical energy.

[1] Perhaps the maritime league, of which we read in Strabo (viii. 374), and which is called the Amphictyony of Calauria, protected the towns in the Argolic and Saronic Gulfs sufficiently from the attacks of the Aegeans. If we consider that even the Delian Amphictyony, regarding which we now have a considerable number of authentic inscriptions, is mentioned only once in all the known writings of the Greeks, in Athenaeus (vi. 234 E), it is not impossible to assume that many another league for the protection of the Argolic and Saronic coast towns was in active existence at a time when the Laconian Gulf was left unprotected from the Aegeans, who found easy shelter from the bad tempests round Capes Matapan and Malea in the numerous natural ports of that gulf. Compare the *Mediterranean Pilot*, iv.[3] [1900], pp. 16 *seq.*, about Ports Azomato, Vathy, Kaio, Skutari, and the Bays of Kolokithia, Xyli, Saraceniko, and Vakika, all in the Laconian Gulf. In the *Odyssey* there are three passages speaking of the "drifts" towards Crete from Cape Malea (iii. 289 *seq.*, iv. 514 *seq.*, ix. 80 *seq.*

Once their State was firmly established, its inherent powers preserved it, although the danger from the seaside had long ceased.

The individualism of the Hellenes is thus shown to have been neither a consequence of some mysterious "race"-quality of theirs, nor a mere accident. It is the consequence of clearly discernible geo-political circumstances and causes operating for centuries upon the eastern Mediterranean area of history; just as the intense individualism of modern European States and nations is the result of secular struggles for the Hellenisation of peoples north of the Mediterranean. In modern times there is one very large nation with whom the social and political forces making for the union and assimilation of untold millions are so much more powerful than the forces making for separatism or individualism, that the members of that nation are more than amazed at what appears to them as the overdone or rather incomprehensible individualism of modern Europeans. That nation, we need scarcely say, is the Americans. That within one or two hours' distance by steamer from Dover, England, the American traveller meets from four to five totally different languages and nationalities; that all Europe is a bewildering mass of the most diversified types of humanity; all this is to an American, used to uniformity in the States, a phenomenon both inconceivable and regrettable. Mr. Carnegie is not the only Americanised European who, with noble impatience, admonished the little nations of Europe to drop their petty individualities, and to merge in a United States of Europe. To the American mode of thinking—a mode which is not restricted to the States—the incredible diversity of States, laws, institutions, literature, art,

and sports in ancient Greece, that is, in a country of exceedingly poor extent, when compared with Europe or the United States; to the American mode of thinking, we say, Greek individualism appears even more enigmatic than does modern European individualism. On the other hand, a short study of the true nature of the forces that brought about the union of close on a hundred million Americans in one huge polity, will help us to understand better the additional cause prompting the Greeks to persevere in that individualism which the political circumstances of the tenth and ninth centuries, or perhaps even of the twelfth and eleventh centuries B.C., had forced them to adopt. For it is quite clear that the trend of American history is the very reverse of that of ancient Greece. Where two nations espouse two diametrically opposed strategies, there much can be learned for the comprehension of both.

The Americans, although every one of them is of European descent (ignoring as we do the coloured and politically insignificant elements of the population of the United States), have ever since 1783, that is, the termination of their war of independence, manifested a total absence of that distinctly European or neo-Hellenic trait of separatism or State-individualism. Although the territority of the Union increased at an astounding and unprecedented rate, yet the Union itself was for the first seventy-seven years of her existence scarcely disturbed at all. The rapidly rising population, far from attempting to establish mutually hostile and highly differentiated States, continued, on the contrary, to carry one and the same type of State and social life from the Alleghany Mountains to the Pacific. In 1860

and the following years the Union seemed to be seriously threatened with disruption. This, however, was obviated; and at present close on a hundred millions avow one Union, one language, one social life, one mentality. Such a vast phenomenon indicates, by its very vastness, that it is due to geographical causes. It is indeed due to the fact that the Americans of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries A.D. were filled with one desire only, to wit, the desire to take possession of what is, outside Europe, the most fertile, the most accessible, and most valuable piece of land in the world. Seeing, as they did, that the utilisation of the immense territory between the Atlantic and the Pacific promised to give comfort, ease, and pleasure to untold millions; that, in other words, the *hinterland* of the ancient "thirteen colonies" was (quite unlike the *hinterlands* in Canada, Australia, Brazil, or Africa) not a waste, a jungle, or an impenetrable forest, but the most easily available country, wonderfully fitted for culture of any kind: the Americans were prompted, by the strongest of instincts, to keep peace among themselves, so as not to be diverted from their main and all-dominating task; that is, the *exploitation* of their common inheritance, the territory of the United States. Having made their war of independence principally for the sake of that very *hinterland* west of the Alleghany Mountains,[1] they were naturally averse to risk

[1] The contention of this passage was first publicly developed by the author in the opening chapter of his *The Foundations of Modern Europe* [1904]. Meanwhile the author has, by the aid of one of his hearers, copied out all the original documents, now in the Record Office in London, which have so far escaped the attention of historians, and which, both by their number and significance, fully prove the author's theory. The colonials, the author holds, rose against the British Government for no other reason than this, that all British statesmen in power, from October 1763 to the year 1775, or

the common *exploitation* thereof either by bootless wars among themselves, or by splitting up into high-strung individualities of State, by which they would have evidently disabled themselves for the work of rapid cultivation of their boundless *hinterland*.

If, now, we apply this point of view to Greek history, we find that the Greeks had no such common and uniting territorial factor at all. Their *hinterland* was inhabited by a very great number of warlike nations, was exceedingly mountainous, is even to the present day only poorly known, and held out few if any promises of advantageous cultivation. We shall see that even Philip II. of Macedon, the heroic father of Alexander the Great, suffered, by the middle of the fourth century B.C., several defeats at the hands of the Illyrians, Paeonians, Triballians, and other nations in the *hinterland* of the Greeks. A uniting *hinterland*, therefore, the Greeks did not have at all. On the other hand, they and their offshoots in South Italy, Sicily, and at other places, had as a common means of expansion the Mediterranean Sea. A sea, as against a profitable *hinterland*, has this characteristic difference, that instead of uniting, it separates nations. Naval supremacy, or *thalassocracy*, can be acquired with much greater ease than military ascendency on land. A relatively small number of ships in excess of those of one or two other naval Powers may secure a temporary naval supremacy. Naval wars are rapidly decided, as has long been noticed, and may and do frequently end with the total ruin of the enemy by one victorious

to the outbreak of the war of independence, obstinately refused to repeal the royal proclamation of October 7, 1767, which forbade the colonials to settle west of the Alleghany Mountains. The work containing all the documents referred to will appear end of 1907.

battle. Whatever, then, the sea may contribute towards a closer contact of nations commercially or socially, it remains certain that politically it is, *par excellence*, a disintegrating factor. It proved so in post-Roman Europe too. The great wars for "the balance of power" in Europe were most energetically and often with decisive good fortune fought by England, that is, the country that had the naval supremacy. "Balance of power," it need hardly be added, is for England the expression of the wish or determination to prevent, on the Continent, the rise of any Power, or union of Powers, that might be strong enough to dictate the fate of the other States; in this sense, it is a disintegrating force, one making for the dissolution of big unions. We observe the same effects in mediaeval Italy, where Venice and Genoa acted as solvents on the other Lombard States. It was even so in ancient Greece. There, in territories that were practically all either peninsulae, islands, or coast-towns, naval supremacy had infinitely freer play than in the north-west of Europe. Having more elasticity and scope, its disintegrating power worked more intensely.[1]

It is now sufficiently clear that fundamental forces, quite independent of the will or wish or the

[1] Thus one ought to make a special study of the "disintegrating" influence of the isle of Salamis, and still more of that of Aegina, on all the land-powers, *i.e.* city-states, round the Saronic Gulf. The struggles of Athens with the Salaminians, and still more with the powerful and rich Aeginetans, whose coinage and measures were used almost everywhere, lasted for many a generation, during which time the Athenians were unable to expand either on land or on sea. The same "disintegration" may be noticed on the west coasts of Greece, where the islands of Cephallenia, Leucas (although then practically a peninsula), Corcyra, prevented the rise of any powerful city-state on the Ionian coasts, so that Corinth, situated at the neck of the deeply indented gulf of that name, got the first good chance of building up a great State in the west of Greece.

"racial gifts" of the continental Greeks, compelled them to adopt a high-strung kind of local and intensely differentiated polities. Once it had become inevitable to proceed on the lines of practically *music* States, that is, of States built on high-strung individuals, and not on organisations such as a tribe, a clan, a *gens*, a nation; nor on the basis of an indefinite hunger for more land; once this, the central and most essential trait of the Greeks, had become evident as well as imperative, the Greeks, while not entirely undoing the archaic remains of gentilician institutions, yet so reduced and impoverished them as to make them practically unimportant. Having thus relegated to the background the material, concrete, and personal of their aggregate elements, they easily repaired within the precincts of a State abstract, ideal, and impersonal. Had the aggregate organisations of tribe, clan, *gens*, and similar institutions been endowed, in Greece, with the vitality which they enjoyed through nearly the whole of the Christian Middle Ages, no Greek city-state could have arisen through *synoecismus*. In fact, the existence of *synoecismi* is the most clinching proof of the decline of all sorts of gentilician groups. The one reason why the Christian Middle Ages never knew of a complete case of *synoecismus*, was the fact that political as well as social life in those times was so inextricably cross-cut by old and immovable gentilician or strictly personal aggregates and groups, that the impersonal and non-gentilician State could not be extricated or distilled from them. This interference of personal and concrete forces with the rise of an impersonal form of State, of Universities, or of juristic Persons generally is, as every one knows, one

of the characteristic traits of modern England, a polity that has retained much of its mediaeval nature.

In Athenian history we can follow this rapid decline of gentilician forces very closely. It may be said that the most important and abiding part of Solon's famous legislation consists in this, that he practically shelved nearly all the remaining laws, customs, and legal practices of the gentilician institutions. This side of Solon's great work has rarely been taken due notice of; yet it is in this, and only in this part of his great work that he laid down his most profound and beneficial ideas. Profound, because they testify to his deep insight into the true nature and trend of an Hellenic city-state in general, and that of a purely maritime State, like Athens, in particular; beneficial, because they saved Athens once for ever from the horrors of those wholesale massacres which disgraced so many Greek States outside Athens or Sparta, where the survival of gentilician bonds went with the persistence of gentilician or irreconcilable class-hatred.[1] For, from what we have seen before, it follows that the quicker an Hellenic State de-gentilised itself; the more rapidly it developed into a *music* or *apotelestico-music* organisation independent of all local, personal, genealogical, or territorial influences; the more real power it was sure to accumulate. Solon in precipitating this, the ideal line of procedure for Athens; Solon gave the keynote to all Athenian history. Lycurgus

[1] Of the States terribly suffering from these clan-*vendettas* we may mention Sicyon (Plutarch, *Aratus*, ii.; Xenophon, *Hellen.* vii. 1, 44); Phlius (Diodorus, xv. 4; for it follows from this passage that an oligarchic government was introduced); Thasus (Pseudo-Demosthenes, *de Halon.* lxxx. 12, and the scholia thereto); Argos (Diodorus, xv. 57); Thebes, Megara, etc.

had done that for Sparta nearly three hundred years before Solon. The two great legislators thus created the two types of States, by the partial or complete imitation of which the other Greeks might have, in the end, consummated the dream of humanity: the abiding Hellenisation of men. Amongst modern laymen there can be no Solons nor a Lycurgus, just because we have suffered so many irrelevant elements to enter into the constitution of our States. With all the local, personal, territorial, social, and economic influences obscuring the pure outlines of a *music* State proper, we have at once less *music* and infinitely more irregular and complicated States. For such States, no single Solon can bring an all-round remedy. It nevertheless remains true, that Solon and Lycurgus have laid down for all times the fundamental laws of *music* and nearly *music* States proper; that is, for States into which all European nations will in the end conform themselves, after centuries and centuries of hard-paid efforts and sacrifices. For, the Greek State is the classical State in this sense too, that the Greek free citizen will at all times remain the avowed or non-avowed model for the citizens of all States.[1]

In addition to a consideration of the *synoecismus*

[1] It is worth noting that the legislation of Solon abolished a mode of imprisonment which in France existed up to the law of July 22, 1867, and which in England is still practised very extensively. We mean imprisonment for debts. Solon declared it the law of Athens *τὸ μὴ δανείζειν ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασιν* (Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* iii. 9); on which see a very able and full discussion in Glotz, Gustave, *La solidarité de la famille dans le droit criminel en Grèce* (1904), pp. 361 *seq.* In another sphere of real life it is certainly no exaggeration to say, that the exquisite tact of most free Athenians has rarely been equalled even by the members of a few exceptionally well-bred circles of European society. This is, of course, not a matter of much importance to people who will never learn the truth that, but for tact, Society could not exist a single day.

of Attica and the legislation of Solon, we have another means of illustrating the de-gentilisation or *Ent-geschlechterung* of the Atticans. This means is a study of the life of the Athenian citizens in the *demoi* or country districts outside Athens.[1] For a study of these *demoi* we have at present very ample and first-hand information in the numerous inscriptions found all over Attica. The upshot is, that the *demoi* had no political or social life of their own to speak of. All life was centred at Athens; although, in concordance with the remarks made in the *Introduction* on Foreigners (pp. 38 *seq.*), many a man prominent at Athens came from one of the rural *demoi*.[2] Now, the obscure remains of the Attican *gentes* were intimately connected with local customs, shrines, or associations in the rural *demoi*. Yet we learn of no "landed aristocracy" dwelling in the country and dominating the urban element, as has been the case in England, Hungary, Poland, and other countries. The Attican *gentes* as such had, with exceedingly few exceptions, very little influence, or for a very short time, and even the Alcmaeonidae soon ceased producing men of note.[3]

[1] As we now know from the twenty-first chapter of Aristotle's *Athenian Constitution*, Athens too was comprised within or divided up into δῆμοι. In the text we put the dwellers in the country, that is, in the δῆμοι, in opposition to those in the town, for the purpose of our contention.

[2] Thus Socrates, Aristides, and Thucydides the statesman, were from Alopeke; Xenophon and Isocrates from Erchia; Thucydides the historian from Helimus. In fact the town of Athens has, like Rome, Paris, or London, given birth to only few of her great men. It will be also noticed that after Athens, Sparta, and Thebes had mostly spent themselves, new Greek States, such as the Phocians, Epirotes, Aetolians, etc., came to the fore, who had not yet, by excessive urbanisation, lost all their grit.

[3] We cannot prove the existence of descendants of the Alcmaeonidae beyond the end of the fifth century; Toepffer, *Attische Genealogie* (1889), p. 243; the Lycomidae, who count amongst them the great Themistocles, disappear, for us, with a grandson of the victor of Salamis; Toepffer, *ibid.* p. 224.

If, now, we integrate the preceding remarks and reflections, we cannot but arrive at the result, that in Greece there were both unwilled and willed, both natural and legislative forces at work to make the rise of one political nationality a matter of impossibility. Where individualism was dictated by both political and geographical circumstances; where the most successful legislations completely (or practically so) destroyed the bonds of *gentes*, which in all times have served as the basis of large nations in Europe; where a landed aristocracy and provincial life was legislated out of existence by the greatest and wisest of Hellenic legislators; where territory was and could not but be a secondary consideration; where citizenship was rightly held to be of a most exclusive character, owing to the intimate union of State, Church, and Society in a Greek city-state (see pp. 230 *seq.*); where, finally, the State was grafted on one town, and naturally and inevitably hastened to depopulate itself; in that towns, at all times, produce a greater waste of civic, if not of natural life than do rural districts; and in that towns, unless constantly receiving fresh blood from "the country," invariably tend to lower the status and vitality of their inhabitants:[1] there and under such conditions,

[1] This has been amply proved by the beautiful work of Georg Hansen, *Die drei Bevölkerungsstufen*, quoted above, p. 41, note 1. See also articles by E. G. Ravenstein on the Laws of Migration in the *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 1889, pp. 241 *seq.*; G. B. Longstaff, *Studies in Statistics* (1891), pp. 34 *seq.*; del Vecchio, G. S., *Sulla emigrazione permanente italiana*, etc. [Bologna, 1892], pp. 63 *seq.*; Sitta, P., *Le migrazioni interne* [Genoa, 1893]; Turquan, V., *Les mouvements intérieurs de la population en France* [Paris, 1895]; and numerous articles in *Blätter für soziale Praxis*, and the well-known journals of Statistical Societies. For ancient Greece this effect of the capital attracting and consuming the country-people is of the greatest importance. In the rural districts of Attica there were in the fourth century B.C. probably more *metoeci* or denizens than Athenian citizens, although

it is impossible to see how the Greeks could ever have united into one strongly knit political nation. To do so would have required some powerful common material interest, which was absent, while a more powerful solvent, the Mediterranean Sea, was constantly present; some *permanent* danger from without, which never made itself felt; some far-reaching associations of mighty *gentes*, who had long been destroyed; and last, yet first, the abandonment of all the glories of Hellenic civilisation which, the Greeks rightly felt, were indissolubly bound up with their being not one bulky nation, but an endless array of small and highly differentiated city-states. It is quite conceivable that modern scholars whose personal experience is restricted to the observation of a Continental State or Government, more especially one of the Prussian or Austrian type, naturally incline to minimise the influence of the State on the intellectual and artistic life of a nation. In the opinion of men of such experience there ought to have been little, if any, difficulty in bringing about the political union of all the Hellenes without impairing their intellect. These "intellectual glories" might, it is thought by such scholars, very well have continued under a universal Greek monarchy or empire too; just as Prussia had her Kant and her

many of the latter remained inscribed on the registers of the rural *demos* to which, in law, they belonged; such as Pasion, the great banker, who lived in the commercial centre of Attica, in the Piraeus, although he was inscribed in the *demos* of Acharnae. At any rate we find that in the numerous still extant inscriptions telling us of the occupations of the people in the δῆμοι, we hear mostly of *metoeci* or denizens; compare Scherling, *Quibus rebus singulorum Atticae pagorum incolae operam dederint* (in *Leipziger Studien*, xviii.), who collects the whole material. From this it is not quite unsafe to conclude that the free Athenians preferred the town, and so the Attican freemen rapidly fell under the influence of Hansen's "law."

A. v. Humboldt, whether the Prussian King was Frederick the Great or a Frederick William IV. The Prussian State is indeed a mere lid falling heavily upon the wooden box of Prussian civic life. Such a lid may cover any box, and its influence upon the various contents of the box is indifferent. A Hellenic State, on the other hand, was not a mere lid. It was both the skin and the blood of Hellenic political organisms. It mattered everything, both to the political and intellectual life of the Greeks, in what sort of State they were housed. *Vice versa*, their intellectual, artistic, or scientific achievements, they felt, would have to be given up completely, did they give up their State. For reasons, then, that gathered their greatest strength both from a long past and from an intensely reacting present, the Greeks could not possibly admit that in a political union of theirs into one big Nationality there was anything either feasible or desirable.

This conclusion is strikingly illustrated and proved by the absence in ancient Greece of what we moderns have long been used to call and to respect as the Law of Nations, or International Public Law (*droit des gens*, *Völkerrecht*). The great Delphic Amphictyony had indeed some influence on what is now called the Law of War and Peace; but as far as we can see, that influence was unimportant.[1] In keep-

[1] Of a "law of nations" established or administered by the Pylaean-Delphic Amphictyony we have only very poor evidence. In fact, of such rules there is only one single trace, the passage in Aeschines (ii. 115) to the effect that no town belonging to members of the Amphictyony shall be razed to the ground, or deprived of her water-supply, whether in war or in times of peace. Whatever else that famous Amphictyony could or did do in matters of religion, of roads and bridges, of *ἀσφάλεια* and *ἀσυλία*; in matters relating to the law of nations they had, as far as we can see, very primitive rights. Up to a few years ago, Bürgel's *Die pylaeisch-delphische*

ing with this absence of Public International Law, the Greeks had no standing ambassadors at each others' capitals. That they had no such diplomatic representatives at the courts of non-Greek, or such Princes as they looked down upon as "barbarians," might not be quite incomprehensible.[1] But that they never kept embassies in the Greek capitals of great and important States seems and is very strange. The fact of the matter is, that the Greeks could not keep such embassies without incurring dangers even greater than those menacing them in the absence of such representatives. Surely no Greek statesman could fail to see the disadvantage of insufficient information about the political life of States other than his own, caused by the lack of steady and authentic reports; and yet, no Greek statesman, as far as we know, ever proposed the sending out of permanent diplomatic representatives. Had Athens and Sparta tried to establish permanent embassies of theirs, say, at Thebes, the inevitable result would have been an immoderately increased chance of friction and conflict between Sparta and Athens, Athens and Thebes, and Thebes and Sparta. Every movement of the Spartan ambassador would have been watched with the greatest jealousy by the ambassador of Athens, and *vice versa*; the

Amphiktyonie [Munich, 1877] was the fullest statement of the facts; however, the ever-new finds of inscriptions at Delphi at the hands of French excavators will soon render necessary a new work on the subject.

[1] Yet we read of various "barbarous" rulers, or rather rulers of "barbarians," on whom the Athenians conferred the Athenian citizenship, this being their only means of attaching diplomatically the interests of a foreign ruler. Such rulers were: Cersobleptes and Teres, kings in Thrace (Demosthenes, *in Aristocr.* 688); Leucon, on the Cimmerian Bosporus (Demosthenes, *in Lept.* 466); Clearchus, ruler of Heraclea on the Pontus (Demosthenes, *ibid.* 482); and others.

same applies to the Thebans; and such constant tension could not but end in conflicts.[1] In modern times ambassadors and consuls have, in the first place, a solid *raison d'être* in the fact, that probably several thousands of their countrymen are living or sojourning in the State to which they are accredited. This consideration falls, with regard to Greek States, entirely to the ground; a Spartan or Athenian proper neither could nor did live or, for any lengthy time, sojourn at Thebes. Ambassadors would thus have been purely academic representatives. Considering, now, the extreme proximity of Greek States to one another, and the constant rise of new factions and political parties in each of them, a permanent ambassador would have been watched and intrigued against with unrelenting jealousy, not only by his diplomatic colleagues, but also, and even more intensely, by the members of the faction or party he belonged to. For nothing was more common in Greece than the concurrence of a neighbouring State in the party-risings of a given town. Under these conditions, permanent diplomatic representatives, with all their concomitant "*entente cordiale*," "benevolent neutrality," etc., were technically impossible in ancient Greece.

Finally, and as if to complete the adamantine chain that debarred each Hellenic city-state from any organic welding with other Greek States, the Greeks did not have that subtle yet exceedingly

[1] There is a slight modern analogy to this in the relation of diplomatic representatives of, for instance, Bavaria, to those of the German Empire in the same foreign country. Conflicts between the two otherwise closely connected diplomatists have been foreseen, and are regulated by article 19 of the constitution of the German Empire; see Laband, Paul, *Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reiches*, vol. iii.[4] [1901], p. 5.

efficient politio-legal device which the Romans introduced for the more effective assimilation of peoples and States. We mean the *jus gentium*. It is hardly necessary to remark that by this term we do not mean anything remotely resembling either our modern Public International Law, or our Private International Law. *Jus gentium* means neither. *Jus gentium* was Roman law, of Roman origin, of a Roman character, whatever the Roman jurists themselves pretended that it was. It was, not a decoction from or a residue of several foreign laws. It was obtained by the efforts of the Romans to supplement and perfect their own strict *jus civile*.[1]

[1] In the extensive work of the late Professor Moritz Voigt on the *jus gentium* of the Romans (*Das jus civile und jus gentium der Roemer*, being the second volume of his *Das jus naturale, aequum et bonum und jus gentium der Roemer*, 4 vols. [Leipsic, 1856-1875]), nothing is proved more conclusively and fully than the strictly Roman character of the *jus gentium*, which the Roman jurists themselves loved to consider as, in point of origin and character, opposed to the *jus civile* of the Romans; see ii. pp. 662-676, and more particularly the passage on p. 665: "*wir haben sodann . . . zu erklären, dass die Römer nicht erkannten, oder nicht anerkennen wollten, noch auch richtig würdigten, wie das jus gentium in Wahrheit ein römisches Recht ist.*" This statement is certainly true. Where we entirely differ from Voigt is his contention, that the Romans invented the *jus gentium* to meet the ever-new requirements of their constantly increasing commerce. Had increasing commercial relations been the real cause of the rise of a *jus gentium*, the Greeks of the third, second, and first centuries B.C. would have had very much stronger motives and chances for the development of such a *civilistic* and non-empirical law. Their commercial intercourse with one another was on a very much more considerable scale than that of the Romans in the fifth, fourth, or third century B.C.; compare especially, Mitteis, *Reichsrecht und Volksrecht in den östlichen Provinzen des römischen Kaiserreichs* (1891). There was a faint beginning towards a non-local law, with regard to the so-called *δίκαι ἐμπορικαί* and the dangerous *συγγραφή*, both referring to commercial law, the *συγγραφή* being a very close analogy to a modern bill of exchange. The Romans developed their *jus gentium* out of the necessities entailed upon them by their *jus civile*. This peculiar system of law was, as we have tried to show in our *Graeco-Roman Institutions* [Oxford, 1890], full of the most dangerous or criminalistic elements produced by the central institution of civic life in Rome, by *Infamia*. To preserve the *jus civile* while obviating its intolerable severities, made it necessary to develop the *jus gentium*. In a future work on this fundamental question, the author

It consisted, technically, of a system of law in which the ultimate and purely jural points of all legal business appeared divested of all economic, religious, historical, or local influences. It was law (*jus, droit*) pure and simple. It went in nearly every concrete case straight to the principles underlying a jural relation. This alone made it an *ars* proper, that is, both an art and a science. Accordingly, the Romans had no difficulty in applying it to any nation, to any business transaction, to any legal procedure. In giving, as they did, *connubium*, *commercium*, and *recuperatio* to many an allied nation, they insensibly attracted that nation to themselves, without at once conferring upon it the benefit of Roman citizenship proper. They thus created a great number of people who were in an intermediate status of Roman freedom, and who naturally desired to become Romans.[1] The English, whose law (*jus, droit*) is far from artistic or scientific, its principles being clotted, as they are, with numberless precedents, have always been unable to extend their purely empirical law to all their colonies; and the variety of laws in the British Empire is almost as bewildering as that of languages. Not so the Romans. Through their *jus gentium* they secured powerful

will give his view in elaborate detail. An outline may be found also in the second volume of the present work.

[1] Even territorially this process of demi-absorption and envelopment can very well be traced on a map of ancient Roman possessions and allies in Italy. Thus the *ager Gallicus* and *Picenus*, both settled with Roman citizens, were contiguous with allied Umbria and Picenum; so was the civil Sabina with Umbria, Picenum, and the country of the Vestini and Marsi; who again were surrounded by the Aequi and Hernici, who had the *civitas*, etc, etc. This territorial intersection of rights and *status* would have been, as Voigt, *l.c.* ii. p. 215, rightly remarks, quite impossible had not *connubium* or inter-marriage been the rule amongst Roman citizens and allied nations. The Greeks very rarely gave their ἐπιγαμία to other States.

material interests in their favour on the part of their allies or friendly nations; and by this peaceful means they did perhaps as much for the realisation of their imperial policy as by their arms.[1]

However, such a *jus gentium* was impossible at Athens. We saw above that the Roman *jus civile* was the necessary complement, and in this way the motive, if not the cause of the *jus gentium*. At Athens there was nothing corresponding to the Roman *jus civile*. At Rome, the citizen proudly insisted on his right to keep the money and other property he had; at Athens, he proudly insisted on getting from the State the money he did not have. The "pension" paid by the Athenian State to nearly all the citizens was one of the chief causes of the scientifically backward state of Athenian private law. In Rome, the private law was the pivot of Roman citizenship, and the Romans were less averse to granting to foreigners portions of Roman public rights than the slightest particle of Roman *jus civile*. In Athens, private law was held in so indifferent a regard, that all the *metoeci* or denizens in Attica were granted it to the same extent as were the citizens proper. The average Athenian was infinitely more interested in defining and formulating strictly the *theorikon* and other property of the State, than in searching for elegant juristic definitions of private property.[2]

[1] See the entire second chapter in vol. ii. of Voigt's *Das jus naturale*, etc., pp. 103-252, entitled *Verleihung von conubium, commercium, und actio des jus civile Romanorum an Peregrinen*, more particularly §§ 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 (pp. 198-248).

[2] An Athenian was, with regard to the juristic elaboration of the right of property, almost in the same position as a secular or regular cleric of the Catholic Church with regard to his personal claim upon the property of his living or monastery. The monk can never sue any one otherwise than *nomine monasterii*, Pope Innocent III. in the Canon Law, c. 2, X. i. 3,

In Sparta, similar reasons crippled the rise of a *jus civile* proper. The juristic idea of ownership, for instance, could evidently not develop to its strict expression in a State such as Sparta, where landed property was practically entailed, where slaves were not the legal property of the individual but of the State, and where money, at least in theory, did not exist. That the harsh treatment of weak infants, and of married but childless women in Sparta, dealt the death-blow to any attempt at the formation of a strict conception of jural personality, need not be elaborately proved. In the rest of the Greek States, more especially in Thebes, there plainly were similar, or, at any rate, such institutions at work as did not allow of the rise of a Theban or Argive *ius civile* proper. Accordingly, none of the Greek States in the fifth or fourth, let alone in the third century B.C. could possibly produce a system of *jus gentium*, by means of which an easier assimilation of various Hellenic or non-Hellenic with Hellenic States might have been achieved.

No. 7, and the commentaries of the canonists such as Durantis, Guilelmus Speculator (*Speculum judiciale*, written 1272-1287) i. 2, de actore § 1, Nos. 81 and 82; and Compostellanus junior (*Lectura* on the decretals, written 1245-1260, *ad* cap. 21, xi. 3; *apud* Gierke, *Genossenschaftsrecht*, iii. (1881), p. 296, note 152. Gierke says of the secular cleric: "*So wurden die Kanonisten mit Nothwendigkeit zur Aufstellung eines* Zwischenbegriffs *zwischen reinen Korporatsrechten und reinen Individualrechten gedrängt*," *ibid.* pp. 297 *seq.* At Athens, too, where most citizens considered the moneys of the State partly theirs, and partly not theirs, the juristic concept of property was a hybrid form of corporative and individual rights. But for this initial vitiation of an efficient juristic construction, the Athenians, or at any rate the numerous *metoeci* or trading denizens and bankers (τραπεζῖται) might have developed fair beginnings of a *jus gentium*. In addition to Pasion, who got the franchise, we read of numerous other *metoeci* as bankers; such as Pamphilus, Euphraeus, Xenon, Cittus, Euphron, Callistratus, Sosicles, all mentioned in the orations of Demosthenes.

II

We have in the preceding section investigated one after the other the various factors that have so far in History enabled large numbers of cognate people to unite into one big Nationality. These factors were: material or commercial interests; gentilician associations; common dangers; systems of law; diplomatic resources; territorial aggrandisement; and rising populousness. We have found that not only were none of these positive factors present in ancient Greece, or outside Greece where Hellenes settled; but a series of circumstances, all historically inevitable, worked straight against those factors, annihilating their efficiency. It is, we take it, superfluous to show in detail that Religion could not unite the Greeks, in that their form of Religion was by nature excessively decentralised, so that each local cult of an Attican *demos*, for instance, was jealously guarded from interference or participation on the part of the neighbouring *demoi*. The same held good for single family cults. Religion, therefore, being most intimately bound up with the high-strung individualism of a Greek State, was not at all likely to serve as a bond of union among Hellenes.

The net result, then, of the above inductive examination of causes making for union is this, that a common political Nationality of the Greeks could not be established. And inasmuch as the downfall of the Hellenes was, as we said at the outset, due to the absence of such a strong and united political nationality among them, their early downfall was as inevitable as had been their rapid rise to the

apogee of greatness. Polities so high-strung and yet grafted only on a handful of individuals, cannot last very long. In all our reflections on Greek history we have repeatedly directed the reader's attention to the psychological identity between a Greek city-state and any one of the severe and great Orders of the Catholic Church. It cannot therefore be a matter of surprise, that this inherent inability of the average Greek State to keep up the intense tension of its inner life for more than six or ten generations may also be observed in the history of these orders. They invariably decline in point of spiritual intensity and efficiency, and no individual, abbot or pope, can revive their pristine grandeur. New orders may be founded, and for a small number of generations they may, in their way, display the virtues so characteristic of the beginnings of the older orders. But the old orders have lost their inner elasticity and power for good. We saw that, after the Athenians, Spartans, and Thebans had practically spent themselves, the Phocians, the Epirotes, the Achaeans, the Aetolians, and other Greek tribes rose to temporary importance. The old States, however, had lost their grip on Fate. No individual Greek statesman or foreign conqueror could remedy an evil, if evil it be, so deep-seated, so fundamental.

If, now, we return to our original question; if we ask whether Demosthenes counselled the Athenians wisely, in encouraging them, with scarcely a serious interruption, for over thirteen years, to combat, with all their might, Philip II. of Macedon, who clearly wanted to win the supremacy over all the Hellenes; can our answer be one of hesitation? For the Athenians, of all Greeks, there was, as we have

seen, only one path open: that of ever greater insistence on their specific individuality. They could not, at the risk of all that made life worth living for them, abandon either their political, social, or intellectual mode of existence. Philip threatened, it is true, mainly, if not exclusively, their political autonomy and power. But was not their constitution as a polity proper the soul and essence of their social and intellectual existence too? Could they ever hope to be Athenians, that is, individuals who had coined out nearly the whole mint of the human capital in medals of singular beauty, if their *Ecclesia* or Assembly and their law courts were mere boards run by Macedonian trustees? Philip was no doubt a man of very great genius, and moreover, in all probability, a statesman of singular sagacity and moderation. One may even go so far as to call him an altogether admirable personality. Can this personal greatness of his atone for the barrenness of his policy as a means of preserving the glory of the Hellenes? He was a Greek himself; we do not doubt it. Arguments to the contrary are without any force, because they are based only on philological and "racial" considerations. Philip was a Greek. Demosthenes calling him a "barbarian" cannot be taken seriously. In political controversies one does not choose the most moderate terms. But the more readily one acknowledges Philip as a Greek, the more reasons one has to condemn his policy as barren. Had Philip been at the head of a highly organised nation, of a polity instinct with trained and disciplined forces making for a well-governed empire proper; had he or his predecessors introduced a *jus gentium* or some other system of law endowed with the silent

force of assimilating nations, so characteristic of the Roman law; had the women of his kingdom advanced, in point of social and legal status, upon the women of the other Greeks; had he, or his predecessors, carried on the distinctly Greek vocation of de-gentilisation to a degree and to an extent higher and wider than had been done by the other Greeks; had Philip, by definitively conquering the Illyrians and other Balkan and Danubian peoples, won for the Greeks that *hinterland*, the lack of which kept the Greeks close to the coasts of the disintegrating Mediterranean; had he opened up for Greek expansion, not, as he intended to, the rotten oriental Empire, but the fresh and untouched territories between the Carpathians and the Aegean Sea; had he thereby given to the mass of Greeks whom domestic party-strifes had rendered homeless and roving, new homesteads, new colonising possibilities, and thus prevented them from becoming wretched mercenaries and *condottieri*; had Philip done all this, or much of it, then, and then alone, one might accuse Demosthenes of fatal short-sightedness, of inability to see where lay the real interests of the Greeks. To follow the lead or accept the *hegemony* of such a Philip, such an hypothetic king of a superior Macedon, might perhaps have been a plan not destitute of wisdom. But did Philip do anything of the kind? Was his own country Hellenised, that is, de-gentilised? The very reverse. The Macedonians were still deep in *gentilician* bonds, and Philip, by rudely transplanting the population of entire villages,[1] treated them as what they were, the nearest approach to the modern Slav peasant that we find in antiquity. We saw that it had long

[1] Arrian, *Anabasis*, vii. 9. 3.

become a matter of absolute impossibility to screw back Athens to the archaic stage of *gentilician* associations. Shall we, then, assume that the Macedonians, with their archaic and un-Hellenic social organisation, could effectively lead the thoroughly Hellenic Athenians? It is needless to show in detail that the Macedonians had no other engine or institution of political organisation in any way comparable with those of the Greeks or Romans. They had not the trace of a *jus gentium*; not the slightest special aptness for administering provinces. Or did the towns of Amphipolis or Stagirus, both wonderfully situated for commerce and industry, ever develop to any height or importance either under Philip or under his Macedonian successors? Did Philip conquer the much-desired *hinterland* in the Balkans? His and his son's, Alexander the Great's, efforts in that respect were alike fruitless. What, then, could Philip offer the Greeks? His court was hell on earth, both from the dissoluteness of his courtiers and from the infernal conjugal relations of Philip himself. Everything depended on Philip's own person. The Romans, in conquering a nation, offered them the guarantee of steadiness, in that the force of the Romans was national and institutional. Was there anything like it in Macedon? Was not rather all guarantee in Philip's own person, and in him alone?

True, Philip was a great general, and his armies were probably better organised tactically than were the Greek armies. But was it really impossible to defeat him? Had not Demosthenes' activity foiled Philip's attempts on two towns in the Hellespontic Chersonesus, Byzantium and Perinthus, which, as centres of the Pontic wheat-supply, were of primary

importance for the Athenians? Had not the Athenians in 352 B.C. foiled Philip's attempt on the Pass of Thermopylae? Had not the Phocian Onomarchus repeatedly defeated Philip? Had not, as already remarked, the Paeonians and Triballians defeated him signally? In other words, the power of Philip was neither institutional nor national; it was neither in advance of Greek local, nor similar to Roman imperial policy; it was purely or chiefly one of temporary military ascendency. Philip won the battle of Chaeronea in 338 B.C., which practically gave him the *hegemony* in Greece. But might he not have lost it? Might he not have been assassinated two years before the battle, as he was two years subsequent to it? Was such an eventuality so unlikely as to render Demosthenes, who discounted both Philip's victories and his life, subject to serious blame? When we study Philip's reign with an unbiassed mind, we cannot but admit that Philip's real and constant superiority was not military but diplomatic. In battle he might very well have been defeated by the Greeks; but in diplomacy they were quite unable to cope with him. We saw above that owing to the peculiar nature of Greek city-states, the Hellenes had practically no diplomatic resources whatever. They were badly, if at all, informed of events and schemes in other States. It is there where Philip placed the point of his lever. He had spies, informers, partisans in all the great Greek States. He was constantly, amply, and correctly informed about what was really going on at Athens, Thebes, Corinth, Messene, Sparta, or Argos, let alone at Delphi or in Thessaly. This knowledge gave him a true and superior leverage. He was able to choose the right persons, the right moment for action, the right use

of language in his letters to the Greeks, or in his treaties with them.[1] Numerous Greek States, in which the gentilician party-strifes were carried on with unabated fury, readily availed themselves of the proffered help of Philip, or of "Philippising" partisans, and in this manner Philip weakened the Greeks long before he defeated them on the battlefield. Demosthenes, in resolutely combating Philip, did the Greeks generally a twofold and inestimable service: first, he urged them to hold out on the only path on which they could retain their liberty and their unique civilisation; and secondly, he tried to tone down their unfortunate domestic contentions by thwarting Philip's intrigues to sow dissension amongst the Greek States. It is here not meant to slur over Demosthenes' repeated declarations, that both Thebes and Sparta ought to be maintained, in the interest of Athens, in a state of inferiority;[2] nor did he readily indulge in Panhellenic fantasias, in the style of the orator Isocrates. In refraining from such purely utopistic discourses, Demosthenes only proved that he clearly grasped the real possibilities of Greek politics. "Let each Greek State," he would have answered to his modern detractors, "do its best and

[1] From the writings of Demosthenes, Theopompus (*apud* Diodorum Siculum, Plutarchum, et Trogum Pompeium), Plutarch, Aeschines, and a few stray notices of Xenophon and Pausanias, we learn of the following "Philippising" partisans outside Athens. Timolaus, at Thebes; Perilaus, at Megara; Philiades, at Messene; Cercidas and Hieronymus, in Arcadia; in Elis, Philip had a hand in all the frightful civil discords of the time (Pausanias, v. 4. 5); Plutarch, tyrant of Eretria, in Euboea, together with the following dynasts in party-rent Euboea: Clitarchus, Automedon, Philistides, Socrates, Charigenes, Hipparchus, Sosistratus, etc.; the *gens* of the Aleudae, in Thessaly, of whom Demosthenes mentions Cineas, Daochus, Eudicus, Simus, and Thrasydaeus; Python, the orator, of Byzantium; Myrtis, Teledamas, and Mnaseas, at Argos; etc. etc.

[2] Demosthenes, in the speech for the Megalopitans, § 4: *συμφέρει* (to Athens) *καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους ἀσθενεῖς εἶναι καὶ Θηβαίους*; even so *in Aristocratem*, § 102.

in the spirit of healthy egoism, to secure a high place among the rest of the Greek States." Nothing was more in uniformity with the best interests of all the Hellenes. Such among the moderns as do not want to or cannot rise to the conception that the Hellenes in ancient Greece were not like the modern Germans, meant to form one Nation; but that those Greek States have their true counterparts in the totality of the States of modern Europe; and that therefore one national polity neither could nor ought to have been made in ancient Greece, any more than it can or ought to be made by the various States in modern Europe; such scholars, we say, will of course never see the true perspective of a statesman like Demosthenes. The modern Germans consisted and consist of millions of private men, who can and could very well be kneaded into a State such as the Prussian empire-builders have made over their heads. At Athens, Sparta, or Thebes there were no private men; there were only persons who combined in their types the professional interest in military matters entertained by a modern soldier, with the keen attachment to power of the modern bureaucrat, and the zeal for Religion of a modern priest. Over the heads of individuals of such a high-strung type no foreign or half-foreign Power can place some governing machinery called a modern Continental State. Demosthenes' policy was therefore the only possible policy that the Athenians could adopt. His whole life-work may be summed up in the statement, that he advised the Hellenes generally, and the Athenians in particular, to *Lycurgise*, or to *Solonise*, but under no conditions to *Philippise*. The most fatal drawback in the constitution of Greek States was, as we

saw, the dwindling of their population. This could be remedied only in one way: by imperial expansion. For, even had the Athenians emancipated all their slaves, and given the full franchise to their denizens, they would not have sensibly altered the irresistible tendency to under-population. The new citizens, on becoming Hellenes proper, would have insisted on the exclusion of newcomers with even greater fanaticism. Remained only imperial expansion. This, however, proved a failure in the so-called Social War (B.C. 356-354; see the map of the military movements of that war in the author's *Atlas Antiquus*). Imperial expansion failing, under-population was inevitable. It is, or ought to be, now, after over three thousand years of history, no longer a secret, that a great State must after a certain time seriously think of imperial expansion, or its people will be forced to practise—Malthusianism. Surely the example of the French in the nineteenth century might have opened the eyes of the most bravely resolute of *pacifistes*. The French, having brought Napoleon I. to fall by not sufficiently countenancing his imperial enterprises, have ever since Waterloo been forced to practise an abominable Malthusianism. In 1815 they were more populous than the Germans; at present (1906) they are over twenty million people less populous than Germany, both countries having nearly the same areas. If Napoleon killed 2,000,000 Frenchmen, as statisticians say; who killed the other 18,000,000? One wonders. The fact is, that Alcibiades and similar Greek statesmen had seen deep into the vital organs and requirements of Hellenic States. So did Demosthenes. In Alcibiades' time, great imperial enterprises were still possible; in the time of Demosthenes,

they proved impossible. The wars and the terrible pests had severely reduced the numbers of the Athenians. This, no doubt, accounts for much of their unquestionable unwillingness to bear the privations of war. They had become war-sick. They preferred their pleasurable life, and Demosthenes had very great trouble in arousing them to the seriousness of the moment. But he did arouse them; and even eight years after Chaeronea, the Athenians, by deciding Aeschines' arraignment of Demosthenes against the accuser; by accepting the contentions of Demosthenes' oratorical masterpiece, the *Speech on the Crown*, proved worthy of their ancestors and of Demosthenes.

What, indeed, would the Athenians have gained had they followed in the wake of the Philippising *clique* of Aeschines, Eubulus, Phocion, Philocrates, Demades, Hegemon, and many others? Civil wars the Athenians had none; Philip could therefore not liberate them from a plague that did not affect them. Their imperial possessions Philip was the last man to restore to them. Other advantages, as we have seen, Philip had no means at all of offering them. The "Medic danger" was a farce. The Persian Empire in no way seriously threatened Athens. What Aeschines could and did offer the Athenians consisted in words and bribes. More he, the representative of Philip, could not offer. There was indeed one man who might have done more even than Demosthenes. That man was Phocion. The Athenians, as has been repeatedly pointed out, were so deeply jealous of all individual persons who united both military and oratorical genius, that in the whole history of Athens Pericles alone succeeded in retaining their confidence for a long number of years. When it is said that

Demosthenes was no good soldier, not even a brave one; this may or may not be true. It was certainly not in his interest to gain the reputation of a great general too.[1] His powers as an orator, brought to the pitch of perfection, both in delivery and stylistic construction, by unremitting efforts and study, had placed him at the head of those influences which at Athens always rewarded the great talent of artistically addressing a multitude. Had he been a great soldier too, his career, in all probability, would have ended long before Chaeronea. Phocion, on the other hand, was an efficient soldier, but blunt in conduct and limited in mind. Even great military successes of his would hardly have filled the Athenians with misgivings about their liberty. Had Phocion, instead of befriending Aeschines, followed and supported Demosthenes, the Athenians might very well have availed themselves of the rare opportunity of sound advice soundly carried out. This, however, Phocion was very far from doing. He preferred to play the country squire, who with pregnant coarseness poured cold water over the gorgeous oratory of the townsman Demosthenes. This won him much applause from the "goody" ones, who even at Athens were not quite absent. But if one is to point to any one single man who misplayed his *rôle*, and thereby precipitated the downfall of Athens, that man is Phocion, and not Demosthenes.

What, then, remains of all the reproaches heaped upon the incomparable orator-statesman? One alone. He talked the right thing; his advice was the

[1] One has only to consider the levity with which the Athenians dropped the valiant generals Iphicrates and Timotheus, son of the great Conon (Diodor. xvi. 21; Aelian, *V. H.* xiv. 3), to acknowledge the wisdom of Demosthenes, in relation to military excellence.

soundest. But he gave it in an artistic form. He spoke and wrote better than any other author whose works are under the whip of the modern schoolmaster. That he should have written well, and grammatically, that is indeed quite welcome. But that he should have pretended to be at the same time a man of action, a statesman; that cannot be forgiven. Cicero, as is well known, has shared the same fate at the hands of the redoubtable Drumann, and other philologians. So have all men of admitted literary greatness who tried to win laurels as men of action. The modern philologian beholds a Demosthenes, the statesman, in the light of a brilliant university professor who poses as the saving statesman of a large country. Such a professor may or may not be a matter of ridicule. It is certain that the Athenians took Demosthenes *au grand sérieux*. It is equally certain that unless we take him so, we shall never understand Athenian history. Orators, even great orators, have repeatedly done much harm to their nation. Yet, even in our own times, we have learnt to admit that, for instance, Hungary's greatest orator's, Louis Kossuth's, ideas are now, over fifty years after the close of his political activity, the strongest living force in Hungary; and that for the Hungarians there is salvation only in one method: in that of following, with slight modifications, the counsel given them by their Demosthenes.

Greek city-states, raised on a basis of moral and mental forces rather than on that of territory, nationality, or "common blood," had not, like modern States, a comprehensive foundation in practically unalterable broad facts of nature. They were essentially spiritual, like all works of art. Their termination was

inevitably a form of polity that we have long been induced to differentiate by the name of a Church. This, in fact, was the ultimate end of the *cephalic* city-state of antiquity. In our third volume, when we shall treat of the origins of Christianity, we shall see in detail that the Church was the natural termination of all the history of classical Antiquity. It follows from that, that the great Greek statesmen, such as Demosthenes, who irreconcilably opposed any attempt at changing the true trend of Athens, Sparta, Thebes, or any other Hellenic city-state; who desperately fought either the Persians, the Macedonians, or the Romans; who, in other words, felt, with the profound instinct of members of old historic nations, that Athens could neither be Philippised nor Romanised; these Greek statesmen, we say, had their finger on the very pulse of history. Had modern scholars, studying the rise of Christianity, constantly held before their eyes the fact that Christianity is only the last act of the vast drama played by the border nations of the Mediterranean, none of them would have attempted to comprehend the first century of our era and the growth of the Christian Church without first possessing himself, as of the major part of his task, of the principles, general facts, and meaning of classical Antiquity. To begin the study of Christianity with the New Testament and the Fathers, is to close the door to any real insight into the causes of the coming of Christianity. This is mentioned in order to bring out as clearly and as forcibly as possible the ultimate and essential nature of the Greek city-states. It is mentioned to place the policy of Demosthenes, who fully grasped the spiritual character of the "Hellas of Hellas," or of Athens, in

the strongest light. What Demosthenes thought in actions, Plato thought out systematically in ideas. His *Republic*, at once the best known and the least understood of his works, outlines in unmistakable clearness the Greek State of the future, that is, as has long been noticed by Baur and others, the Church as it developed in the Middle Ages. Aristotle penetrated deeply into the Greek city-state as it then was; Plato even so deeply into what the Greek state was driving at. One saw much, nearly everything, of the present; the other was a seer of the future. The policy of Demosthenes was, if we analyse it to its last foundation, prompted by the same considerations that led the divine pen of Plato in the writing of his *Republic*. Both felt that the pre-eminently spiritual character of holy Athens must not be vulgarised by contact with forces and men who were in no wise able to continue the work of Solon, Clisthenes, Themistocles, Pericles, and Demosthenes. The city of Minerva, after losing more and more her hold on the material resources of a State, could only transform herself in the direction of a still more intense spiritualisation. This Plato taught in the cool shades of the Academy, while Demosthenes thundered it out in the Assembly. Plato stands to Demosthenes as does the Parthenon to Pericles. The same eternal idea is embodied by one in a work of living art, by the other, in actions of artistic finish. Such was Demosthenes, the Athenian.

ALEXANDER THE GREAT AND THE HELLENISATION OF WESTERN ASIA

Philip's son, Alexander, was brought up by Aristotle, and after subduing the rebellious tribes to the north of Macedon, as well as rebellious Thebes, 30,000 of whose citizens were sold into slavery (335 B.C.), he started on the conquest of the Persian Empire, which he completed in the course of three years, 334-331, from his twenty-second to his twenty-fifth year, chiefly through his victories on the Granicus river (334), at Issus (333), the capture of Tyrus after a siege of seven months (332), the conquest of Lower Egypt (332), and the decisive victory of Gaugamela (331 B.C.). At the outset his army consisted of only 30,000 infantry (12,000 of whom were Macedonians, 7000 Greeks proper, the rest mercenaries) and 4500 cavalry; reinforcements were, however, sent in the course of the war. The army of the Persian king, Darius Codomannus, does not appear to have been very large in the first two years of the war. Alexander extended his conquest deep into Central Asia, Afghanistan, and parts of the "North-western Provinces" of India. Our knowledge of these memorable campaigns is very scanty, and while we must admire the military genius of Alexander, we yet cannot either relate his exploits with accuracy or consider his task as one of inordinate difficulty. The Persian Empire had, like all the preceding empires, an inadequate organisation. It was practically what each ruler was able to make it. Institutional forces were poor; foreigners and

mercenaries, such as Iphicrates, Timotheus, the brothers Mentor and Memnon, together with intriguing eunuchs (*e.g.* Bagoas), and women, made the Persian Empire as loosely connected and rebellion-stricken a conglomeration of incoherent *satrapies*, as was, in its worst times, the Byzantine Empire in the Middle Ages. No wonder that a great general at the head of a well-disciplined army overthrew that empire with even greater facility than had been the case with the overthrow of the Babylonian or Assyrian Empire. Alexander's real greatness shines rather in the spirit in which he utilised his remarkable conquests. The pupil of the broadest mind amongst the Greeks cherished the broadest possible conception of the part to be played by the Hellenic mind. It was said at the outset of the present work that history is largely a continuous process of Hellenisation. This process, still far from its consummation, Alexander wanted to bring to its maturity during his lifetime. Over forty towns of "Alexandria" are known to have been founded by him in the various parts of his immense empire. The most famous of these towns is Alexandria in Egypt. His project was to blend the Greeks with the peoples of Asia. In this he failed; but a very considerable number of Greeks settled in his new provinces and there spread much of the spirit of Greek art, Greek science, and Greek culture, and so prepared the Hellenistic period, without which some of the most momentous phenomena, such as Christianity, could scarcely have been spread amongst Mediterranean nations. Alexander's conquests are therefore of exceeding importance for the abiding interests of humanity. In fact, he reversed the

secular process by means of which the best part of ancient history had been wrought. We have seen that Hebrew, Phoenician, and Hellenic civilisation were the outcome of the secular fight, military and intellectual, of border nations against inland empires. Alexander, by turning the defensive into the offensive, imbued the ancient empires with some aspects of the higher life won by the border States. To impart to Asia the whole life of true Greek culture was impossible. Such a life needs, as we have seen, peculiar conditions, quite wanting in Asia. Alexander's work will be completed in the distant future; but the longer the advent of that time will be in coming, the more lustre will fall on the son of Philip and demoniac Olympias. His failings are easy of criticism, although even their existence is not so easy of proof. No person, however, can have done what Alexander did without being inspired by the greatest ideals that go to make real history.

THE DIADOCHI[1]

For a short time after Alexander's death (323 B.C.) there was a central imperial power represented by the *chiliarch* Perdiccas; soon, however, the governors and generals rendered themselves independent, and the chief realms of these so-called *diadochi* were—Macedon and Hellas, under Antipater (died 319 B.C.) and his son Cassander (died 297 B.C.); Thrace, under Lysimachus, a fierce warrior and astute statesman; Greater Phrygia, under Antigonus, a most gifted and

[1] For all the wars of this period, see the author's *Atlas Antiquus*, where, in a series of maps, the military events of that time are graphically represented.

ambitious ruler, father of a still more ingenious and powerful son, Demetrius Poliorcetes; Egypt, under Ptolemy I., son of Lagus (323 to 284 B.C.), a prudent yet energetic king, and the great Maecenas of Hellenic literature; Syria, Babylonia, temporarily extending to India, under the Seleucids, first of whom was Seleucus I. Nicanor (312 to 282 B.C.).

Down to the end of the third century B.C. (a period very unsatisfactorily known), the main events appear to have moved on the following lines:—(*a*) Attempts on the part of the *diadochi*, chiefly Antigonus and his son Demetrius Poliorcetes, to gain supremacy over the other *diadochi*. These attempts led to great wars and a constant shifting of leagues between the rivals. Ptolemy I. was defeated off Salamis in Cyprus by Demetrius (306 B.C.), but Antigonus was killed and Demetrius defeated by their antagonists at Ipsus in Phrygia, 301 B.C. Seleucus I. Nicanor, and his son Antiochus I. Soter (281-262 B.C.), succeeded in establishing an immense empire, and their capital, Antiochia, became the splendid heir of ancient Babylon and Nineveh. The Ptolemies (Ptolemy II. Philadelphus, 284-246 B.C.) consolidated their Egyptian realm by conquests on the Cyrenaean or western (321 B.C.), and eastern borders (301 B.C.); in 294 even Cyprus came under their rule; and by their protection of literature and science (foundation of the immense library at Alexandria under Ptolemy I.; of the great school of Alexandrian literary critics, most famous of whom is Aristarchus; cultivation of mathematical sciences, chiefly by Euclid and Eratosthenes). Demetrius Poliorcetes became King of Macedon in 294; he was there hard pressed by Pyrrhus, King of Epirus, a

rising power on the borders of Hellas and Macedon, and himself ended miserably; yet his son Antigonus Gonatas recovered Macedon. In addition to these greater realms there were numerous minor kingdoms arising in that period, such as the constantly increasing realm of the Parthians under their kings called Arsaces, six in number from 256-136, rulers of Media, Persia, Babylon, victorious against the Seleucids, as later against the Romans; the prosperous kingdom of Pergamum, whose kings (Eumenes I., 263-241 B.C.; Attalus I.) were consummate diplomatists; Bithynia (King Nicomedes I., 281-246 B.C.); Paphlagonia, etc. All the *diadochi* were busy founding new cities, in order to attract the most desirable colonists, that is, Greeks, who were, of course, adverse to any life other than urban. (*b*) The increasing attempts of the Hellenes in Greece to break the ascendency of the Macedonians. This was tried both by reorganisation of the institutions at home and by wars abroad. Of these wars the best known are the "Lamian" against Antipater (322 B.C.), and the "Chremonidean" (266 ?-263 ?); in both cases the Greeks, despite great efforts, and even considerable victories, were worsted. In these wars against Macedon the other *diadochi* took a great part, the most brilliant of their exploits being the liberation of Athens by Demetrius Poliorcetes, 308 B.C.

Of the changes in the constitutions the most remarkable is the reform of King Agis III. of Sparta (assassinated by the oligarchs in 241 B.C.), and his successor Cleomenes III., husband of Agis' noble widow, and son of his great antagonist King Leonidas. Sparta was by the middle of the third century B.C.

in a state of rottenness; reduced to a few hundred families; she was poor and corrupt. Agis and Cleomenes, with unfailing tact, felt that Sparta, unlike merely territorial States, could find salvation only in the restoration of the old Lycurgean constitution, and not by the introduction of new and "progressive" institutions. And, indeed, the same stress of circumstances that had centuries previously compelled Sparta to bow to the will and the system of Lycurgus (see the chapter on Lycurgus) now, under Cleomenes III., imperiously called for the same remedy. Sparta had since Lycurgus neither become a Laconian national state nor a mere satrapy. It was still a city-state, sorely pressed by other city-states, themselves intensely developed. The evil being the same, the remedy could not be altered either. The "reforms" of Agis and Cleomenes therefore were dictated by truly practical wisdom. They infused new life into Sparta. Cleomenes defeated the Achaeans in the battles of Leuctra (226 B.C.) and Dyme (221 B.C.), and made himself practically *hegemon* of the Peloponnesus. He ended, it is true, in misery and exile in Egypt; but only through the desperate wickedness of the head of the Achaean league, Aratus, who hounded against him Antigonus Doson, the King of Macedon, victor at Sellasia, 221 B.C., over Cleomenes.

END OF VOLUME I

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